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consistently dodged the First Amendment question regarding 
whether use of the flag is symbolic speech. There is 
also an overbreadth problem since it is possible that 
arne uses of the flag would be constitutionally protected 
but wearing one on the seat of the pants would not. In 
this case, the DC and CA decided both that the State law 
was impermissibly vague and that it was overbroad. I -think Coffin is right about vagueness, or at least close 
enough to being right as to make that an a dequate 
ground upon which to refuse to decide the First Amendment 
issues. Therefore, I would dismiss. (Coffin has writtten 
a 30-page opinion that you might want to read if you 
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No. 72-1254 
SMITH (Sheriff of 
Worcester County, Mass.) 
v. 
1/ II / I 
Appeal from First Circuit- {.IV ..5 T 4_,
1 
f-
(Coffin, McEntee; Hamley 5 j C 
concurring in part) 
GOGUEN Timely 
1. Appellee was convicted of "publicly treat[ing l contemptuously" 
the flag of the U.S. The Mass. Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Petr 
1/ 
This case does not involve a Three-Judge Court. Appellant seeks 
an appeal on the basis of 28 U.S. C. § 1254(2) from a decision of CA 1 
holding a state statute to be invalid under the Constitution. 
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sought federal H/C relief in DC, D. Mass. The DC found the statute 
unconstitutional on the ground that it was vague and overbroad. CA 1 
affirmed. 
2. FACTS: On January 30, 1971, appellee was observed by a police 
officer in Leominster, Mass. He had an American flag, approximately 
(Jt 
3 by 5 inches~ 4 by 6 inches, sewn to the seat of his pants. A while later, 
another police officer observed appellee walking through the business 
district of the town with the flag sewn to the seat of his pants. Appellee 
was arrested for violating Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 264, § 5 (set out below). 
He was charged with "publicly treat[ingl contemptuously the flag of the 
United States. 11 Appellee was tried in Mass. District Court, found guilty, 
and sentenced to 1 year in jail. He exercised his right to trial de novo. A 
jury found appellee guilty and imposed a 6-month sentence. 
The statute in question reads in full: 
Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 264, § 5: 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces 
or treats contemptuously the flag of the United 
States or of Massachusetts, whether such flag is public 
or private property, or whoever displays such flag 
or any rep res entation thereof upon which are words, 
figures, advertisements or designs, or whoever causes 
or permits such flag to be used in a parade as a re-
ceptacle for depositing or collecting money or any 
other article or thing, or whoever exposes to public 
view, manufactures, sells, exposes for sale, gives away 
or has in possession for sale or to give away or for 
use for any purpose, any article or substance, being 
an article of merchandise or a receptacle of merchan-
dise or articles upon which is attached, through a 
wrapping or otherwise, engraved or printed in any 
manner, a representation of the United Stc::_te.s flag, 
or whoever uses any representation of the arms or 
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the great seal of the commonwealth for any adver-
tising or commercial purpose, shall be punished by 
) 
a ~ss than ten nor m ore-tlian one hundred 
~rs ~risonment for not more than one 
oth. Words, figures, advertisement~ or de-
signs attached to, or directly or indirectly connected 
with, such flag or any representation thereof in such 
manner that such flag or its representation is used 
to attract attention to or advertise such words, figures, 
advertisements or designs, shall for the purposes of 
this section be deemed to be upon such flag. Notwith-
standing the foregoing, there may be attached to the 
staff bearing a flag of the United States or of Mas-
sachus etts belonging to an organization of veterans 
of the Civil War, to a camp of the United Spanish 
War Veterans, to a post or department of the Amer-
ican Legion, or to a post or department of the Vet-
erans of Foreign Wars of the United States, or to 
a post or department of the Jewish War Veterans 
of the United States, or to a camp or department of 
the Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War, or to 
a barracks or department of the Veterans of World 
War I of the U.S. A., or belonging to or used in the 
service of the United States or the commonwealth, a 
streamer having inscribed thereon the names of battles 
and the name and number of the organization to which 
such flag belongs. For the purposes of this section, a 
flag shall be deemed to continue to belong to any or -
ganization of veterans hereinbefore specified, al-
though such organization has ceased to exist, during 
such time as it remains in the lawful ownership or 
custody of any other of the aforesaid organizations 
or of the commonwealth or of any political subdivi-
sion thereof, or of any patriotic or historical society 
incorporated under the laws of the commonwealth 
or determined by the adjutant general to be a proper 
custodian thereof. 11 
After the Mass. SJC affirmed his conviction, appellee sought federal 
H/C relief. The DC found the statute to be unconstitutional. CA 1 affirmed 
on alternative grounds. First, the CA treated the statute as if it did not -raise a First Amendment issue. Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksondll e , 




the court held that appellee was entitled to challenge the statute on 
its face under the void for vagueness doctrine. CA 1 found that the 
statute did not adequately warn potential defendants of what the State 
"commands or forbids" in the use of the words "treats contemptuously." 
The court stated: 
,te.. 
We do not see how the statt} could be so interpreted as 
to cover appellee and exclude others who placed the flag 
in odd positions, or in conjunction with deprecatory 
symbols, gestures, or slogans, or who merely dislplay 
it while acting out or speaking that which many Americans 
might consider obnoxious. Additionally, the statute's 
words make it clear that the Massachusetts legislature 
did not intend to confine maltreaters of the flag to those 
who mutilate, trample upon, or deface the flag but meant 
to cover separately other types of contemptuous treatment.'!:_/ 
Second, the CA found the statute vague since it does not give sufficient 
guidelines to prosecutors. Third, the statute was found to be vague 
in that juries and courts are not given sufficient standards as to what 
"treats contemptuously" means. · In this portion of the opinion, Judge 
Hamley concurred, criticizing the majority for going further, since the 
above holding disposed of the cas e. 
]:_/ 
We therefore conclude that resolution of appellee's 
challenge to the statute as applied to him necessarily 
adjudicates the statute's facial constitutionality, and 
we proceed to address appellee 1 s vagueness argument. 
Appellee claims that the decision of the CA holding the statute facially 
vague was thus also a ruling that, as applied, the statute was vague. 
- 5 - I 
c. The majority then treated the statute in ·its First Amendment 
context. The State claimed that no First Amendment values were ~ U 
concerned since the statute was only intended to protect the "physical --:::;.. 
integrity" of the flag. The court noted that it was unable to find any 
state authority, e. g. state court or AG opinion, which so construed 
the statute's language. The court proceeded to find that display of 
the flag constituted symbolic speech, just as the armband in Tinker. 
~
The interests which the State claimed to exist in protecting the flag 
were (a) the preservation of the flag as a symbol of unity , and (b) 
preservation of the pea·ce. As to the first, theCA held that the statute 
attempted to deter individuals from expressing their beliefs. If two 
individuals treated the flag in the same manner, one could be arrested 
because he felt contempt, while the other would go free if he felt 
patriotic. As to the latter, the court admitted that the State had a 
valid interest in preserving the peace, but noted that the statute 
was not confined to circumstances in which a breach of the peace was 
'}_/ 
an immediate threat. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
(a) Appellant contends that the constitutionality of the 
statute was not argued in appellee's briefs in state court. Consequently , 
appellee has not exhausted state remedies. 
The above description covers only a · portion of the CA 
opinion. 
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Appellee notes that the Mass SJC, in affirming, stated: 
We reject the claim that the statute is on its face or 
as applied to him a restraint upon the right of freedom 
of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
It also stated that, "Whatever the uncertanties in other circumstances , 
we see no vagueness in the statute as applied here." 
(b) Appellant argues that the statute is not vague, and 
that it applied only to the physical integrity of the flag. Unlike other 
flag statutes, this statute does not apply to items which are similar 
in appearance to the flag but only to the flag its elf. Appellants claim 
the statute is also narrow since it requires proof of "culpable intent." 
Furthermore, the words "treats contemptuously" are claimed to "take 
color" from the first phrase in the statute. 
(c) Appellant claims that the statute furthers an ......_ ____ _
important state interest. No s eech is involved as the statute only 
proscribes acts which touch on the physical integrity of the flag. The 
~~------------------------..----------------------------------------
statute helps to preserve the public peace and furthers the State's 
interest "in the preservation of the flag as a symbol of unity on 
national ideals and purpose. 11 The State ends by stating: 
There is nothing on the face of the statutes indicating 
that it will unduly interfere with an individual's right 
to possess and use the flag of the United States. Indeed, 
individuals who wish to exercise their constitutional 
right to assemble, to picket, to protest, etc., may still 
do so and may do so with use of the flag. The statute only 
prohibits acts which touch and physically dishonor the 
flag. [The statute] is not overbroad. 
c 
, .. ,. 
I . 
~ 
- 7 ,. 
Appellee contends that the CA not only found the statute facially 
unconstitutional, but that it also found it unconstitutional as applied. 
(See fn. 2.) Consequently. the court's broad statement about the 
statute was unnecessary in affirming appellee's release. Appellee 
contends that, in a~tempting to preserve political unity, an asserted 
justification for the statute, the State is trying to censure expression 
on the basis of content. One individual may fly the flag as a symbol 
of unity, but another may not fly it as a symbol of disunity or dissent. 
See Street v. N.Y. , 3 94 U.S. 576 (1969). Furthermore, the statute, 
as an att e mpt to preserve the peace, prohibits far more conduct than 
is necessary to this objective. 
4. DISCUSSION: The opinion of CA l goes much farther than 
it needs to. I agree with Judge Hamley that resolution of the question 
of vagueness is dispositive. In regard to the vagueness claim, the 
words "treats contemptously" appear to give little warning to either 
tnT---> 4/ . 
appellee) .Ythe jury.- Even if the prosecutor's statement that the 
statute goes only to physical intrusion is accepted, the State has still 
I do not know how the jury was charged. I infer from the 
CA' s opinion that they were charged that "treats contemptously" 
means "the feeling with which one regards that which is esteemed 
mean, vile or worthies s. " It is not clear what evidence was presented 
as proof, except for the place where the flag was worn. The Mass 
SJC states: "The jury could infer that the violation was intentional 
without reviewing any words of the defendant." I do not know whether 
this refers to the question of whether the appellee was intentionally 
contemptuous. 
- 8 ' 
not defined the meaning of being intentionally contemptuous. Further-
more, it is not at all clear that sewing a flag on a piece of clothing 
interfers with the physical integrity of the flag, any more than 
putting it on a car antenna. 
The questions involving flag statutes were before the Court 
previously in Street v. N.Y. , 3 94 U.S. 576 ( 1969). I would assume 
the issues are well known. If the Court does not wish to reach them, 
but wishes to affirm as to this individual, it could vacate the opinion 
below, asserting that the statute is vague as applied in this case. It 
could also hold that the opinion is affirmed insofar as it held the 
statute unconstitutional as applied (see fn. 2). 
(\__/ There is a motion to Affirm. 
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Mr. Jack B. Owens 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: October 23, 1973 
72-1254 Smith v. Goguen 
I spent a couple of hours last night with the briefs and opinions 
in the above case. I will need your advice. 
Judge Coffin's opinion (which reads more like a law review than 
an opinion addressed to the case at hand) does specifically identify -
and discuss - several areas which are difficult for me in light of my lack 
of experience and learning in the criminal law. The doctrines of 
"vagueness" and "overbreadth" have seemed to me to enable subjective 
decisions by each judge with relatively no objective standards or bench-
marks. I am not sure that Coffin's opinion helps me a great deal in this 
respect. 
But he does focus specifically on an issue which I have found 
particularly difficult: when and under what circumstances, in the applica-
tion of the vagueness doctrine may a court consider whether the statute is 
facially unconstitutional as distinguished from addressing its validity as 
applied in the particular case. One may concede that in many situations it 
might be difficult to tell whether conduct is "contemptuous" with respect to 
the flag. But in this case Goguen's conduct - as found by the Massachusetts 
court -was intended to be contemptuous and could have been nothing else. 
2. 
This contrasts sharply, as you have pointed out, with the case of the person 
hanging the American flag out of the window with a peace symbol on it. 
Judge Coffin accepts Raines as stating the general rule that a person 
may not plead facial unconstitutionality of a statute that is constitutional 
as to him, but then lists and purports to apply exceptions which to me seem 
unconvincing. What do you make of this, and what guidelines - if any -
have been established by the Court? 
As to Coffin's gratuitous discussion of the First Amendment and 
overbreadth, I read his opinion as saying in effect that no state may 
validly protect the flag from contemptuous conduct or treatment, however 
one defines this. In what seems to me to be an oversimplistic approach, 
he reasons (i) that the flag is "a pure symbol"; (ii) that "most, if not all, 
conduct associated with the United States flag is symbolic speech"; (iii) 
that this is "closely akin to pure speech"; (iv) that the function of the flag 
is to "encourage patriotism and love of country among its people" (citing 
Halter); and ( v) that "promotion of loyalty and patriotism may not 
constitutionally furnish a justification for imposition of criminal penalties". 
It may not surprise you to know that I am not immensely impressed 
by Judge Coffin's opinion (except by its length and vocabulary). I certainly 
will not buy the full sweep of his First Amendment absolutism. But if we 
must consider the facial constitutionality of the statute under a vagueness 
test, it is easy enough to think of scores of situations in which it may 
be difficult to know whether or not the statute is applicable. 
If, however, we may inquire only whether the statute is vague 
as applied to Goguen, I would think it is not. Then, we would have to 
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of experience and learning in the criminal law. The doctrines of 
"vagueness" and "overbreadth" have seemed to me to enable subjective 
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conduct associated with the United States flag is symbolic speech"; (iii) 
that this is "closely a-kin to pure speech"; (iv) that the function of the flag 
is to "encourage patriotism and love of country among its people" (citing 
!!~lter); and (v) that ''promotion of loyalty and patriotism may not 
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It may not surprise you to know that I am not immensely impressed 
by Judge Coffin's opinion (except by its length and vocabulary). I certainly 
will not buy the full sweep of his First Amendment absolutism. But if we 
must consider the facial constitutionality of the statute under a vagueness 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell DATE: November 9, 1973 
FROM: Jack B. Owens 
No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen 
The Massachusetts Flag Contempt Case 
This will respond to your memorandum of October 23, 1970, 
on the above subject as well as take into account the conversations we 
have also had on this subject. 
The principal question posed in ,your memo is when a court 
in dealing with the vagueness doctrine may review a statute on its face 
rather than as the statute applies to the litigant before the court. 
First, I will address that question solely as it applies to the 14th Amend-
ment due process vagueness doctrine. Then I will discuss it more 
broadly in relation to both the vagueness doctrine and the 1st Amendment 
related overbreadth doctrine. As I pointed out to you in our discussion, 
Judge Coffin's separation of the doctrine of vagueness from the doctrine 
of overbreadth is analytically correct but is not fully faithful to recent 
precedents of this court dealing with cases that raise 1st Amendment 
issues. 
When only 14th Amendment vagueness is at issue, the traditional 
rule is that a party to whom a statute is not vague may not raise a facial 
vagueness attack on that statute. Judge Coffin circumvented that rule 
2. 
by applying certain exceptions to it that he took from the case of U.S. v. 
Baines, 362 U.S. 17 (196() ( Brennan, J. ). The exceptiomrelied on by 
Judge Coffin were cases in which a state statute has been stricken in 
so many particulars by a state court that what remains cannot reasonably 
be construed as what the legislature intended, and cases in which the 
state courts have invalidated a statute with regard to an application 
of that statute that is indistinguishable from the case at bar. However, 
as Judge Coffin frankly recognized, the state statute he was dealing 
with had not been construed at all by the Massachusetts courts; the 
statute was too new for extensive state court construction• to have 
taken place. Judge Coffin applied the two Raines exceptions on the 
extremely dubious ground that if the state courts had construed the 
statut~ they would have plac~ it under one of the two Raines exceptions. 
I think the state is right in arguing that this is a misapplication of the 
Raines case. 
The Raines exception that Judge Coffin should have relied on is 
the exception created for cases raising 1st Amendment issues. Judge 
Coffin was not able to rely on that exception because he started out by 
treating the vagueness doctrine as distinguishable from the 1st Amendment 
aspects of the case. Thus, I think Judge Coffin erred for two reasons 
in allowing Goguen to attack the statute as vague on its face -- (1) He 
misapplied the Raines case and (2) he failed to treat the case as has 
3. 
this Court in recent years in dealing with cases that raise mixed vagueness/ 
overbreadth claims. 
If Judge Coffin was going to treat vagueness distinct from the 
------------~-------------------- -
overbreadth questions presented, he should havEL_gllowed Goguen to -----------------------
attack the statute only as a lied to him. On that basis, I think the 
--------~·-~..,._.._~-- ~ 
statute meets one-half of the traditional vaguen~ss t est but not the other. 
The first element of vagueness is the concept of notice or warning. - -
I find it hard to believe that someone who wears a flag on his fanny does 
not have adequate notice that he has, as the statute proscribes, treated 
the flag contemptuously. The second half of vagueness requires a 
/I 
state to set ce!'tain reason~ble standards to govern the discretion of 
law enforcement officials as well as triers of fact in criminal trials. 
With regard to this half of the vagueness test this case gives me real 
difficulty. The concept of treating with contempt, without further 
ldefini!!on, is so unlimited that it in essen: e allows both law enforcement CJ!f~and fac_t f inders to act out of personal prejudice. By failing 
as 
to be more specific/to what constitutes contempt -- by perhaps forbidding --------- ~ - -
any application of the flag to one's clothing -- I believe that Massachusetts 
has failed to meet the second half of the vagueness text, and I think I 
could with : pri.n.Qiple decide this case on that basis . 
.---...___ - - '-
Turning from vagueness alone to vagueness and overbreadth, - -..____ ... - -
which is the common mixture in 1st Amendment cases, the controlling 
4. 
precedent at the moment with regard to the question posed in your 
October 23 memorandum is Broadrick v. Oklahoma, June 25, 1973, 
White, J. A slip opinion for that case is attached and you must review 
it prior to voting in Goguen. In Broadrick, Justice ~ite departed from 
earlier opinions that he had written in this area in recent years ~and 
established the following rules for when a party may bring a mixed 
' 
vagueness and overbreadth attack on the face of a statute. First, Justice 
White distinguished conguct from pure speech (and obviously Justice 
White would treat this as a conduct case). Second, Justice White 
established the concept of the ''hard core violatort" -- one to whom there . 
\f• ,.j -nut doubt that a statute applied and whose conduct could be prohibited 
without violating the 1st Amendment. With regard to the hard core 
violator engaged in conduct, Justice White declared that the attack could 
be made on the face of the statute only if that statute was substantially 
overbroad. The tes t he created is clearly circular. If the Court 
believes that a statute is substantially overbroad and vague, then the 
hard core violator may make a facial attaek. If the statute is not 
., 
substantially out of line, then he cannot. Since Broadrick is the 
controlling case, I think, then to answer the question posed in your 
memorandum you must decide whether the Massachusetts statute is 
substantiall vague and overbroad. 
-5-
Justice ' White 8 s position in this case will be important 
not only because of his aut~hip of the Broadrick opinion 
and his swing vote, but also because of the speech/conduct line 
he has developed over the last few years in the vagueness/ 
overbreadth cases, For example, Coates v, Cincinnati, 402 
u.s. 611 (1971), involved a city ordinance making it a crime 
for "three or more persons to assemble • • • on any of the 
sid~alks , , • and there conduct themselves in a manner 
annoying to persons passing by , , II Justice Stewart, • • 
joined by JJ. Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, and Marshall*, struck 
the ordinance down on its face without specifying whether those 
challenging the ordinance had engaged in conduct at the core 
of the ordinance or at its outer perimeters, ("The record 
brought before the reviewing courts .... tells us no more than 
that the appellant Coates was a student involved in a demonstration 
and the other appellants were pickets involved in a labor 
dispute,") That is, Justice Stewart and four others were willing 
to accept a facial overbreadth and vagueness attack on a 
criminal ordinance without specifying whether the appellants• 
own position vis-a-vis the e ordinance made any difference, 
On the face of the statute, it was the opinion of the Court that 
..... . . . . 
"Justice Black filed a separate op1n1on conta1n1ng a 
comment that may --strike your fancy, "It is a matter of no 
little difficulty to determine when a law can be held void on 
its face and when such summary action is inappropriate." Id,, 
at 617 
-6-
"this ordinanc~ is unconstitutionally vague because it 
subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to• an 
unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally overbroad 
because it authorizes the .. punishment of constitutionally 
protected conduct." Id. , at 614. 
Justice White, joined in dissent by the Chief and 
Justice Blackmun, .. presented the outlines of a position that 
was ultimately to garner a Court in Broadrick. He noted the 
"general rule" that "when a criminal charge is based on conduct 
constitutionally subject to proscription and clearly forbidden 
by a statute, it is no defense that the law would be unconsti-
tuttonally vague if app~ied to other behavior. Such a statute 
is not vague on its face. It may be vague as applied in some 
on 
c~rcumstances, but ruling~such a challenge obviously requires 
knowledge of the conduct with which a defendant is charged." 
But, as J. White pointed out, the cases "recognize a different 
approach where the statute at issue purposts to regulate or 
proscribe rights of speech or press protected by the First 
Amendment." "Although a statute may be neither vague, over• 
broad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to the conduct* charged 
against a particular defendant, he is permitted to raise its 
*An unfortunate choice of words by Justice White, as 
noted in the next few sentences. I think he really meant to 
use the term "expression" or 
"communication" at this point. If this sentence from the Coates 
dissent is read literally, it directly conflicts with the 
postion taken by Justice White, for the Court, in Broadrick. 
-7-
' vagueness or ~nconstitutional overbreadth as applied to others. 
And if the ... law is found deficient in one of these respects, 
it may not be applied to him either, until and unless a satis-
A 
factory limiting construction is placed on the statu,te by 
~ 
the state courts " .... 
Although in recognizing the above exception 1111 the 
general ••-• vagueness "on the face'' versus "as applied" 
rules in First Amendment cases, Justice White used the term 
"conduct," the latter part of his Coates dissent makes clear 
that he intends the exception to apply only in cases where the 
party making the attack was engaged in pure ._. speech. 
Although he did not fully articulate what .... was to become 
a full-blown position in Broadrick, he did stress that the 
case presented a "regulation of conduct rather than pure 
speech." Thus, he had to dissent • from the majority 0 s 
holding that the appellants could challenge the statute at 
issue on its face, So, you have an instance of Justice White 
sending up a signal in 1971 that, with regard to when facial 
attacks could be made, a line should be drawn between conduct 
and speeck. Also, quite 1& 1 ... •• significantly, at that 
point in the Court 0 s makepp, a majority of the Court was 
willing to acc~t a facial vagueness/overbre~dth attack 
without regard to • conduct/speech and without regard to 
whether the party making the attack was at the core or the edges 
of the statutory proscription. 
In analysing Justice White's development in this 
area (which has become a litmus test for the Court's position, 
it appears), you should also e take into account Gooding v. 
-8-
Wilson, 405 u.,s. 518 (1972)(JJ. Pdwell and Rehnquist no f 
. 
participation). At issue there was a Georgia statute 
subjecting to criminal .. liability persons who in the 
presence of another used "opprobrious words or abusive language, 
tending to cause a breach of the peace • • • • " This statute 
was applied by the state to what undoubtedly must be viewed 
as a hard core violator. The defendant took part in a demon-
stration blocking access to a draft induction center, ..a: 
expressing his race-hatred through such volatile statement asa 
"White son of a bitch, 1°11 kill you." "You son of a bitch, 
I'll choke you to death." Justice Brennan, wtiting for the 
./' 
Cou~t, stressed that the challenged statu1te reached only 
~ 
spoken words. In that contexta "It matters not that the words 
appellee used might have been constitutionally prohibited under 
a narrowly and precisely drawn statute. At least when statutes 
regulate or proscribe speech and when gno readily apparent 
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating 
the statutes in a single prosecution,' ••• , the transendent 
~ value to all society of • constitutionally protected 
expression is deemed to justify allowing 'attacks on overly 
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the 
attack demonstrate that his own ,.. conduct could not be 
regulated by a statute ... drawn with the requisite narrow 
specificity' • • • • " (citing J. White
1
s comments from his dissent 
in Coates). Apparently because "puJ;:e" s_peech was at issue, . -
J. White joined the 5 man .... majority striking down the 
. ---- -- "---" -------
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If a five man majority ( inc.luding you) <;::ontinues to 
coalesce around 
Broadrick, then 
the Justice White position expressed in 
~ w,·, 
I believe that Court a 11 refuse to allow 
~ · 
Goguen to make a facial overbreadth or vagueness attack on 
the Massachusetts flag contempt statute, because Goguen was 
a hard core violatmr who engaged in conduct, not speech, and 
tyV~ ~v::;J!~ 
V./""~ because a statuee that forbids treating the u.s. • flag 
~ / contemptuously is not "substantially" overbroad (or vague) with 
~ ~ __.,)- regard to someone Who puts the flag on the seat of his 
lr;t~.}ui ~..;+t:V-Ybritches. That determination will probably end the case--
· with regard to the statute~ facial problems and its as appled 
V"'-' )?Y 




adopted by J. White in Broadrick. This statute is not vague/ 
overbroad as ap~lied to Goguen, because he is a hard core . 
violator. Since it is not bad "as applied," Goguen loses under 
' that approach. , Furthermore, since .. it is not bad as app~ed, 
it equally is not "substantially" overbraad, Statutes 
that are not substantially overbroa? cannot be challenged on 
their face by hard core violatmrs, --- ------------- - .._ - - .; Thus, Goguen loses under 
the on the face approach as well, and the case must be reversed. 
Q.E.D • 
• I don't mean to oversimplify the approach of the Cout 
in • Broadrick. The critical determination is, of course, 
f V ~ 
L.!) ·J,.~pvlu whether Goguen is a hard core violator (that determination 
/~~~ VV' ~ ~vv ~ in essence resolves the case, under the Broadrick approach). 
t•¥~ ~t~ 
t;Vtt.,e.J v To make that determination, J. White would, I take it, have 
tV' 
vA,A/~ 
JJ.vftr/ ' '--._./ v--~ . 
to determine whether Goguen was as close to the core of what 
fl(... Jfk1? 
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the statute p~oscribes as were the state governmental employees 
in Broadrick. That will be no easy task, because what the 
,o~-~------- r.., . . --
statute proscribes has been dtfined in this case with a total 
--------
lack of particularity on the part of the state legislatur~or -- -
the state courts. However, I am fairly certain that Justice 
White will conclude (and certainly the Chief, J. Blackmum, and 
J. Rehnquist will be with him on this) that whatever the legis-
lature meant to forbid, they certainly must have had Goguen°s 
conduct in mind, 
I must warn you 57 against assuming that the Court 
has developed hard and - fast rules in this area, or at ... 
least in assuming that the Court has always been consistent, 
Broadrick may signal an attempt to put the on the face/as 
applied question to rest, at least as it arises in conduct 
~..._earlier 
cases, But it is .. written against a backgDound of,tcases 
in which the • court has either failed to discern the difference . 
between on the face 
I , 
and as app~ed attacks or has • chosen not 
to make an issue of the .. distinction. In 1960, the author 
of the classic piece on vagueness wrote thata"To challenge a 
statute as vague or overreaching, at litigant must still be 
as 
one ,..to whom it is vague or whom it may overreach." Amsterdam, 
"The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court," 109 
U,Pa.L.Rev. 67, 101. But, as J, Coffin correctly points out, 
.~ );~ 
~~~ ~ the Court failed to adhere to this maxim in many of the leading 
~~~~Q.·~~ 
?>-t.P-t-v&~ - 0 vagueness cases prior to 1960 (See J.S. at 24, nn. 5, 6) and • . b'~ - U- ':" :!;/.ui-r {1_ct.~ i:las failed to do soa in a number of cases since, some of them 
-~ quite recent and some of them authored by J. White (See J.S. at 




It is my personal belief that an effort to 
Court's cases dealing with the question you asked in your memo 
fit together in principle leads to paralysis. Given that, and 
since your own slate in this 
attempt to write some sense, 
area is essentially clear, ..:_, ~~~d -~· 
if you have the latitude to do that 
In deciding this case (as distinguished from the other flag =--contempt cases which are hanging around, some of which do not 
have the statu~ ambiguity posed by this case), I would 
focus squarely on 14th Amendment due process vagueness. 
Judge Coffin is right that the vagueness doctrine is 
If.../ /\~analytically distinc'tl from the W overbreadth doctrine. "1: 
1!,;)' • '1--''UJ\... 







criminal proceeding is a doctrine derived directly from the due 
pr~cess clause of the 14th Amendment. Its roots area independent 
of the First Amendmentl. It presumes that due process of law 
demand~air warning an~ined channels for the exercise of -
prosecutorial and fa~t-finder discretion. Overbreadth, on the 
~-----------------------~ 
other hand, is thought of primarily as a First Amendment related 
doctrine. Assume that Aus activity falls outside the scope .. 
*As noted above, in opting for analytical clarity, J • 
. A~ Coffin departed from the precedents of this Cout, which have 
~~- miXed the two doctrines up in 1st Amendment cases for the last 
Jt<. -~~ decade and a half. "T~ ueness do2_tri!_1~S been almost wholly 
q-~ • I ~~.QY~.!'~ad~h_ <:toctri,.ne when s~a_!:utes covering first 
.. P/ ,~? amendment ac£_vities ar~ a~_J.s;?ue." Note;-a "Thel'irst Amendment 
· r;v- b~ 0~ Doctr1.nef;"' 83 Harv.L.Rev. 844, 873 (1970). This .. ;r -, ~-· commentator, as other~?, espouses this development, because, it is 
__,X ~- argued, 1st Amendment rights are peculiarly susceptible to "chill" 
) "' · when vague statutes are • in operation. However, i.n cases where 
~ ypu bel~ve, as I think you do in this case, that the 1st Amemdment 
I 
does not cover' the activity engaged in, it does not appear that . 
· ~.1 yelu neeCf~a such uidance to ~ix up vagueness and overbreadth. 




of the First ~mendment, but that B's communicative activi~y 
cannot constitutionally be proscribed. A state statute that 
(as pared down by the state courts, if at all) reaches A~ 
B is overbroad. The doctrine has oft~ been used to dodge tough 
First Amendment questions. ... Suppose that the constitutional 
status of A's expressive activity poses a ........ Court-
splitting First Amendment question. It the statute at issue 
forbids I* B's clearly protected expression (or indeed can be 
by this Court to 
read 2 .. ,forbid B's expression), there has been an under-
standable tendency to knock the statute down in toto on the basis 
of • its application to B, thus --* avoiding ha~ng to confront 
A0 s .case head on, yet nevertheless granting A relief. 
Although I don't advocate reaching out to decide tough 
First Amendment questions (the First Amendment may too oft~ 
be the worse for the • wear), I am equally no fan of the doctrinal 
• confusion a that has been engendered by the above tendencies 
~
of the Court. • & Like Judge Coffin--although hopefully with 
more temperate language--! would attempt to decide this case 
on 14th Amendment vagueness grounds at the outset. And, I would 
B2! go on to • say anything in this case about the 1st Amendment. 
In this z? 3 respect, I think my former mentor, Judge Hamley, 
was right in the • brief opinion he authored in this case. As noted 
earlier, un~er my view of vagueness, which I believe is supported 
in thm cases, this statute is ..._ vague because of the unbridled 
--------- -z: 
at large under a criminal statute. 
~ 
Under this of vagueness, note that the concept of 
the hard core ... violator (so central to the views of Justice 
-13-
White and, I believe, to those of the Chief and Justice 
Blackmun) has no meaning. The very notion of vagueness, as 
I lunderstand it, is that there is no "core• to the statute. 
----------- '"~=' 
That is precisely the problem, The legislature has failed to I' 
g~e- definition to the crime to be able to determine, 
as a law enforcement official, a prosecutor, or a criminal fact-
finder, what conduct is at the core and therefore prohibited 
and what is not, The due process clause fmrbids a legislature 
·----------·~----~---~·----
from setting state officials and juries loose on such anA 
unrestricted field, As Judge • Coffin noted, an effort to 
"\....-~------ ---- ... 
enforce this law "would be the exact equivalent of an effort to 
carry out a statute which in terms merelw penalized and punished 
all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and 
unreasonable in the estil.mation of .. court and jury," (Citing 
the Cohen Grocery case, one of the vagueness groundbreaker 
precedents). 
As you have correctl~ pointed out, deciding this case 
on vagueness grounds will not relieve the Court of deciding the 
• flag contempt issue for very long, ._. since so many cases 
are now that issue Thus, you will 
have to come to rest on the substantive first amendment issue, 
and now is as good a time as any. Before I commit anything to 
paper on that, I urge you to read Jilt Justice Harlan's opinions 
in Street v. New York, 394 u.s. 576, 590-94 (1969)(note in 
particular the reliance on the Barnette "flag salute'' case) 
and Cohen v. California, 403 u.s 15 (1971). Then I would like 
.•·'·' 
-14-
to discuss the issue with you again. I also think, given 
the importance of the First a Amendment issues that are 
involved, that you might also discuss the case with one of 
the other clerks, so that your thinking will not be influenced 
solely by my own somewhat settled views. You ought also to 
have a look at United States v. O'Brien, 391 u.s. 367 (1968), 
the draft card burnigg case. That case does~ not control here, 
in my view, because in the opera~n of a draft system the 
requiere 
state has certain legitimate needs thatA it to channel 
conduct with no primary purpose of attempting to tiB censor 
communication. In this case, the state has no interest or 
purpose other than foreclosing certain categories of communication, 
which is what gives me such First Amendment problemso 
I 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS November 21, 1973 
MEMO TO JUSTICES BRENNAN, STEWART, l>fARSHALL AND POWELL: 
I have put in summary form my conclusions in 72-1254, Smith 
v. Goguen. As I recall the Conference discussion Bill Brennan affirmed 
on First Amendment grounds as did Thurgood. 
Potter, I recall went ~ on vagueness and overbreadth. -Le'\·ris, I believe, went only on vagueness. 
Anyone can,· of course, write his own personal views. ~ 
concern at this time is whether we can get a Court. 
I have stated my preferenc~s in my memo. But I could, --
I believe, go on vagueness as well as overbreadth • 
.... ~ ........... - .-..._.._ - -- ,,.. ..... ~. ~ .... ._ ~ . -
Perhaps either Potter or Lewis should write this opinion. 
Perhaps the five of us should have a brief conference. ~
23rd at 3 p.m. itTould be · o.-k. with me. 
•, 
- ( .J 
! (-1) -:-ri--J!~ ~. 15. ~ ~ 
cY-~~ , , 
II /fG ~'1/v' ~~ ~ 
~~~~~~.~ 
-~~"-o~ ~~ .. ~~ 




Mr. Jack B. Owens 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: November 26, 1973 
No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen 
At the Conference today, and after considerable discussion, 
Justice Douglas assigned this case to me to write solely on the vagueness 
issue. 
Bill Brennan indicated that he might concur separately and 
reach the First Amendment issue, but said he would join an opinion 
for the Court solely on what he called "old fashioned" 14th Amendment 
due process vagueness. I had previously stated that if I wrote, it would 
be on that basis. 
You will find in the file my conclusory summary of the position 
which I took at the Conference today. 
It is important to bear in mind that Justice Stewart thinks that 
there was no adequate notice under this statute. At one point you and I 
had thought that the notice was sufficient. Yet, as I thought about the 
case further, I have come around to Justice Stewart's view that the 
basic infirmity of the language here is that it doesn't give anyone notice 
or guidelines. The remarkable concession by the Attorney General 
pretty well illustrates that a citizen just can't know when he would be 
2. 
prosecuted, and indeed the prosecutor himself wouldn't known in advance 
because he would have to make a subjective judgment as to the intent of 
the person arguably violating the statute. 
No mention was made at the Conference of Broadrick. 
Justice Brennan, in particular, was anxious to know whether the 
other Justices present thought we would reach the First Amendment issue 
in Spence. I stated that I believed we would, and certainly that we would 
or could reach it in one of the other pending cases. Justice Brennan 
expressed the opinion that we would have to reach the First Amendment 
issue in Spence, and Justice stewart was of a like view. Neither Justice 
Douglas nor Justice Marshall expressed an opinion on this question. It 
is fair to say, however, that Justice Brennan was willing to go along with 
a narrow decision in this case on the assumption that we will reach the 
First Amendment issue in one of the cases now pending. 
As we agreed, I would like to write this case as narrowly as 
we can write it and still deal fairly and explicitly with the issues and 
the relevant authorities. Justice stewart expressed the opinion that 
there were several Supreme Court cases (which he did not identify 
specifically) which would strongly support a 14th Amendment vagueness 
decision. 
One final footnote: To the extent that we can use the views of 
Justice Douglas (as expressed in his memorandum) without compromising 







Mr. Jack B. Owens 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: November 26, 1973 
No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen 
At the Conference today, and after considerable discussion, 
Justice Douglas assigned this case to me to write solely on the vagueness 
issue. 
Bill Brennan indicated that he might concur separately and 
reach the First Amendment issue, but said he would join an opinion 
for the Court solely on what he called "old fashioned" 14th Amendment 
due process vagueness. I had previously stated that if I wrote, it would 
be on that basis. 
You will find in the file my conclusory summary of the position 
which I took at the Conference today. 
It is important to bear in mind that Justice stewart thinks that 
there was no adequate notice under this statute. At one point you and I 
had thought that the notice was sufficient. Yet, as I thought about the 
case further, I have come around to Justice stewart's view that the 
basie infirmity of the language here is that it doesn't give anyone notice 
or guidelines. The remarkable concession by the Attorney General 
pretty well illustrates that a citizen just can't know when he would be 
I I 
2. 
prosecuted, and indeed the prosecutor himself wouldn't known in advance 
because he would have to make a subjective judgment as to the intent of 
the person arguably violating the statute. 
No mention was made at the Conference of Broadrick. 
~Justice Brennan, in particular, was anxious to know whether the 
other Justices present thought we would reach the First Amendment issue .~ 
in Spe~ce. I stated that I believed we would, and certainly that we would 
or could reach it in one of the other pending cases. Justice Brennan 
expressed the opinion that we would have to reach the First Amendment 
issue in Spence, and Justice stewart was of a like view. Neither Justice 
Douglas nor ,Justice Marshall expressed an opinion on this questioo. It 
is fair to say, however, that Justice Brennan was willing to go along with 
a narrow decision in this case on the assumption that we will reach the 
First Amendment issue in one of the cases now pending. 
As we agreed, I would like to write this case as narrowly as 
we can write it and still deal fairly and explicitly with the issues and 
the relevant authorities. Justice stewart expressed the opinion that 
there were several Supreme Court cases (which he did not identify 
specifically) which would strongly support a 14th Amendment vagueness 
decision. 
One final footnote: To the extent that we can use the views of 
Juiltice Douglas (as expressed in his memorandum) without compromising 
a principled and coosistent opinion, I would like to do so. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
sa 
J ~'·.·~ 
.§tqtrctttl' <1;m1rt llf t11c ~lttitdt .§t:lll·a 
~(H\lthtgtl1lt, p. <;. ~l12J~~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS November 26, 1973 
Dear Chief: 
In 72-1251~, Smith v. Goguen· 
the opinion has been assigned to Leins. 
c.uv 
W'illia.m 0. Douglas 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
No. 72-1254 SMITH v. GOGUEN 
The Sheriff of Worcester COtmty, Massachusetts, appeals 
from a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
' \ J! ~( ) 
CircuitAthat the desecration provision of the Massachusetts fl~ misuse 
statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 
471 F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1972), probable juris. 
. ~~··u.t n•~ ~~ vJ , 
noted, _u.S. _ (1973). We affirm on theAbasis of •-=~~ 
· the Fourteenth Amendment due process doctrine of 
yagueness. We do not reach the correctness of the holding below 





The slender record in this casi reveals little more than that 
Goguen wore a small cloth version of the United States flag sewn 
, 
I [c If' OY 1l1e 
to the seat of his pants. The flag, approximately three by five inche~ 
of~t~ J · 
~ or four by six inches, was clearly visible to passersby. On January 
30, 1970, two officers of the :bee-minister, Massachusetts Police 
o~ L~ .. w ~ ~f... '~ 
Departmen~ saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The first officer 
• 
2. 
encountered Goguen standing and talking with a group of persons on a 
public street. The group was, apparently, not engaged in any demonstra-
7 d-. 
tion or other organized protest associated with Goguen's apparel. No 
~~~~ . 
disruption of traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this 
officer approached Goguen to question him about the flag, the other 
persons present expressed their amusement. Some time later, the 
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking in the 
downtown business district of Leominister. 
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint against 
Goguen under the desecration provision of the Massachusetts flag misuse 
J 
.statute. At the time, this provision read, in relevant part: 
''Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces 
or treats contemptuously the flag of the United states ... , 
whether such flag is public or private property . . . , 
shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more 
than one hundred dollars or by :imprisonment for not 
more than one year, or both. . . . " 
Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was not charged 
il 
with any act of physical desecration. As permitted by the disjunctive 
structure of the desecration provision, the officer charged specifically 
and only that Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of 
the United states. II 
~~ 
3. . -r c>~~,_· I 4r C\\ v ·/~£;.~~" 
~ .)\.:;1' ~. \t. "' A jury convened in the Worcester County Superior Court fatmd 







Goguen guilty. The court imposed a sentence of six months in the 
Massachusetts House of Corrections. Gog.1 en appealed to the 
~¥'/-~ ( ' 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed in a b:Pief-
? {~i·I.,;;/Jrl-1~( {1 (t'L\ ~·(. i , /(~J.tC<'.:. 
~s~fPl:)opiniol}t Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. _, 279 
N. E. 2d 666 (1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argumentc, 
I 
inter alia, with the comment that "[ w ]hatever the uncertainties in 
~ ....... ......,_ 
other circumstances, we see no vagueness in the statute as applied 
here. " Id. , Mass. at __ , 279 N. E. 2d at 667. In support of 
its holding on the doctrine of vagueness, the court cited no Massachusetts 
precedents interpreting the statutory language under which Goguen 
to 
was charged. The vagueness issue was simply given res ipsa ·loquitur 
treatment. 
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was granted bail 
and then ordered released on a writ of habeas corpus by the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Goguen v. 
Smith, ~upra, 343 F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag 
~~ 





under the Due process Clause as well as overbroad under the Firs t 
Amendment. A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects. 
rt 
Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d 88. Th7
1 
Circuit Judge, now Senior 
Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation from the Ninth Circuit, 
concurred solely on vagueness grounds, without reaching any First 










·Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening brief, 
~ 
as he did his oral argument, to the contention that Goguen failed to 
pre~ve his :r:n•-e-sent- due process vagueness claim for the purposes of 
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Appellant concedes that the issue 
7 
of "vagueness as applied" is properly before the federal courts. 
-4-"-c. ~$,~-.s e'f.s 
Attacks on I\ statute as being vague on its fact or as applied are, 
however, treated by Appellant as distinguish · ble here. Appellant 
believes that Goguen has only a facial vagueness argument and that 
that claim was not presented to the state courts with the requisite 
fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971). 
8 
The exhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly raised and 
fails to take the full measure of Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness 
9 
attack in the state courts. We do not deal with the point at length, 
however, for we find the pertinent statutory language impermissibly 
vague as applied to Goguen. In light of the Massachusetts Supreme 
~-
Judicial Court holding on va(f#ness and appellant's concession, we 
have no doubt that "the substance" of this claim was "fairly presented" 
6. 
to the state courts under the exhaustion standa.rds of Picard, supra, 
at 275, 278. 
In addition, we do not iiJ'gree with appellant's view that the v 
Court of Appeals held only that the challenged statutory language is 
void on its face, and not as applied to Goguen. It is true that the 
Court of Appeals at first posited arguendo appellant's claim that Goguen's 
dress was so obnoxious that he personally had no vagueness argument, 
regardless of the statute's facial application to others. 471 F. 2d 
+ke co~ 
at 91. It seems clear, however, that.A engaged in this 
assumption solely to deal with appellant's citation of United States v. 
Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), a · red herring that appellant dragged 
10 
across the court's path with temporary success. Following the 
discussion of Raines, the court concluded "that resolution of [Goguen's] 
challenge to the statute as applied to him necessarily adjudicates 
the statute's facial constitutionality .... "471 F. 2d at 94. (Emphasis 
added). As we see it, the Court of A.pp· ".tls found the "publicly ... 
treats contemptuously" phrase of the Massachusetts statute so devoid 
of standards that it provided no means for distinguishing Goguen's 
' .. 
7. 
behavior from a broad range of unceremonial treatment of fla gs. 
Id., at 42, 94. Accordingly, the court viewed as-applied and facial 
~J~~# 
challenges to be essentially identical in this case, and thus it · " 'h 
1dl both. For the reasons stated below, we agree that the statutory 
phrase at issue is void for vagueness in Goguen's case, as it would be, 





The settled principles of the due process doctrine of vagueness 
require no extensive restatement here. 11 The doctrine incorporates 
/d. 
notions of fair warning. Moreover, it requires legislatures to set 
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers 
13 
of fact, in order to deter "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state 
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the 
First Amendment, the doctrine requires a greater degree of 
specificity than in other contexts.'~-/ The statutory language at issue 
here, "publicly ... treats contemptuously the flag of the United 
;'If 
States ... , "has such scope, ~-~· street v. New York,394 U.S. ,.. 
576 (1969) (verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant times was 
... 
without the benefit of judicial clarification./.!::> 
Flag contempt statutes have been described as impermissibly 
vague for lack of notice on the theory that "[w ]hat is contemptuous 
lit; 
to one man may be a work of art for another." Goguen's behavior 





. ' l 
1 
9. 
to the mark. But we see the force of the District Court's conclusion: 
that since the flag has become "an object of youth fashion and high 
D,.$ 
camp •.. , " it is by no means certain as it might have been at 
)\. 
another time in this country's history that wearing a miniature 
flag on one's clothing constitutes criminal contempt. 343 F. Supp. 
at 164, 167. I Unceremonlal treatment of the flag in many contexts 
/\.. 
has become a widespread, if unfortunate, contemporary phenomenon, 
/ 
(. as both lower federal courts noted. Ibid., 471 F. 2d at 96. 'Thus, 
we h~ a ro.vc. cAc>IAh f.s ~c~k"t.~~ cit ti 
At=D==t:;=~illil£:~tl·~· ~~reasonably clear to those of "common 
••t intelligence, "Connally v. General Construction Co., supra, 
269 U.S. at 391, that the statutory language at issue proscribes 
Goguen's behavior. 
Appellant argues that any notice difficulties are ameliorated 
by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the 
' 11 
United States. This allegedly "takes some of the vagueness away 
I< 
from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously: . . " Anyone who "wants 
notice as to what this statute proscribes, . immediately knows 
. -~ l ·ui~" 









that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to stay clear 
of violating this statute, he just has to stay clear of doing something 
11 • 
to the United States flag. " Aside from the difficulties pre~ented by 
d-.0 
the concept of an "actual" flag, we fail to see how this alleged 
particularit:· resolves the central vagueness question presented --
the standards for defining contemptuous treatment. 
Appellant's argument that the language provides adequate 
warning of what constitutes contempt rests in large measure on, 
as the Court of Appeals put it, the "unarticulated premise" that the 
statute "is not vague as to one who sews a flag to the seat of his 
pants. "471 F. 2d at 91. The argument presumes that contemporary 
community understanding sufficiently distinguishes that treatment from, 
Stvf-1 M r'\()teJ ~\ouue., 4Uct ct"'-~t'~ ._,le~c... ~,·, t:S ~. ~ o.~ we~ 
for example, displaying the flag on the bumper of a car. A )/fe cannot 
find that shifting trends for displaying something as ubiquitous as the 
United States flag or representations of it provide ,a:~:a sufficient 
warning under the statutory language at issue. Precisely because 
display of the flag is so common and takes so many forms, changing 
from one generation to another, a legislature should define with 
precision those exhibitions it means to outlaw. The "publicly treats 




Furthermore, whatever doubts may exist here about whether 
Goguen was fairly warned or should haveJmown the consequences of 
his behavior simply by the force of its offensiveness are overcome, in 
our view, by the Massachusetts statute's substantial failure to meet 
the other principal requirement of the vagueness doctrine. The 
a1 
vagueness concept of notice has a certain fictional flavor. This is 
as 
particularly so in a noncommercial context, wherE/a general rule 
behavior is not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory 
language. In such cases, perhaps the most meaningful aspects of 
the vagueness doctrine is not true notice, but the requirement that 
.. a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. 
()"-'I 
: JVh(\~ 
.· \ ·Vl f"" \\).!,1 ·'~In this regard, the language under which Goguen was charged as 
(l ~ i J L..w 
l ft1f .,. .. r -\~~ f K. its most severe deficiencies. 
~~~ ~' 
1 
In its terms, the language at issue is_ sufficiently unbounded 
to, in the District Court's words, "prohibit any public deviation from 
formal flag etiquette. . . " 343 F. Supp. at 167. Enacted in 1899 
&R 
and unchanged until after Goguen's conviction, the "publicly. 
~3 --------------------------------











of course, are without authority to cure that defect. Statutory language 
of such a standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors and juries 
to pursue their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so -
abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal 
law. ~·_g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, supra, 405 U.S. I _\- J,J 
!} JP~ffy r at 166-168. 
' JJ'l r.t-' . 0- /' ,..,., 
}\~~> 
...,.,...., ·"' ........ , 
argument before the Court of Appeals about the enforcement standards 
l ~
. ~).f-o., 
• .N"" for this statute suggests the aptness of Mr. Justice Black's warning 
t.' ~""' 
. ~\~ft. 
-~~tf.Yt Jl ~ b~0-0 in Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 117, 120 (1969), against · 
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment -to-moment judgment of the 
i 
l 
policeman on his beat: " 
" .•. [A]s counsel admitted, a war protestor who, 
while attending a rally at which it begins to rain, , 
evidences his disrespect for the American flag by 
) 
contemptuously covering himself with it in order 
to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the 
Massachusetts statute. Yet a member of the American 
Legion who, caught in the same rainstrom while 
returning from an 'America - Love It or Leave It' 
. rally, similarly uses the flag, but does so regrettably 
and without a contemptuous attitude, would not be 
prosecuted. " 471 F. 2d at 102. 
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such selective law 
enforcement, there is a denial of due process. 
13 . 
. . . 
Accordingly, we find ihc "publicly treats contemptuously" 
'A 
phrase vague as applied to Goguen. It avails nothing to suggest, 
as does appellant, that Goguen 1 s behavior rendered him a hard core 
violator to whom the statute was not vague. The gravamen of the 
due process doctrine of vagueness is that a statute, plus any 
accompanying judicial gloss, has no core. The doctrine voids a 
criminal statute that is vague "not in the sense that it requires a 
person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but .m;::~;altmlllll21!1 
comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no 
standard of conduct is specified at all. " Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 
402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). The absence of any reasonable ascertainable 
set of standards for inclusion and exclusion, and particularly for the 
guidance and control of law enforcement officials and triers of fact, 
is precisely what offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Where this deficiency exists and until it is corrected 
either by amendment or judicial construction, it affects all who are 
prosecuted under the statutory language. The language at issue is 
void for vagueness in Goguen 1 s case because it subjected Goguen 
'. 
14. 
to criminal liability under standards so indefinite that the police 
and the jury were free to express essentially nothing more than their 
own preferences for treatment of the flag. 
Appellant's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. 
1 :~· <tl',)) 
1 '-' 1 fJI"'c Appellant asserts that the first six words of the statute add specificity 
.I Jt'l e G)fi'~. J 
, ~ i Q • 
· l>lr( t· ()( to the "treats contemptuously" phrase. It is alleged that the 
·./.,., 
v•f ().$ "'~~ ~ 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Cour~applie6 a principle of statutory 
interpretation of construing general language to take on color from 
more specific accompanying language. But it is conceded that Goguen 
was convicted under the general phrase alone, and that the highest 
d-5 
specific prrnciple of statutory interpretation in this case. Appellant 
also argues that the Supreme Judicial Court has in Goguen's case 
;;;.6 
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional contempt. Aside 
from the problems presented by an appellate court's limiting 
construction in the very case in which a defendant has bem tried 
;}7 
under a previously unnarrowed statute, this still does not resolve 
L toll\t-~ "'cA- 'of\$+.'+~ 








. ....... . 
Finally, appellant argues that sta~ law enforcement authorities 
have shown themselves ready to interpret this penal statute . -
narrowly and that the statute, properly read, reaches only direct, 
immediate contemptuous acts · that "actually impinge upon the 
physical integrity of the flag. " There is no support in the record 
~~ 
for the former point. Similarly, nothing in reported state court 
J,;..e.l"'dl.:,,........ "'Pi"'t~ ~~ 6oJ'4"'-a.s ~~~ ute1 
opinions~r in the language under which Goguen was charged upholds 
the latter. 
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature and 
variety of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot establish 
standards with great precision. Control of the broad range of disorderly 
conduct that may inhibit a policeman in the performance of his official 
duties is one such area. Cf.) Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). 
But there is no comparable need for committing broad discretion to 
law enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt. Nothing 
prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what 
~q Jl'lA • .sAdA~eH.s I 
constitutes forbidden treatment of ·. United States flags. +Hfte 
~-~!f~i:~fi~~~~~~ lt~ffi~; d 
. 
~c..& ....v:...,~ .~v...t,~ ,.).,;.._ Db Go3 ~.t~·.r eoa.1_ tJitAtW... . 










Although we hold the "publicl~treats contemptuously" ph rat S e. 
m;;:~ void for vagueness, we do not address in this case the .J+~.:fJe'.J 
0~·~ ~ 
first six words ~e-eef!!t@e 811 ~I.@ commercial misuse provisions. 
In light of the universal adoptio1of flag desecration statutes by the 
31 
federal and state governments, we • • • emphasize that we also 
do not hold that the due process doctrine of vagueness invalidates 
1" all flag contem~ statutes. The validity of such statutes will, insofar 
as the vagueness doctrine is concerned, depend on their particular 
30\. 
language, judicial construction, and enforcement history. And, as 
noted earlier, we do not deal here with the question whether the 
Massachusetts statute or other statutes are valid under the First 
33 a Amendment. 
3:.1 
Goguen's "silly conduct" finds no sympathy here. But this 
is a country devoted to the rule of law, and the requirements of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to those 





most from a government of principled laws are probably the least 
likely to reflect on their good fortune. .The judgment is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
J ,-c u - ~ 9/ t( . .-f' 
~· .,(. I' 
v~-4 ! '-4 l~t 77:_ / t<(./·-d L ,,..£......., CJ.,-·u. .-c...~ l. 
t-1,.._,___ CL.,.-oYd ) 
<2.-'fdt--~t.-t: ~ v- {,_~-....,-(. t.. 8. .... 
I 
fAV I~ I /II I . LJ.,ff"z.,t. 'U .Ln. .:1 ,. ; 
10. Raines is not a vagueness case, as the Court of Appeals 
itself noted. 471 F. 2d at 91, n. 3. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
u.s. _, U.S. (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, 
that court's substantial treatment of Raines was unnecessary.,_. 
lildll? I!Illl·•••llltiii .. ,IIIfi'sllrMit•' -•r•s••s-lllitlllll*•~• e. Raines involved a statute 
that unambiguously prohibited certain conduct on the part of state 
officials as well as private persons. The state officials did not 
deny that the statute could constitutionally be applied to them. Rather, 
they attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the statute's 
application to private persons. Applying normal third party standing 
rules, the Court held that the state officials could not do so. There 
was no doubt what the statute in Raines required nor whether the state 
.. <)-
officials were within its scope. This case• raises just such issues. 
,# 
Raines also dealt' with certain exceptions to the general rule 
that a party lacks standing to assert the rights of another. The Court 
of Appeals read these exceptions "as not depending upon the historic 
fortuity that a statute has already been subjected to [narrowing] holdings 
but as depending upon the possibility of such holdings inAited by the 
/ working of the statute. " 471 F. 2d at 92. This is a misreading of 
-' b.,,~ 









FOOTNOTES - No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen 
1. The record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions 
and opposing briefs before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
the complaint under which Goguen was prosecuted, and Goguen's 
petition for federal habeas corpus. Appendix 1-38, 42-43. We do 
not have, nor did any state or federal reviewing court have, a trial 
transcript or a copy of the jury instructions. Trans. Or. Arg. 6, 51. 
Appellee's claim that he was plainly engaged in protected expression 
and Appellant's arguments about the narrow grounds on which appellee 
must have been convicted are ill-suited to such a marginal record. 
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FOOTNOTES - No. 72-1254 Srniih v. Goguen 
1. The record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions 
and opposing briefs before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
the complaint under which Goguen was prosecuted, and Goguen's 
petition for federal habeas corpus. Appendix 1-38, 42-43. We do 
not have, nor did any state or federal reviewing court have, a trial 
transcript or a copy of the jury instructions. Trans. Or. Arg. 6, 51. 
Appellee's claim that he was plainly engaged in protected expression 
and Appellant's arguments about the narrow grounds on which appellee 
must have been convicted are ill-suited to such a marginal record. 
2. Trans Or. Arg. 5-6, 35-36. 
l 
j 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 264, § 5 (1971). At the 
time of Gogue~'s arrest and prosecution, the statute read as follows: 
I . ~ :i. Fl : I J~ ; IH 'll:tll ,l' fpr 11ti s us o• 
\\"lill l'l 'l'l' puhlidy 11 11 11 il:tlt· ~. tr:tlllJIII's 
llfllllt, t!Pf:t< 't'' or lt·<':lls •·onl<' lllpl'tiOH sly 
tho• flag of IIi~ l'nito•ol :-;!alPs ot· of 
:'.ln ssachus l'tt~. wlt<;tjt<'r Slll'li f!:tt; is puh· 
I 
lit• ,,. pril'at<• propt•rty, (>I' whot•l't'l' dis-
J•Ia.l·s sH <·h f!a~ or· lllt,l' t'<'JII'<' .'"lltatio n 
t IH•t 'I'O ( IIJlllll wltio ·li an· \\'tJl'll s , fit;lli ' P~. 
aoln•rt is l'llll·ttts ot· d('si~n s , o1· whor1·cr 
< ' llll~t·s ur pc·rmits s ut ·h flag to ),p uxt•tl 
i 11 a p:l r:11lr as n n··•·o•pt '"'"' for tlP -
JlOsit in~ or c·olh•<·( ill~ lllllllP ,\' or nny 
ot h<·1· .a rtil'!e o1· t !tin:,:, n1· wii(JI •I't•r f'X-
JtOSI's to public l' il'll' , tnantJfal·tures, 
Ht'IJ ~ . I'XllOSI'S fOI' snit'. g-i\'t·~ i\Wil,V 01' 
lut~ iu poss t · s ~·doll for s alt\ IJL" to g-in• aw:ty 
01' fnt• IISI' fo1· ;tll,l' fllii'JIOS<', llll)' :trlidP 
or· 1-illhs t :tilt'(\ ht·iug- Ill I :11'1 ic·lt~ of lllP.r-
dt:tlldi.'<' or a I'CI'<' Jll Ill' I<' of · lllo ' r..!tnlldis•~ 
or u rt i<-l••s 11 poll w!Ji,·h is :tl t :tdll•d, 
thmn~h a Wl':lppi11:,: or l!!hc rwi sP, t'lt -
g-r:n·t•d or prinh'd in :rny rnanllcr, a rep-
'""''l11ntloll nf lltn l ' nitPd >"ttll ' , . 
01· wl~t 11 , 1 . ,, 1 • . , • • s flng, 
tho~ :11'01<' IJI' llt.,Jes olll,\' l'l' /H 't 'SCIII:ttion of 
,, II' "l'l"l t . " I f 
II!OII\\'t'llltl f , " ' ~~ ,t O · t!Je I'Oill-
1 01 IIIII' 'ldl't' l'f' . 
11JPrdul pur' s' · . : . - l !'; l!Jg- or < 'OJn~ 
. f' I o. r' .~lt.tll Le l!tllti ~ hed !J 
'1 "" ~ of uot Jt .. ,, tltnu 1 .Y 
t'lt'll 1 '' 11 IIOI' more 
' ' Oll(' lllllo!rctl dollars ot· h . . . 
rncnt for nut· lltnt•t• I . ,\ lltt)II'I~Oil-
hutlt. W ·I· .. 1 " 111 (Jill' )'<':11·, or 
011 ..... fl"III'PS 'l I . ,. 
01' dt'si "' lls 'Ill· ·I ,"1 . ' ''.
11'1' !St'lll(•nts 
. ,., •. u "' lo, Ol' dtrt•dl ... 
dll't'I'IJ,\' t 'Oilllt•t•lt•o! ll'ith S! (•J f'J ) 01 Ill· 
,. • • · 1 1 :t•• or· nt1y 
l fti'I 'St' rJI n (ion I IH•J't 'nf iu , ·J ,.. . 
that sudt fl·t" . . -' 111 1 lltanllcr 
i)< llS('(j fo 'II;~~ ·101 II.~ ~'I ' Jil't'SI'It(:tfiOII 
• • 1.11 I :ttlt•llti(JII I .. I 
, .,.rt""" ·'twit 11'111''. r· . o ut ,!( -
I S , I' ' IJI't '~ 'td\' ( • 
llll'lll s ,.,. do•sig lls slt ·tll "1. 1. 1, • er lsc-f . . ' . . Ill' ,, . Jll . . 
0 IJtJS Sf ' t•litJII ht: dt •t•J ' IIJlOst::-; 
sudt fhg X t . 
1 
til d lu he upon 
g-oin" ;I · ' "ll'tt "' 1' 111 din;: the fOI't'-
. . ~. lt'l'f' lll:l,l' Ill' :tll ·to·ho•d . 
~t;tff '" 'HI'illg" fl ·w ,,r II ·,. . to the 
'.., 11 ' lltl<'d Sl 1 
or of ,\[" ·'"'"'ltltsf'll s '"I . • a cs 
Ol';~ardzaf itHt of ·\'l'( ~. ' 011 h' 111 ;..: to un 
111111 ., of tit~ ('jyjJ 
\\'nr, to a •·:tlllJI of lltt! l'llit (•ll ~-'l"llli s h 
\Ynr \'(•lf't ':tll', to a post or tlt•p:ll'llll<'lll' 
of 'l'ltt• .\ln f' ril':lll l.<·gion, ur to a pus t 
or tlrpariiiH·nt of tl11• \ ' !'!•: ralls n( For-
l'i~n \\'at's of tl>£' l'nilt•d :-;tales , nr to a 
post or dl'p:trltll£' 11( of tl11· .Tt·ll·islt \\'a 1· 
\'<'lt' I'Uils (I( tl11• l'nif<·1l Statt-s , o1· to a 
•·ntnp or olr •pat·t IIH'Ilt of t Ito • :-;ons of 
l'nion \'Ptt•ran s of tl"' ('il'il \\'ar, or to 
a h~t'l':u·l;s ut· t!t'p:trltllt'llt of t/ 11· \'t•t -
l'r:tlls of \\ 'orlol \\'at· l of tl11 · t· .  :-: .. \., 
or l>t•longilll' to or uso••l lo> in t 111 · sc·n·i•·t' 
of lltt' l'nitt •J :-:tat.·s "'' tl~t· o'OIIlllll<ll · 
\\'t•altlt, a ~otrt • :tnH' t ' ltal'in ~ itt.'< ·r·iio0d 
tlu•I'('Oll tho· ll:tlilt 's of b:tttl1 '' and tlte 
u:unt· nntl 11\l nt h,·r· of tlat• urgnni z: tfi11 11 to 
wlti .. !t stwlt flag !Jl'h>n:,:, . l~or t It (• Jll1r. 
lll>St·s of tlti, S<'l'l ion, a flng sh:tll hP 
olt•rnu·ol to < " <~ltlillu< · l'o IH · Ion~ tc> any or· 
~:ani z at iun t>f l'l ' lt·r·: tii S IH ' I'o ' illl• t• fon• ~ Jo l' r ·­
ifio·ol, :tltli(Jllj; lt snl'l1 or;; :llti z:ttit.n liltS 
('(':t s t•t! to t' :d .s t, dul'in:,: ~tlt'lt titll (' a ., it 
rt'lll:tin ., in lito' l:twful 11\\' llt'l' ' ltip 11 r 
•·u s tool,l' <•f Hll,l' 1ot l1• ·r t•f IIi• · afort ·said or-
gn1tizations or of 1111· ('IIIJJltlllll\lt ·:tlilt 
or of :tll,l' joolitio ·al sttlodil'i s ioll tl,..rt •of, 
or of 1111.r p:ll rioti. · o1 · lli s tori, ·:ll ~· wi 1 · ty 
illt 'Pt'JIUI':I I t•r) II lido• I' t /10 • 1:111 s of t Jt(• 
f'lllillllOII \l 'o':t I ill Ill' oil'! <'11 11 i llo•ol loy t IH • ad -








The statute is an amalgam of provisions dealing with flag 
desecration in general (the first twenty -six words) and with commercial 
misuse or e:Arploitation of flags of the state and national government in 
particular. This case concerns only the desecration portion of the 
statute. In 1971, subsequent to Goguen's prosecution}hat portion of 
the statute was amended twice. On March 8, 1971, the legislature, 
per St. 1971, C. 74, modified the first sentence by inserting ''burns 
. 
or otherwise" between the terms "publicly" and "mutilates, " and, 
in addition, by increasing the fine. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 264, 
§ 5 (1973 Supp. ). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, C 655, the 
legislature appended a new sentence defining "the flag of the United 
States" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the purpose of this 
section the term 'flag of the United States' shall mean any flag which 
has been designated by Act or Resolution of the Congress of the 
United States as the national emblem, whether or not such a designation 
is currently in force. " Ibid. The 1971 amendments are relevant 
to this case only in the tangential sense that they indicate a recognition 
on the part of the legislature of , the need to tighten up this 
imprecise statute. Sec n. ~0 , infra . ...... 
4. 
of. -fkt. ol t'.f.ftC.t.t-tt, o .f 
4. Perhaps this was bcc ause~Y~ G~tt'l"iref Apl~Q.Q., 
the question whether Goguen's conduct constituted phys ical desecration 
Sf·) 
of the flag .me::. '~.l:t:;;QnD-. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d at 
" .A 
91, n. 4 ( ". . . [w Je are not so sure that sewing a flag to a backgr ound 
clearly affects 'physical , ... integrity. '") 
c)~ MJ ~ tk t~h f6 ~;; '~ ~ L-l~. 
5. Appendix 4. ~ c'f. (t,A -tfM . ~-.re~ ~ b · 
6. Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen 's 
case was the first Massachusetts appellate court reading of the 
statutory language under which Goguen was ~nvicted. Trans. Or. 
Ar g. 17-18. There is one turn· of• the-century interpretation of one 
of the commercial misuse provisions of the statute, but that case 
1 
has no relevance here. Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co. , 
.. 
189 Mass. 76, N. E. (1905). 
7. Reply Brief 4. 
. ; 
5. 
8. The District Court and the Court of Appeals decisions in 
this case were entered subsequent to tz3t?j:!~~~~m•:c, :lll· Picard, 
supra. Yet it appears that appellant did not raise his present exhaustion 
be~o""& 
argument w"'either court. The District Court commented specifically 
0 
on this !fission: "No contention is now I!a;;Q:!II!a& made that~~ 
(Goguen] has not exhausted state remedies, nor that the constitutional 
issues 
.... «presented here were not raised appropriately in state proceedings. " 




~ \j.r 9. Goguen filed in state Q~~- S~perior Court an unsuccessful 
k.e cd·ed 
motion to dismiss the complaint in which,_,the Fourteenth Amendment 
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "impermissibly 
vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation by public 
before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was 
incorporated in Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid. In 
addi~on, Goguen's brief before that court raised vagueness points and 
cited vagueness cases. Id., at 19, 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U.S. 451 (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (1971) 
(North Carolina flag desecration statute unconstitutionally vague 
as well as overbroad). Appellant is correct in asserting that Goguen 
s~-..4t. ~-
failed to compartmentalize in hi~ brief the due process <8*~t~. 
doctrine of vagueness and First Amendment concepts of overbreadth. 
See Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of leakage between 
those particular adjoining compartments is understandable. -Cf., 















844, 871-875 (1970). The highest state court's opinion, which dealt 
. ~ c-141~) 
separately with Goguen's First Amendmen~vagueness ~~ 
Mass. at _, 279 N. E. 2d at 667, indicates that that court was 
well aware that Goguen raised both sets of arguments. 
8. 
10. Raines is not a vagueness case, as the Court of Appeals 
itself noted. 471 F. 2d at 91, n. 3. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, - ' 
u.s. _, U. S. ( 1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, 
that court's substantial treatment of Raines was unnecessary_, 
.I 
j that unambiguously prohibited certain conduct on the part of state 
j 
·j 
officials as well as private persons. The state officials did not 
deny that the statute could constitutionally be applied to them. Rather, 
they attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the statute's 
application to private persons. Applying normal third party standing 
rules, the Court held that the state officials could not do so. There 
was no doubt what the statute in Raines required nor whether the state 
officials were within its scope. This caseet raises just such issues. 
Raines also dealt with certain exceptions to the general rule 
l 
I 
that a party lacks standing to assert the rights of another. The Court 
of Appeals read these exceptions "as not depending upon the historic 
fortuity that a statute has already been subjected to [narrowing] holdings 
but as depending upon the possibility of such holdings inXited by the 
working of the statute. " 471 F. 2d at 92. This is a misreading of 
' ba~,~ 




11. The prillciples have been developed ill a large body of 
precedent from this Court. The cases are categorized in, ~· ~· , 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972). See, 
Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrille ill the Supreme 
Court, " 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 ( 1960). 
12. ~· ~·, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451; 453 (1939): 
"No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or 
property to speculate as to the meanillg of penal 
@--~~tes. All are entitled to be informed as to what 
the ~ commands or forbids." (citations omitted); 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385; 391 (1962): 
". . . [A] statute which either forbids or requires 
the doillg of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application, violates the first -· 
essential of due proce~ of law. " (citations omitted). 














13.1' Grayned, supra, 408 U.S. at 108j ~oe-=tlds61!!• 5 ~~ 
United Slates v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., ·255 U.S. 81, 89 f3 (1921) 
( ". . . [T]o attempt to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent 
of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and 
punished all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and 
unreasonable in the estimate of the court and jury. "); United states 
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) (''It would certainly be dangerous 
if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who 






14. §. _g:. , Gr ayned 
) 
supra, 408 U. S. at 
109; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less 
stringent requirements of the modern vagueness cases dealing with 
• 
purely economic regulation. ~· _g:., United states v. National 
DGt~!\ 
Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act). 
15. See n. 6, supra . 
16. Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. · 1040, 1056 (1968). 
17. Appellant's Brief 17; Trans. Or. Arg. 9. 
18. Trans. Or. Arg. 9. 
19. Ibid. 
statute referred simply to "the flag of the United states . . . , " without 
further definitjon. That raises the obvious ·question whether a 6T>J~b\ 1 s 
minature cloth flag constituted "the flag of the United states. . " 
Goguen argued unsuccessfully before the state courts that the statute 
applied only to flags that met "official standards" for proportions, 
such as relation of height to width and the size of stripes and the 
field of stars, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those 















no dispute that Goguen's adornment had tho requisite number of stars 
and stripes and colors. Trans. Or. Ag. 11-12. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be covered by 
the state statute, noting that "[t J he statute does not require that the 
flag be 'official"' Commonwealth v. Goguen, _Mass. _, _, 
279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). The lower federal courts did not address 
this holding, nor do we. · We note only that the Massachusetts legis-
lature apra rently sensed an ambiguity in this respect, because 
subsequent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute to define 
what it had meant by the "flag of the United States. " IIIIIs See n. 3, 
supra. Flag defilement statutes that fail to define with _..,. 
reasonable precision what they protect have not fared well before 
vagueness challenges in the federal courts. ~· ~·, Long Island · 
~O'r~.\o't~ 
Vietnam Committee v. Cahn, 437 F. 2d 344 (CA2), cert. denied, 








21. Amsterdam, supra, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 83, n. 79. 
produced record court opinions. Trans. Oral Arg. 28. In 1968, 
a teenager in Lynn, Massachusetts was charged, apparently under the 
present statute, with desecrating the United States flag by sewing 
pieces of it into his trousers. New York Times, August 1, 1968, 
~--~4-t. 4~ ~fr.(J ~J-
Clv.-----_,..-::--: 
p. 31, col 1. The teenager was orde~d.Ato prepare and deliver an 
essay on the flag. Jll.ga-., Because the £1mmaa court continued 
the case without a finding or reported opinion, it has no precedential 
effect. 
24. ~-~·, United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 
369 (1971). 









26. The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t]he 
jury could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing 
any words of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. 
279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). Thus, the court held that 
the jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct. This is 
apparently also a holding that the jury ~t find contemptuous 
intent under the statute, although the requirement amounts to very 
little since it is so easily satisfied. The court's reference to verbal 
communication reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. New York, 
394 u.s. 579 (1969) . 






















A· With regard to prosecutorial policies, appellant cites 
'fl1 A U Cl\ C.. k 1.\J ef1 .S 
two published opinions of the ~/\Attorney General. 4 Ops. of 
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (REJFJroduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Report 
of Atty. Gen. ·, Pub. Doc. No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at 
Juris. Statement App. 53). Appellant concedes that neither deals 
with the desecration portion of the statute under which Goguen was 
Tl.\11.~; ~ (Moe, Y\1\t-\- ~~ po\~ ~. ~ p'roi.H~" t j14~t.Pa-c.c, lc r\o ~ fJit'. ~ 
convicted. [Nevertheless, appellant is cor red that they s ow a ~\·"'·~ 
,.. -4+J.~ 
. ~ l~J~· 
tendency on the part of the 1:ate Attorney General to read ¥at i~s 
portions of the statute narrowly.· At the same time, they show the 
k.d( c6 pre~~ re.c.{4..M.~"'! ~vt>tt5~....+-- ·. e. ft1tA.lSA~•* ~~~ MU. 44~ 
~~ ¥Ci\€§QQ14SB~-em~"in t'ftis l1tl\ll1@~ il:nl'~~tatute. The 
1915 opinion noted that one portion of the statute, prohibiting 
exhibition of engravings of the flag on certain articles, ~ if 
wo~ 
read literall~ make it a criminal offense to display the,...... __ 
flag itself "in many of its cheaper and more common forms. " 
Appellant's Brief 31-32. This would be a "manifest absurdity". 
Id., at 32. The 1968 opinion advised that a flag representation 
,, ,, 
pai1ted on a door was not a flag of the United States within the 
meaning of the statute. Juris. Statement App. 53-55. A contrary 
16. 
interpretation would "raise serious questions under the First and 
l 
I 
Fourteenth Amendments . . . , " given the requirement that belftiior 
made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the language of the 





29. The federal flag desecratio+tJt.tute, for example, 
reflects a Congressional purpose to do just that. In response to a 
warning by the United states Attorney General that the use of such 
'' d.efa'e,s •' 
unbounded terms as" ·· or "casts contempt ... either by 
word or act" is "to risk iJ?,validation" on due process - grounds, 
S. R.ep. No. 1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1968); H. R.. R.ep. No. 350, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967), the bill which became the federal 
statute was amended, 113 Cong. R.ec. 16449, 16450 (1967)>to reach 
only acts that physically damage the flag. The desecration provision 
of the statute, 18 U. S. C. § 700(a), declares: 
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any 
flag of the United states by publicly mutilating, defacing, 
defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall be fined 
not more than $1, 000 or imprisoned for not more than 
· one year, or both. " 
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to r~h only defined 
IIIIBt physical acts of desecration. H. R.. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 
3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not 
accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration. ")) 
S. Rep. No. 1287, sup:r:,e., at 3 ("The language· of the bill prohibits 
18. 
willful, not accidental or inadvertent 
public physical acts of desecration of the flag. ") The act has been • 
so read by the lower federal courts, which have upheld it against 
vagueness challenges. United States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96 
(CA9 1972), cert. denied, u.s. (197_); Joyce v. 









30. See n. 3, supra . 
.s:.u. V'\. ?,.. ~ -4 ':'f~ . 
19. 
31. A All fifty states have flag contempt statutes. The statutes 
are synopsized in Hearings on H. R. 271, et al, Before Sub. Comm. 
No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. , 1st Sess., 
ser. 4, pt. III at 324-46 (1967). The flag contempt statutes of most 
states are patterned after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which 11 t \1\. 
§ 3 provides that: 
"No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, 
defy, trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt 
upon any such flag, standard, color ensign or shield. " 
Compare)9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966) with Hearings on 
H. R. 271, et al, supra, at 321-46. Massachusetts, which has one 
of the "older flag laws, " Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp. at 
164, is among the handful of states that have not adopted the Uniform 
Flag Ad or a derivation. 
~0. 
3C1. t.-t, 
·. . See cases cited n. supra. Some state flag contempt 
statutes have been substantially narrowed by judicial interpretation. 
~~~·, State v. Royal, N.H. __ , 3·05 A. 2d 676, 679 (1973) 
0~~ 
(New Hampshire flag contempt statute reaches "physical abuse type 
/1 
of acts .... "). See also, State v. Hodson, 289 A2d 635 (Del. 
Super. 1972). Others have not and have not fared well in federal 
court. ~· ~, Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W. D. N.C. 1971) 
(3 judge court) (North Carolina flag desecration statute void for 
vagueness and overbreadth). See also, Long Island Vietnam Mo:attorium 
Committee v. CQhn, 437 F. 2d 344 (1970), cert. den. U.S. 
(197_) (New Yo;rk statute). Cf., Crosson v. Silver, 319 F. Supp. 













33. We are aware of course of the Firi;;t Amendment questions 
wrapped up in the flag contempt controversy. The Court of Appeals 
dealtlt with these issues at length. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d 
at 96-105. See, ~· _g:., Thayer, "Freedom of Speech and Symbolic 
Conduct: The Crime of Flag Desecration," 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 71 (1970); 
Note, "Developments in the Law -the National Security Interest and 
Civil Liberties," 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1138-1141 (1972); Note, 
66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040 (1968). However, we think the slim record 
in this case renders treatment of Goguen's First Amendment arguments 
difficult. Goguen's counsel argues that Goguen was engaged in a 
"demonstration of one" with a clear purpose to communicate. Trans. 
Or. Arg. 36-37. The record does not back him up. particularly in light 
~ 
t.ve. Ave /e+-4- -lo spec......ttt.h ~~....-. &oJM~·s f'14¥f~· 
of Goguen's decision not to take the stand1A Perhaps Goguen's P""~•e 
wasl'!llnlllilillllldl: communication. Or perhaps Goguen was engaged in 
nothing more than a thoughtless example of contemporary clothing 
fashion. The difficulty of the First Amendment issues posed by 
n~.f. dec.lrJc~ ..f-'t.te""' ~ 
outlawing flag desecration counsels forA . , ·· · -, a case where an 
$&4~ A.\1\ .~~,--~ ~~._A 
intent to communicate rests on a n~nHH' fs6l8PR~foundation. 
34. Goguen v. SmitE, supra, 343 F. Supp. at 166. 
.. 
1. ~  t1; ~ vot.2P ~ v~ ~ dkn:)r~ 
.. The - have been developed in a large body of 
precedent from this Court. The cases are categorized in, ~· g:. , 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972). See, 
Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960). 
<i. a ~· g:., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939): 
''No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or 
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal 
All are entitled to be informed as to what 
;;--~:.::::::.:~~ ommands or forbids. " (citations omitted); 
3 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 391 (19A2): 
" . [A] statute which either forbids or requires / 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application, violates the first --• 





va.e.A-i6~  tJ ~ ~ ) 
~~-~ I~ 2 LICf 7 '2._) ), I 
1ft ~ L( . ,') . ) / 
4. 
o+ if,t.t. ~;+~,(.M.,., o.f 
4. Perhaps this was because·.,....••••••lllill•=•• 
the question whether Goguen's conduct constituted physical desecration 
c:£· ) 
of the flag iiiUL 11CCI ,,. 1 Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d at 
" # 
91, n. 4 (" ... [w]e are not so sure that sewing a flag to a background 
clearly affects 'physical••• integrity."') 
5. Appendix 4. 
6. Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's 
tll1Uov-t.kl 
case was the firs) Massachusetts •••• court reading of the 
statutory language under which Goguen was ~nvicted. Trans. Or. 
li0, e~ ~ hliA ~ ~ ~(l~-?/__!1__:fJitc& 41t-tJ J')r~~ .. ___ .--.,.e~.P· ~ --------.___ 
Arg. 17-18. A There is one turn-of-the-century ·sr ~1 1 1 of one 
" 1\. -
of the commercial misuse provisions of the statute, but that case 
has no relevance here. Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co., 
IG" 1/ 
189 Mass. 76, ~ N. E. ~(1905). 
12/14/73 jo/ss 
FOOTNOTES -No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen 
1. The record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions 
and opposing briefs before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
the complaint under which Goguen was prosecuted, and Goguen's 
petition for federal habeas corpus. Appendix 1-38, 42-43. We do 
not have, nor did any state or federal reviewing court have, a trial 
transcript or a copy of the jury instructions. Trans. Or. Arg. 6, 51. 
xpression 
~ "" (A /.4.-Y'I fit 
re ill-suit 













FOOTNOTES - No. 72-1254 Smith v. Gog;uen 
1. The record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions 
and opposing briefs before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
the complaint under which Goguen was prosecuted, and Goguen's 
petition for federal habeas corpus. Appendix 1-38, 42-43. We do 
not have, nor did any state or federal reviewing court have, a trial 
transcript or a copy of the jury instructions. Trans. Or. Arg. 6, 51. 




J. M G I Ju h ")61.•, §5 (1971.). ass. en. aws 1n. c . ~ ~ Omit~ing 
several 
sentences protecting the 
, 
ceremonial activi~es 
' certain veterans groups, the statute read at the time 
Goguen's arrest and conviction as follows: 
* ::;. Fln~; penal! y fo·r mi~usr 
\Yluwvrr J>uhli<"lY IHUtilnt<'~. t r:unplPs 
npOH, ,]1-(ar·t•s or tn•:lts t•ont~mptuonsly 
the fln~ o( the ~nitt••l Statrs. 01· of 
;llassachust'U~. wh~tcr snt:lt fla:; Js pu_h· 
lie or privatt• propt•rty, <>r who<'n·r •:ts· 
plny~ sneh fin~ or nny n•prl'st'l~tnllon 
tltPI'I'O( 111'011 wltit'h :tr" Wt)I'US, ftJ~III'CS, 
:\ll\'f'l'l ist'tllClltX 01' llrsi~n~, 01' whOPVCI' 
<'fiiiS<'H 01• prrmits Slll'h flnr: to he 11"'''
1 
in n parutl•• as a rcc·rpt:ll'lt! for tlc: 
positin~ or t·ullc·etin~ 1110111')' or an) 
other nrtit-lt• or thill~. or wltrwn•r ex· 
vosPs to puhlit: vit'w, lll:"lllllf:lt·tures, 
sl'll~. t·xpo:-;P:-: for :-<:\lt', gi\'t'~ :~wn,r or 
hns in lHlSSt'ssion ft)l' ~alt' or to ~1\'t' :n~·ny 
Ol' for liS<' fnr auy purpose, nny artH:lc 
or suhstalH'P, ht·ing an nrtidc of tn~~r­
t·hnwli~P or a rPf't'pt nc~h' of nwn·handlsl~ 
or nrt il'ks upon wltidl is n~tac•h<'tl, 
tltron .~h a wr:tppin!' or otherWISt', t'll· 
J:r:l\·r·•l tll' printctl in nny llt:IIIIICr, ll rPp· 
rl'st•ntation o( 11111 l·nitr•l !-'tnt<'s. flng, 
or whul'\'CI' IIHCS nny represt'lltatHlll of 
the arms or the grPat. ~t'nl ~[ thl' t·om· 
monwralt It (ur any ntll'l·rtismr:. or t·om· 
mer..ial purpos<', shall l.H~ Jllllll~hctl hy 
n fine of not lt•ss than trn ~or ~norc 
than onQ hnlt<ll'<~<ltloltars nr hy 1111 1>1'\son· 
mcnt for nut niOr<' than <>110 ~·,•ar, 01: 
hot h \\" ortls, fiJ-:11 I"('S, ar\ l't'l't ISCIIICI~t~ 
or tl;•signs at't:!l'ht•tl to, or tlii'I'C"tl;' o_r Ill: 
rlin•l'lll' •·onn•·•·t<•tl with, Slll'h fln!, 01 nny 
rC}trt•St~lll :1tion t ltt•rpo( in Sllt'h 111:11\1.\CI" 
that Htll'h fl:t:,: Ill' its l't'(ll't'St'll(:ltiOII 
is nst•tl to attr:wh ntto•ntion to or ~·l· 
v••rt i~l' ~\l('h wnnl:-:. ri~nrr-~. :Hln!rt tsc· 
lll<'lltS Ol' t\toHi"liS, shal\ fnr thP ]tlll"jlOSCS 















The statute is an amalgam of provisions dealing with flag · 
misuse or exploitation of flags of the state and national government in 
(.oM.l-e~-1-
particular. This case concerns only theA portion of the 
statute. In 1971, subsequent to Goguen's prosecution}hat portion of 
the statute was amended twice. On March 8, 1971, the legislature, 
per st. 1971, C. 74, modified the first sentence by inserting ''burns 
or otherwise" between the terms "publicly" and "mutilates, " and, 
in addition, by increasing- the fine. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 264, 
§ 5 (1973 Supp. ). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, C 655, the 
legislature appended a new sentence defining "the flag of the United 
states" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the purpose of this 
section the term 'flag of the United states' shall mean any flag which 
has been designated by Act or Resolution of the Congress of the 
United states as the national emblem, whether or not such a designation 
is currently in force. " Ibid. The 1971 amendments are relevant 
to this case only in the tangential sense that they indicate a recognition 






o+ Tk.t. ~ t"+·4\C.M~ o .f' 
4. Perhaps this was because ~· .• 
the question whether Goguen 's conduct constituted phys ical desec ration 
. S£·) 
of the flag ~~al~ Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d at 
~ A 
91, n. 4 (" ... [w]e are not so sure that sewing a flag to a background 
5. Appendix 4. 
6. Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's 
tllflC()I~J,J 
case was the firs~ Massachusetts Q'.l&S:S• court reading of the 
-- - c 
statutory language under which Goguen was "onvicted. Trans. Or. 
~ e~<-:t~ ~(rte Ju.:~ ~~ .e-kJI!"-Jl~~~ cf!.e.v" ~?f!.__!j __ .:,{lk'--t~ 12""J /'ll '.k~/c-.4,. _ 
..---..----f" ec.-:1, ~------ _ 
Arg. 17-18. A There is one turn· of-the-century · of one 
" /\ 
of the commercial misuse provisions of the statute, but that case 
has no relevance here. Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co., 
,:; 1[ 
189 Mass. 76, rM- N. E.~ (1905). 
s-. 
7. 
precedent from this Court. The cases are categorized in, ~·_g., 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972). See, 
Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960). 
Sl 
~·_g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939): 
''No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or 
property to speculate as to the · meaning of penal 
statutes. All are entitled to be informed as . to what 
the commands or forbids. "(citations omitted); 
3 
Connally v. General C_onstruction Co., 269 U.S. 385; 391 (19,&2): 
" . [A] statute which either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application, violates the first · . 
essential of due proce~ of law. " (citations omitted). 
G. 
~ ) 
Grayned, supra, 408 U. S. at 108J· . . gee alf:l& ~·, a,t..Q.. ·4)-
/' - -
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 t$ (1921) 
( " ... [T]o attempt to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent 
of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and 
punished all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and 
unreasonable in the estimate of the court and jury. "); United States 
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous 
if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who 
could be rightfully detained, and who could be set at large. "). 
;. 
10. 
~· ~·' supra, 408 L". S. at · 
109; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less 
stringent requirements of the modern vagueness cases dealing with 
• 
.0Gt¥"') 
purely economic regulation. ~· ~·, United states v. National y 
Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act). 
See n. 6, supra. 
1~. 
a. Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040, 1056 (1968). 
1?:.. 
•· Appellant's Brief 17; Trans. Or. Arg. 9. 
/L/, 




a At the time of &:3i:!ql51D Goguen's pro~ . ~ution, the 
statute referred simply to ''the flag of the United states . . . , " without 
further definition. That raises the obvious ·question whether t. ~J"'~ 1 s 
·# 
minature cloth flag constituted "the flag of the United States. . " 
. A 
Goguen argued unsuccessfully before the state courts that the statute 
applied only to flags that met "official standards" for proportions, 
such as relation o'f height to width and the size of stripes and the 
field of stars, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those 
standards. Trans. Or. Arg. 1.1-12, 24-26; Appendix 2. There was 
. ;1 
j 
J .. l 
~ 
... 
no dispute that Goguen 's adon1ment had th e r equisite numbe r of star s 
and stripes and colors. Trans . Or. Ag. 11-12. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen' s cloth flag to be cove r ed by 
the statute, noting that "[t] he statute does not require that the 
flag be 'official"' Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. _, _, 
279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). The lower federal courts did not address 
this holding, nor do we. We note only. that the Massachusetts legis-
lature appl rently sensed an ambiguity in this respect, because 
1V. o,..<d? f:~f' 
subsequent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute to define 
.A 
what it had meant by the "flag of the United States. " .._ See n. 3, 
t:l>Vtt e wtp t 
supra. Flag statutes that fail to define with --~ ,.... 
reasonable precision what they protect have not fared well before 
vagueness challenges in the federal courts. ~·_g., Long Island ,.,....~.,..­
ft'o\"4.\o't~ 
VietnamACommittee v. Cahn, 437 F. 2d 344 (CA2), cert. denied, 
400 u.s. 264 (1970). 
'1. 
17. Amsterdam, supra , 109 U. Pa .L. Rev . at 8J, n. 79. 
18. Goguen v~ Smith, §Upra, 471 . F.2d at 90, n.2. See 
note J, supra. 
19. See note 6, supra. portion of 
the Massachusetts statute seems to have lain fallow for 
almost its entire history. There apparently have been a 
half dozen arrests under this part of the statute in recent 
years, but none of them has led to recorded court opinions. 
Trans. Or. Arg. 28. In 1968, a teenager in Lynn, r1assachusetts 
was charged, apparently under the present statute, with 
desecrating the United States by sewing pieces of it into 
his trousers. New York Times, August 1, 1968, p. Jl, col. 
1. The teenager was ordered by a state district court to 
prepare and deliver an essay on the flag. The court continued 
the case without a finding, depriving it of any precedential 
value. 
20. E.g., United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 u.s. 
36J, 369 (1971). 
21. Reply Brief 4. 
1 
22. 'rhe D:tstr 1ct Court dec is ion in this case vuJ ~-; 
entered subsequent to Picard, supra . . Yet it appears th~t 
appellant did not raise his present exhaustion of remedies 
argument before that court. The District Court 
commented specifically on this omission: ''No contention 
is now made that [Goguen] has not exhausted state remedies, 
l 
' 
nor that the constitutional issues presented here 
were not raised appropriately in state proceedings." 





Goguen filed in .~tate c:Jr p~!!l Supe.rior Court an unsuccessful 
k.e ct~ed 
motion to dismiss the complaint in which,.the Fourteenth Amendment 
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "impermissibly 
vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation by public 
officials." Appendix 1. This motion,....-'41"t'M iiGfNWQNiQp#fft;t;uaiJy 
before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was 
incorporated in Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid. In 
addi~on, Goguen's brief before that court raised vagueness points and 
cited vagueness cases. Id., at 19, 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
. I 
I 
306 U.S. 451 (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (1971) 
CC!ti\.~ew •. .p +-
(North Carolina flag statute unconstitutionally vague 
f.:. 
as well as overbroad). Appellant is correct in asserting that Goguen 
.s4-At. ~ 
failed to compartmentalize in hi~brief the due process ea=aa. 
doctriJie of vagueness and First Amendment concepts of overbreadth. 
See Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of leakage between 
those particular adjoining compartments is understandable. -Cf.' 
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844, 871-875 (1970). The highest state court'~ opinion, which dealt · 
.... 
~ ~141~) 
separately with Goguen's First Amendmen~vagueness > 
Mass. at _, 279 N. E. 2d at 667, indicates that that court was 
well aware that Goguen raised both sets of arguments. 
24. II Trans. Oral Arg. 48. 
,-;. 
(),5' 
The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t ]he 
jury could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing 
any words of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. 
279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). Thus, the court held that 
the jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct. This is 
apparently also a holding that the jury ~t find contemptuous 
intent under the statute, although the requirement amounts to very 
little since it is so easily satisfied. The court's reference to verbal 
communication reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. New York, 
394 u.s.-579 (1969). 
~4:>. 











WHh rcp,·:1rd to prosCC\.llorh1lpol.ieics, appcllJnt cites 
Y¥\ L\ ~ ~ C\ f ~ 1-t ~·,.J c-f·f .J 
iwo published opinions oi the ~Attorney Gencr:~l. 4 Ops. of 
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (Ilqr:roduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Report 
of Atty. Gen., Pub. Doc.· No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at 




·" portion of the statute under which Goguen was 
TIA~~ J ~ a.v-e.~-\- .~ po~~ ~. ~ p-ro1.n~..J _..:f~A-~t.P~u. ~ Y\o ~~ f.J't'o. l-k.t. 
convicted. Ar-:Nevertheless, appeiiant is correct that they s 1ow a ~v~ 
p --4+~~ 
~~~~· 
tendency on the part of theftate Attorney General to read"~ 
re.Cied-
portions of the statute narrowly. At the same time, they ll the 
~ D-6 pre~td-v... rec..kAt.r\·vs ~vo't.S~w.J- ·~te. fl'ltA.:.s(..~e.ll.r ~~~ M~l4s..a. 
rs:r:n~~u~~~s,.px:ob1-e:m·s··4n-th~-i'11'lp'lle-G>i~e,!tatute. The 
1915 opinion noted that one portion of the statute, prohibiting 
exhibition of engravings of the flag on certain articles if 
wor.J.el 
read literallJA make it a criminal offense to display the ~~ 
flag itself "in many of its cheaper and more common forms. " 
Appellant's Brief 31-32. This would be a "manifest absurdity". 
Id., at 32. The 1968 opinion advised that a flag representation 
,, ,, 
pahted on a do1.0r was not a flag of the United States within the 
meaning of the statute. Juris. Staten1ent App. 53-55. A contrary 
a 
IS. 
interpretation would "raise serious questions under the First and 
j 
j Fourteenth Amendments . . . , " given the requirement that belfti.ior 
made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the language of the 
statuL,;. " Id. , at 54. 
' . 
.. 
2Q. The federal flag desec ratioTt'Jttute, for example, 
reflects a Congress ional purpose to do just that. In response to a 
warning by the United States Attorney General that the use of such 
\I cie f a'es ,, 
unbounded terms as At!ZmiD or "casts contempt ... either by 
word or act" is "to risk invalidation" on due process grounds, 
If.. . 
S. R.ep. No. 1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1968); H. R. R.ep. No. 350, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967), the bill which became the feder8J 
statute was amended, 113 Cong. R.ec. 16449, 16450 (1967)>to reach 
only acts that physically damage the flag. The desecration provision 
of the statute, 18 U. S. C. § 700(a), declares: 
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any 
flag of the United States by publicly mutilatin g, defacing, 
defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall be fined 
not more than $1, 000 or imprisoned for not more than 
one year, or both. " 
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to r~h only defined 
physical acts of desecration. H. R.. R.ep. No. 350, supra, at 
3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not 
accidental or in8_dvertent public physical acts of desecration. ")) 
S. R.ep. No. 1287, supr~, at 3 ("The langua ge of the bill prohibits 
.. .... 
public physical acts of desecration of the flag. ") The act has been 
• 
so read by the lower federal courts, which have upheld it against 
vagueness challenges. 
( CA9)~ cert. ded. 
{\ 
United States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96 
4o7 1o6'1 u.s. ( 197 a ); Joyce v . ...- ~ ""'-







See n. 3, supra . 
.s:.u. V\. 'l,. ~ ~y-fl(, • 
3t . A All fifty states have flag contempt statutes. The statutes 
are synopsized in Hearings on H. R. 271, et al, Before Sub. Comm. 
No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 
ser. 4, pt. III at 324-46 (1967). The flag contempt statutes of most 
states are patterned after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which 1:1 tv... 
§ 3 provides that: 
"No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, 
defy, trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt 
upon any such flag, standard, color ensign or shield. " 
Compare/ Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966) with Hearings on 
H. R. 271, et al, supra, at 321-46. Massachusetts, which has one 
of the "older flag laws, " Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp. at 
164, is among the handful of states that have not adopted the Uniform 
Flag Ad: or a derivation. 
?J' 
t..<S, 
. Sec cases ciled n. P supra. 
/' ---- Some state flag contempt 
statutes have been substantially narrowed by judicial interpretation. 
~~_g., State v. Royal, N.H. __ , 305 A. 2d 676, 679 (1973) 
o~t...,_ 
(New Hampshire flag contempt statute reaches 'ttl "physical abuse type 
~ 
of acts .... "). See 9l§.Q, State v. Hodson, 289 A2d 635 (Del. 
Super. 1972). others have not and have not fared well .in federal 
court. ~· ff, Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W. D. N.C. 1971) 
t.-C~-t fe >ff 
(3 judge court) (North Carolina flag statute void for 
I 
vagueness and overbreadth). See also, Long Island Vietnam Monttorium 
Lj()O <J.. {,. 'f 
Committee v. CQhn, 437 F. 2d 344 (1970), cert. den. ~U.S. _ 
(197 D) (New York statute). Cf., Crosson v. Silver, 319 F. Supp. ,.,...,.... -
1084 (D. Ariz. 1970) (3 judge court) (Arizona statute). 
,' 
I 
(?~ \ \t~ ...... "-..! ' 
I ;~ II) V)' 
L. ~ 
• !I 
3a. We arc aware of course of lhe Fir !-;t Amendment questions 
.f' wrapped up j.n the fl ag contempt controversy. The Cour t of Appeals 
~ 
dealt[) with these issues at length. Gogu en v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d 
----------. · ~ ; at 96-105. See, ~· fi· ,,i!'hayer, "Freedom of Speech and Symbolic 
/ 
Conduct: The Crime of Flag Desecration," 12 Ariz~ L. Rev. 71 (1970); 
Note, "Developments in the Law - the National Security Interest and 
Civil Liberties," 84 Harv. L. Rev. · 1130, 1138-1141 (1972); Note, 
66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040 (1968). However, we think the slim record 
.. 
Ma.-k e.> i+ ';,." prro p11 fJl:t5 -/v t(nA.Su;b....., 
in this case/\ Goguen's First Amendment arguments. 
Goguen's counsel argueJthat Goguen was engaged in a 
"demonstration of one" with a clear purpose to communicate. Trans. 
Or. Arg. 36-37. The record does not back him up. particularly in light 
~ 
t.u e. llW'e /e+.+ -k> spec.wt~ ~D~ !.""'.J to~ oa... '.s pi41r ft>Se · 
of Goguen's de.cision not to take the stand_, A Perhaps Goguen's ~;:,~ 
j(>~l'- was l'~e:~,Pf~·~ communication. Or perhaps Goguen was engaged in 
nothing more than a thoughtless example of contemporary clothing 
fashion. The difficulty of the First Amendment issues posed by 
, .jf4; VL U~ W':;J, 
f: ICLj C.0"'--~"'1'+ .s~J~d-es · a-'JJ.-U.<s+ - d e(,1'c) 1'""' J.d.t~ t......... 
. ) 
· .. · " · . counsels AfX::::..~:?:..~!~":,'..:t.m- a case where an 
"v.-.?l euc~oop';o. e 
$1.4""' O<.V\ . . • .r~c..+""' , ..... Q r--· 
intent to communicate r ests on .a~R-1€':1"-fe.fiB-1\~}Joundation. · 
34 . \ 
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to the mark. But we see the force of the District Court's conclusion 
that since the flag has become "an object of youth fashion and high 
tU 
camp . . . , " it is by no means certain as it might have been at 
.A 
another time in this country's history that wearing a miniature 
flag on one's clothing constitutes criminal contempt. 343 F. Supp. 
at 164, 167. ~ceremonial treatment of the flag in many contexts 
has become a widespreadA••••• contemporary phenomenon, 
Appellant argues that any notice difficulties are ameliorated 
by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the 
/3 
United states. This allegedly "takes some of the vagueness away 
,q 
from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously~ . . " Anyone who "wants 
notice as to what this statute proscribes, ... immediately knows 
?. 
that it has something to with flags • and if he wants to stay 
jcut 
clear of violating this statute, he lilt has to stay clear 
,s-
of doing something to the United States flag." But quite 
apart from the difficulties presented by the concept of an 
I~ 
uactual" flag, we fail to see how this alleged particularity 
resolves the central vagueness question presented--the 
r LL-
a?sence of any stand~d for defining cont~mptkous treatmente . 
Appellant's argument that the language provides 
adequate warning of what constitutes contempt rests in 
large measure, as the Court of Appeals put it, on the 
11 unarticulated premise" that the statute • "is not vague 
as to one who sews a flag to the seat of his pants.n 471 
F.2d at 91.. 
,... e The arguament assumes that it would be 
"" 
reasonably clear to anyone of "common intelligence", 
Connally v. General Construction Co, 269 u.s. 385, 391 
(j932), that this particular use of the flag would consti-
e..ueV\ ~~ ~ s~ ~ 4o cle.+t~ ~~+~ /YeJ~. 
tute criminally contemptous behavior, ~ Or, putting it 
~ iU-e-~ ct> ~ ../)~ J~'4f k ~ ~ 
differently, appellant is forcedAto argue that contemporary 
community understanding ... should enable a reasonable person 
to distinguish the culpability of wearing a small flag on 
' 
~').t~~4R~ 
one's pants from the many argu~ly innocent Aof our 
national emblem, such as wearing it at other places on one's 
I 
~3 
moun t a vagueness at t ack in t he stat~ courts . We do not 
I dea l wi t h the point a t l ength, however , for we f i nd 
the per tinent statut ory l anguage imperm i ssibly vague as 
applied to Goguen. In light of the Mas sachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court's explicit holding on vagueness "as applied," 
Commom>real th v. Goguen, 11ass. , 279 N.E.2d 666, 667 
(1972~ and given app~llant's concession, we have no doubt • 
that the "substance" of this claim was "fairly 
presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion s'IJ%!dards 
of Picard, supra, 404 U.S. at 275, 278. 
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is 
pr:emised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him 
I as 
a hard core vio~atorAto whom the statute was not vague, 
!! •• &. whatever its implications for those engaged in differen,t w~ 
~ ~isz_ ·~ 
I'('- We find no merit to such a distinction in this case . . -lt-i& ~ it.te.i kv1M4 ~e- ~~~ ~ . 
~"' ~ r~ ri~ 111 ~ ~~ t:1f 4d-ud&;) M 0~ 
true that a statute may be vag:ue as to a particular violator, without 
tt~ -b ~1 ~~~ ~~ ~atflrH~~- ~ ~4~~ l-ui-? ~a. 
neeessa:nly bentg faemlly vague. But th1s ca1u:~.ot ~aul wtth respeet 1 
~ 
~ criminal statute .iaa:t is vague "not in the sense that it requires 
a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible 
normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct 
is specified at all. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 
(1971). Such a statute simply has !!.Q core. '-----------~ 
The abs ence of an ascer t a ina ble 
standard for i nclus ion and exclus ion, or of guidelines I 
8. 
0 ~ -tfA.e b l.l ~p-eA. 0 .p. 
clothes or displaying i~A_. ................ . one's 




adequately to take into account ... ~widely varying attitudes 
and tastes for displaying something as ubiquitous as the 
United States flag or representations of it. Precisely 
because display of our flag is so common and takes so many 
~ of.fe,.,... ok+ft~ ~ ~~"flU-'~) .@ 9 
forms, changing from one generation to another~ a legis-
lature should define with some precision those forms of 
; t m e"-V\.~ 
treatment of the flag~ ....... to outlaw. I The "publicly 
. . • treats contemptuously" phrase does not do so. 
Whatever doubts may exist here as to whether Goguen 
was fairly warned or should have known .. the consequences 
of his behavior simply by the force of its offensiveness are 
overcome by the statute's plain failure to meet the other 
principal requirement of the vagueness doctrine. The 
/1 
vagueness concept of notice has a certain fictional flavor. 
This is particularly so in a .. noncommerical context, where 
as a general rule behavior is not mapped out in advance 
on the basis of statutory language. In such cases, 
perhaps .. the more meaningful aspect of the vagueness doc-
trine is not true notice but the requirament that a legis-
lature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. ~ 
In this regard, the language under which Goguen was charged 
is notably deficient. 
12. 
susceptible of common understanding, is precisely what 
offends the Due Process Clause. Such a deficiency is 
particularly objectionable in view of the unfettered 
latitude thereby accorded law enforcement officials and 
triers of fact. Where this problem exists and until 1t 
is corrected either by amendment or ta judicial construe-. 
tion, it affects all who are prosecuted under the 
~ ()Lv\. opUAl;.._ ) f:l.uz. proto lbk ~(s.fs: I;_,. ~.s C-CIJ4/l- • 
statutory language. A The language at issue here is void for 
vagueness in Goguen's case because it subjected Goguen to 
criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that 
eo~~jury 
... police) were free to express 
nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of 
the flag. 
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavailing. 
I~ 
' -Finally, appellant argues that sta~ law enforcement authorities 
have shown themselves ready to interpret this penal statute •••• 
narrowly and that the statute, properly read, reaches only direct, 
immediate contemptuous acts- that "actually impinge upon the 
physical integrity of the flag. 
"1 • for the former point.~
" There is no support in the record 
~ Similarly, nothing in the state court's opinion in 09g'Hn':~ IUplll case 
€Cllr-l td.v- 0 'f4 k lJ...... 0~ ~ U» ~.~..AT 
or in any aS I! 1 1 u P 2 · i 1 · · sustains the latter. In 
{)..1/l.r).q. 
any event, Goguen .was charged onlyl\..a the wholly open-ended 
language of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously". 
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature and 
variety of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot establish 
standards with great precision. Control of the broad range of disorderly 
conduct that may inhibit a policeman in the performance of his official 
Y"'~ be.. 
duties 1\ one such area. Cf.J Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). 
But there is no comparable need for committing broad discretion to 
law enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt. Nothing 
prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what 
. ~ 
~g 
constitutes forbidden treatment of-United States flags. The state's 
failure to approach this goal in the statutory language at 





Although we hold the "publicl~treats contemptuously" ph w-as e. 
W § g void for vagueness, we do not address in this case the "+-..+-.J.e '.J 
Oy. '""" <:/1 first six words ef ~:he ~@tt+rt.M!e , er Uti commercial misuse provisions. 
C-oi"'JeJ.Mf+ o V"' J.eseer-a.Pto~ 
In light of the universal adoptimJof flag,_: statutes by the 
3D .fu~ 
federal and state governments, we emphasize that we -
do not hold that the due process doctrine of vagueness invalidates 
~e 
all statutes. The validity of .-...li statutes)... insofar 
wdl 
as the vagueness doctrine is concerned, . ...<depend on their particular 
3 1 
language, judicial construction, and enforcement history. And, as 
noted earlier, we do not deal here with the question whether the 
-Pl~ ~IU.k ~wA 
Massachusett~statute or othe~ statutes are valid under the First 
3;).. a Amendment. 
33 
Goguen's "silly conduct" finds no sympathy here. But this 
is a country devoted to the rule of law, and the requirements of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to those.-:: 
given to adolescent behavior as 
well as to anyone else. An irony in this is that those who benefit 
Ito 
• 
most from a government of principled laws are probably the least 
likely to reflect on their good fortune. The judgment is affirmed. 













Although we hold the "publicly t reats contemptuous ly" phretS e 
. " 
••-Ill void for vagueness, we do not address in this case the J~-f..Je '.J 
o~\~ dq 
first six words M-.~he sWttt-e"o@¥ iM commercial misuse provisions. 
· · CoMJeV<-<p+ c. , ... cl.:esec r-Jte,:.,__ 
In light of the universal adoptio1of flag/' - . · ·· statutes by the 
3D . .J..~;;tt.v"-' 
federal and state governments, we emphasize that we ~ 
do not hold that the due process doctrine of vagueness invalidates 
insofar . 
will 
as the vagueness doctrine is concerned,,Adepend on their particular 
. 3 I 
language, judicial construction, and enforcement history. And, as 
noted earlier, we do not deal here with the question whether the 
fl t¢q 1~ t~-;,e .4o-<cA. 
Massachusett~statute or other statutes are valid under the First 
A 
. -------. -------- . 
e Process Cla~f~llef(;urteenth Amendment extend to tho ~ 
EE~~~~-~Sii~~ili~·~ven t;-----=-ntJ)e~ 
I 1 
-Finally, appellant argues thai st~t~ law enforcement authorities 
have shown themselves ready to interpret this penal statute ~t 
.l 
narrowly and that the statute, properly read, reaches only direct, 
immediate contemptuous acts that "actually impinge upon the 
physical integrity of the flag. " There is no support in the record 
,.1 
~ 
for the former point.') . 
r----------..- ~ 
~ Similarly, nothing in the ~?tate court's opinion in 6:8~8R ' s 8wn
4
case 
ectrl~ ... ~ op.11td ......... o.<:: -~ {p.;VI,.r 
or: in any Mi'M:bsw•fAr;~S;es sustains the latter. In 
i-(Vtctl'l.-
any event, Goguen· was charged only A · the wholly open-ended 
language of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously". 
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature and 
variety of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot establish 
standards with great precision. Control of the broad range of disorderly 
conduct that may inhibit a policeman in the performance of his official 
rv,~ h?.. 
duties 1\ one such area. Cf.) Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). 
But there is no comparable need for committing broad discretion to 
law enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt. Nothing 
prevents a legisl<:tture from defining with substantial specificity what 
. ~ 
constitutes forbidden treatment of ·.· United States flags~g The state's 
failure to approach this goal in the statutory language at 
issue requires invalidation of Goguen's conviction • 
. . 
····----- ·-- ·------------~----· ----
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72 - 1254 SMITH v. GOGUEN 
The Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachus etts, appeals 
from a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
. h o/tl, ~f; C.ovtkV>-<-f+· 
Circui~ . theA provision of the Massachusetts fl~ misuse 
statute fa unconstitutionally vague and overbroad . . Goguen v. Smith, 
~· 
/fiJ. q"s-
noted, . U.S. (1973). We affirm on theA \D-db~.,...~· ... ~-· .... ~· ~;y 
tft7v=" /\ p;fi.A..-- I\ 
-~--· We do not reach the correctness of the holding below 
on overbreadth or other First Amendment grounds. 
I 
The slender record in this casi reveals little more than that 
Goguen wore a small cloth version of the United States flag sewn 
to the seat of his pants. The flag, approximately three by five inches 
or four by six inches, was clearly visible to passersby. On January 
pal1 LP- tt1. 






encountered Goguen standing and talking with a_ group of persons on a 
( l ( )(11.1./'a..llj.<. ft .. <j l.U .:l/.1 
public street. The group · · )~ not eng-aged in any demonstra-
disruption of traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this 
officer approached Goguen to question him about the flag, the other 
persons present expressed their amusement. Some time later, the 
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking in the 
downtown business district of Leominister. 
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint against 
CoVtkl¥+ 




~.--~...,..."'4 This provision./l.read, in relevant part: 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces 
or treats contemptuously the flag of the United states ••. , 
whether such flag is public or private property . . . , 
shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more 
than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not 
more than one year, or both .... 11 3 
Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was not charged 
with any act of physical desecration~f As permitted by the disjunctive 
L.(J ~ 'tJ e~.--4. p+· 
structure of the0 · · provision, the officer charged specifically 
and only that Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of 
the United states. . . II 
'. J .. ,, 






















A jury convened .in the Worcester Coun~y Superior Court fotmd 
Goguen guilty. The court imposed a sentence of six months in the 
Massachusetts House of Corrections. Gowen appealed to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed •••--, 
' 
Mliilliiii•O:Ic~w.hXlit Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. _, 279 
N. E. 2d 666 (1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness arguments_ 
other circumstances, we see no vagueness in the statute as applied 
here. " Id. , Mass. at __ , 279 N. E. 2d at 667. 1w ?'ZM~Ci:t: of 
it..U:auld~WilJRWtttt tlf~e~ fue court cited no Massachusetts 
precedents interpreting the statutory language under which Goguen 
lo 
was charged. 
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was granted bail 
and then ordered released on a writ of habeas corpus by the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Goguen v. 
Smith, _§_upra, 343 F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag 
wrde,"-f+· 
· IM 






' .. . 
under the Due Process Clause of t he Fourteenth Arnr nd-
me nt as we l l as overbroad und er t he Firs t Amendment . In 
"' r~ l cJ ·~- I,.L.. 
~====~~:a·~.Goguen's void for vagueness arg~ments , t he 
District Court concluded that the words 11 tr eats contemptuously ' 
did not provide a "readily ascertainable standard of • 
guilt . 11 I d • , at /lv 1. 
1/1 I I 
Especially in these days •when flags 
are commonly displayed on hats, garments and vehicles • • . '' 
words 
the under which Goguen was convicted 11 leave 
conjectural, in many instances, what conduct may subject 
the actor to criminal prosecution." Ibid. The court also 
found that the statutory language at issue 11 ma.y be said to 
encourage arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. 11 
A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court in all respects. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F.2d 88. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that "resolution of @oguen' s 
void for vaguenes~ challenge to the statute as applied to 
him necessarily adjudicates the statute's facial constitu-
tionality . . . . " I£·~ at 94. Treating as-applied and on-
the-face vagueness attacks as essentially indistinguishable 
' ' ph r-c...!;.e.. . 
in light of the A ~ ...... - of the statutory~ ·- " . 
. 'Ic: ~ ) J. q;)..) ct..J) ·~ 
at issue,Athe court foundAthe langua ge failed to provide 
adequa t e warning , failed to provide sufficient guiUeline s 
for l aw enfor c ement officia l s , a nd set juries and courts a t 
.· 








tfl/ - 1-1 1. • large. Id., at /4J Then C1rcujt Jud ge, now 
Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation from 
the Ninth Circuit, concurred solely on void for vagueness 
grounds. 1£., at 105. t Judge Hamley thouglA the majority's 
extensive treatment of overbreadth and the other First 
Amendment issues raised by Goguen unnecessary to the 














Wr::. ~.x!)ret: tvdi1 ht:..il4. (()w::,.,.1 .(.?cl' .. ""<-·.:1! '"''u.{lr tL!,::i t'Lc..&-z... 
settled principles of the due process doctrine of vagueness /1 
.• 6~~.-Jf-.t.L t<.>t.:'d l?-<(PrPl .. •,} /o -~~~v'<,.,P ke.'·i dr ·1 t.<:•p•£4 ~·f:'.i..2€?tf. /kov:z /r'-"~-•t.tf' L'-;;> 
t\require no extensive restatement here. 11 The doctrine incorporates 
~~IV' f6 
notions of fair warning. Moreover, it requires legislatures to set 
" 
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers 
pr-eue.c.P.. 9 
of fac~ in order to~ "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.11 
Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state 
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the 
First Amendment, the doctrineA=~te~ a greater degree of 
/0 
specificity than in other contexts. The statutory language at issue 
here, "publicly ... treats contemptuously the flag of the United 
* States ... , "has such scope, ~· ~· Street v. New York,394 U.S. 
" 
I 
576 (1969) (verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant timef was 
without the benefit of judicial clarification.'' 
Flag contempt statutes have bee~~i=y 
vague for lack of notice on the theory that "[w ]hat is contemptuous 
(J.. 
to one man may be a work of art for another." Goguen's behavior 
l( . ,, ,/' .. .. J ~ , , 13 
<.rL S• ~ ~01) 







In its terms , the language at issue is sufficien:ly 
" unbounded to pr~ohi bit, as the District Court noted. 
''any public deviation from formal flag etiquette. • 
tiS 
J4J F. Supp. at 167. Enacted in 1899 and unchanged since, 
the "publicly • • • treats contemptuously" phrase was also 
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the 
lq 
~ time in this case. We are without authority to 
'J_() 
cure that defect. Statutory languag~ of such a standardless 
sweep allows policemen, prosecutors and juries to pursu~ 
their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so 
abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards 
of the criminal law. E.g., Papachristou v. City of 
rs(>> (lctU), 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 166-68A ln Gregory 
v. City of Chicago, 394 u.s. 117, 120 (1969), Mr. Justice 
Black voiced a concern that we share against entrusting 
lawmaking "to the moment-to.-moment judgment of the 
policeman on his beat. tt 'I' he aptness of Nr. Justice Black 's 
warning is evident from appellant's candid concession in oral 
argument before the Court of Appeals regarding state enforce-
tltwJ--
ment standards forAportion of the statute under which 






". [A]s cot~dmitted, a war protestor who, 
while attending a rally at which it begin.s to rain, 
evidences his disrespect for the American flag by 
contemptuously covering himself with it in order 
to .avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the 
Massachusetts statute. Yet a member of the American 
Legion who, caught in the same rains1f?&hl while 
returning from an 'America - Love It or Leave It' 
rally, similarly uses the flag, but does so regrettably 
and without a contemptuous attitude, would not be 
prosecuted. " 471 F. 2d at 102. 
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such selective law 
enforcement, there is a denial of due process. 
Appellant's arguments that the "publicly • treats 
contetnptuously" phrase is not imperm1ss1 bly vague, or at 
I 
\ 
~ \_~st should not b1 so held in this ca~e. az unpersuas:ve.'; 
I\ 
Appellant devotes c substantial portion of his opening brief, 
his oral argument, to the contention that Goguen -- ~ -
failed to ~serve his present void for vagueness claim for 
the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Appellant 
concedes that the issue of "vagueness as applied" is properly 
a1 
before the federal courts, but contends that Goguen's only 
arguable claim is that the statute is vague on its face. 'l'he 
latter claim, appellant insists, was not presented to the sstate 
courts with the requisite fair pa precision. Picard v. Connor, 
L/D~ 4 .S. J..lo ( Jq 11) r 
~~ 
This exhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly raised 
;t 




mount a vagueness attack in the state courts. We do not 
for 
deal with the point at length, however, we find 
the pertinent statutory language impermissibly vague as 
applied to Goguen. In light of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court's explicit holding on vagueness "as applied," 
Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass . , 279 N.E.2d 666, 667 
(1972J and given appellant's concession, we have no doubt • 
that the "substance" of this claim was .. "fairly 
presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion s~dards 
of Picard , supra, 404 ·U.S. at 275, 278. 
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is 
pr~mised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him 
as 
a hard core violatorAto whom the statute was not vague, 
whatever its implications for those engaged in differenct 
St.f~' dt~h~~ I 
conduct. We do not agree with this The 
gravamen of the due process doctrine of vagueness is that a 
statute has no core. The doctrine voids a criminal statute 
that is vague "not in the sense that it ·requires a person 
to conform his conduct to an imprescise but comprehensible 
normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard 
of conduct is specified at all.'' Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 
402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). The absence of an ascertainable 
standard for inclusion and exclusion, or of guidelines 
... 
·' 
Appellant argues that any notice difficulties are ameliorated 
by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the 
/3 ,.,. '"""' .t "'--' ~ 
United States. 'i'ais teH:;~;::takes some of the vagueness away 
tl{ 
from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously: . " Anyone who "wants 
notice as to what this statute proscribes, ... immediately knows 
_.L .... ::L---
h 
that 1 t has something to with flags t=t and if he we..nts t o s ' ay ,. 
J.usr 
clear of violating this statute, he . has to stay clear 
I~ 
of doing something to the United States flag." But quite 
a ~ · ~ . . 
apart from the ~~a~ presented by the concept of an 
It:> 
' 1actual" flag, we fail to see how this alleged particularity 
resolves the central : agueness question pres:nted--the \ 
absence of any stand~d for defining cont:empt~ous treatmento. \ 
'. 
susceptible of commo:n understanding, · is precisely wha t 
offends the Due Process Clause. Such a deficiency is 
particularly objectionable in view of the unfettered 
latitude thereby accorded law enforcement officials and 
triers of fact. Where this problem exists and until it 
is corrected either by amendment or Ga judicial construe-. 
t1on, it affects all who are prosecuted under the 
~ DU.A "P~~u"~ ) ttu.. prot,&-.. 0-.xlsk 1:.,.. ~ cc->..t.-e.. . 
statutory language. A The language at issue~ is void for 
vagueness 1R ee~weR ' Q ees · because it subjected Goguen to 
criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that 
Co•~ e-J. jury 
.. police) 
nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of 
the flag. 
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavailing. 
~1 
l 
- (;-:-.:::----- .. ·---·---~-·----··------
t;· cr imj.llerrJ.iability under standard~ s o · indefinite that the police. /) 
~ I ...,. . .,.,..., 
/"'"" ....,..""""'- _,.....rt"....... ._,.,..., 
~· ....,.,,. "'' /", 
and the jl\;t;.Y ~:re free t9,.4ress ess ept-ia1ly nothing 9)-~fe, than thei 
/"" . ;"" "".P' ,,,.-' ~ 
/ .~/. / /,/ 
own pref7S for trea.tm rtf" of the flag. / ~-
~- .. -1 /.v; --- / 
Appellant's arguments to the contrary 'are ot pe ua,_ve . ., 
1\ :.__...T 
I+ i~ ,~~0-.;:J:;u.'~ 
-~Q:=.IS~- that the first six words of the statute add specificity 
A 
A - 1/1.1' .k 
to the "treats contemptuously" phrase) 
. ~0 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Cour~a}3t}~le-of-statut~ 
.. 
~,l.w..?44, ~ . 
interpretation of const~in~feneral lan~age to take on color from 
more specific accompanying language. But it is conceded that Goguen 
was convicted under the general phrase alone, and that the highest 
()'-/ 
specific principle of statutory interpretation in this case. Appellant 
als o argues that the Supreme Judicial Court · · in Goguen's case 
~~$ ~s-
A restricted the scope of the statute to intentional con tempt. Aside 
from the problems presented by an appellate court's limiting 
construction in the very case in which a defendant has bern tried 
;;;h cla.v-·1 ~-lJ 
under a previously unnarrowed statute, this still does not/ . 
\..l¢11\.t)~c,..f- ~$+-;+~ 
what - ·:;;\contempt, whether intentional or iriadvertent. 
.·. 
./ . 
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SMITH v. GOGUEN 
The Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, appeals 
fro m a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
· h o 1 d /(~ CD V\ +-e v-.~ r+· 
Cil cui~ theA · provision of the .Massachusetts fl~' misuse 
stat 1t e unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 
. . .frolo' 
471 F . 2d 88, aff' g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1972), uris . 
. · · ft,:;. ·. · q~s ··.· · · · .. ·a ,. 
nm.ed, ' u.s. (1973). We affirm on. theA·----··g· - - pt;t;=l, Atfo4- . ,, 
~t:..~••· We do not reach the correctness of the holding below 
or: overbreadth or other First Amendm ent grounds. 
I 
, .......... 1':. :•· .·• 
The slender record in this case reveals little more than that . . 
C-vguen wore a small clo~h. version .of the United States flag sewn 
i 
tc, the seat of his pants. The flag, approximately three by five inches 
ot four by six inches, was clearly visible to passersby. On January 
poliU"· 1 t1. 
30. 1970, tw~ officers Leominister, Massachusetts a:s~JI 
2. 
encountered Goguen standing and talking with a group of persons on a 
o rr i.J./U' .. u. '.j w .:.v.1 
public street. The group not engaged in any demonstr a-
~isruption of traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this 
Qfficer approached Goguen to question him about the flag, the other . ,, 
~~rsons present expr"'s sed their. amusement. Some time later, the 
. · ... . •. ,. 
~1e,cond ·office.r observ-ed Goguen in the same attire walkmg in the 
~owntown business dist r ict of Le~minister. 
~rhe follow.i.n~ day the first officer swore out a complaint against 
covde rkf+ 
goguen under the £::_..,;111•• provision _of the Massachusetts flag misuse 
~1 · · .f.hel-\. 
This provision.Aread, in relevant part: statute. 
tc t: 
: , 
1Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or t.reats contemptuously the flag of the United states ... ~ 
whether such fla g is public or private property . . . , 
shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more 
than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not 
more than one year, or both. . . . " 3 · · 
Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was not charged 
c . 
with any act of physical desecration~ As permitted by the disjunctive 
C~.H/t.JeVL,_ p·t-
structure of the0<Z provision, the officer charged specifically 
and only that Goguen 11did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of 
the Unite l . 'tate ·. . . II 
. ·,. 
3. 
A jury convened in the Worcester County Superior Court found 
Goguen guilty. The court imposed a sentence of six months in the 
Massachusetts House of Corrections. Gog..t. en appealed to the 
'Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed ala!~~ 
r 
' """{' . 
·M~~Iiillill~li=-m·m1._ Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. _ ., 279 · 
JN. ·E . 2d. 666 (1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argument~· 
with the comment that "[w ]hatever the uncertainties in 
<bther 'circumstances, we see no yagueness in the statute as applied 
here. 11 ~id. /C~ Mass. at __ , 279 N. E. · 2d at 667. is s pp 1:t: of ·. 
~14='!irlll'm11fjdttM.&-:~~--.-a•s=:mmai;;' iillirilMB'+il' lli4t=l!=e=•=•PI::IIr""g--•~"' lhe court cited no Massach.usetts 
1_1recedent s interpret~g the statutory language under ~h-ich Goguen 
t 1 iF1R. :J ·: : .. •: ~. ·. 
: . .. . ···. · 
111 ("' ( !.:· ., . c . 
Mter Goguen began serving his sentence, he was granted bail 
and then ordered released on a writ of habeas corpus by the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Goguen v. 
Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag 
IM 
liBD£:C1J portion of the Massachusetts statute lf\\Permissibly vague 
4. 
under the Due Proc ess Clause of the . Fourteenth Amend -
ment as well as overbroad under the First Amendment. In 
1-1p ~t cJ ~ ~J l-l, 
~~~~~~~_ Goguen' s void for vagueness arg~ments, t he 
District Court conc l uded that the words "treats contemptuously" 
did not provide a "readily ascertainable standard of 
guilt. 11 lQ._. , at/~ 1 . 
Ill ,, 
· Es~ecially in th~se days- •when flags 
are commonly displayed on hats, garments and v~hicles (.l • • ' 
,. . t 
~ \ ~ - \ . 
words 
.the lllli:d!E!IIB.Itl under -which .Goguen was convicted. "leave 
conjectura l , in many instances, what conduct may subject 
( I l • (. ' ' -
the actor t o criminal prosecution." Ibid. The cour t also 
}: l :·.' \. t tO j'-' I • • • • f 
found-tha t t he statutory language at issue "may be said to 
encourage arbitrary and erratic arrests and convic t i ons. " 
. . . . . .. 
-,., ,_ ,..,),, A majority of t he Court of Appeals affirmed the Dts trict 
\, "·-•··' L J. • •· . 
'• 
Court in all respec t s. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F62d 88. 
rrhe Court of Appeals concluded that ttresolution of @oguen Is 
.I .~ .. 
/_ 
void f or vaguenes~ challenge to the statute as appl ied to 
him necessarily ad judicates the statute's facial cons t1tu-
t1onal ity •••• 11 ~.)at 94. Treating as-applied and on-
t he-face vagueness a ttacks as essentia~ly indistingui shable 
(Jh N.S. !C. 
in light of the /l.l&lt!!:'JfBD:D:IIIfll:l• of the statutory,._,··"" -
:Ic~ ) J- f( J .. ) •1•J; 
at iss ue,Athe court 
' . ' 
I M\)r-e.c t ~to~ 
·Ht.;.l-
f ound. t he language failed to provide 
.A 
adeq uate warn i ng , fa iled to provide sufficient guHle11nes 
for l aw enforcement off icia l s , and se t juri es and cou:rts at 
tl 
. . . 
large . Id., at ' q'l - 96. · 'l'hen Circuit Judge, now 
Sen i or Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation from 
t he Ninth Circuit, concurred solely on void for vagueness 
• t 
grounds. ~.,at 105. Judge Hamley thoug~ the majority's 
extens ive treatment of overbreadth and the other First 
Amendment issues raised by Goguen unnecessary to the 
decision of the case. ~· 
• • # ~ . - ·. . ,1' -~· . . . ... 
·. : _ ~- ,. , t _._, .. 
II 
,_ . -· We agree with both lower federal courts that under 
the due process doctrine of vagueness 
. ~ se-1-l!-e c.l . . . 
GPg~:Ien W~S entitled to federal habeas corpus relief; '-~ 'IJj'--
o.f- ·~J c~cf...-,~~ 7 
p~inciples~require no extensive restatement here. The 
· doctr i ne . incorporates 
' I 




·(lot,~ .... t> -r f6 
•• • 
notions of faiA warning. Moreover, it requires legislatures to set 
r easonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers 
r. · ~ · · pt-eueuf- 9 
of fac~ in order to.t "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.1' 
, 
\Nhere a statutevs literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state • '-4~ 
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the 
cl e.t."-\ll.A..j s 
f:i'rst Amendment, the doc~rineA a greater degree of 
. . I~ . 
specificity than :in other contexts. The statutory language at issue 
hie~e~ 1'publicly . " t reats contemptuously the flag of the United 
(] (. r '*' . 
States . . 0, 11 has such scope, ~· ~· street v. New York,394 U.S. ,.. 
576 (1969) (verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant timef was 
without the benefit of judic.ial clarification.'' 
Cti.AV"~~3~ 
I 
Flag contempt statutes have bee~llta••••• as impermissibly 
vague for lack of notice on the theory that "[w ]hat is contemptuous 
IJ.. 
to one man may be a work of art for another. " Goguen's behavior 
II ·,.1 I . !) II 13 . 
or- S t ~~ ~U<C::r 
can hardly be described as art. Immaturity probably comes closer 
1\ . . . . 
• 
Court's conclusion that since the flag has become "an 
objec t of youth fashion and high camp •• , ," it is by 
no means as likely as it mi ght have been at another time• 
thi s 
in country's history that wearing a miniature flag 
· - 343 F,Supp at 164, 167. As both lower fed.eral ta•• 
casua..Q 
Gourts noted, treatment of the flag i n ,_. 
,/1 
. . .. 
many contexts has become a widespread contemporary 
phenome non, Ibid., 4 71 F.2d at 96, Flag wearing 
in a day of relaxed clothing styles may be simply for 
7-
adornment or nothing more t han a ploy to attract attention. 
To be sure, much of the tendency of youth in recent years 
. . r-c-P\-ech cu... . ~v<.-~-c'cd -l-o to,>1 H• ~~~ ·~ 
to wear unorthodox • c lathing t1.' . · ' ' t · !ar.c• 
.. . . ... 
disagreement with the conventions, manners and values of 
their e lders, as well as to express dissent from gover nmnet 
policies and resentment against an unpopular war, 
But certainly in a time of widely varying attitudes and 
tastes for displaying somethi ng as ubiquitous as the 
United States flag or representations of it, not every 
uncer emonial wearing or displaying of the flag upon one's 
clothing can be said to constitute criminal contempt. And, 
fails to draw reasonably clear lines between the many kinds of modern, 
nonchalant uses of the federal flag. The classic vagueness cases require 
that all "be informed as to what the State commands or forbids . . • , " 
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939), and that "men of common 
int~lli~ence" n?t ~ forced to guess at the meaning of the c;riminal law. 
C onnally v. General Construction Co., 2 69 U.S. 385, 391 (1932). Given 
·. +ot1'4j ·~ . . . c~ess)~::> . 
a DaE:llli1tendencies to treat thE:(flag J •· those notice standards 
. . 
are not satisfied in this case. 
The language under which Goguen was charged also fails to meet 
the other principal requirement of the vagueness doctrine. The vagueness 
concept of notice often has a fictional flavor. 14 This is particularly so in 
.. . . . ·· 
a noncommercial context, where as a gene1~al rule. behavior is not mapped 
out in advance on the basis of statutory language. In such cases, perhaps 
the more meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not true notice 
but the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guide lines to 
govern law enforcement. In this regard, the statutory language under 




In its terms, the language at issue is sufficiently 
" unbounded to pr~ohibit, as the District Court noted, 
''any public deviation from formal flag etiquette • • " • • 
343 F. Supp. at 167. 
16' 
Enacted in 1899 and unchanged since, 
,, 
the .......... ___ treats contemptuously" phrase was also 
devoid . of a narrowing state court interpretation at t he 
l& 
~ re1evant time in this case. We are without authority to 
.• 11 . . . 
C cure 'that defect. Statutory language of such a standardles s 
" ' <• 
sweep allows policemen, prosecutors and juries to pursue 
t heir personal predilections. Legislatures may not so 
abd icate their responsibilities for setting the s tandards 
11. 
of the criminal law. E.g., Papachristou v. City of 
. c IS(>> (1'17~), 
,Jacksonville, 40.5 ~.s.: • 166-68A - ln Qr.egory 
'J 
"v . City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 117, 1.20 (1969), l'1r • .Justice 
c• Black voiced a concern that we share against entrusting 
11 l awmaking "to the moment-to-moment . judgment of the ., 
policeman on his beat.'' The aptness of Mr. Justice Black 1 s L 
warning is evident from appellant's candid concession in ora l 
argument before the Court of Appeals regarding state enforce-
·thul-
ment standards forAportion of the statute under which 





f{o r Cifpell~fJ 
" •.. [A]s c~unse/actmitted~ a :var p;otestor :Vho, 
while attending a rally at which It begms to ram, 
evidences his disrespect for the American flag by 
contemptuously covering himself with it in order 
to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the 
Massachusetts statute. Yet a member of the American 
Legion who, caught in the same rains~g'm while 
returning from an 1 America - Love It or Leave It' 
rally, similarly uses the flag, but does so regrettably 
and without a contemptuous attitude, would not be 
prosecuted. " 471 F. 2d at 102. 
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such selective law 




•• "' I.~ •• 
II 
c· Appellant's arguments that the ~ ..... &2 .... 8._ .. ._ treats 
,· 
con_temptuously" phrase is not impermissibly vague. or· at 
s . 
lea~t should not be so held in this ca~e. are unpersuaslve. 
c;._ ~ 
App~llant devotes a substantial portion of his openi~~ bri ef, 
as he did his oral argument, to the contention that ~?~uen 
' 
fai~ed to ~serve his present void for vagueness cla im f or 
\ . 
t he ·. purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. · ·Appellant 
concedes that the issue of "vagueness as applied" is properly 
\~ 
before the federal courts, but contends that Goguen's only 
arguable claim is that the statute is vague on its face . 'l'he 
\ 
l atter claim, appellant insists, was not presented to the •s t ate 
Picard v . Connor, courts with the requisite fair~ precision. 
4D~ ll .S. llo (ICC11)4l 
\ ~ 
~his exhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly raised 
;t 





mount a vagueness attack in the sta,te courts. We do not 
deal • with the point at length•, however, for we find the 
relevant statutory language impermissibly vague as applied to 
Goguen. In light of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court's explicit holding on vagueness "as applied," 
Commonwealth v. Goguen, ___ Mass. ~. 279 N.E.2d 666, 667 
(1972), and given appellant's concession, we have no doubt 
that the "substance" of this claim was "fairly presented" 
to the state courts under the exhaustion standards of 
Picard, supra, 404 u.s. at 275, 278, 
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is premised 
on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him a hard 
core violator as to whom the statute was not vague, whatever 
~ its implications for those enga!Ped in different conduct. 
we do not believe that this concept has much meaning in 
ft-es•..J- case. There are statutes that by their terms or as 
authoritatively contrued apply without ques~n to certain 
activies, but whose application to other behavior 
1{"-"'Q. u.,·e. ..,.~t.Jto-; k.v..wph fv\.C>l.I{Q. s~ w(tt, lf'-U~ ·1-o .~o, ..:Jfv~. 
is uncertain./\,,···· But that's not this statute. This criminal 
provision is vague "not in the sense that it requires a 
person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensi• 
ble normative standard, but rather in the sense that .no 
standard of conduct is specified at all,l" Coates v. City 
of Cincinatti, 402 u.s. 611, 614 (1971). Such a statute 
12.. 
simply has no core. The absence of an ascertainable 
standard for inclusion and exclusion is precismly what 
~ 
offends the Due Process Clause. Such a deficiency is particular} 
thereby 
objectionable in vie1v of the unfettered ~Dia latitude ~~-
accorded law enforcement officials and triers of fact. 
Where this problem exists and until it is corrected al either 
by amendment or · judicial construction, it affects all who are 
prosecuted under the statutory language, In our opinio~ the 
problem exists in this case. The language at issue is .. 
void for vagueness as applied to Goguen because it 
subjected him to criminal liability under a standard so 
indefinite that police, court and jury were free to react 
rto·f.<.t~~ (\W\Q. ~ 
toAtheir own preferences for treatment of the .. flag. 
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of 
the vagueness question presented, ap~llant argues that any v 
notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow subject 
/\ ..-:\_ ' 'd-1 
matter of the statulte, "acfll:Ual" flags of the United States. v \:,; 
Appel~ant contends that this "takes some of the vag~ness 
~ 
away from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously' •••.• " Anyone 
who "wants notice as to what this statute c proscribes, • • • 
immediately knows that it has something to do with flags and · 
if he wants to stay clear of violating this [l statute, he 
stay clear of doing something to the 
,')3 
United States flag," Apart from the ambiguities presented by 
~~ ' 
the concept of ' an "actual" flag, we fail to see how this 
s· 
alleged particularity resolve~ the cen~ral vagueness 
question--the absence of any standard for defining 
~IIIII!CII contemptuous treatment. 
Appellant's remaining arguments are~equally 
unavailing. 
--· - ···-· ----- ------------a:------------------------
t;· crim· ttr1iability under standard/ so indefinite that the police 
/~ . ~ -~/ . / ~- ~~ ~
and t,~ .. "'tifere fre;_;~~~~"" ress es~ia.1ly noth~~·gJ.Ofe than~i 
/ // /fl'' / 
own pref7~s for treatm~ of the flag./ . 
~ ~~-- ./ 
Appellant's . arguments to the contrary are 
(I 
*=;.a:!:=tl:2m._ that the first six words of the statute add specificity 
I "A 
1\ 0' Hjj2l 
to the "t~eats contemptuously" phrase) e 
"' ' ~ '" • ,.0 I :::..st&.. 
. .;itt Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Cour~ atel.dtil M £' '''"' it h d~8i'Y 
C U!.~-o 1'11 ~,;~_..7 4J·vV.SfrW24 
in4Hn~eta.fiii!M sf @81\8trtt~lt.generallanguage to take on color from 
more specific accompanying language. But it is conceded that Goguen 
was convicted under the general phrase alone, and that the highest 
Q.\'\~ 
state court Gapt.:m•• did not rely onl\lfal· ••• general-to-
;)~ 
specific principle of statutory interpretation in this case. Appellant 
· ~IA-v4.1. .... .; \-
~,argues that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case 
ha..s. ,2(, 
A restricted the scope of the statute to intentional contempt. Aside 
from the problems presented by an appellate court's limiting 
construction in the very case in which a defendant has bem tried 
~ 1 c la..v-'1 ~-i:J 
under a previously unnarrowed . statute, this sti~l does not
1
r JT 
whether intentional or inadvertent. 
Finally, appellant argues that state law 
enforcement auttf.t9ities have shO\vn themselves ready to 
interpret this penal statute narrowly and that the statute , 
properly read, reaches only direct, immediate contemptuous 
acts that "actually impinge upon the phtsical integr ity of 
the flag. " There is no support in the record for t he • • • 
[)9; 
former po~nt. Similarly, nothing in the .state court is 
opinion in this case or ina any earlier opinion of tha·t 
· · ·court sustains the latter. In any event~ Goguen was char ged· 
only under the wholly open-ended language of public l y 
treating the flag "contemptuously." There was no 
allegation of physical desecration. 
There are areas of .f human conduct where, by the 
nature of the problems presented, legislature s 
simply cannot establish standards with great precis i on. 
Control of the broad range of disorderly conduct that may in-
hibit a policemant in the performance of his official dut ies 
r€4""~~ ~ ~ Jo~ OM. lJl". -Ttu .. - spt>f- ~e~·v~ t·f.. 7~ J~LR..u.i. /c. I~ :t1cA?>t, 
may be one such area, A Cf., Colten v. KentuciQy, 407 u. s. 
.104 {1972). 
lf" t '(,<C•L 
But there is no comparabl~,_... for committ i ng 
broad discretion to law enforcement officials in the area of 
flag contempt. Indeed, be~se display of· the flag is so 
common and takes so many forms, changing from one generaft ion 
. .... 
to ·another and often difficult to 4 distinguish in principle , 
a legislature should define with some care the flag behdv ior 
.... ~ 
/•.> 
it means to outlaw ~ Certainly nothing prevents a l egis lature 
from defining with substantial specifi'city what constitutes 
d-Cf 
forbidden treatmen t of United States S flags. The state' s 
at issue requires invalidation of Goguen's conviction. 
:tV 
/I 
Although we hold the ,. ........ ._. treats 
. ' • • t ·' • 
contemptuously" phrase void for vaguen~ss, we do not 
address in this case the statute's first six words or its 
~C> 
commercial misuse provisions, In light of the universal 
adoption of flag contempt or desecration_ statutes by the .. 
Jt 
federal • and s tate governments, we further emphasize that 
we do not hold that the due process vagueness doctr ine 
invalidates all s uch statutes, Insofar as that doctri~ 
is concerned, the validity of these statutes will depend on 
their particular language, judicial construction, and 
enforcement history.~ Finally, as noted earlier, we ' do not 
deal here with the question Whether the Massachusetts fl ag 
evvvh--o.. ue-'v\8S 
misuse statute~~a•r.-~·•·.aaa-. .... w.i&=2f~~~~~.~~!l~la the First 
13 
Amendment. Insofar as the judgment below rests on the 
doctrine of vaeuenes s, it is affirmed, 
It is so ordered, 
1 • 
NOTES No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen 
~ 
The record consists solely of the amendDed v 
bill of exceptions Goguen filed in the Massachusetts 
Suprmme Judicial Court, the opposing briefs before that 
court, the complaint under which Goguen was prosecuted, and 
/. 
Goguen's petition for federal habeas corpus. Appendix 1-38, 
.,~- .,, . 
We do not have a trial transcript, although Goguen's A . . . 
amended bill of exceptions briefly summarizes some of the 
· · · · t0 4;,/-/,.l~~·.sc·'>' .ft.··, "'tk.. {'i· ~se(_..,)~.;_ 
testimony givenAat his state trial. Goguen did not take the 
stand. Thus we do not have of record his account of what 
transpired at the time of his arrest or of what his purpose 
was in displaying a flag on his pants. 
2. Trans. Or. Arg. S-6, 35-36. 
2. 
J. Hass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 264, §5 (1971). Omitting 
several 
sentences protecting the 
, 
ceremonial activi)\es of 
' certain veterans groups, the statute read at the time of 
Goguen's arrest and conviction as follows: 
~ 5_ Flag; JlL'llllltY for misuse 
, "'horvrr publiPIY mutilnt•·~. tramtllcs 
111'011. dPfar·t·s or tn•ats •·ontcmptuously 
the flng . of the ~nitecl :'\tatrs. or of 
;'.lnssnchusl'tts, wh~1er Sll(:h flag lH llll.b· 
lie: or privatl' protll'rty, or who~n·r <~IS· 
I !ell 1
.1,1, or 1111 ,. r<'t•n·sPntntwn p :I)'S HI ' M ·' • 
tht•n•of upon whic-h are words, flgurt's, 
:~clv('rtiscmcnts or cl<'~i{:ns, or whoever . 
1'1\ll~<'s or Jl<'rlllits sn<'h flag to he usee! 
in 11 pamdl' aR 11 rec·q>tnc·lc for tic· 
positing or c·ollf'l'tin;: lllOIIP)' or nny 
other nrtidc or thing, or whoi'Yrl' ex· 
JlOSPs to puhlic: view, mnnufndnrcs, 
!wlls, "xpnsc•s for sale•, gin•s :~wny or 
hns in 1111ssc•ssion for sale! or to 1,;1\'l' ll\~ny 
or for liSt' for llll.l' purpose, any nrtH:Ie 
Ol' suhstnll<'<', ht•ing an artic-le of m~r­
Phnnclis<' or a n•c·l'pf·ndc of uwrc·htllHhse 
or nrt it-h·s upon whic·h is n~tnP\I(•tl, 
thi'On:;h n wr:tppinl! or otherwise•, en· 
.:r:wt·•l or printt~cl in :my manner, II rep· 
. tntion of the llnitt>•l StntcR f\ng, 
rt>S('Il • t t' of 
or whol'YCI' uses rmy reprt!SCII a lOll 
tht! nrnls or the grrat sl'a~ ~f the t'Olll· 
monw<'nlth fur nny ncln•rtlslllg _or t·om· 
. . , ·I ·Ill be JHIIIISIJC<l hy 11\CI'<'llll purpose' s ,, 
n fine of not lt· s~ tltnH t<'ll ~or ~norc 
thall one ltnnclre<l cloll:lrs tll' hy 11\l!ll'lSOll· 
mcnt for not morr than one ~·ear, or 
hoth. \\'orcls, fi)!:llr<·s, n<ht•rttscnlt'l~ts 
or tlt>sigll~ at t:wlu•cl to, or clirc•<·tly or Ill· 
tlirc•dly c·onlw<'IP<l with, Slll'h flag Ol' nn~· 
reprt·~<'Ht:ltion t\tt'I'Pilf ill stwh 111:11\l.lCT 
that snt·h flag Ol' its ~<'Jircst>ntatton 
is usrtl to nt t rac1i ntt.•nt lOll to or ~tl­
Vl\rt ise sul'lt \Y4Htls. lig-n res, ndvt:rttxc· 
nwnts Ill' •\cosigns. shall fol' t lu' Jill I' !lOses 




The statute is an amalgam of provisions dealing with ftj flag 
c::::=maf'\.in general (the first twenty-six words) and with commercial 
m isuse or exploitation of flags of the state and national government in 
(olvfevu-f +-
particular. This case concerns only thet\ portion of the 
statute. In 1971, subsequent to Gogue~'s prosecution}hat portion of 
the s tatute was amended twice. On March 8, 1971, the legislature, 
per st. 1971, C. 74, modified the first sentence by inserting ''burns 
or otherwise" between the terms "publicly" and "mutilates, " and, 
in addition, by increasing the fine. Mass. Gen. · Laws. Ann. ch. 264, 
§ 5 (1973 Supp.). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, C 655, the 
le gis lature appended a new sentence defining ''the flag of the Unf . } 
States" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the purpose of this 
section the term 'flag of the United States' shall mean any flag which 
has been designated by Act or Resolution of the Congress of the 
United States as the national emblem, whether or not such a designation 
is currently in force. " Ibid. The 1971 amendments are relevant 
to this case only in the tangential sense that they indicate a recognition 
on the part of the legislature of , th.e need to tighten up this .-
'-/. 
4. Perhaps this was because of the difficulty of the question 
whether Goguen's conduct constituted physical desecration of the 
flag. Cf., Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d at 91, n. 4 ( " ... 
[w ]e are not so sure that sewing a flag to a background clearly affects 
~·- '-physical integrity. "') 
. ·... . .· ..... 
6. Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's 
cease was the first recorded Massachusetts court reading of the 
}:statutory language under which Goguen was convicted. Trans. Or. 
:· Arg. - 17-18. Indeed, the entire statute has been essentially devoid of 
_:estate court interpretation. There is one turn-of-the-century reading 
~- of one of the commercial misuse provisions of the statute, but that 
~ case has no relevance here. Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co., 
: 189 Mass. 76, 75 N. E. 71 (1905). 
7. The elements of the void for vagueness doctrine have been 
developed in a large body of precedent from this Court. The cases are 
categorized in~·~' Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 
(1972.). See, Amsterdam, "The Void-for Vagueness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court," 109 U. Pa.L. Rev. 67 (1960). 
8. E.~., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 
162 (1972); Lanzetta v. · New Jersey, 306 U.s. · 451, 453 (1939): 
"No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or 
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal 
statutes. All are entitle·d to be informed as to what 
the ~tate commands or forbids. "(citations omitted); 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (19 32): 
" . · [A] statute which either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must ·necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application, violates the first essential 
of due process of law. " (citations omitted). 
• 
~) 
a f\ Grayned, supra, 408 U.S. at 108j See a-lae .!!!• J a.t ~- 4)--
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 *' (1921) 
( ". . . [T]o attempt to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent 
of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and 
'· 
punished all acts detrimental to the public. interest when unjust and 
unreasonable in the estimate of the court and jury. "); United States 
• "r_ • • • •• • •• •• • • • ••• • • • • :' .-• . • 
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous 
if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to - step inside and say who 
c~uld be rightfully detained, and who. could be set at la~-~~. ;,}~: : 
. '~ ... . ~ . 




a E. g. , GrayHed ... ~~ 
- - ) supra, 408 U. S. at 
109; §.m!!!:l v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less 
stringent requirements of the modern vagueness cases dealing with 
• 
~'\.... purely economic regulation. ~· ~·, United States v. National ~T 
. Prcx:l. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act). 
II· 
a See n. 6, supra. 
1~. 
a Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. · 1040, 1056 (1968). 
13. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F.Supp. at 166. 
fti 
Ja:L Amsterdam, supra, 1'09 U. Pa."L.Rev. at 8J, n. 79. 
IS 
IL. Goguen v. Smith, §Epra, 471 F.2d at 90, n.2. See 
note J, supra. 
l b 
•• See note 6, Q~pra. The .A portion of 
the Massachusetts statute seems to have lain fallow for 
almost its entite history. There apparently have been a 
half dozen arrests under this part of the statute in recent 
years, but none of them has led to r ecorded court opinions. 
Trans. Or. Arg. 28. In 1968, a teenager in Lynn, Massachusetts 
was charged, apparently under the present statute, with 
desecrating the United States by sewing pieces of it into 
his trousers. New York Times, August 1, 1968, p. )1, col. 
1. The teenager was ordered by a state district court to 
prepare and deliver an essay on the flag. The court continued 
the case without a finding, depriving it of any precedential 
value. 
17 
... E.g., United States v. 37 Photosraphs, 402 u.s. 
J6J, 369 (1971). 
11 
~. Reply Brief 4. 
q ... 
The District Co~rt decision in this case wa s 
entered subsequent to Picard, supra. Yet it appears that 
appellant d i d no t raise his present exhaustion of remedies 
argum~:""nt befor e that court. The District Court 
commented s pecifically on this omission: "No content ion 
is now made that [Goguen] has not exhausted state r emedies, 
r1or that the constitutional issues presented here 




ll Goguen filed in state •••• Superior Court an unsuccessful 
I 
k.e cd·e.d 
motion to dismiss the complaint in which,._ the Fourteenth Amendment 
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "impermissibly 
' •' ·- . 
vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation by public 
~' f ~ .. 
officials. " Appendix 1. This motion,.......,.il~.(!lll·#lltdll•m•••·llillr~,~~rlilll?ilii?IW2illli1,_11=:•~&i=hlllllilifiuw.nl6lfl·y 
bioatilstsss:pp ta 5 u·a1 dE wm=+i""!MiiitJOsdrd' ~ wasalso 
before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was 
.... ; ~ .- .. _ . ~ . 
incorporated in Goguen's amende~ bill of exceptions. Ibid. In 
addi~on, Goguen's brief before that court raised vagueness points and 
cited vagueness cases. · Id., at 19, 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
( u._ 0 jJ',( . I Cj IJJ 
306 U.S. 451 (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 58~~-
( 1J,ree J "'-<-~t {..()L"t·f) Cbt-\.~e~u-r ·I-
1\(North Carolina flagt-: 
c:~ Oi.~~~,L -, c~). 
(){J t~) ·krr /.)(!1!-<.f'LA..(- .(<; 
statute,, -...am'JJ:>; izrlliiJliiiHI§&C 
aatl;J;Uan:ae~aoogp)ipsq C). Appellant is correct in asserting that Goguen 
s-'-...lt. ~ 
failed to compartmentalize in hi~brief the due process SI<Mialtllli• 
doctrine of vagueness and First Amel).dment concepts of overbreadth. 
See Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of leakage between 
those particular adjoining compartments is understandable. -Cf., 
Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, " 83 Harv. L. Rev. 
I I • 
844, 871-875 (1970). The highest state court's opinion, which dealt 
. . ~ c:.IAI ~.) 
separately with Goguen's First Amendmen~ vagueness ~m;nn., 
_ Mass. at _, 279 N. E. 2d at 667, indicates that that court was 
well aware that Goguen raised both sets of arguments. 
6l I. 
\ •• 
Appellant's Brief 17; . Trans . Or. Arg. 9. 




a At the time of Goguen's prosecution, the 
statute referred simply to 1 'the flag of the United states ... , " without 
further definition. That raises the obvious ·question whether a 6-oJ"'-eCA.' s 
·:ff. 
minature cloth flag constituted "the flag of the United states. . n 
A 
Goguen argued unsuccessfully before the state courts that the statute 
a pplied only to flags that met "official standards" for proportions, 
such as relation of height to width and the size of stripes and the 
field of stars, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those 
standards. Trans. Or. Arg. 11-12, 24-26; Appendix 2. There was 
I 
' 
\ 1 .\I 
no dispute that Goguen's adornment had the requisite number of stars 
and stripes and colors. Trans. Or. Ag.· 11-12. · The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be covered by 
the statute, noting that "[t] he statute does not require that the 
flag be 'official"' Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. _, ·---' 
279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). The lower federal courts did not address 
this holding, nor do we~ We note only that the Massachusetts legis-
lature apra rently sensed an ambiguity in this respect, because 
1~ "'-'' e+=k-.--1-
.Sllbsequent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statut~ to define 




a The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t ~1e 
jury could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing 
any words of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. 
279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). Thus, the court held that 
the jury could infer int ent merely from Goguen's conduct. This is 
f&lll: apparently also a holding that the jury !!ll!§.t find contemptuous 
intent under the statute, although the requirement amounts to very 
little since it is so easily satisfied. The court's reference to verbal 
communication reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. New York, 
394 u. s.· 579 (1969). 
d-7, 
a ~· ~·, Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966). 
WHh r e rr,a.rd to prosecutorial policies , appellant c ites 
'fV\ M $ C.. c,., 1-t k.J efi .J 
tw o published opinion s of the ~)\Attorney GBneral. 4 Ops. of 
Att ,' Gen. 470 (1915) (Rcrr:roduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Report 
of Atty. Gen., Pub. Doc: No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at 




portion of the statute under which Goguen was 
1'-l . . 
· TV!~::., ~ ~e """"+- ,~ po~..vl' ~. ~ f''rO~l~..J !J~;t.Pa...Gt. lc r\o ~~ q.... ~ 
c onvicted.['ftevertheless, appellant fscorrect that they show a \"Clev-..(l 
I" .-4 + to:J.vhY .. ( 
~ )AA.J~(.. 
t endency on the part oftheftate Attorney General to read"~ 
re.Ciecl-
portions of the statute narrowly.· At the same time, they,...._ the 
k.d( o6 prew~ re.c..~~ ~v~4...:1- t4..t. flA.Al.StA.~dittf.r .f!fr.::;; ,.....~~.~ 
~us-~~~·x:ob-l-em-&-:in-4~fi~He,!tatute. 'The 
1915 opinion noted that one portion of the statute, prohibiting 
exhibition of engravings of the flag on certain article spa' a_ :i.f 
wo~l 
read literallJA make it a criminal offense to display the C'St~ 
flag itself "in many of its cheaper and more common forms. " 
Appellant's Brief 31-32. This would be a "manifest absurdity 1 \ 
Id., at 32. The 1968 opinion advised that a flag representation 
,, ,, 
pai:lted on a door was not a flag of the United States within the 
meaning of the statute. Juris. Statement App. 53-55. A contrnry 
IS' . 
interpretation would "raise serious questions under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments ... , " given the requirement that belft~Hor 
made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the language of the 
statut e. " Id. , at 54. 
:t-1 
•· The federal flag desecratioT(jttute, for example, 
reflects a Congressional purpose to do just that. In response t o a 
warning by the United states Attorney General that the use of such 
'' ~ef a'es ~' 
~-
unbounded terms as At:, ..:. or "casts contempt ... either by 
word or act" is "to risk invalidation" on due process 8J grounds, 
S. R.ep. No. 1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 350, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967), the bill which became the federal 
statute was amended, 113 Cong. Hec. 16449, 16450 (1967)>to r each 
only acts that physically damage the flag. The desecration provision 
of the statute, 18 U. S.C. § 700(a), declares: 
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any 
flag of the United states by publicly mutilating, defacing, 
defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall be fined 
not more than $1, 000 or imprisoned for not more than 
one year, or both. '' 
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to r~h only defined 
1118 physical acts of desecration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 
3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not 
accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration. ") ) 
S. Rep. No. 1287, sup@, at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibits 
\ 
\ 
public physical acts of de sec ration of the flag. ") The act has been 
• 
--
so read by the lower federal courts, which have upheld it against 
vagueness challenges. United States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96 
. , 
( CA0~ cert. den. -- {\ 
4o? . 1o6t/ . u.s. (197a ); Joyce v . ......,_.. ~ ~ 




& See n. 3, supra. 
Z I S.,.... V\ ' 1-~ .I() ~V'!!:- . 
•· A All fifty states have flag contempt statutes. The statutes 
are synopsized in Hearings on H. R. 271, et al, Before Sub. Comm. 
No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 
ser. 4, pt. III at 324-46 {1967). The flag contempt statutes of most 
. 
states are patte rned after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which :SI '"" 
§ 3 provides that: 
"No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, 
defy, t r ample upon, or by word or act cast contempt 
upon any such flag, standard, color ensign or shield. " 
Compare)9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966) with Hearings on 
H. R. 271, et al, supra, at 321-46. Massachusetts, which has one 
of the "older flag laws, " Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp. at 
164, is among the handful of states that have not adopted the Uniform 
Flag Act or a derivation. 
~q) ... 
·. See cases cited n. II supra. 
/' --- Some state flag contempt 
s tatutes have been substantially narrowed by judicial interpretation. 
E. _g. , State v. Royal, N.H. __ , 305 A. 2d 676, 679 (1973) 
0~~ 
(New Hampshire flag contempt statute reaches a "physical abuse type 
1-
of acts • ... . "). See gl§.Q, state v. Hodson, 289 A2d 635 (Del. 
Super. 1972). Others have not and have not fared well in federal 
c ourt. ~· ~, Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W. D. N.C. 1971) 
~~- ~~k~Jf 
(f_ judge court) (North Carolina flag statute void for 
vagueness and overbreadth). ee also, Long Island Vietnam Mo~ton 
. . . . . ~ jj.~ ~4 
19. 
omJ!U>t!!Ei'v. ~437 F. ~4{1!i7o), cert. <;len~ U.S. 
7 ~ / -· ~ -- "/, ~w York p.atnte). Cf., Cr sr::::v. Silver 19 F. $nl>p. 
1084 (DhO) (3 judg court) (Arizon statute)./ 
' w 
20. 
33. We are aware,of course,of the First Amendment questions 
wrapped up in the flag contempt controversy. The Court of Appeals dealt 
with these issues at length. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d at 96-105. 
See, -~ .~., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 579 (1969); Thayer, "Freedom 
of Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Crime of Flag Thsecration," ' 
12 Ariz . L. Rev. 71 (1970); Note, "Developments in the Law - the National 
,. Security Interest .and Civil Liberties, " 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1138-1141 
' 
(19'72); Note, 66 Mich. L . . Rev. 1040 (1968). However, we think the slim 
,.record in this case makes it inappropriate to consider Goguen's First 
I ' 
I r 
Amendment arguments. Goguen's counsel argued that Goguen was engaged 
in a "demonstration of one"'with a clear purpose to communicate. Trans. 
Or . Arg. 36-37. The record does not back him up. Particularly in light 
of Goguen's decision not to take the stand, we are left to speculate about 
Goguen's purpose. Perhaps Goguen's goal was communication. Or perhaps 
Goguen was engaged in nothing more than a thoughtless example of 
contemporary clothing fashion. The difficulty of the First Amendment issue 
posed by flag contempt statutes counsels against deciding those issues in 
a case where an alleged intent to communicate rests on such a frail factual 
c./e{,~ .Jc. 
foundation . We also find wisdom in Judge Hamley's aversion · to11t~:·DI8t 
First Amendment issues where decision of them is unnecessary to resolutio1 
of a case. 471 F. Supp. at 105. 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Jack B. Owens DATE: December 6, 1973 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Goguen - Comment on Note No. 2 
I doubt the wisdom of being as specific about the future action 
of the Court as note No. 2. The note also conveys to me a certain 
self consciousness about not reaching First Amendment issues in this 
case. 
I would either omit the note or simply state something along the 
following lines: 
'We recently noted probable jurisdiction in Spence 
v. Washington, No. 72-1690, U.S. (1973) 
which may raise First Amendment questions more 
specifically. " 
I have not looked at the law review articlES cited. Perhaps 
they could be added to another footnote. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
ss 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Jack B. Owens DATE: December 6, 1973 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Goguen- Comment on Note No. 2 
I doubt the wisdom of being as specific about the future action 
of the ~ as note No. 2. The note also conveys to me a certain 
self consciousness about not reaching First Amendment issues in this 
case. 
I would either omit the note or simply state something along the 
following lines: 
"We recently noted probable jurisdiction in~ 
v. Washington, No. 72-1690, _U.s. _\I9'13} 
which may raise First Amendment questions more 
specifically. " 
I have net looked at the law review articlES cited. Perhaps 
they could be added to another footnote. 





Mr. Jack B. OWens 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: December 18, 1973 
Smith v. Goguen 
You will observe from Rider A, p. 10 that I have tried some 
different language. I have no doubt that you can improve on my effort. 
The next to the last sentence on page 10 speaks of the need 
to define with reasonable precision "those exhibitions" the legislature 
intends to proscribe. The word "exhibition" is appropriate to the facts 
of this case, but it by no means encompasses the spectrum of flag 
uses and abuses that are customarily included in statutes. Of course, 
we are addressing only the "contemptuously" phrase. But I suppose 
a properly drawn statute, portraying it in a grossly obscene tableau, 
and the like. All of this might well be in addition to the words which 
define (as does the federal statute) physical mutiliation or defilement 
of the flag. 
This is a difficult area, but I wonder whether a footnote would 
be appropriate (keyed to the sentence in question} which leaves open 
the type of situation I have just described? 
L. F. P., Jr. 
ss 
cc: Mr. John C. Jeffries, Jr. 
j)n.prmu <!fcurt ltf tfrt 'Jl;tttittlt j)btit&' 
~a&'Jrittgflttt. !9. <q. 2!l&fJl,~ 
C HAMBE RS OF 
.JUSTIC E WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS January 8, 1974 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your opinion in 
72-1254, Smith v . Goguen. 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 
Mr . Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.iu:prtmt <!f~ud d tlft ~uitt~ . .itattg 
J)'agfriughtn. ~. <!f. 2!lgt'!-~ 
January 9, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1254, Smith v. Goguen 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
.i~ <qottri ltf tlt't 'Jttittb .:itatts 
~asftinghttt. ~. <!f. 2ll~J.t.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. January 10, 1974 
RE: No. 72-1254 -Smith v. Goguen 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your fine opinion in 
the above. And thank you for making the 
changes in the last paragraph. They make 
clear what I thought was implicit. 
Sincerely, 
' 
Mr. Justice Powell 
;/ f ,t:tl 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
,ju.prtntt <!foud of tlrt ~ttitt~ , ,jtN±ts 
'IJa:sfrittgtttn. :!8. <!f. 2llbi'!~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS f-'AL L January 10, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1254 -- Smith v. Goguen 
Dear Lewis: 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
., 
To } . 
.hJtrttttt <!fottri ttf tltt ~ttitt~ .itatts 
' 
._-asltht¢Mt. ~- ~· 2ll.;iJ.l.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN ( ~ ~ 1 January 17, 1974 
I" ; 
Dear Lewis: 
Re: No. 72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen 
I, too, shall very likely be in dissent in this case. If 
there is no writing, I shall appreciate your noting the following 
at the end of your opinion: 
"Mr. Justice Blackmun dissents. 11 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.iu:prttttt Q}ttttrlltf tqt ~b ~tafts 
'JlasJringhtn.18. Qj:. 211,?'-J,;t 
January 17, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall very likely be in dissent in this 
case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Dear Lewis: 
.§nvrtntt Qfonrlttf tqt ~nittb .ihdte 
-aelfi:ttgtlllt. ~. <!f. 2Ll~'-"c1 
January 17, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen 
I, too, shall very likely be in dissent in this case. If 
there is no writing, I shall appreciate your noting the following 
at the end of your opinion: 
"Mr. Justice Blackmun dissents. 11 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~u:.prtmt ~lllttt llf t4t ~nittP ~bdts 
._aslrittghm. ~. <If. 2llP:'1~ 
February 28, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen 
Dear Lewis: 
Although I agree with Byron's concurring op1n1on on 
the vagueness point, I do not agree with it on the constitu-
tional protection accorded to one who sews a flag to the seat 
of his pants, and therefore will undertake to write separately 




Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~u.pnmt Q}autt af t4t ~mttb ~tws 
'J!iasqi:ng~ ~. <lf. 2Llgt'k~ 
February 28, 1974 
Re: No. 72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen 
Dear Lewis: 
Although I agree with Byron's concurring op1n1on on 
the vagueness point, I do not agree with it on the constitu-
tional protection accorded to one who sews a flag to the seat 
of his pants, and therefore will undertake to write .separately 




Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
-~-,~- -;"'"~··,.,.-.........---~-------~~..,......,------
s s 3/4/74 As new footnote 32, p. 16 
Smith v. Goguen 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment of the Court, 
addresses First Amenument issues t.hat we do not reach. The con-
curring opinion is premised on the assumptions that "the jury was 
appropriately informed that the defendant, if he was to be convicted, 
must have intended to treat the flag contemptuously; and the jury found 
this to be the case. " ~~~ at __ . These assumptions find no support 
in the record. As counsel for appellant stated at oral argument, there 
is not extant transcript of the jury instructions in this case. Tr. Or. 
Arg. 51. Thus, we. may only surmise that the jury was instructed in 
a way that allowed them to convict Goguen because of what he attempted 
to communicate, if he indeed had that purpose. Goguen's contentions 
subsequent to his conviction that he was in fact engaged in communica-
tion are mere assertion. As Goguen's counsel conceded at oral 
argument, there is nothing in the record defining what, if anything, 
Goguen was attempting to express. Tr. Or. Arg. 37. This is due 
in large measure to Goguen's failure to take the stand in his own 
defense. See n. 1, supra. 
The concurring opinion also would have us speculate, in the 
absence of jury instructions, as to what the jury found. It may well 
be that Goguen was attempting to communicate his contempt for the 
flag and that the jury was instructed that such an intent to communicate 
was an element of the offense. But the record before us supports 
2. 
neither of those assumptions. If we are to engage in speculation, there 
are other assumptions that are certainly not implausible. As suggested 
by the District Court, Goguen may have intended nothing more sinister 
than an expression of "youth fashion and high camp • • • . " 343 F. Supp. , 
at 164. And the jury may have found that alone sufficient to justify 
convietlcm. 
In short, we do not reach Goguen's First Amendment arguments 
for two reasons: ( n having found the challenged statutory language void 
for vagueness, addressing further constitutional issues is unnecessary; 
and (2) the skeletal record in this case affords a poor opportunity for 
the careful consideration merited by issues of such importance. 
.:J I '*I I <t. Rider A, p. 16 (new footnote) 
Smith v. Goguen 
32. We have not addressed Goguen's First Amendment arguments 
because, having found the challenged statutory language void for vague-
ness, there is no need to decide additional issues. Moreover, the 
skeletal record in this case, see n. 1, supra, affords a poor oppor-
tunity for the careful consideration merited by the importance of the 
First Amendment issues Goguen has raised. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, 
concurring in the result, posits that "the jury was appropriately 
informed that the defendant, if he was to be convicted, must have 
intended to treat the flag contemptuously ..•• " Ante, at __ • 
This assumption is the peemise for MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S conclusion 
that Goguen was punished for what he communicated. But, as counsel 
for appellant confirmed at oral argument, there is no extant record 
of the jury instructions in this case. Tr. Or. Arg. 51. 
March 15, 1974 
No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen 
Dear Bill : 
I have just read your dissenting opinion and, while I come 
out differently in this case, I write to say that I greatly 
admire the eloquence of your last few pages and, in terms of 
my personal feelings, agree totally with your sentiments about 
the flag. 




;lttprmtt ~ourl .of tltt J'nif:tb' ~taft· 
,raslfi:n\lhm. ~. ~· 2ll?~.;t 
THE CHIEF' .JUSTICE March 22, 1974 
Re: 72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 3/23/74 No. 72-1254 SMITH v. GOGUEN 
This case is here on appeal /fro~ the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit. 
Appellee wore/ a small representation of the U.S. flag~ 
on the seat of his trousers. He was prosecuted under a 
Massachusetts statute/ that subjects to criminal liability I 
anyone who "publicly • treats contemptuously the flag -
of the United States." Although other portions of the 
statute deal broadly with misuse ' nd mutilation of the flag, ) 
(__f 
appellee was charged only with treatin~, tfie ~la~ 
"contemptuously". He was convicted and was sentenced to 
6 months imprisonment. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the 
conviction. Thereafter, Ia federal District Court found 
the statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and 
granted a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed. 
We agree with both~ the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals that the contempt ~ortion of the statute is 
void for vaguenes~under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The statute, whose sweeping 
language has never been narrowed by the state courts, 
2. 
affords inadequate warning of forbidden conduct. Moreover, 
it leaves police, courts and juries fre~ ~o prosecute and ,. 
to impose criminal liabilit~on little more than their own 
preferences for treatment of the flag. 
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals. 
Mr. Justice White has filed an opinion concurring in 
the judgment. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist have filed 
dissenting opinions, in which the Chief Justice has joined. 
AprU 8, 1974 
HOLDS FOR SMITH v. GOGUEN, No. 72-1254 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONF:£RENCE: 
Two eases have been held for No. 72-1254, Smith v. 
Goguen. They are No. 72-1359, Heffernan v. Thoms, and No. 72-1439, 
Van Sl~ v. Texas. Both are schedUled for review at the Aprill2, 
1974 C erenee. Heffeman was also held for Steffel v. Thompscm, 
No. 72-5581, and is discussed at pp. 3-4 of Bill Brennan's memo to 
the Conference on the Steffel holds. I wlll vote to continue to hold 
both eases. 
No. 72-1359 Heffernan v. Thoms ( Cert to CA 2) 
In this ease, respondent owned a vest fashioned from a 
U.s. flag which he desired to wear as an aet of symbolie protest. 
He brought a § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the COIUleetteut flag defUement statute, which forbids placing 
extraneous materials oo the flag and subjects to erimlnalliabUtty 
anyone who ''publicly misuses, muttlates, tramples upoo or otherwise 
defaces, defiles or puts indignity upoo'' aU. s. flag. The District 
Court declared the statute uneonstttutlonal but did not issue an 
injunction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
The ease dUfers from Smith v. Goguen in two ways. 
One, there was no e rimlnal proseeuttcm. RiSp(iident has not been 
subjected to erimlnalllablltty, as was Goguen. In that posture, the 
-2-
lack of clarity in the state statute goes more directly to the 
possibility of "chilling" expression-- L e., to First Amendment 
overbreadth-- than to selective enforcement and criminal penalties 
without warning -- L e. , Due Process vagueness. Two, the parties 
and the lower federiicourts barely touched m the vagueness 
doctrine. They addressed themselves almost exclusively to First 
Amendment overbreadth. In Smith, by comparism, both lower 
federal courts and both patties fUlly ventilated the vagueness issue. 
The District Court in Heffernan held the statute invalid 
under the First Amendment withoUt mentioning the vagueness doctrine. 
The Court of Appeals declared that the statute "is overly vague, " but 
did not develop the point and appears to have relied primarily on First 
Amendment overbreadth. The petition (by the state) does not address 
vagueness at all; the state seems to read the lower federal court 
opinions as turning exclusively on overbreadth. The response 
closes with a parting shot on vagueness but is devoted almost entirely 
to the steffel issue and to the First Amendment. To the degree that 
respondent touches oo vagueness, , be does not distinguish it from his 
principal argument that the statute is overbroad under the First 
Amendment. 
In short, in light of the way the parties and the lower 
federal courts have treated it, Heffernan is not controlled by crsu;n. 
In my view, it should be heltl for Sj)!nce v. ~ashington, No. 7 -16 0, 
where the issue is overbreadth. 
No. 72-1439 VanSlyke v. Texas (App. from Tex Ct. Crtm. App.) 
VanSlyke burned aU. s. flag, after he had blown his nose 
on it and feigned an act of masturbation by rubbing the flag against 
himself. He was prosecuted under a Texas statute that subjects 
to crim:tnalltabiltty anyone who shal!. "publicly or privately mutilate, 
deface, defile, defy, tramp upon, or cast contempt upon" aU. s. flag. 
He was charged, and the jury was iistructed, essentially tn the 
- 3-
language of the statute. He moved to quash the indictment on 
vagueness grounds. He appears to have preserved the point at the 
Texas Ct. of Crlm. App., and he sets it out in his jurisdletlonal 
statement. The motion to affirm also addresses the issue. 
The case is like Smith v. Go~en in that the vagueness 
issue has been dealth with by all concerne and in that the Texas 
statute is stated in the disjunctive and, presumably, permits 
prosecut1011 solely for ca,nln. g cootempt on the flag. But there the 
slmllarJty ends. Van Slyke ,was charged under the full langUage 
of the statute, which encompasses acts of physical desecra.tim, 
in which he obviously engaged. Furthermore, unlike the Massachusetts 
statute, the Texas statute has been significantly narrowed by the 
state.eou:rts. For example, 1n Deeds v. states, 474 s. w. 2d 718 
( 1972 ), * the highest state court rejected a vagueness challenge to 
the statute at issue in Van S~e and held it applicable to flag 
burning, one of the acts lor k.h Van· Slyke was prosecuted. In 
Delorme v. State, 488 s. w. 2d 808 (1973), ** the highest state 
court narrowed the statute by eliminating its appltcatim to private 
acts and to spoken expression. In addition, the court n<ted that 
the statute as construed has been reduced to language "similar to 
that of the Federal Flag Desecration statute • • • • " 488 s. W. 2d at 
811-812. SmJth v. Goguen leaves open to the states, insofar as the 
vagueness doctrine is concerned, the possibility of narrowing broad 
statutes by judicial constructim, and it points to the federal statute 
as an example of a statute drafted to avoid vagueness problems. 
It appears, in other words, that most of the vagueness 
problems posed in Smith are not present here. Texas courts have 
* This opinion came down a year prior. to the Texas Ct. of 
Crim. App's opinim in Van Slyke's ease, although it was subsequent to 
his prosecution. 
** Prior to the affirmance of VanSlyke's eonvtctlon, but 
subsequent to his prosedblion. 
' ,; 
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attempted to narrow the sweeping Texas statute, and VanSlyke's 
behavior clearly violated the statute as narrowed. Thus, if 
Van Slyke raised ooly vagueness issues, I would vote to dismiss. 
However, since he raises Flrst Amendment arguments as well, 
I think the case should be held for Spence. 
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On Appeal from the United 
States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit. 
[January -, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, ap-
peals from a judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt pro-
vision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconsti-
tutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471 
F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972), prob. juris. 
noted, 412 U. S. 905 (1973). We affirm on the vague-
ness ground. We do not reach the correctness of the 
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment 
grounds. 
I 
The ~ender record in this case reveals little more 
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the 
United States flag sewn to the seat of his~ The 
1 Tho record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions 
Goguen filed in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the 
opposing briefs before that court, the compJajnt under which Goguen~, 
was prosecuted, and Goguen's plltitign fqf federal habeas corpus (.:lg.·hfl 01-\..- ~ 
Appendix 1-38, 42-43. We do not have a trial transcript, although \ 
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions briefly summarizes some of the 
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1K Ar3e 
~woximately three by five inches QF £sen· ey siF--
~mlfies, v;as eleal'l) visible to I'Htsset'f3b¥. On January 30, 
1970, two police officers in Leominister, Massachusetts 
saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The first officer 
encountered Goguen standing and talking with a group 
of persons on a public street. The group apparently 
was not engaged in any demonstration or other protest 
associated with Goguen's appareJ.2 No disruption of 
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When thi.s offi-
cer approached Goguen to question him about the flag, 
the other persons present expressed their amusement. 
Some time later, the second officer observed Goguen in 
the same attire walking in the downtown business dis-
trict of Lcominister. 
The following clay the first officer swore out a complaint 
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the 
Massachusetts flag misuse statute. This provision then 
read , in relevant part: 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon . de-
faces or treats contemptuously the flag of the 
United States ... , '"hether such flag is public or 
private property . . . , shall be punished by a fine 
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one 
year, or both .... "a 
tr~timon~· ~i,·rn h~· witnr~~r" for the pro~rrution at. hi~ ~ tate trial. 
Gogurn clicl not tnkr the ~ta nd. Thn~ wr do not haw on record his 
nrrount of what tran~pired a t f he f imr of hi~ nrre~t or of what his 
purpo~r \\'M in di~playing n flag on hi~ pant ~. 
2 Tr. of Ornl Arg. 5-6, 35-36. 
a l\fn~~. Gen . LnwR Ann. c. 264. § 5 (1971) . Omitting Reveral 
Arntenres prot ort ing t hr rrrrmoninl activit ir~ of certain Ye1 rrans' 
groups, the statutr read nt tlw time of Goguen's arrr;-;t and convic-
tion ns follow~: 
"§ 5. Flag; pcnnlty for mi~mc 
"Whoever publirl~r mutilnfc, , tramr1le~ upon , defnres or trcnts 
contemptuously the fing of f he United States or of l\1nssnchusctts, 
72-125-1-0PIN ION 
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Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was 
not charged with any act of physical desecration.'' As 
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the contempt 
whrthrr surh flng is public or pri,·ntr proprrty, or whoever displays 
~uch flag or any rrpre~entntion lhrreof upon which are word~, figurrs, 
n,dvrrtisrmrnt~ or design~. or whoc,·er cn uHrs or permits ~uch flng 
to be used in n par:1de n~ a recept nclc for depositing or collecting 
monry or any othrr uri iclc or thing, or whorvrr rxposrs to public 
Yirw, manufurture~, ~rlb, rxpo~cs for ~nlr, givr~ nwuy or has in 
pos~r~~ion for ~nlr or to gi,·r nwny or for u~e for :my purJlOse, nny 
n.rticlr or ~ub~tancr, bring an nrtirlr of mrrchandise or a rrcrptarlr 
of mrrchnndi~e or a rticlrs upon which i~ attached, through n 
wrapping or otherwi~r. enlJ:r:wrd or printrd in an~· mnnner, a repre-
sentation of the United Statrs flag, or \Yhocvrr usrs any rrprcsenta-
tion of thr nrms or the great sral of thr commonwealth for any 
achuti~ing or commrrci:-tl purposr, ~h:11l be puni~hrd b~· n finr of 
not. le,;:;: than trn or morr than one hundrrd dollars or b~· impri:·mn-
mrnt. for not more than onr ~·rnr, or bot h. W"ord:;:. fignrrs, advcr-
tisrmrnt~ or designs n ttached to. or dirwll~· or indirectly conncctrd 
with, ~uch flng or any n'pre~entation t hrrrof in ~uch mmmrr that 
~uch flag or it~ rrpresrntntion is usrd to nttr:1rt attrntion to or 
advrrtisc such word~. figurr~. ach-erti~rments or designs, shnll for 
thr purpo. r~ of this section be dremrd to he npon such flng:." 
The ~tntntr i~ :m amnlgnm of provi~ion~ draling with fl:lg con-
tempt. in grnrral (the fir~t 2G word~) and with commNcial 
misusr or rxploitntion of flngR of thr stntr :mel nnlionnl go,·rrnmrnt. 
in particular. This cnse concrrns onl~r the contempt portion of the 
statute. In 1971, subsertnent to Gogurn's prosrcution, that portion 
of the ~tntute wn~ nmendrcl twice. On March R, 1971, tho lrgiRln-· 
ture, per St. 1971, C. 74, modifird lhr first srntrnce bv inserting 
"burn~ or othrrwisr" betwren the term:-: "publicly" and "mutilate~,"· 
and, in addition, by incrrasing the finr. 1\'fa~,o;. Gen. Law~ Ann. 
c. 264, § 5 (1973 Supp.). On August 12. 1971 , vi:-t Rt. 1071, C. G.55, 
the lq~i~lnturr 11]1pendecl n nrw sentence defining "thr Ang of the 
Unitrd Stntes" phrnse npprnring in the fir~t ~rntcnce: "For the 
purposr of this srction thr trrm 'flag: or thr United Stntrs' shall 
mean nny flag which ha8 11C'en de~ignntrd by Act or Rrsolution of" 
the Congrrss of the Unitrd State~ ns t hr nnl ional emblem, whrther 
or not ~uch a dr,.,ignation is currrntl.'· in forrr." Ibid. Thr 1971 
nmendmrnts arc relcv::mt. to this case onl.v in the tangrnlial sense 
[Footnote 4- is on 7J. 4-J 
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provision, the officer charged specifically and only that 
Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of 
of the Unit€d States .... "" 
A jury convened in the \Vorcester County Superior 
Court found Goguen guilty. The court imposed a sen-
tence of six months in the Massachusetts House of 
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed. Common-
wealth v. Goguen, - Mass. -, 279, N. E. 2d 666 
( 1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argu-
ments with the comment that " [ w] hatever the uncer-
tainties in other circumstances. we see no vagueness in 
the statute as applied here." !d.,- Mass., at-, 279 
N. E. 2d, at 667. The court cited no Massachusetts 
precedents interpreting the statutory language under 
which G-oguen was charged.0 
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was 
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas 
corpus by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 
that they indicatP a rPcognition on the part of the legislature of the 
need to tighten up this imprecise statute. 
4 Perhnps this was becau~e of the difficulty of the quPstion whethpr 
Goguen's conduct constituted physical desecration of the flag. Cf. 
Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d, at 91, n. 4 (" ... rwJe are not 
so sure that sewing a flag to a background clearly affects 'physical 
integrity.' "). 
5 Appendix 4. 
6 Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's 
case was the first recordrd Massachusetts court rrading of the 
statutory language undPr which Goguen was convicted. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 17-18. IndcPd, the entire statute has been essentinlly devoid 
of sta te court interprPtation . There is one turn-of-the-century read-
ing of one of the commercial misuse provisions of the statute, but 
that case has no relevance here. Commonwealth v. R. I. Shennan 
Manu. Co., 189 Mass. 76, 75 N. E. 71 (1905). 
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F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag con-
tempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly 
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First Amend-
ment. In upholding Goguen's void for vagueness argu-
ments, the District Court concluded that the words 
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily 
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., at 167. Especially 
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on 
hats, garments and vehicles ... ," the words under which 
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many in-
stances, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal 
prosecution." Ibid. The court also found that the 
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage 
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid. 
A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
District Court in all respects. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 
471 F. 2d 88. The Court of Appeals concluded that 
"resolution of [Goguen's void for vagueness] challenge 
to the statute as applied to him necessarily adjudicates 
the statute's facial constitutionality .... " I d., at 94. 
Treating as-applied and on-the-face vagueness attacks as 
essentially indistinguishable in light of the imprecision 
of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92, 94, the court 
found that the language failed to provide adequate warn-
ing, failed to provide sufficient guidelines for law enforce-
ment officials, and set juries and courts at large. I d., at 
94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now Senior Circuit Judge 
Hamley, sitting by designation from the Ninth Circuit, 
concurred solely on void for vagueness grounds. I d., at 
105. Judge Hamley thought the majority's extensive 
treatment of overbreadth and the other First Amend-
ment issues raised by Gougen unnecessary to the decision 
of the case. Ibid. 
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II 
We agree with both lower federal courts that under 
the due process doctrine of vagueness Goguen was en-
titled to federal habeas corpus relief. The settled prin-
ciples of that doctrine require no extensive restatement 
here.7 The doctrine incorporates notions of fair notice 
or warning.8 Moreover, it requires legislatures to set 
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials 
and triers of fact in order to prevent "arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." 9 '\Vhere a statute's literal 
scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, 
is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First 
7 The f'lemrnt~ of the void for Y:11!Uene~s dortrinr han been 
deYcloped in n l:trl!e bodv of rercdcnt from th.is Comt. Thr cn~es ,~ 
nrc categorized in e. g .. Gmynrd v. City of Rorl•fo1'd. 408 U.S. 104, 0 
108-109 (1972). See Amsterdnm, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine 
in the Supremo Court." 10!) U. Pn. 1. Rev. 67 (1960). 
8 E. g., Papach1'istou. v. City of Jacksonville. 405 U. 8. 156, 162 
(1972): Lanzetta v. New Jr1'sey, :JOG U. S. 451, 453 (1939): 
"No one mny he reCJnired nt peril of life, Iibert~· or proper(~' to 
spcrulatr n8 to the mc:1ning of prnnl stntutcs. All nrc entitled to 
he informed ns to what the Sinte romm::mds or forbid~." (Citntions 
omiltrd.); 
Connally Y. General Construction Co., 269 U. 8. 385, 401 ( 1932): 
" ... [A] ~tntutc which either forbid~ or requirrs thr doing of nn 
net in term~ ~o 1·a~rue tlwl mrn of common intelligrnce must necr~­
~arily guess nt it~ menninl! :mel diffrr a~ to its applirntion, violntrs 
tho fir4 e~sentinl of due prores.'i of lnw." (Cilntions omitted.) 
0 E. g., Gmyned, supra, 408 U. 8 .. nt 108: United States v. 
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 221) U. S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... fT]o attE-mpt 
to enforce the ~ection \\'otlid be the exnrt CCJUil·nlent of nn effort to 
rat'!'~' out a Rtntule which in trrms merrl.1· pennlir.rd nnd punished 
nil nrts detrimental to thr pnhlir in1·erest \\'hen nn.inst and nnrenson-
nblo in the e~tim:~tr of the court nnd jnr~r ."); United States v. 
Reese. 92 U. S. 214, 221 (1 75) ("It would certain]~· be dnngerous 
if the legislntme rould ~rt a net lnrge enongh lo rntrh all po~Hihle 
offenders, and lcn\'C it to t hr romls to step in~idc nne! ~a~· who 
conld be rightfully detained, nnd who could be set at lnrl!e."). 
72-1254--0PINION 
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Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of 
specificity than in other contexts.' 0 The statutory lan-
guage at issue here, "publicly ... treats contemptuously 
the flag of the United States ... ," has such scope, e. g., 
Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969) (verbal flag 
contempt), and at the relevant time was without the 
benefit of judicial clarification.1 ' 
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as 
impermissibly vague for lack of notice on the theory that 
" [ w] hat is contemptuous to one man may be a work 
of art for another." 12 Goguen's behavior can hardly be 
described as art. Immaturity or "silly conduct" '" prob-
ably comes closer to the mark. But we see the force of 
the District Court's conclusion that since the flag has be-
come "an object of youth fashion and high camp ... ," 
it is by no means as likely as it might have been at 
another time in this country's history that wearing a 
miniature fiag on one's clothing constitutes criminal con-
tempt. 343 F. Supp., at 164, 167. As both lower federal 
courts noted, casual treatment of the flag in many con-
texts has become a widespread contemporary phenom-
enon. lb'id.; 471 F. 2d, at 96. Flag wearing in a day of 
relaxed clothing styles may be simply for adornment or 
nothing more than a ploy to attract attention. To be 
sure, much of the tendency of youth in recent years to 
wear unorthodox clothing reflects an intent to communi-
cate disagreement with the conventions, manners, and 
Yalues of their elders, as well as to express dissent from 
10 E. g., Grayned, supra, 408 U. S., nt 109; Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compnre the less stringent requirements 
of the modern vagtH'ne~" cn~rs dealing with purely economic regula-· 
tion. E. g .. United States v. NationaL Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U. S. 
29 (1963) (Robinson-Patmnn Act). 
11 Sec n. 6, supra. 
1 ~ Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040, 1056 (1968). 
1 0 Goguen v. Smith, su7n·a, 343 F. Supp., at 166. 
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government policies and resentment against an unpopu-
lar war. But certainly in a time of widely varying atti-
tudes and tastes for displaying something as ubiquitous 
as the United States flag or representations of it, not 
every unceremonial wearing or displaying of the flag 
upon one's clothing can be said to constitute criminal 
contempt. And, the statutory language under which 
Goguen was charged fails to draw reasonably clear lines 
between the many kinds of modern, nonchalant uses of 
the federal flag. The classic vagueness cases require that 
all "be informed as to what the State commands or 
forbids ... ,"Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 
(1939), and that "men of common intelligence" not be 
forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 
( 1932). Given today's tendencies to treat the flag care-
lessly, those notice standards are not satisfied in this 
case. 
The language under which Goguen was charged also 
fails to meet the other principal requirement of the 
vagueness doctrine. The vagueness concept of notice 
often has a fictional flavor. 14 This is particularly so in_L@ 
noncommercial context, where as a general rule behavior 
is not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory 
language. In such cases, perhaps the more meaningful 
aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not true notice but 
the requirement that a legislature establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement. In this regard, 
the statutory language under scrutiny is notably deficient. 
In its terms, the language at issue is sufficiently un-
bounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "any 
public deviation from formal flag etiquette. " 343 
F. Supp., at 167. Enacted in 1899 and unchanged 
14 Amsterdam, supra, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 83, n. 79. 
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since/5 the "treats contemptuously" phrase was also· 
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the· 
relevant time in this case.10 We are without authority 
to cure that defect. 17 Statutory language of such a 
standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla-· 
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting 
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166-168 (1972). In 
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 117, 120 (1969), 
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against 
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judg-
ment of the policeman on his beat." The aptness of 
Mr. Justice Black's warning is evident from appellant's 
candid concession in oral argument before the Court of 
Appeals regarding state enforcement standards for that 
portion of the statute under which Goguen was convicted: 
" ... [A]s counsel [for appellant] admitted, a war 
protestor who, while attending a rally at which it 
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the 
American flag by contemptuously covering himself 
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prose-
15 Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d, at 90, n. 2. See n. 3, supra. 
16 See n. 6, supra. The contempt portion of the Massachusetts 
statute seems to have lain fallow for almost its entire history. There 
apparently have been a half dozen arrests under this part of the 
statute in recent years, but none of them bas led to recorded court 
opinions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. In 1968, a teenager in Lynn, 
Massachusetts was charged, apparently under the present statute, 
with desecrating the United States by o:ewing pieces of it into his 
trousers. New York Times, Augu 't 1, 1968, p. 31, col. 1. The 
teenager was ordered by a state district court to prepare and deliver 
an essay on the flag. The court continued the case without a find-
ing, depriving jt of any precedential value. 
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cuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a 
member of the American Legion who, caught in the 
same rainstorm while returning from an 'America-
Love It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag, 
but docs so regrettably and without a contemptuous 
attitude, would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2cl, at 
102. 
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such 
selective law enforcelllent, there is a denial of due process. 
III 
Appellant's arguments that the "treats contemptu-
ously" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least 
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive. 
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening 
brief, as he did his oral orgument, to the contention that 
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness 
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness 
as applied" is properly before the federal courts,'~ but 
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the 
statut-e is vague on its face. The latter claim, appellant 
insists. \ras not presented to the state courts with the 
requisite fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 
( 1971). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belat-
edly raised ' 0 and it fails to take the full measure of 
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the 
18 Rrpl~, Brief 4. 
1 n The District Court ckci~ion in thi~ ca~r \\'UH PntPrPd ~ub,cqu<'nt 
to Picard. supra. Yet it appear~ thfil app<'llant did not rai"e hi:; 
present exhan~tion of remedie:; :ugument befor<' that court. The 
District Court commrnicd ~prrifically on thi~ omi~sion: "No con-
tention is now made that rGogurn] hn~ not cxhan~tcd ~tate rrmccliCR, 
nor thnt the con~titutional i~~ur~ prr~rntrd here \I'Crr not rniRed 
npproprintely in ~tate proceedings." 3-1·3 F. Snpp., at 164. 
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state courts.~0 We do not deal with the point at length. 
however, for "·e find the relevant statutory language 
impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. In light of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's explicit 
holding on vagueness "as applied," Commonwealth 
v. Goguen, - Mass. -, 279 N. E. 2d 666, 667 
(1972), and given appellant's concession. we have no 
doubt that the "substance" of this claim was "fairly 
presented" to the sta.te courts under the exhaustion 
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S .. at 275, 278. 
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is prem-
ised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him 
a hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not 
vague. whatever its implications for those engaged in dif-
ferent conduct. We do not believe that this concept has 
20 Go~-rurn filed in ~tntc Auprrior romt an un~urrcsRful motion to 
dismi~s thr romplnint in \rhirh hr citrd thr Fourtrrnth Amendment 
and nllrg:cd thnt, thr stntute undrr whirh hr wns chnrg:rd wns "imprr-
missibl~r Ynguc nnd inrnpnblr of fnir and reasonnble intcrpretntion 
h~· publir officinls." Apprndix l. This motion wns ;ilso brforc 1 hr 
Mnssnchnsrtts Ruprrmr .Tudirinl Conrt, sinre it wnA inrorpornted in 
Goguen's amenclrd bill of rxcrptionR. Ibid. In ncldition, Gognen's 
brief before thnt Comt rni~ccl Yngurnrss points nnd cited vnguenrss 
cnsrs. ld., nt 19. 25-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey. 305 U. S. 
4fil (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (WD N. C. 
1971) (thrC'e-juclge court) (North Cnrolim flag fl trmpt statute 
void for YngurneRs nne! ovcrbrrnclth). Appellant is rorrE'c1 in assC'rt-
ing that Goguen fnilrd to compnrtm0nta lizc in his s1nte court brirf 
the due proce~s clortrinc of vngnrncss nne! First Amrndm0nt concepts 
of overbrmclth. Sec Appendix 19-24. But permitting n drgrrc of 
lenkngr brtwcrn those pnrticubr adjoining compnrtments is under-
stnndable. Cf. Note, "The Fir8t Amrndmrnt Ovcrbrradth Doc-
trine." 83 Hnrv. 1. Rrv. 844, 871-875 (1970). The highrst stntc 
court'~ opinion, which drnlt separate]~' with Gogurn's Fir~t Amend-· 
mcnt nnd Yaguencss rlaims,- 1\Ins~., nt -, 279 N. E. 2d, nt 557, 
indicate~ that 1 hat court was wrll awnrc that Gognrn f;lisrd both 
sets of nrgumcnts. 
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much meaning in the present case. There are statutes 
that by their terms or as authoritatively construed apply 
without question to certain activities, but whose appli-
cation to other behavior is uncertain. Hard-core violator 
concepts make some ~gard to such statutes. But 
that's not this statute. This criminal provision is vague 
"not in the sense that it requires a person to conform 
his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible norma-
tive standard, but rather in the sense that no standard 
of conduct is specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincin-
nati, 402 U. S. 611. 614 (1971). Such a statute simply 
has no core. The absence of an ascertainable standard 
for inclusion and exclusion is precisely what offends the 
Due Process Clause. Such a deficiency is particularly 
objectionable in view of the unfettered latitude thereby 
accorded law enforcement officials and triers of fact. 
Where this problem exists and until it is corrected either 
by amendment or judicial construction, it affects all who 
are prosecuted under the statutory language. In our 
opinion the problem exists in this case. The language 
at issue is void for vagueness as applied to Goguen 
because it subjected him to criminal liability under a 
standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury were 
free to react to nothing more than their own preferences 
for treatment of the flag. 
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of 
the vagueness question presented, appellant argues that 
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow sub-
ject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the United 
States.21 Appellant contends that this "takes some of 
the vagueness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptu-
ously .... ' " 22 Anyone who "wants notice as to what 
this statute proscribes ... , immediately knows that it 
has something to do with flags and if he wants to stay 
21 Appellant's Brief 17; Trans. of Oral Arg. 9. 
22 Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. 
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clear of violating this statute, he jmt has to stay clear 
of doing something to the United States flag." 2 3 Apart 
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an 
"actual" flag, 2• we fail to see how this alleged particu-
larity resolves the central vagueness question- the· 
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous 
treatment. 
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavail-
mg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute 
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase, 
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
customarily construes general language to take on color 
from more specific accompanying language. But it is 
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general 
phrase alone, and that the highest state court did not 
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory 
interpretation in this case. 25 Appellant further argues 
2 3 Ibid. 
24 At the time of Gogurn's prosecution , the statute referred simply 
to "the flag of the United States .. . ," without further definition . 
That raises the obvious question whether Goguen's miniature cloth 
flag constituted "the flag of the United Sta.tes . . .. " Goguen 
argued un~u ccessfully beforE' the state courts that the statute applied 
only to flags that met "official standards" for proportions, such as 
relation of heigh t to width and the size of stripes and the field of 
stars, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those standards. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 24-26 ; Appendix 2. There was no 
dispute that Goguen's adornment had the requisite number of stars 
and stripes and colors. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be 
covered by the statute, noting that " [t]he statute does not require 
that the fla g be 'official'" Commonwealth v. Goguen, - Mass. - , 
- , 279 N . E. 2d 666, 668 (1972) . The lower federal courts did 
not address this holding, nor do we. We note only that the Massa-
chusetts Legislature apparently sensed an ambiguity in this respect, 
because sub equent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute 
in an effort to define what it had meant by the "flag of the 
United States." See n. 3, supra. 
25 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. 
72-125-l-OPINION 
14 SlVITTII v. GOGUEN 
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has 
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional con-
tempt.~r. Aside from the problems presented by an 
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case 
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously 
unnarro,Yed statute,"7 this still does not clarify what 
conduct constitutes contempt. whether intentional or 
inadvertent. 
Finally. appellant argues that state law enforcement 
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret 
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute. prop-
erly read. reaches only direct. immediate contemptuous 
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity 
of the flag .... " "~ There is no support in the record 
for the former point."" f\imilarly. nothing in the state 
~"The M:1~~:1chu~etts romt commonird Rimp]~, th:1t "rtJhe jury 
rould infer that the violation was intent ionr~l without reviewing any 
words of the defendnnt." Commomrealth v. Goguen,- l\fa~R. -, 
-, 270 N. E. 2d 666, 6GR (1972). Thus, the court held that the 
jury could infer intrnt mrrcly from Gognrn'R conclurt. This is 
n.ppnrentl~' abo :1 holding t h:1t thr jur~' must find cont rmptuous 
inirnt under thr ~tatutc, nlthough thr rr(]uirrmrnt ammmts to vrry 
little ~ince it iR ~o ca~ih· ~ati~fircl. Thr court'~ rrfrrcnrr to Yerbnl 
<"ommuniration reflrctrd. ocfrjen'~ reliance on St1'eet v. New York, 
~94 U. S. 579 (1969). 
~• E. g., Ashton v. Kenttttky, 384 U.S. 195, 19R (1966). 
2R Appellant'~ Brirf 22. 
2u iVith regnrcl to J1l'O~rc·utori:il policie~, appl'llant rite~ t\\'o pub-
lished opinion~ of the Mn~~nchu~rtt~ Attorney Grneral. 4 Ops. of 
Att. Orn. 470 (HJ15) (Rrprocltwed at Appellnni'~ Brirf 30): Rrport 
of Att)'. Gen., Pub. Dor. No. 12. p. 192 (190R) (Rcproduced a.t 
Juri~. Statement App. 5:3). Apprllnnt ronrede~ that nriihrr de:ils 
\\'ith the contempt 11ortion of the ~1 nt utr nndrr "·hirh Gognrn waR 
rmwirted. Tim~. i hry n rr not in point herr. They proYided 
guidnnre to no one on the rrlrnmt Rtatutory lnngnnge. N rvrri he-
le~s, np]1elbnt i~ rorrert that iher ~ho\\' a tendenr~· on thr part of 
the state Attornry Genernl io rrad other portionH of the statute 
nnrrowly. At the same time, they reflect the lark of preci~ion 
recurring throughout the l\1as~arhusett~> flag misuse statute. The 
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court's op1mon 111 this case or in any earlier op11110n of 
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen 
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language 
of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There 
was no allegation of physical desecration. 
There arc areas of human conduct where. by the nature 
of the problems presented. legislatures simply cannot 
establish standards with great precision. Control of the 
broad range of di~orcler]y conduct that may inhibit a 
policeman in the performance of his official duties may 
be one wch area. requiring as it docs an on-the-s~ 
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Coltfo:v. '-.::....~ 
Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no com-
parable reason for committing broad discretion to law 
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt. 
Indeed. because display of the flag is so common and 
takes so many forms. changing from one generation to 
another and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a 
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior 
it means to outla''"· CPrtainly nothing prevents a legis-
lature from defining with substantial specificity what 
constitutes forbidden treatment of UnHccl States flags.an 
1915 opinion notrd that one portion of thr ~tatutr. prohihitin~ 
rxhibition of cn~r::l\·in~s of the nn~ on crrtnin articlrs if rrmllitcrally 
would make it. H rrimina.l offrnsr to displny 1 hr fia~ itself "in many 
of its cheaprr :mel more common forms." Ap]wllant 'R Brirf 31-32. 
This would bo a "manifrst ab~mdit~·." !d., at 32. Thr 1968 
opinion ::1dvi~cd that a~ rrpre~rn a 1011 pamtrcl on a door was not 
"a fia~ of thr United Statr~" within thr mranin~ of the statute. 
Juris. Statrmrnt App. 53-55. A contrary in1Nprctation would 
"rai~e serious qurstions unclrr the Fir~t and Fomtcrnth Amend-
ments ... ," gi\·cn the rrquirrmrnt that brh:wior maclr crimin::1l 
mu~t he "plainly prohibitrd b~· thr l::1n~ua~c of thr tatutr." !d., 
::lt 54. 
~0 Thr fcclrml fia~ clr~ccration stntutr, for cxamplr, rrflrcts n 
con~ressionnl purpose to do juHt that. In rc~ponsc to a m1rning 
by the United States Attorney Grncral that the usc of such unbounded 
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The State's failure to approach that goal in the statutory 
language at issue requires invalidation of Goguen's 
conviction. 
IV 
Although we hold the "treats contemptuously" phrase 
void for vagueness. we do not address in this case the 
statute's first six words or its commercial misuse pro-
visions.31 In light of the universal adoption of flag 
contempt or desecration statutes by the federal and 
state governments, 3~ we further emphasize that we do 
terms as "defir~" or "cnstf' contrmpt ... either by word or act" is 
"to riRk invalidation" on due procrss ground~, S. Rep. No. 1287, 
90th Cong., 2d Srs~., 5 (1961\); H. R. Rep. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st 
se~:;:., 7 (1967), thr bill which brcame thr frdeml statute was 
amrnded. 113 Cong. Rec. 16449, 16450 (1967), to rrach only acts 
that physically damagr thr flag. The desrrration provision of the 
statute, 18 U. R. C. § 700 (a), drclnres: 
"(a) Whoever knowing]~, ca ·ts contempt upon any flag of the 
United States b~· publicly mutilating defacing, defiling, burning, or 
trnmpfing upon it shall br fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned 
for not more than one year, or both." 
The lrgislative hdory revrals a clrar desire to reach only defined 
physical acts of drsrcration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 3 
("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful. not acci-
dental or inadvertent public !)hysical acts of desecration."); S. Rep. 
No. 1287, supra, at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, 
willful, not acridental or inadvertent public phyRical acts of dese-
cration of the flag."). Thr act has been so re,'ld by the lowrr federal 
courts, which have upheld it against vagueness challenges. United 
States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96 (CA9) cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1064 
(1972); Joyce v. United States, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 454 F. 
2d 971 (1971), ccrt. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). See lloffman v. 
United States,- U.S. App. D. C.-, 445 F. 2d 226 (1971). 
31 See n. 3, supra. 
32 Sec n. 29, supra. All 50 States have flag contempt statutes. 
The statutes are synopsized in Hearings on H. R. 271, et al., before 
Sub. Comm. No. 4 of i he House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th 
Cong., 1st Scss., ser. 4, pt. III, at 324-346 (1967). The flag con-
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not hold that the due process vagueness doctrine invali-
dates all such statutes. Insofar as that doctrine is con-
cerned, the validity of these statutes will depend on their 
particular language, judicial construction, and enforce-
ment history.a:l Finally, as noted earlier, we do not deal 
here with the question whether the Massachusetts flag-
misuse statute contravenes the First Amendment.'H In-
tempt statutes of most Statrs arr patterned after the Uniform Flag 
Act of 1917, which in § 3 provides that: 
"No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defilr, defy, trample 
upon, or by word or act rust contempt upon any such flag, standard, 
color design or shield." 
Compare, 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966) with Hearings 
on H. R. 271, et al., supra, at 321-346. Massachusetts, which has 
one of the "older flag laws," Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp., 
at 164, is among the handful of States that have not adopted the 
Uniform Flag Act or a derivation. 
33 See cases cited n. 30, supra. Some flag contempt statutes have 
been substantially narrowed by judicial interpretation. E. g., State 
v. Royal, - N. H. -, - 305 A. 2d 676, 676 (1973) (New 
Hampshire flag contempt statute reaches only "physical abuse type 
of acts .... "). See also State v. Hodson, 289 A. 2d 635 (Del. Super. 
1972). Others have not and have not fared wrll in federal court. 
E. g., Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (WDNC 1971) (three-
judge court) (North Carolina flag contempt statute void for vague-
ness and overbreadth). 
34 We are aware, of course, of the First Amendment questions 
wrapped up in the flag contrmpt controversy. The Court of Appeals 
dealt with these issues at length. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 
2d, at 96-105. See, e. g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 579 (1969); 
Thayer, "Freedom of Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Crime of 
Flag Desecration," 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 71 (1970); Note, "Develop-
ments in the Law-the National Security Interest and Civil Liberi-
ties," 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1138-1141 (1972); Note, 66 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1040 (196 ) . However, we think the slim record in this case 
makes it inappropriate to consider Gogurn's Fir~t Amendment argu-
ments. Goguen's counsel argued that Goguen was engaged in a 
"demonstration of one" with a clear purpose to communicate. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 36-37. The record does not back him up. Particu-
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sofar as the judgment below rests on the doctrine of 
vagueness, it is affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
larly in light of Goguen's decision not to take the stand, we are 
left to speculate about Goguen's purpose. Perhaps Goguen's goal 
was communication. Or perhaps Goguen was engaged in nothing 
more than a thoughtless example of contemporary clothin fashion. 
The difficulty of the First Amendment issu posed by flag contempt 
statutes counsels against deciding those issues in a case where an 
alleged intent to communicate rests on such a frail factual founda-
tion. We also find wisdom in Judge Hamley's aversion to delicate 
First Amendment issues where decision of them is unnecessary to 
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the First Circuit. 
[.January -, 1974] 
Mn. .J FSTICE PowELL delivered · the OJ.HillOII of the 
Court. 
Thr ~heriff of Worcester County. Massachusetts, ap-
peals from a judgment ·of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt pro-
vision of the · Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconsti-
tutionally vague and overbroad. Gogue·n v. Smith, ·471 
F . 2d 88. aff'g. 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972), prob. juris. 
Jloted. 412 U. S. ~)05 (1973). We affirm on the vague-
ness ground. \Ve do not reach the correctness of the 
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment 
grounds. 
I 
The slender record in this case reveals little more 
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the 
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers.' The 
1 The rN·ord C'ou~i~b ::>okly of the amended bill of excf'ptions 
Cogtll'll Jikd i11 1he :\Ia~~aelntHr>tts. S11preme Judicial Court, the 
oppo~ing brief~ bdore that court, the complaint under which Goguen 
wa::> pro~(·cutNI. :tud Goguen'~ ff'df'ral hnbea::> corpus petition. 
App('lldix 1-:3.", 42-4::!. Wf' do not hnvc a trial tran~eript, nlthough 
Oogum', :unl'nc!t·d hill of t•xrrptiom; briefly summarize.; ~orne of the 
LFP 
72-1254-0PINION 
2 Sl\UTH v. GOGUEN 
flag was approximately four by six inches aiH.l was 
displayed to the l<>ft rear of Goguen's blue jeans. On 
January 30, 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Mas-
sachus<>tts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The 
first offi(•('r encoulltered Goguen standing and talking with 
a p;roup of p<>rsons on a public street. The group appar-
ently was not engaged in any demoustration or other pro-
test as~ociated with Goguen's appareP No disruption of 
traffir or· breach of the peace occurred. When this offi-
cer approached Goguen to question him about the flag, 
the otlwr p<'rsons present laughed. Some time later, the 
sC'cond officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking 
in the downtown business district of Leominister. 
Tlw following day the first officer swore out a complaint 
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the 
Massaehusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part 
of the statute then read: 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, de-
facPs or treats contemptuously the flag of the 
Fnited States .... whether such flag is public or 
private property .... shall be punished by a fine 
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one 
yc>ar, or both ... .'' :• 
tP~Iimon~· gin•n ~~~· witur~~P~ for the· pro~Prution nt hi::; :;tate trial. 
CoguC'n did uot take· I he· ~tand. Thu~ wr do not ·havr of rrrord hi~ 
aC'<'OIIDI of wh;tl tran~pirrd at thr time of hi~ arrr::;t or of hi~ pltrpoHe 
in Wl'arin!{ a flag on tlw ~<'at of his trou~rr:;. 
2 Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-ti, :~5-:{() . 
a :.ra~~ . (;pn, Law,: Ann. c. 2M, § 5 (1971). Omitting ~evernl 
Ht'tllc•ucr~ prolrC't ing t lw crrrmouial activitiP:; of eertain Y<'lrran~ ' 
group~. tlw ~fatute r<'<Hl a~ followi' at tlw time of (logurn'~ arrest 
and C'Oll\'irf ion: 
·'§ 5. Flag; ; prnally for mi:;use 
"WhoPvl'r publiel~· mutilntP~, lrampiP:o upou, defncr:o or trPnto 
rontc•mptuou,;l~· llw flail: of thr United State:; or of ~la:;snchusrlts, 
whrtlwr such ftng i~ public· or privatr proprrty, or whorvr}' displays 
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Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was 
not charged with any act of physical desecration.'' As 
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration 
~neh flag or an~· n•prr~Pntation thereof upon which arc word:;, figures, 
:ulwrti~e·mrnt~ or dt•,;ign~. or whoever r:nt::;r,; or permiti:i sueh flag 
to lw u,;pd in a paradc• a,.; a n·c·cptnrlc for drpo,.;iting or collrcting 
monP~' or an~· othrr nrtirlr or thing, or whoevrr rxpo~r~ to public 
viPw. manttfactun·~. ,;pll~, c·xpe"r::; for :<air, giv~ awa~· or ha~ in 
llO"""""ion for ,;alP or to giV<• away or for u~r for an~· pnrpo,.;r, any 
artiPle· or Hlh,;tan<·<', ]l(•ing atl artirlr of mrrchnndi~r or a rrreptarle 
of mPrehatHli~<' or artieiP~ upon which is attachrd, through a 
wrapping or othrrwi~P. e•ngnlvPd or printrd in an~· mannrr, a rrpre-
:'e•n t:tlwn of the· l'ttitPd State•,; flag. or whorv<'r u;;r,; any rPprp,;pnta· 
tion of the· arm,; or thP gn•at srnl of thr rommonwPalth for any 
adn•rti~1ng or <·omnH·rcial pmpo,r. :<hall be pnni::;lwd b~· a fine of 
not. jp,.;,~ than tPn or mor<' than onr hnndrrd dollar::; orb~· tmpri::;on-
lll('J)t for not more• than OIH' ~·t•ar, or botli: \Vorcb, figurrR, adver:_ 
tiH•ntc•nt,: or dP~ign:,: attadwd to. or direct!~· or indirectly comwctcd 
with. ~neh Hag or any rPprr,entation thrrrof in ;;neh mnnner that 
~ueh flag or it,; rrpn·:<e•ntation i" u~ed to attract attrntion to or 
advc·rt 1~c· ~mh word~. figure~. adverti~rmr'nt;; or de~ign~, ~hall for 
the· pttrpo~e·:; of thi~ ~ertion be drcmrd to be upon ;;uch !iag." 
ThP ,;tatmc· i~ an amnlgmn of pro,·i~ion::; draling with flag d<'~<'rra~ 
tion and rontrmpt (thP fir~t 26 word,;) and with commercial mi~llS('. 
or othc•r Pxploit:ttion or flag~ of tlw ;;tate and national gov<'l'nment. 
Thi~ rtt~P c·otJe•c•m,; on!~· the ·•trPat,; rontrmptuou::;l~·" phrn:;e of thl• 
~iatut<>, whieh h:1~ appare•ntl~· brPn in thr ;;tatut<' ~inrr it~ enaetment 
in 11-\\JH. Oouaen '. Smith. ~upra. 471 F. 2d, Ht 90, n. 2. 
ln lHil. "uh~PquPnt to Gogupn',; pro~reution, tlw dP:seeration and 
eontc·mpt portion of tlw ,;tatute• wa,; amendC'd twice. On ~larc·h 8, 
1971, tlw l<•gi:;laturr. pPr St. 19il, C. 74, modified thr fir,;t ~enteiH'l' b~· 
in,;prting "burn,.: or ot herwi~P" bet ween the trrmro; "publici~·" and 
"mutilat<·~,'' H!l(l. in additiou, b~· increasing thr fitH'. :\Ia~l:'. Grn. Laii'H 
Atm.<· . 21i~. § f> (197:~ Supp.}. On Augu:st 12,1971, via St. 1971, C. 655; 
the l!'gi,;lat ur<' ttppPtltkd :1 1ww sentrnrc defining ''thP flag of the 
·unit!'d Htatl';;" phra,;c appearing in the fir;;t ,;rntencr: "For the 
purpo"p of thi" ,.:<•ctioJt the tc·rm 'flag of thr Unitrd Statei:i' ;;hall 
mean an.'· flag whieh ha .~ bl'rn designated b~· Art or Hl'~olution of 
.the Congrr"'"' or the Unit<'d States a:,; the national embiPm, whPther 
or not :::uch a de•"ignation j,; <'urrrntly in force." Ibid . The 1971 
[Poot11ote 4 is on p. 4] 
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a1Hl eonh-'mpt portiou of the statute. the officer charged 
SJW<'ifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat con-
temptuously the flag of the United States .... " r, 
A ftc'r jury trial in tlH' Worcester County ~uperior 
Court. Gogupn was found guilty. The court imposed a 
S('lltC'llC'!' of six months in the Massachusetts Hom:e of 
Cort'l'ctions. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts 
Supn'nH' Judicial C'ourt, which affirmed. Common-
wealth Y. Gouuen, - Mass. -, 279, N. E. 2d 666 
(1!172). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argu-
IIH'nt with the comment that "rwlhatever tlw uncer-
tainti<'s in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in 
thC' statute as applied lwre. " !d.,- Mass., at-, 279 
~. K 2d. at 667. The court cited no Massachusetts 
preeedC'nts int<'rprC'ting the "treats contemptuously" 
phrasl' of th{' statutf'.n 
,\ftl'r Cogul'n began serving his sentence. he was 
grantl•d bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas 
corpus Ly the U nitf'd States District Court for the Dis-
triC't of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Sntith, supra, 343 
:tmrndnH•nt,- nn· r('lc-nnt to thi" ca~r only in tiH' tangPntial ~~·n~r 
that the~· indil'ntP a n•rognitiotl b~· tiH• lrgi~lHtmr of the Jwed to 
tightPn up thi>< impn•l'i::-! ' o<tatute. 
' Perhap" t hi,- 1\'a>< hrratl"(' of rhc diftirulty of the quro<twn wlwt her 
Cogll('ll'>< l'OtldtH·t ('()llo<tit ttt I'd phy~irnl dc~erration of the Hag. cr. 
Uouw'''· \' , Smith, ~upra. -til F. 2d, at 91 , 11. 4 ('' .. . I W_le arr not' 
~o ~ttr1• I hat "1•winp; a J1ng to a hal'kground rlcurly af'f1·ct~ 'phy:sieal 
inlcgrit.1·.' ''). 
" ApJwndix 4. 
•;Ap]lt'llant <'OI'I'('I'tl~· <'Ollf'<'dc·d itt oral argument that Gogurn'~ 
ra~e i" tlH• fir~t n•eord('d ~dno<":lclltl:sctt:; tourt rrading of thi,; l:m-
gttag<'. Tr . of Oral Arg. 17-lR. Indeed, with the exePption of OIW 
turn of lh!' t·<• ntllr~ · l'a~r involYing one of the ~tatutc'~ commercial 
mi"u~!' pro vi~ ion~, thr mt in· "tntutr hn~ bern l'><~entinlly devoid 
of ~tat1• !'ourt inl<'rprrtation. ('ommomcealth v. R. ! . Shennan 
Mwut . ('o., lH!J :\fa,;:s. 76 , 75 K. E. 71 (1905) . 
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F. Rupp. 161. The District Court found the flag con-
tempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly 
vague unclrr the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amrndment as well as overbroad under the First 
Anwndmrnt. In upholding Goguen's void for vague-
net-:s eontentions. the court concluded that the words 
"trPats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily 
ascertainable standard of guilt." !d., at 167. Especially 
in "th(•se days when flags are commonly displayed on 
hats. !!:amwnts and vehicles ... ," the words under which 
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many in-
stanet>s, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal 
prosPcution." IIJid. The court also found that the 
statutory languagr at issue "may be said to encourage 
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid. 
Tlw Court of Appeals, with one judge concurring, 
affimwd thr District Court in all respects. Goguen v. 
Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d 88. The Court of Appeals con-
clt!drd that "resolution of [Goguen 's void for vagueness I 
challt>ngP to the statute as applied to him necessarily 
adjudieates tlw statute's facial constitutionality .... " 
!d., at 94. Treating as-applied and on-the-face vague-
nrss attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of 
tlw imprecision of tlw statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92, 
H4, th<' eourt found that the language failed to provide 
ad(•quate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guide-
lim's for law enforcement officials, and set juries and 
courts at large. !d., at 94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now 
Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation_(-) 
from the Xinth Circuit, concurred solely on void~
vagueness grounds. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley thought 
the majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and 
other First Amendment issues unnecessary to the disposi-
tion of the case. Ibid. 
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Wc ap;rN' with the holdings of the District Court and 
the Court of Ap]><'al!" on thc due process doctrine of vague~ 
nesf':. Tlw settled principles of that doctrine require no 
extt' nsi V(' rcsta tPlll(' n t lwrP .' The cloctri ne incorporates 
notiont> of fair notice or waming.' Moreover, it rcq uires 
lt'gislaturcs to set rPasonably clear guidelines for law cn-
fm·cpnwnt officials and triers of fact in order to (H'<'V<'nt 
"arbitrary and discriminatory pnforcement."'" Where> a 
statutt,.s literal f':eop<'. unaided by a narrowing state court 
illtPrpretation. is rapahk of reaching expression sheltered 
by the First AnH'lHinwnt, the doctrine demands a grcatcr 
7 ThP <·l<•lll<'lll~ of t lw ,·oid lor vaguenr~~ doet ritw han• bPen 
d('\"(']opPd in :t In 1'1!:<' bod~· or Jll'P('('d('JJ( from thi~ Court. Thr ('H;o;('~ 
:m· <'<ltPgorilwd in, c. u .. (;l'([lJ!Ied \".City of Hockford. 40S LT. S. 104, 
10~-lO!l ( 1\Ji:!) . :-it•(', Am,t Pnlam. "The Void-for-Va!!:lll'll<'"" Dortritt<• 
ill th<· :-ittpn·m<· C'omt." 109 ll. Pa. L. Rev. ti7 (1960). 
'E. (/ .. /'apal'hl'i~tou \ '. ('ity of Jar·hmll'ille. -W5 C. S. 15H, 1112' 
(197:2) : Lanzetta v. NPw ./N~e!J, :~on. U. S. 451 , +5:~ (lU:~9): 
":\o Oil<' nut~ · h<• n•qmn·d at pPril of lifP, librrt~· or prop<•rt~ · to 
~p<·<·ulatP : t~ to th<· lll<':llling of p('nal ~tntut<'" . All ar<• Pntitlrd to 
h<· mfornwd a~ to what thP 8tatP rommand~ or forbid~ . " (Citation~ 
omitt<•d .), 
Collnally 1 . 01'111'/'a/ ('oll8truclwll Co., 2H9 U. S. :3R.'i, ..J.~)1 (19:~:2) : 
,, 
. ] .\] ~tat11t< · whi\'h PithPt' forbid~ or rPquirr~ thr domg of an 
:t<·t in tPrnt~ ~o ,·ngu<• that lliPil of common intrllig<'IH'<' mu~t ncer~· 
>"ttril~· p;ll<'"~ at it" nH':Irting: and difl'Pr a~ to it" application, violatr" 
tlw fir~t <'""<'llfial of du<• pro<·<·,.;~ of 1:\w." (Citations omittPd.) 
11 E. (/ .. Omy11ed. supra . ..J.OS l". S., at 108; ('nited 8tat1's v. 
L Cohen Orocery ('o .. 225 r. S. i-11, x9 (1921) ('' .. . [T]o attrmpt 
to <·nfon·p thP ~<·<·tiou would IH· thr <·xart rquivalent of an dfort to 
<·arr~· o11t a :<fatlltP whic·h ill t('rlll~ mprrl~· prn:tliz<·d and puni,.;]wd 
all acts detrinwntal to tlw publi<• intPrP~t wlwn unju,.;t ami um<•a,.;on-
;tblP i11 th\' <'"timat<' of th<· eo11rt and jur~· ."); l'uited States \'. 
Reese. 0:2 P. S. :21-J.. :2:21 (1Si.5) ("lt would certain]~· lw dangerou~ 
if tlw l<'gi:<latlll'(' <'Ottld :<et a 11<'1 !urge <'nough to catch all po~~ibl<' 
olf<·nd<>r~. and lr:l\'(' it to th<· court~ to ~tep in"id<' a11d ,.;a~· who 
could ])(' ri~~;htfully d\'taitl<'d, and who eould be set at largt•."). 
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dPgn'(' of specificity than in other contexts.'" The statu-
tory language at issue here. "publicly ... treats con-
tPmptuously tlw flag of the United States ... .'' has such 
~<·ope. e. g., Street , .. .\"ew York, 394 r. S. 5-76 (Hl69) 
(verbal flag contempt). and at the relevant time was 
without the benefit of judicial clarification." 
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as 
void for lack of notice on the theory that "l w J hat is 
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art for 
another." '" Gogupn 's heha vi or can hardly be described 
as art. lmmaturi ty or "silly cone! uct '' '" probably 
conwR closer to the mark. But we see the force of the 
District ( 'ourt's observation that the flag has becomP 
"an object of youth fashion and high camp . . . ." 
:Ha F. Supp .. at 164. As both courts below noted, casual 
tn•atnwnt of the flag in many contpxts has become a 
wid<•spread contemporary phenomenon. !d., at 164,. 
Hi7; 471 F. 2d. at !Hi. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed 
elothing styles may lw simply for adornment or a ploy to 
attraPt attention . It and many othPr current. careless 
usf's of tfw ftali nevertheless constit"Ute unceremonial 
treatJnPnt that many people may view as contemptuous. 
Y Pt in a time of wid Ply varying attitudes and tastes for 
~fi splaying something as ubiquitous as thP Cnit<>d States 
flap; or rPpresPntations of it. it could hardly be the pur-
pose of tlw Massach usf'tts legislature to make criminal 
every informal us<' of the flag~ The statutory language· 
onder which Gogue11 was charged'. however, fails to draw 
10 /<J. (/ .. (;raynl'd. suwa. -101\ LT . S .. at 109; ~mith \'. California, 
;{(il l '. S. 1-17 . 151 (Hl5!l). Comparr tlw fp~~ :stringt•nt rrquirrmrnt~ 
of t lw modPm vai-(IH'IlE'~~ ca~P~ d<·nling with pmely rronomic rrgula-
1ion. E. g .. l'nited .State~\' . National Dairy Prod~ Corp., ;{7:2 U. S. 
29 (H)():3) (Hobiu:<on-Patman .-\ct) . 
11 S<•P n. ll. supra. 
' " .NotP, Hti .\lich. L. HP\'. 10-10. 105() (1\:Jt\S) . 
"' Gogw'n \'. Smith, su;pra. ;{4;{; F .. Rupp ... a.t Hili" 
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reasonably ekar lines between the kinds of nonccremonial 
treatment that arC' criminal and those that an• not. Dw• 
proc·p~s r<•quirPs that all "lw informed as to what the 
f.ltat<' eomrnands or forbids . .. ," La11zetta Y. Yew Jersey, 
;~Q() l r . ~- 4.~1. 4.~:3 ( Hl:3!l), and that "nwn of commort 
intPlli~<·nc<'" 11ot bC' forc<'d to guess at tiH• mpaning of tlw 
<~rilllinal law. Connally Y. Genera.[ Construction Co. , 
:2()0 l '. ~- :38•). :3\Jl ( l\1:3:2 ). Given today's tendencies tu 
tn•at tlw fta~ urlccrPnloniously. those notice standards 
arc 11ot ~atisfipr] hPr<' . 
\\'(' rPco~nize that in a noneotlllnereial context lw-
havior a:s a ~<'ll<'ral rule is not mapped out in advance 011 
tlw basis of statutory languag<'.'' In such cas<'s. perhaps 
tlw mo~t nl<'aningful asp<'Ct of the vagueness doctrine is 
not actual noticl' but thP other principal element of the 
doetrirw- tlw r<'quir<'lll<'llt that a legislature estab~ 
mini mal l!;llidrlhll'S to govern law enforccmcn t. 1 t is[this ~ 
rc~ard that thP statutory language under scrutiny has its 
most notahlP d<•ficiPrlcics. 
ln its t<•rms, tlw language at issue is sutficieJJtly un-
bound<•<! to prohibit. as the District Court noted , "any 
public d<•viation from formal flag etiquette . .. . " 343' 
F. Supp .. at W7 . l ' nchanged throughout its 70-ycar 
history,"' the "trc>ats con tcm ptuously" phrase was also· 
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the 
relevant tinw in this casP.'n We are without authority 
11 Am~tc·rdam, .~1/fll '(l, 109 l '. Pa. L. Hrv., at to;;{ , JL 79 . 
J ;, 1'4<'1' II. ;{, S /1 j)/'(1. 
ln ~-'<'<' 11. ti , ~upra . TIH• <·on tempt portion of thP .\la~,.;<tehu~<'t t~ 
~fa1Ute ~ < 'Pill~ to haYr lain fallow for <tlmotit it~ entire hi:>tor)·. Appar-
c•ntl)' fhpn• han· IH•<•n ahout a h:ilf dozen aiTe~t~ under thi~ part of 
tlw ~tatJJl!' in rrc·rtJt )'<'HI'~, but nonr ha~ producrd a reportrcl' 
d<•('i,ion . Tr. of Or;d Arg. :2k. In 19f\H, a tr<'IWg<'l' i11 L~·Jln , 
::\fa"";l(·hu~pt t" w;J,.; l'lwq.!P<I. <tppan•ntly undc>r the prr~rnt ~tatutc, 
with d<·~c·c·rating th<· lluitrd :::ltat<'~ by "<·wing piec·<'~ of it into ltii-: 
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to cure that defect." Statutory language of such a 
standard less sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla-
turPs may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting 
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 166-168 ( 1972). In 
Gregory "· ('ity of Chicago, 394 U. S. 117. 120 (1969), 
Mr. J usticc Black voiced a concern that we share against 
CJJtrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judg-
ment of tlw policeman on his beat." The aptness of 
his admonition is evident from appellant's candid con-
eession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals 
re~arcling state enforcement standards for that portion 
of th<' statute under which Goguen was convicted: 
" • • . I A ls counsel [for appellant] admitted, a war 
protestor who. while attending a rally at which it 
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the 
American fiag by contemptuously covering himself 
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prose-
cuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a 
mc.mber of the American Legion who, caught in the 
same rainstorm while returning from an 'America-
Love It or Leave It ' rally, similarly uses the flag, 
but does so regrettably and without a contemptuous 
attitude. would not be prosecuted.'' 471 F. 2d, at 
102. 
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such 
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process. 
~l'Oil~<·r~ . New York TimP~, Aug11::;l 1, 1968, p. 31, rol. 1. The 
le('nager wa~ ordt'n'd hr a ~tHtP di~trict court to prepare and deliver 
an tway 011 the fing . Tlw rourt continuPd the case without a find-
ing, dPpriving .it of any IH"<•cwlmtial valur. 
J; f!J . !f., ('nited 8totes v. 87 Photographs, 402 U. S. 36:3, i36Q: 
vHJ71). 
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Appellant's argumeu ts that the "treats contemptu .. 
ously" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least 
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive. 
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening 
brief. as he did his oral orgument, to the contention that 
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness 
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness 
as applied" is properly before the federal courts.'s but 
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the 
statute is vague on its face. The latter claim. appellant 
insists, was not presented to the state courts with the 
requisite fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 
(. Hl71). This exhaustion of remedies argume11t is belat-
edly raiscd.l!' and it fails to take the full measure of 
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the 
statP courts.~" \Ve do not deal with the point at length, 
1' Rep]~· Brit'f 4. 
"'The Di~triet Court dC'ei~ion in this ca~r wa.-; entc•rrd ~ub~equent 
to l'i('(lrd, supra. Yc•t it apprar~ that appellant did not mise hi· 
JH'C'~c·nt c•xhau~tion of rPmediP~ ur~umPnt beforr that court. The 
Di~t riel Court comm(•utrd .-;perifirally on this omi~~ion: '·No con-
tention j,., 11ow madr that l Goguml ha~ not exhaustrd state rrmrdiro, 
11or that t hr con.-;t it ut ion a! i~:>ur:; prP~rnt rd hrrr wrrc> not raised 
appropria t PI~· in :>In tp proerc·ding~." 34:3 F. Supp., at 154. 
"" Goguc•n filc·d in :;tatP ~up!'rior court an Uli::'UC'C(•:;,;ful motion to 
di~mi~~ tlw c·omplaint in which hr eited thr Fourtr(•nth Amendment 
and :dll'~l'd that the st:tlutc' under which hr wa,., rhar~ed wa~ " imper-
mi~::'ibl,\· Y:t~Ul' and inc·apab!C' of fair nnd reasonnblr intrrpretation 
b~· public· oiliciak" Appendix 1. Thi~ motio11 wa<> altio before the 
':\[a~~ac·hu~ctt~ 8upn·mp .Judicial Court, ::'incr it wa~ incorpornted iq 
Gogum'~ amPndc·d !Jill of <'xecption,;. Ibid. In addition, Gogurn's 
brirf before· that Court rai~<·d vaguc•ne,;~ point,; nnd cited vagueness 
ea~e~ . /d., at 19. 21)- :27, eiting Lanzetta "· New Jersey, 306 U. S. 
451 (19:{0), and Parker "· Morgan, 322 F . Suw. 5R5 (WD N. C. 
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how<'v<'r. for we• find tlw relevant statutory language 
imprrmissibly vague as applied to Uoguen. With~ 
ciut doubt tlw "substance" of this claim was "fairly 
JH'PSPnt<:>d'' to thr stat~' courts under the exhaustion 
standards of heard, supra, 404 L. S .. at 275. 278 . 
. \ppellant's Pxhau~tion of remedies argument is prem-
is<•d on tlw notion that Goguen's bcha vior rendered him 
a hard-corP violator as to whom the statute was not 
va!l:ll<'. whatevrr its implications for those engaged i 11 dif"! 
ferPn t conduct. To lw sure there are statutes that 
by th<'ir terms or as authoritatively construed apply 
without question to certain activities, but whose appli-
cation to other lwha vi or is uncertain. The hard-core 
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such 
statutes. Tlw pres<•nt statute. however. is not in that 
cate~ory. This criminal provision is vague "not in tho 
sense that it requin's a person to conform his conduct 
to an imprPeiscj but eomprehrnsible normative standard, 
hut rather in the sense• that no standard of couduct is 
SJWCifi<•d at all." Coates\'. City of Cincinnati, 402 r. s. 
fHl. H14 ( 1071 ). ~uch a provision simply has 110 core. 
This absPnC<' of any ascertainable standard for inclusion 
and rxclusion is preeisely what offends the Due Process 
Clause. Thr deficiency is particularly objectionable in 
Hl/1) (I hn•<'-JIHlgP r·our1) ( \' or1 h Carolina flag eon1 <'mpt :;ta tu1<• 
Yoid for \'11!-(IH'IH''' and ovc•rureadth). Appellnn1 j, corrPe1 in a:;~rrt­
ing; tha1 (:og;u<·n faihl 1o compar1mmtalize in hb ~tH 1<' cour1 brief 
1 h<' du<· pro<'<'~' do<"1 riur· of vag;ll<'llf'~~ and Fir:;t Anwndmru1 conrrp1~ 
of O\'('rhmtdlh. 8t•f• AppC'ndix 19-:24. Bu1 permi1ting a drgrce of 
ll'akag;<' hP1WP('Il tho~<' par1ieular adjoiuiug r•omp:ll·tmrnt' i~ uuder-
~t:tndahl<-. C'f. \'ot<·. "Tiw Fir'1 Anwndm<'lll OvrrbrPnd1h Doc-
trill<'." 1-i:{ Han·. L. H<'\'. ,'\H. l·lil-~75 (Hl70). The highe~t ,;ta1e 
court·~ opinion, whieh d<'alt 'f'Jlara1Pl~· with Gogm•n';; Fir,:1 Amend-
nwnt and \':II!;IH'Ill''~ claim~,- :\la~~ ., at-, :279 l'\. E. 2d, a1 (i67, 
indi<'a1<'' thai 1ha1 <·our1 \\'H' wE'll HW<Il't' 1hat Gogut>n rai:;<'d hot!~ 
~<'t~ of argunwn1,;. 
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view of the unfettPrcd latitude thereby accorded law 
enforcpnwnt officials and triers of fact. P n til it is cor:.. 
rectC'd either by anwndmPnt or judicial construction, it 
affec·ts all who arc~ prosecutC'd under the statutory Jan~ 
guagr. 111 out· opinion the dPfect l'xists in this case. 
ThP languagP at is~ll(' is void for vaguC'nf'SS as applit>d to 
Goguen hf'eause it subjectC'd him to criminal liability 
undC'r a ~tandard so indf'finitC' that police. court. and jury 
were' frc•c• to react to nothing morp than their own JWf'fer-
('IICCS for tn•atmrnt of the flag. 
Turning from the t•xhaustion point to the merits of 
the vagu!'ncss question prC'SCll ted, appellant argues that 
any notieP difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow sub-
jN·t tnatt('r of tlw statut('. "actual" flags of thl' United 
:-ltat('s." ' .\ppc•Hant contends that this "takt>s some of 
the vagut'nef!s away from th(' phrase. 'treats contemptu-
ou ~ly · ·· .... .:\nyone \\·ho "\vants notice as to ~:hat 
this statute• proserilws ... , immediately knows that it 
has soni<'thing to do with flags and if he wants to stay 
clear of violating this statutP, he just has to stay clear 
of doiiip; sonwthing to thf' Pnited States flag." "a Apart 
fro1n tl1C' ambiguities pres('nted by the concept of an 
"actual " flag." ' WP fail to s<'e how this alleged particu-
"' .\pJ H' Ilant '~ Bril'f' 17; Tran~ . of Oral Arg . !:1 . 
"" Tr . of Oral .\q!; . !l 
"" Ibid 
"'At tht• tillH' of (;op:U('Il·~ pro~t·cution, tlH' ~tatutl' rpfrrred ~imp!)" 
lu "tlw flag; of tht• l'nitl'd ~tatl'~ . .. ," \\'ilhuut furthrr drfinition . 
That rai~< · ~ tht• oll\ · iou~ qnc·~tion \\'IH'thl'r (;ogtwn·~ miniatur<· rloth 
flag; f'OII~titutc·d " thl' flag of tht• {lnitt•d Statt·~ . . ." Cogul'n 
nrgu<·d tlll~IH'C'l'~~full .\· l)('fon· tlw ~tatr rourt~ that tlw ~tatutr applied 
only to flag~ thnt m<•t "ollicial ~tnndarcb" fur proportion~, ~nrh a~ 
rda I ion of IH'ight to width and t ht· ~izr of ~~ ripl'~ and t h(' firld of 
~tar~. :11HI that thr· cloth lw \\'Ol'l' did not rnrrt tho~l' ;;tnndnnb. 
Tr. of Or:d Arg. 11- 1:!, :!+-:.W: Appc·ndix :!. Tlwn· wa~ no. 
di~pntt• that (;ogltl'n·~ adontmc•11t had thl' n•qni~itr nnmhrr of ~tnr~ 
lllld .~tripP~ :~nd l'Olor~ . . Tr .. of Or;tl Arg. 11- 12. The Ma~~a,.. 
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larity resolves the central vagueness q~.:estion-the 
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous 
treatment. 
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavail-
mg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute 
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase. 
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
customarily construes general language to take on color 
from more specific accompanying language. But it is 
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general 
phras<' alone, and that the highest state court did not 
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory 
interpretation in this case."'' Appellant further argues 
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has 
r<'stricted the scope of the statute to intentional con-
tempt."" Aside from the problems presented by an 
appellate court's limiting construction itt the very case 
i11 which a defendant has been tried under a previously 
<~hu~Ptt ~ 8npremp .T nditia I C'onrt found Gogueu ·~ riot h flap; to be 
rov<'n·d b~· th<· ~tatutr. noting that "Lt]ll(' ~tatntC' doC':::: not require 
that tlw f!a~~; I)(' ·ofli!'ial'" Comrnontcealth \'.Goguen,- :!VIa::::~.-. 
-. :2i9 ~. E. :2d li(ifi, li(ii-1 (197:2). The lowl'r fedrral court~ did 
not addr<·~~ thi~ holding, nor do we. We uotC' only that the :'\Ia~~a­
rhn"'<'tt~ Legi~laturr apparrntl~· ~en~E>d an nmbiguit~· in thi~ rr~prct, 
IJ<'tau~c· ~uh~Pqurnt to Uogu<•n'~ pro~ecution it amrnded the ~tntutc 
in au <'ffort to ddim• what it had uwant h~· tlw '·Hag of the 
llnitrd State,;." St'e n. :3. ~upra. 
"" Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.'). 
2'; Th<• \Ja~~arlnt~l'tt~ court commented ~imp]~· that "[t]hr jury 
!'ould inf<•r that tiH' violntion wa~ intentionnl without reviewiug an~· 
word~ of thl' ddrndant." Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mai:l~. -, 
-, 2i9 ~. E. :2d li!H'i, fi(ii-1 (197:2). Tlm~S, the court held that the 
jur)· could iufl'r iniC'llt mrrely from Gogurn':,; conduct. Thi~S i~ 
:ipJl:ln'ntl~· al~o a holding that tlw jury rn~t find contemptuou~ 
int(•nt under t hr ~tnt uU·. although the rrquirPment amount~S to vt•ry 
litrlr ~inrr i1 i~ ~o t•asil~· ~ati~fird. Tlw court'~ rcfrrencc to verbal 
<·ommuniralion rrfl<'!'!<'d Ooguen',: rrliancp on Street v. New York, 
::!94 11. H. 5i9 ( 191)9). 
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unnarrowcd statute.~' this holding still does not clarify 
what. eonduct constitutes contempt, whether intPntionai 
or inadwrtent. 
Finally. appellant argues that state law enforcement 
authorities ha.vf' shown themselves rBady to interpret 
this penal statute narro,.,·ly and that the statute, prop· 
crly r<'ad. reaches only direct. immediate contemptuous 
acts that "aetually impinge upon the physical integrity 
of tlw fiag ... .' ' ~·' There is no support in the record 
for tlw fomwr poi 11 t. "'' Similarly, nothing in the state 
court's opinion in this ease or in any earlier opinion of 
that eo ur t sustains the latter. In any event, GoguBn 
was charp;('d only undPr the wholly open-ended language 
~· 8 . !f .. A8hton , .. Krutul'k!J, :3x4 ll. S. 195, 198 (19fil.i ). 
2 ' ApJH'IIHni ',; Bri<·f 2:.! . 
"'' Wi th l'<'l!:tnl io pro~< ·<· utorial policies, app<•llant cite~ iwo puh-
li~lwd opinions of ihl' \l:",;aehuol'ti ,; Attorntoy GrnPrnl. + Op~:>. of 
Att. (:t•n . .tiO (1915) (Ht•prodlll'l'd ai Appt>llant'~ Brief 30); Hrpori 
of Ati~·. G<'u., Pub . Doe . Xo. 11. p. 192 (19(i~) (H('pnH.lurrd at 
Jmi~. Siat!'llll'lli App. s:n. Ap]H'Ihmi conrl'dl'o that Ill'iilwr dra b; 
wiih ilw <·o ni<•mpi poriion of tlw ~tatute umlrr which Goguen wa~:> 
coil\'idt•tl. Thu~. thl'~ · an• noi in point hrn'. Thl'~ · provided 
guidaJH'l' i o no om· on t hP rt'lt•vmli ~t:t tutor~· Ia nguage . NPvrrt he-
Ir~~ . npp<>llant 1 ~ <'OJT<'c! t hn t the~· ~bow a t<•ndrnry 011 t lw part of 
tlw :<iail' AtionH·~· (;l'IWI'III to n·ad othpr portion~ of ihr ,;tatutP 
ll:IIT0\\' 1~·. Ai th<• ,;nnw time, tbp~ · rrftrct the lark of prrcision 
rr!'mrinl! throughout ihP \ln,;~: t<·hu~<·it~ flag mi~u~<' ~tHiutr. Tlw 
191.') opinion 11otrd t h:t t ;t Iii !'I':! I rmdi ng of Olll' pori ion of Hw ~ta tutP. 
prohibiting rxhibition of t•ngravings of t be flag on <'Prtaill artirl<'l-, 
would mah it a l'riminnl otl'Pn:;r to dit~pla~ · ihe flag ii ~rlf " in ma11~· 
of ib !'lwapPr and mon• c•ontmoit form~." Apprllant 's Brid :n-:tl. 
The ~ iatt' Attoni<>~· Urnc•ral c·on!'lml<•d that ibis would be :1 "manifeti1 
ab~urdit~·." lrl .. at :~1. Th!' 19(i~ opinion advi~ed thai a flag repre-
s<>ni<ttion paintrd on a door WH~ not "a flag of thr Unit<•d Statp~" 
wiihiu ihP ltWHIIing of tlw ,;tntut(' . .fmis. StHt<' llll'llt App. 5:J-55 . . \ 
eont ru r~ · int <·rpr<'i a i ion would "rai:;r ~rriou,; qur,;i ions under til(> 
Fir~t and Fourt<'rnth .'\m<>ndmrni~ .. . ," givrn thl' rt'quirenwni, 
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously.'' There 
was no allegation of physical desecration. 
There are arras of human conduct where. by the nature 
of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot 
establish standards with great precision. Control of the 
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a 
policeman in tlw prrformance of his official duties may 
be onP such arPa. requiring as it docs an on-the-spot 
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Colten \'. 
Kentucky, 407 C S. 104 ( 1972). But there is no com-
parable reason for committing broad discretion to law 
enforct>ment officials in the area of flag contempt. 
Indeed, because display of the flag is so common and 
takes so many forms, changing from one generation to 
another and often difficult to distit1guish in principle. a 
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior 
it intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legis-
lature from defining with substantial specificity what 
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags. '10 
thnt behavior mack criminal mu~t bP "plainly prohibited by til(' 
langtwgc of the ~tatnt<>.'' !d .. at 54. 
30 The federal flag rle~Pcration stntute, for examplr, rc·fl<-ct~ a 
congre~sionnl purpo~e to do just that. In rP~pon~e to a warning 
b~· the Pnited St;lte~ Attornp~· General that to u~e ~urh unbounded 
trrm::: n~ "detir"''' or "ea~t~ cont.c·mpt ... rithrr by word or act" is 
"to ri~k invnlidation" on due proce:;~ ground:;. S. TIP!>. ~o. 1287, 
90th Cong:., :M Se:;,;., 5 (19fl~); H. H. Rep. No. ;{50, 90th Cong., h;t 
SP~~ .. 7 (19()7), thr bill which became tlw federal ~tatutP wa~ 
amended. 113 Cong. Hrc. 164-l9, 16450 ( 1967), to reach onl~· actR 
1 hnt ph~·~icall~· damage tlw Hag. The de:::rcm t ion provi~ion of the 
~tatutc. 1R U.S. C.§ 700 (a), declares: 
"(a) Whoever knowin11:l~· ca:;t:; contrmpt 11 Jon any fin of thr 
llnited State:; by publici~· mutilating rfacing. drfiling. buming, or 
trampling upon it ~hall hr fint'cl not more than $1,000 or impri~oned 
for not morr than one year, or both." 
Thr legi,;IHtivc· hi~tor~· rrveal~ :1 clrar de~irr to r<'arh onl~· df•fineJ 
phy:;icnl 11et:; of de~ecration. H. n. Rrp. No. aso, ~upra, at 3· 
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The State's failure to approach that goal in the statutory 
language at issue requires invalidation of Goguen's 
conviction.:n The judgment is affirmed. 
1 t u; so ordered. 
C'The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not acci~ 
dental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration."); S. Rep. 
No. 1287, supra, at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, 
willful, not accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of dese~ 
cration of the flag."). The act has been so read by the lower federal 
courts, which hav<' upheld it ngainst vagueness challenges. United 
States v. Cmsson, 462 F. 2d 96 (CA9) cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1064 
(1972); Joyce v. United States, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 454 F. 
2d 971 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). See Hoffman v. 
United States,-- U. S. App. D. C.-, 445 F. 2d 226 (1971). 
" 1 We ure awnrt>, of rourse, of tht> univt>rslll adoption of flag 
desecration or contt>mpt statutt>s by the federal and state govern-
ments. See n. 30, supra. The statutes of the 50 States are synop-
sized in Hearings on H. H. 271, et al.. before Sub. Comm. No. 4 
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Con g., 1st Sess., ser. 4, 
pt. III, at 324-346 (1967). Most of the ~tate statutes art> patterned 
after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which in § 3 provides that: 
"No pt>rson shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample 
upon, or by word or act CHst contempt upon any such flag, stnndard, 
color design or shield." 
Compnre 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 ( 1966), with Hearings 
on H. n·. 271, et al., supra. at 321-346. Because it is stated in 
the disjunctive, this language, like that before us, makes possible 
criminal prosecution solely for casting contempt upon the flag. The 
validity of such statute;;, however, insofar as the vagueness doctrine 
is concerned, will depend as much on their judicial construction an~ 
enforcement. history as their language. 
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[January - , 1974] 
Ma. J PWJ'ICB PowELL delivered ; the opunon of the 
Court 
Ttw Hheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, ap~ 
peals from a judgment ·of the United States Court of 
Appeals fo r the First Circuit holding the contempt pro-
vision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconsti-
,ftutio nally vague and ovcrbroad~Go U§n v. Smith, ·471 
lE· 2d 88, aft"g, 343 F. Supp. 161 Mass. 1972) , prob. juris. 
noted, 412 U. S. 005 (1973). e affirm on the vague-
ness ~round. We do not reach the correctness of the 
holdin~ below on overbreadth or other First Amendment 
groundR. 
I 
The slender record in this case reveals little more 
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the 
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers.' The 
1 The rrrord consiRts ~olely of the amended bill of exceptions 
Uoguen filed in the ~lassachu~etts. Supreme Judicial Court, the 
opposing brirf~ before that court, the complaint under which Goguen 
was. m>~erutrd . and Goguen's frdcral hnbeas rorpus petition . 
A[>Jlf'Hdix l -3 , 42-43. We do not. have a trial transcript, although 
Gognrn's amendrrl bill of exeeptions briefly summarizes some of the 
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flag was approximately four by six inches and was 
displayed to the left rear of Goguen 's blue jeans. On 
January 30. 1970, t wo police officers in Leominister, Mas~ 
sachusetts saw· Goguen bedecked in that fashion . The 
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with 
a group of persons on a public street. The group appar~ 
ently was not engaged in any demonstration or other pro-
test associated with Goguen 's appareJ.2 No disruption of 
traffic m· breach of the peace occurred. When this offi-
ct>r approached Goguen to question him about the flag, 
tlH' otlwr persons present laughed. Some time later, the 
serond officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking 
111 tlw downtown business district of Leominister. 
Tlw following day the first officer swore out a complaint 
against Gogucu under the contempt provision of the 
Masi'aehusctt~ flag ntisuse statute. The relevant part 
of thC' f'.tntutC' then read . 
''Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon , de-
faees or treats contemptuously the flag of the 
P11ited States .. . , whether such flag is public or 
private property ... , shall be punished by a fine 
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one 
yf'ar. or both . .. . '' 3 
t(·~tmwu~· gtven by wit11e~;;e~ for the prosecution at hi;; state t n al. 
Goguen did not ta ke the stand. Thus we do not ·have of record his 
ac-count of what r ran~pirrd nt the time of his arrest or of his purpose 
in wearing a flag on the seat of his trousers. 
2 Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 35-36. 
3 i\Ia~s . (l(•n. Laws Ann . cf 264, § 5 (1.971) . Omitting several 
sentence:; protecting t he ceremonial activities of certain veterans' 
group~ , the sta tu te read as follows at the time of Goguen's arrest 
Hnd eon viet ion: 
"§ 5. Fl:tg; pena lty fo r misu~e 
"Whoever publiely mutila tes, tramples upon, defaces or treats 
contc•mptuously the flag of the United States or of Massachusetts, 
whether ~'Uch ling is publie or private property, or whoever displays 
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Drspitf' the first six words of the statute, Goguen was 
not charged with any act of physical desecration.4 As 
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration 
"'lll'h tlag or an~· reprrsPntation thereof upon which arc words, figures, 
ad\'l•rti~<·nwntH or de~ign~. or whoever rauses or permits such flag 
10 hr u"'etl m a paradr a~ a. receptacle for depositing or collecting 
motH'~ or any ot her article or thing, or whoever exposes to public 
view, manufarturPs, sPib, exposes for sale, gives away or has in 
po~"'~'"'~tou for ~n l e or to give away or for use for any purpose, any 
art ich· or ~ub:;t:liH'l', being an article of merchandise or a receptacle 
of nu•rchmHii~<' or art ic i<'H upon which is attached, through a 
wrappmg or othrrwi~r. Pn~?;raved or print('(! in any mann<'r, a repre-
"'<'llt:l twn of thP llnited Stat PH flag, or whoever uses any represent a· 
tton of tlw arm;; or thr grrat sea l of the commonwealth for any 
ad\'nlt~llll!; or f'Oilllll\'reinl purpose, shall be punished by a fine of 
not Jp,..,._ than tPu or rnor<' than one hundred dollars or by imprison-
ID<'Ill for not lllOI'(' than Oil(' year, or botli: Words, figures, a elver:. 
ti~l'llH·lll~ 01' dt'SI!l;ll<' attaehed tO. Or dirertJy Or indirectly COnnected 
with. ~ueh flag or :my rcpre,;entation thereof in such manner that 
~uch flag or it~ repreH!'ntation is used to attract attention to or 
alh t•rti~e ,;urh wonb, figure~. advertisements or cle~igns, shall for 
t lu· pmJHl~t·~ of t hi~ ~t·etion b<' deemed to be upon such flag ." 
Tlw ~tatntt> 1~ :In amn lgam of provisions dealing with flag desecra~ 
tion :IIHI rontt•mpt (th<' first 26 words) and with commercial mi~use 
or ot lwr t'\ploitatwn of flag;; of the stat!' and national government. 
Tlu~ <':1~<' <'OIH'Prn;.; onl~· t hP "treats contemptuou~ly" phras<' of the 
~tatut!', wllll'h ha~ appareut l~· been in th!' statute :siure its enactment 
111 lS\19. Uortueu \'. Smith, supra. 471 F . 2d, at 90, n. 2. 
Ill J Hi J. ~ub~<'quent to Gogurn's prosecution, the de;;!'cration and 
<·ont<>mpt portwn of the statute was amended twice. On :\farch 8, 
JH71, tlw lc•g;i~lature, p<>r St. 1971 ,,£: . 74 , modified the ftrst sentence by 
in,ertlllg "burns or otlwrwi,;e" between the terms "publicly" and 
'' mutilate~," and. iu addition, by increasing the fine. Mass. Gen. Law,.: 
~--~-AI Ill . 2ti4, § 5 ( 197:3 Supp.) . On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971)!. 655; 
the lrgi;.;Jature append!'d a new sentence defining "the flag of the 
1Tnitc·d States" phra~e appearing in the first sentence: "For the 
~mpo,:\l of thil:i s!'ct ion tht' term 'flag of the United Statet:~' shall 
(V nwau any flag which hn;.; been designnted by Act or Resolution of 
the Congre~~ of the United States as th<' national embl<'m, whether 
or not :mel( dc·:-~ignation is currently in force." Ibid. The 197l 
[Footnote 4 is on p. 4] 
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and eoJitPmpt portion of the statute, the officer charged 
speeifieally and only that Goguen "did publicly treat con~ 
tNnptuously the flag of the United Statesr.-:-." 5 
. \ ftcr .1 ury t rial in the Worcester Cot!'nty Superior 
( 'ourt, Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a 
:sPut<>JWt' of six months in the Massachusetts Home of 
( 'on·Pctions. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts 
~upreme .Judicial Court, which affirmed. Common-
wealth \'. Goguen, - Mass. -, 279( '-N. E. 2d 666 / 
( 107:2). That court rejected Goguen 's vagueness argu-. 
IIH'Ilt with the comment that "fw]hatever the uncer-
tawtws in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in 
tlw statutP as applied here. " Id.,- Mass., at -, 279 
?\. K 2d, at 667. The court cited no M11ssachusetts 
Jll'<'C'<'d<'nt~ lnterprPting the "treats contemptuously" 
phrast' of thf' statute.'1 
Aftt•r Goguen began serving his sentence, he was 
grant<•d bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas 
corpus by the United States District Court for the Dis-
t.ri('t of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 
:tlltPtHlllll'llts nn· n•]('yant to this caS(' only in thr tangrntial Sf'nse 
that t IH'\ llldiC':tt(' n rProg;nition by thr lrgi~lnture of th(' need to 
ttl-(htr·n np th1" 11npn·ei~<· ~tat utl•. 
' Pl'rh:tJl" tim; wa" IJrc·a u~<· of the difficulty of the qur~tion wlwther 
(:ol-(111'11 ~ c·onduet <'Oil~titutrd phy~icnl dr::;rcration of the flag . Cf. 
Uuutwn v. 8tmlh, 8upra, 471 .F. 2d, at 91 , n. 4 (" ... [WJc nrr not 
~o ~un· that "t'Willg n f1ag to a background rlearly affrcts 'phy::;iral 
111 t t•grlt )'. · ") 
·, Appl'ndtx 4 
11 Appt•llant t•orrPrtly eonrrdrd at oral argument that Gogurn 's 
('HI"l' '" thr fir>'t rt'rordrd Ma8~achusetts court reading of this lan-
gnagt·. Tr of Oral Arg . 17- 18. Indeed, with the exception of one 
turn of t hr <'('ntmy ca~e involvmg one of the statute 's rommercial 
mtt<ttl"(' prov1~ton~,l! hr rnt irr ~tatutr has been essentially rvot 
of ~tnt<· eonrt mterprrtation . .fC'ommomvealth v. R . / . Sherman 
~IU c'o lX\.) :\ l a~~. 7(i, 75 N . E. 71 (1905)~ 
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F ;:,upp. 161. The District Court found the flag con-
tPmpt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly 
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amt>ndmen t as well as overbroad under the First 
Alllend uwnt. In upholding Goguen's void for vague-
ness contentions. the court concluded that the words 
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily 
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., at 167. Especially 
in "tlwsc days when flags are commonly displayed on 
hats, garments and vehicles ... ," the words under which 
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many in-
stances, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal 
prosPcution.'' 1 bid. The court also found that the 
statutory la nguage at issue "may be said to encourage 
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid. 
Tht> Court of Appeals, with one judge concurring, 
affirmed the District Court in all respects. Goguen v. 
Smith, supra, 471 F . 2d 88. The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that "resolution of [Goguen's void for vagueness] 
challenge to the statute as applied to him necessarily 
adjudieates the statute's facial constitutionality .... " 
!d., at \)4. T reating as-applied and on-the-face vague-
ness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of 
the impr<>cision of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92, 
!14, the court found that the language failed to provide 
adequate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guide-
lilies for law enforcement officials, and set juries and 
eourts at large. !d., at 94- 96. Then Circuit Judge, now 
Sen ior Circuit .Judge Hamley, sitting by designation (E) 
from the Ninth Circuit, concurred solely. on voidtfor f 
vagueness grounds. /d., at l05. .Judge Hamley thought 
tlw majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and 
other .First Amendment issues unnecessary to the disposi-
tion of the ease. Ibid. 
81\IITH v. GOGUEN 
II 
We agree with the holdings of the District Court and 
tlw Court of Ap]wals on the due process doctrine of vague~ 
ness. The settlPd prineiples of that doctri11e require no 
extensiv<' rPstatement here. 7 The doctrine incorporates 
notions of fair notic<' or warning.' Moreover, it requires 
legislatures to set rrasonably clear guidelines for law en-
forr<'lllettt officials a11d triers of fact in order to prevrnt 
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.''" Where a 
statute's litPral sr<>JW, unaided by a narrowing state court 
lntrrprdatioll, is rapablr of reaching expression sheltered 
by tll(' Fm;t Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater 
' Th!' (']('mpnt,.: or t IH' VOid for vaguen0'H dortrme have bC'en 
d<>n•lop('d in a Ia r~L' bod~· of preeC'dent from thi~ Court. The ral:l<'i:i 
ar<' ('atPgorizPd 111, e. o., Grayned Y. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
IOK-10!1 (I \l7:! l . SL'<' , Am~tt•rdam, ''The Void-for-Vagu<'llC'~~ DortrinP 
m tlw H11pn•mr Court," 109 U. Pn. L. Rev. 67 (1960). 
'E. rf., J>a]WI'hri8tou \'. City of J'ac!.:sonville. 405 U. S. 156, 16Z 
(1972); LanZI.'tta "· Nl!w Jersey, 30ft. U.S. 451, 453 (1939); 
"!'\o Oil<' lll;l~· bf' req11in'd at pNil of life, librrt~· or proprrt~· to 
~Jl<'l'Uiat<' a~ to tlw nwaning of penal l:ltatutC';;. All arP C'lltitled to 
he lllform<·d a:; to what tlw State rommand;; or forbid;;." (Citation~ 
om1ttrd .); r--....- .;z" 
Connally ' · Oellt'ral Coustructum Co., 269 U.S. 31\5, 91 (19~): 
i A I ~tatui<' \\ hi<'h Pit hPr forbid~ or rrquirP~ thr domg of an 
a<·t 111 trrm~ ~o ,·agu<• that men of common intelligrner must nece~­
~arily gn<'~~ at its meaning and diffrr a~ to it;; application, violate8 
thr firt't C'i:i<'('lltial of du(• proce::;..-. of law." (Citation:; omittC'd.) 
"E ff., (;rayned. supra, 408 cr S .. at lOR; United States v. _ ,s-
J:,. Cohen Oror·ery Co., '2'l9 U. S. 81, 89 (1921) ('' .. . [T]o attrmpt 
to t'nfon•(' the :::eC"tion would br thr exact cquivaiNlt of an rffort to 
carr~· out a ~tatutP whieh in tC'nllH merely penalized and puni;;hed 
all act~ detrnnC'ntal to thl' public intere~:>t whrn unju8t and unreason, 
~0------:,.,...brl(·-111 fTH' e~tunat-;l of tht• court and jury."); United States v. 
~ Reese. H2 ll. S. 214, :!'21 ( 1H75) (''It would certainly be dang<'rous 
tf tlw l<•gii<lature could ~rt a nPt large enough to catch all posHiblo 
off<•tJdrrs, and lt'avr it to tlw courts to ~tep insidC' Hnd ~ay who .~ 
eould lw rightful!~· d('tainPd, and who .. he sC't at L'irgr ."j . -c._::_~~_.) 
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degt'('<' of specificity than in other contexts. 111 The statu.: 
tory language at issue here, "publicly . . . treats con-
tf'tnptuously tlw flag of the United States ... ,"has such 
scope, e. g., Street v. i\'ew York, 394 U. S. 5.76 (1969) 
(verbal flag contempt). and at the relevant time was 
without the benefit of judicial clarification .1' 
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as 
void for lack of notice on the theory that " [ w] hat is _ '+'=' 
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art ~
anotlwr.'' 1" Goguen's behavior can hardly be described 
as: art. Immaturity or "silly conduct" 1" probably 
comes closer to the mark. But we see the force of the 
District Court's observation that the flag has become 
"an object of ybuth fashion and high camp . . . " 
:34a F. Supp., at 164. As both courts below noted , casual 
tn•atment of the flag in many contexts has become a 
widespread contemporary phenomenon. /d., at 164 . 
1~7; 471 F. 2d. at 96. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed 
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to 
attract attention. It all<l many other current, careless 
uses of thl' flag nevertheless constit11te unceremonial-
treatment that many people may view as contemptuous. 
Y ('t in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for 
f{isplaying something as ubiquitous as the United Rtates 
flag or representations of it, it could hardly be the pur-
pose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal 
every informal use of the flag. The statutory language' 
ander which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw 
111 E . g., Gruynnf, supra, 40H U. S., at 109; Smith v. California; 
;{til U. S. 147, 151 (195!)). Compare the le~s ~tringent requirement~ 
of the modern vagtH'IIe,:s ca:,:e~ dealing with purely economic regula-· 
tion . E. g., United States\". National Dairy Pmd~ Corp., 372 U. S. 
:29 (l!Hi:3) (Robinson-Patman Act) . 
1 1 See 11. 6, supra. 
I:! Note, (i(i Mich. L. Hev. 1040 , 105() (196R) . 
I :< Gogunt v. Smith, ~u.pra. 34:3: F .. SL1pp .. a,t 160,, 
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reasoJJably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremollia1 
treatnwnt that are criminal and those that are not. Due 
pro<'ess n'quires that all "be informed as to what the 
~tat1• c·ommands or forbids ... ,"Lanzetta v . • Vew Jersey, 
;{06 {T. ~. 451, 45:~ ( Hl39), and that "men of commort 
intPiligellef'" not be forcPd to guess at the meaning of the 
erimlllal law . Connally v. General Construction Co., 
~(:iSJ l '. ~ . :38.1. 301 ( 1H32). Given today's tendencies tO' 
tl'(·at th<' flag uncerm1oniously, those notice standards 
arl' not 1-'Htisfic•d h<'rP. 
We• recogniz<' that in a noncommercial context be-! 
havior a~ a g<'neral ruk is not mapped out in advance 011 
tht> basis of statutory language. 14 In such cases, perhaps 
tlw most mt>uningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is 
11ot a('tual noticr but the other principal element of the 
dQctmH· tlw requirement that a legislature establish D 
( lllinimal guid<'Jines to govem law enforcPment. lt i~& 
rPgard that thl' statutory language under scrutiny has its 
most notahk defici<'ncies. 
l.n its terms. the }anguag~ at issue is sufficiently un-
hound<'d to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "ally 
public (!Pviation from formal flag etiquette .... '' 343· 
F ~upp .. at Hi7. Fnchanged throughout its 70-year 
h1story , "' tlw "tr('ats contemptuously" phrase was also· 
dPvoid of a JJarrowing state court interpretation at the 
f·rl<'vtwt tinl<' in this case. 1n We are without authority 
' > \m::: tPrdam, 11-upra, 109 ll . Pa . L. Rev., at s[.n. 79. 
" ' H<'<' n. ;{, supra. 
-@ 
1'1 H<'<' 11. (), supra. Tlw t•ontempt portion of the Mas~:>achusett~ 
~tatntl' ~'><'<'111~ to h:lvP lain fallow for almost it~:> entire history. Appar-
t·utl~· t lwn' havt' b!'!'ll about a half doz!:'n arrests under this part of 
tlw 'tatute Ill rrcPJJt yrar~, but none has produced a reported' 
rleri~ion Tr. of Om! Arg. 2'0L In 1968, a teenager- in Lynn, 
:\In~~achu~ptt~ wa,; charg!:'d, apparently under the present statute, 
\' 1th dP~<'l'rating the £1nitrd StMc::; by .,;ewing piece~ of it into loo 
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to cure that defect. 11 Statutory language of such a 
stamiardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla-
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities fo. r sett~~~ fa\ 
~lw standards of the criminal law. E.JJ.., Papachristou
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 16~1qi(1972) . In ('"f'l 
Gregory \'. ('ity of Ch1:cago, 394 U. S. 11,(.""120 (1969), '-.) 
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against 
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judg-
lliPnt of tlw policeman on his beat." The aptness of 
his admonition is evident from appellant's candid con-
r·N;sion during oral argument before the Court of Appeals 
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion 
of th<' statute und<)r which Goguen was convicted: 
.. l.\]s counsel lfor appellant] admitted , a war 
protestor who. while attending a rally at which it 
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the 
Amf'rican flag by contemptuously covering himself 
w1th it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prose-
cuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a 
member of the American Legion who, caught in the 
same rainstorm while returning from an 'America-
Love It or Lf'ave It' rally, similarly uses the flag, 
but dews so regrettably and without a contemptuous 
a ttltudP. would not be prosecuted ." 471 F . 2d, at 
w~, 
Wlwre inherently vague statutory language permits such 
self'rtivP law enforcement, there is a denial of due process. 
f•rou~Pr~ . :\ew York Times, August 1, 1968, p . 31, col. 1. The 
tf'rn:q.t<•r wa~ ordered by a state dititrict court to prep11re and deliver 
:m ('~;;ay on tlw Hag. Tlw court continued the case without a find-
I~Ppriving Jt of any pn•redential valur. 
r~oi'J 7 R (I , Cnitnl .Sta.tes v. #i Photographs, 402 (J. S. 363, 3691 
\;.\li l}. 
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III 
Appellant's argumellts that the "treats contemptu ... 
ously" phra~e is not impermissibly vague, or at least 
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive. 
Appellaut devotes a substantial portion of his opening 
brief, as he did his oral argument, to the contention that 
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness 
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tiOJL Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness 
as applied" is properly before the federal courts,' 8 but 
contC'Hds that Gogueu's only arguable claim is that the 
statute 1s vague on its face. The latter claim, appelhmt 
inst~ts, was not prt'se11ted to the state courts with the 
reqmsitC' fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 
(1071). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belat-
<:'uly raiscd,'u and it fails to take the full measure of 
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the 
statf' courts. ~0 We do uot deal with the point at length, 
"HqJiy Bnef 4 r-----1 Go.ju~n + i /~J h.t~ 
1 
"' Tlw Dlf'tl'iet Cem·i tlecieisu i11 tiHi rasP wlhi t'fltnl"tl~ub~equent ~~..P h~PrA.s J 
to J>u·m:d. ·"J!.l!..ra Y!'t it appears that app<.'llant did not raise hts 
-----p-n-,~-l'nt <•xhau~tHlll uT r('lllC'<h<'ll Hr~umrnt orTurrlt!hllt comt. 'Phe~ Lor &A' p.aJt"h~ 
~kt111t <'I~ <·ommPntrd Hpecifically on this omi:s~iou: "No ron-
trution 1~ now madr that I Goguen] has not exhnustrd state rrmedirs, 
nor th;lt the <"On:stttutlonal i~l:>uc:; presented here were not raise<f 
approprwtrly m ::;tate- proreedings." 343 F. Supp., at 164. 
eu GoF;uen filed in ~tatr superior court an unsurces:sful motion to 
di::;mi~~ t hr eomplaint in which he cited tlw Fourternth Amendment 
and ail('~(·d that the :statute undrr which he was charged wns "imper-
mi~:-;iiJiy Y:tgue and inrnpnblr of fnir and reasonable interpretation 
h.v pubhr officials." Apprndix 1. This motion wa:; also before the 
l\la~~arhu~Ptt~ Supreme .Judicial Court, ::;ince it was incorporated i11 
Gogum's amt>nded bill of rxceptions. Ibid. In addition, Goguen's 
bnt>f befon• that Court rai~ed vagurnes:; points nnd cited vagueness 
ca~l'~. Id., at 19, 26-27, citing Lanzetta '"· New Je1·sey, 306 U. S. 
-!51 ( tn:m), and Parker v. llJ organ, 322 F. Supp. 51\5 (WD N. C. 
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howewr, for we find the relevant statutory language 
impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. With~ 
out doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly 
pn·1wnted" to the state courts under the exhaustion 
standards of Picard, ~:>'Upra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278 . 
. \ppellant 's exhaustion of remedies argument is prem-
ised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him 
a hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not 
vaguP. whatever its implications for those engaged in dif'1 
ferPnt comluct. To be sure there are statutes that 
hy thPir terms or as authoritatively construed apply 
without questiou to certain activities, but whose appli-
catiou to otlwr behavior is uncertain. The hard-core 
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such 
statutt•s. The present statute, however, is not in that 
category. This criminal provision is vague "not in thE) 
sens<' that it requires a person to conform his conduct 
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, 
but ratlwr in the sense that no standard of coJJduct is 
specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 
611, (H4 ( 1D71). ~uch a provision simply has no core. 
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion 
and Pxclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process 
C'lnus(-'. Th<' deficiency is particularly objectionable in 
l!l71) (tiH'<'C'-JUUge court) (North Carolina flag contempt ~:>tatute 
\'oid for \ ' H~?;UPilPo<~ anJ overbreadth). Appellant is correct in a~:>~:>ert~ 
in~ that (;o~u!'ll failed to compartmentalize in his stntr court brief 
th(' due pro!·e~~ dortriJJe of Yaguene:,;s and Fir~l Amendment conrept~:> 
of onrbreadt h. Se1• ApJwndix 19-24. But permitting a degree of 
kakagP lwl Wf'!'ll tho~!' partirular adjoining compa rtmcnt~ is under~ 
HtandabiP. Cf. NotP, "The First Amendment Overbrradth Doc~ 
trine•," k:~ Han·. L. HPv. S44, 871-875 (1970). The highe;;t ~tate 
rourt'~ opmion , whic·h d!'alt ~eparately with Goguen's F~n:wnd· 
'llt and vaglH'nc::;H claim~,F Mass:;"at -, 279 N. E. 2d, at 667, 
cheateo< that that f'Ourt wu;; well aware that Goguen raised botl~ 
t» of nrglmwnts. 
~ .. ~Wt!tc.ffl{ 
v, C.r~l(ell\.) 
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view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law 
rnforcenwnt officials and triers of fact. Until it is cor:. 
rectPd either by anwndment or j uclicial construction, it 
affeets all who are prosecuted under the statutory Ian~ 
guage. In our opinion the defect exists in this case. 
Tlw lan?;uagP at issue is void for 'vagueness as applied to 
GogttPn because it Rubjected him to criminal liability 
under a ~tandard so indefinite that police, court, and jury 
were· free to react to nothing more than their own prefer-
(•nees for treatment of the flag. 
Turnillg from the exhaustion point to the merits of 
tlw vagueness questiou presented, appellant argues that 
any 11otie(' difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow sub-
jN~t mattPr of tlw statute. "actual" flags of the United 
~tates." ' Ap]wHant contends that this "takes some of 
thE' vaguPness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptu- ~ 
ously . . ' " "" Anyone who "wants noticE' as to what .c .... ---~ 
Giis statutr proscribes ... , immediately knows that it as somPthing to do with flags and if he wants to stay lear of violatiug this statute, he just has to stay clear -of doing something to the United States flag." "" Apart 
frotn the ambiguities presented by the concept of an 
"actual ' ' fiag."' we fail to see how this alleged particu-
"' AppPll:lllt '~ BriPf l i; Tran~. of Oral Arg. 9 
"" Tr of Oral A r!J: . !! 
~" I b11l 
"'At tlw time of (1-ogurn'::; pro~l'Ciltiun, thr :;tat11tc rpferred Himply 
to "tlw Ji:tg of th(• FnitPCl Statr:< .... " without further definition. 
That rai~r,.: thr ohviou" qur~tion wiH•ther Gogtwn'~ miniature cloth 
Hag ron~titutrd "thr flag of the United State·~ . ." GoguPt1 
arg11Pd 1msurcr~~fully hdore t hr ~tatr rourt~ that the ~tatutr applied. 
only to flag~ tha1 mP1 "olfirial ~tandard~" for proportion~, ~uch all 
rrla tion of hright to width and t hP ~izr of l:itripe~ and t hr field of 
~tar~ . and thnt thP cloth he worr did not mert thoHr l:itandard~ . 
Tr. of Oral Ar~ . 11-12, 2+-:26; Apprndix :2 . Therr was no. 
di:-ipute· that Uog;uru'~ adornmrnt had tlw rrqui~ite numbrr of l:'1ar" 
:.)nd .~tripe•,.: and rolorl' .. Tr .. of Oml Arg. 11-12. Thr 1\fag:;a,.. 
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larity resolves the central vagueness qt:estion-the 
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous 
treatment. 
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavail-
mg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute 
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase, 
nnd that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
customarily construes general language to take on color 
from more specific accompanying language. But it is 
('Ottced~d that Goguen was convicted under the general 
phrase alone, am! that the highest state court did not 
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory 
intf'rpretation in this case."'' Appellant further argues 
that thf' Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has 
rf'stricterl the scope of the statute to intentional con-
tPmpt."'' Aside from the problems presented by an 
appellate court's limiting constructiott in the very case 
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously 
ehn:;ett~ Suprrnw .Juda·ial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be 
eov<·red b~· the Htntutr. noting that "Lt]he ;;tatute docs not require 
that tlw tla~ be 'ol!iC'ia l'" Commonwealth''· Goguen,- Ma~~- -, 
-. :!i9 !'\. E. :!d !iHo, MiS ( 1972) . Thr lowl'r federal rourts did 
not addrr~s thi~ holdin~, nor do we. We note only that the ::\Iassa-
chu"Nt~ Le~islaturr apparently sensed an ambiguity in this respect, 
h(•(':tiN' sub~('(JUent to Gogul'n'~ proHecut ion it amended the statute 
111 au l'ffort to dl'liJH' what it had meant by tlw '' flag of the 
l'nitf'd :-:ltatPs. '' SeP 11. 3, supra. 
tr. Tr. uf Om! Arg. -~S . 
~I; The :\Ia~~achusPtt~ conrt commPnted ~imply that "[t]hP jury 
r·otdd mfpr that t ht• violation was intentional without reviewing any 
word,; of tlw dPfendant .'' Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mas~.-, 
-, :.!i!) N. E. :2d Htl6, GfiS (19i:2) . Thus, the court held that the 
jmy could infrr intPnl merely from Goguen's conduct. This i:;; 
apparPntly abo a holding that the jury must find r•ontemptuou~ 
int,·nt under tllP statutl·, although the requirement amounts to very 
little ~mre it iH so easily ~atisfiPd. Thr court's rcferPnce to verbal 
r•ommunieat ton rrflf:'rtr•d Goguen's reliauce on Street v. New York', 
:l94 TT S. 571:) (L9!11:)), 
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uunarrowed statute. 27 this holding still does not clarify 
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentionai 
or iuadvPrtent. 
Finally. appellant argues that state law enforcement 
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret 
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, prop· 
erly read. reaches only direct, immediate contemptuous 
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity 
of the fiag . . .. ' ' "~ There is no support in the record 
for tlw former point."" ~imilarly, nothing in the state 
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of 
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen 
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language 
~~ g !I ·· A8htoll v. Kentur;ky, :384 U. S. 195, 198 (1966) . 
"' Appellant';:; Bricf :22. 
:!v With r<•gard to pro~pr·utonal policie~, appellant cites two pub-
h>'IJPd upltlion:; of the .'vltt""achu~et ts Attorney General. 4 Ops. of 
Alt. (;pn . 470 (l!H5) (H<'prodnccd at Ap}wllant':s Brief 30); Report 
of Atty . (;<•n., Pub. Do<' . ?\o. 1:2 , p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at 
Juri~ !::ltatPmPnt App. iS:l) . Appdlnnt concedes that nritlwr deals 
wtt h I ht> eont<•mpt portion of till' statute under which Goguen was 
L'OllVJdPrl. Thu~. thp~· are not in point here. They provided 
guidan<·e to no onP on thr rPlrvaut statutory language. Neverthe-
Jr~,.,, npJwllant I>' eorrrrt that tht>y ~how a tendency on thr part of 
th(' ~tat<' . \tlonH'Y G<•tH•ra l to read other portion;,; of the ~ta tute 
n;trrowb·. .".1 th<' ~ame tim(•, thry reflect the lack of precision 
rrrurnng thronghuut tlw ;\Ia:-~~arhw;etts flag misuse• ~tatut e. The 
1915 upimon nutrd that a liternl rrading of onr portion of the i,;tatute, 
Jtruhihit ing Pxhihi tion of l'ngravmgti of the fl ag on crrtain article~, 
would mak(• tt a erimmtli off<>n~r to di l:!play the flag it self '' in many 
of it~ f'h<':IJlPI' and more common forms(' Appell:mt 's Brief 31-32. 
Tlw ~ta t e Attom e)· C:rueral coneluded that this would be a "manifest 
alt~urdity" !d .. nt :~2. The 1968 opinion advised that a flag rrprc•-
:>l'ntntJOJl pmntrd on a door was not "a flag of thr Unit<>d State~'' 
within 1 he menning of t hr ~tiltutr. .Juris. Statement App. 53-55. A 
coni rary intNprdation would "raise ~erious que~tions under the 
First and Fourt<·Pnlh Amrudment~ . . ," givcn the requirement 
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There 
was no allegation of physical desecration. 
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature 
of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot 
establish standards with great precision. Control of the 
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a 
policeman in the performance of his official duties may 
be one such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot 
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Colten v. 
Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no com-
parable reason for committing broad discretion to law 
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt. 
Indeed, because display of the flag is so common and 
takes so many forms, changing from one generation to 
another and often difficult to distihguish in principle, a 
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior 
it intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legis~ 
lature from defining with substantial specificity what 
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags.:w 
that behavior made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the 
language of the statute." ld., at 54. 
ao The federal flag desecration statt1te, for example, reflects a 
congressional purpo~e to do just that. In response to a warning 
b~· the United State;; Attorney General that to use such unbounded 
terms as "defies" or "ca;;ts contempt ... either by word or act" is /*'": ~ 
"to 'risk invalidation" onl.i{tlt piOtt'!!S grounds, S. Rep. No . 1287,-----~j
90th Cong., 2d Se;;s., 5 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 7 (1967), thr bill which became the federal st~ttute was 
amended. 113 Cong. Rec. 16449, 16450 ( 1967), to reach only acts 
that physically damage the flag. The desecration provision of the 
stntute, 18 U. S. C. § 700 (a), declares: 
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the 
United States by publicly mutilating{cfefiicing, defiling, burnmg, or 
trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned 
for not more than one year, or both." 
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to reach only defined 
physical a.cts of desecration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 3: 
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The State's failure to approach that goal in the statutory 
language at issue requires invalidation of Goguen1s 
conviction.31 The judgment is affirmed. 
1 t is $0 ordered. 
("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not acci-
dental or inadvertt>ut public physical acts of desecration." ) ; S. Rep. 
No. 1287, BUpra, at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, 
willful, not accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of dese-
cration of the flag.") . The net has been so read by the lower federal 
courts, which have upheld it against vagueness challenges. United 
States v. Crosson, 462 F . 2d 96 (CA9) cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1064 
(1972); JQyce v. United States, - U. S. App. D . C. - , 454 F . 
2d 971 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 969 (1972) . See Hoffman v. 
United States, -- U.S. App. D. C. - , 445 F . 2d 226 (1971) . 
3 1 We are aware, of course, of the universal adoption of flag 
desecration or contt>mpt statutes by the federal and state govern-
ments. Sre n. 30, supra. The statutes of the 50 States are synop-
sized in Hearings on H. R. 271 , et al., before Sub. Comm. No. 4 
of the Houst> Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser . 4, 
pt . III , at 324-346 (1967). Most of the state statutes are patterned 
after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which in § 3 provides that : 
"No person shall publicly mutilnte, deface, defile, clefy , trample 
upon. or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard , / ~ 
color~ or shield." -
Compare 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52- 53 (1966), with Hearings 
on H. R. 271, et al., supra, at 321-346. Because it is stated in 
the disjunctive, this language, like that before us, makes possible 
criminal prosecution solely for c sting c<m.tem.J2.!. upon the flag . The u·h·l
1
31·.,..., ..j.M.ts ) 
r 
validity of ~statutes owever, insofar as the vagueness doctrine v / 
is concerned, will depend as much on their judicial construction ancl ~ q..~ I.( ~~ > / 
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V alarie Goguen. 
On Appeal from the United 
States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit. 
[January -, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
Tho Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, ap-
peals from a judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt pro-
vision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconsti-
tutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471 
F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972) , prob. juris. 
noted, 412 U. S. 905 (1973). We affirm on the vague-
ness ground. vVe do not reach the correctness of the 
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment 
grounus. 
I 
The slender record in this case reveals little more 
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the 
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers. 1 The 
1 Tho record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions 
Goguen filed in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the 
opposing briefs before that court, the complaint under which Goguen 
was prosecuted, and Goguen's federal habeas corpus petition, 
Appendix 1-36, 42-43. We do not have a trial transcript, although 
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions briefly summarizes some of the 
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flag was approximately four by six inches and was 
displayed to the left rear of Goguen's blue jeans. On 
January 30, 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Mas~ 
sachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The 
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with 
a group of persons on a public street. The group appar-
ently was not engaged in any demonstration or other pro-
test associated with Goguen's appareP No disruption of 
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this offi-
cer approached Goguen to question him about the flag, 
the other persons present laughed. Some time later, the 
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking 
in the downtown business district of Leominister. 
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint 
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the 
Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part 
of the statute then read: 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, de-
faces or treats contemptuously the flag of the 
United States ... ; whether such flag is public or 
private property ... , shall be punished by a fine 
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one 
year, or both .... " 3 
trstimony given by witnesses for the prosecution at his state trial. 
Goguen did not take the s1 and. Thus we do not have of record his 
account of what transpired at the time of his arrest or of his purpose 
in wearing a flag on the seat of his trousers. 
2 Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 35-36. 
a 1\hss. Gen Laws Ann. c. 264, § 5 (1971). Omitting '*'vera] 
sentences protecting the ceremonial activities of certain veterans' 
groups, the statute read as follows at the time of Goguen's arrest 
and conviction: 
"§ 5. Flag; penalty for misuse 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats 
contemptuously the flag of the United States or of Massachusetts, 
whether such flag is public or private property, or whoever displays 
SMITH v. GOGUEN 
Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was 
not charged with any act of physical desecration.'' As 
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration 
8tlch flag or any representation thereof upon which are words, figures, 
adverti:;ements or drsigns, or whoever causes or permits such flag 
to be used in a parade as a. receptacle for depositing or collecting 
money or nny other article or thing, or whoever exposes to public 
view, manufactmes, sell~, Pxpo;;es for sale, gives away or has in 
po~:;ession for sak or to give away or for use for any purpose, any 
article or substance, being an article of merchandise or a receptacle 
of merchnndio;e or art iclPs upon which is attached, through a 
wrapping or otherwioe, Pngraved or printed in any manner, a repre-
srntatiou or the United Statrs flag. or whoever u:;es any representa-
tion of thr arm:; or the grrat seal of the commonwealth for any 
advrrt ising or commercial purpose, shall be punished by a fine of 
not. 1<'~:<.~ than ten or morP than one hundred dollars or by imprison-
mmt for not more t hnn onr year, or both. Words, figures, adver-
tisements or dP~igns attached to, or directly o1· indirectly connected 
with, such flag or any representation thereof in such manner that 
such flag or its rrpre 'entation is used to attract attention to or 
aclvrrt i;;e such word:;, figure::;, advertisements or designs, shall for 
the purpose:; of this section be deemed to be upon such flag. " 
The statute i ~ an amalgam of provisions dealing with flng desecra• 
tion nnd contempt (the fir:;t 26 worcb) and with commrrcial misuse 
or other exploitation of flng:; of the state and national government. 
This ca~e concernH only tbr " trea.ts contemptuously" phrasr of the 
::;tatutr, whirh ha~ npparrntly been in the statute since it~ enactment 
in 1899. (ioguen , .. Smith. supra, 471 F. 2d, at 90, n. 2. 
In 1971, :,; ub~<'quent to Goguen's pro~ecution, the del:lerration and 
contrmpt portion of thP ~tatute was amended twice. On March 8, 
1971, the legil:llature, per St. 1971, c. 74, modified the first sentence by 
inserting ''burns or othNwi:;e" between the terms "publicly" and 
"mutilatrs," and. in addition, by increasing the fine. Mass. Grn. Lawl:l 
Ann. c. 264, § 5 (197:3 Supp.). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, c. 
655; the legis! at ure a]1pe11ded a new sentence defining "the flag of the 
United States" phrasr appearing in the first sentence: "For the 
purposr~ of this srction the term ·flag of the United States' shall 
mean any flag which hal:l been designated by Act or Resolution of 
the Congress of the United States as the national emblem, whether 
or not s11eh de::;ignation is currently in force." Ibid . The 1971 
[Footnote 4 is on p . 4] 
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and contempt portion of the statute, the officer charged 
specifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat con-
temptuously the flag of the United States .... " 5 
After jury trial in the Worcester County Superior 
Court. Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a 
sentence of six months in the Massachusetts HoUEe of 
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed. Common-
wealth v. Goguen, - Mass. -, 279 N. E. 2d 666 
(1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argu-
ment with the comment that "[w]hatever the uncer-
tainties in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in 
the statute as applied here.'' ld.,- Mass., at-, 279 
N. E. 2d, at 667. The court cited no Massachusetts 
prpceclents interpreting the "treats contemptuously" 
phrase of the statute.0 
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was 
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas 
corpus by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 
amrndment~ nrc relevant to thi~ case only in the tangential sense 
that tlwy indieat(' a recognition by the legislature of the need to 
tightm up thi8 imprrci~e .-tatutc. 
4 Perhaps this wa~ because of the difficulty of the question whether 
Goguen'l:' conduct ron~tituted physical desecration of the flag. Cf. 
Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d, at 91, n. 4 (" ... [W] e are not 
so sure that sewing a Aag to a barkground clearly affects 'physical 
integrity.'"). 
5 Appendix 4. 
6 Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's 
case i:o: the fir8t recorded \Ia~snchusetts court reading of this lan-
guage. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. Indeed, with the exception of one 
turn of the C\:'ntmy ca~e involving one of the statute's commercial 
misuse provisions, Commonwealth v. R. l. Sherman Manu. Co., 189 
Mn::;s. 7(), 75 N. E. 71 (1905), the entire statute has been essentially 
devoid of Rtate court interpretation. 
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F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag con-
tempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly 
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First 
Amendment. In upholding Goguen's void for vague-
ness contentions, the court concluded that the words 
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily 
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., at 167. Especially 
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on 
hats, garments and vehicles ... ," the words under which 
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many in-
stances, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal 
prosecution." Ibid. The court also found that the 
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage 
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals, with one judge concurring, 
affirmed the District Court in all respects. Goguen v. 
Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d 88. The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that "resolution of [Goguen's void for vagueness] 
challenge to the statute as applied to him neces£arily 
adjudicates the statute's facial constitutionality .... " 
!d., at 94. Treating as-applied and on-the-face vague-
ness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of 
the imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92, 
94, the court found that the language failed to provide 
adequate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guide-
lines for law enforcement officials, and set juries and 
courts at large. !d., at 94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now 
Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting b:y designation 
from the ~inth Circuit, concurred solely on void-for-
vagueness grounds. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley thought 
the majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and 
other First Amendment issues unnecessary to the disposi-
tion of the case. Ibid. 
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II 
We agree with the holdings of the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vague~ 
ness. The settled principles of that doctrine require no 
extensive restatement here. 7 The doctrine incorporates 
notions of fair notice or warning. 8 Moreover, it requires 
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law en-
forcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 0 Where a 
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court 
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered 
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater 
7 The elemC>nts of the void for vagueness doctrine hnve been 
developed in a large body of precedent from this Court. The cases 
arc categorized in, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rock/01·d, 408 U.S. 104, 
108-109 (1972). Sec, Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine 
in the Supreme Court," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960). 
8 E. g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 
(1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939): 
"No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to 
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to 
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." (Citations 
omitted.); 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 885, 391 (1926): 
" . [A] statute which either forbids or requires the dcing of an 
act. m terms so vague that men of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates 
the first essential of due process of law." (Citations omitted.) 
9 E. g., Grayned, supra, 408 U. S., at 108; United States v. 
L. Cohen Grorery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... [T]o attempt 
to enforce the sect ion would be the exact equivalent of an effort to 
carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and punished 
all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreason-
able in the estimation of the court and jury.") ; United States v. 
Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221 (1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous 
if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders , and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who 
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large ."). 
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degree of specificity than in other conte'xts.10 The statu-
tory language at issue here, "publicly . . . treats con-
temptuously the flag of the United States ... ," has such 
~cope, e. g., Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969) 
b :erbal flag contempt), and at the relevant time was 
without the benefit of judicial clarification.11 
Flag con tempt statutes have been characterized as 
void for lack of J1otice on the theory that " [ w] hat is : 
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art to 
another." 1 2 Goguen's behavior can hardly be described 
as art. Immaturity or "silly conduct" 13 probably 
comes closer to the mark. But we see the force of the' 
District Court's observation that the flag has become 
"an object of youth fashion and high camp . . . .'' 
343 F. Supp. , at 164. As both courts below noted, casual 
t'reat.ment of the flag in many contexts has become a 
widespread contemporary phenomenon. !d., at 164,. 
167; 471 F. 2d, at 96. Flag wearing" in a day of relaxed 
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to> 
attract attention. It and many other current, careless· 
uses of the flag · nevertheless constitute unceremonial 
treatment that many people may view as contemptuous .. 
Yet in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for· 
displaying · something · as ubiquitous as the United States 
flag or representations of it, it could hardly be the pur-
pose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal 
every informal use of the flag. The statutory language 
under which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw· 
10 E. g., Grayned; supra, 408 U. S., at 109; Smith v. California, 
361 U. S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less stringent requirements 
of the modern vaguene~s cases dealing with purely economic regula-· 
tion . E. g., United · States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U. S .. 
29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act). 
11 See n. 6, supra. 
12 Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040, 1056 (1968) . 
t 3 Cioguen " : Smith, supra, :lll3: F. Su:rn>., at 166 ~. 
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reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremoniai 
treatment that are criminal and those that are not. Due 
process requires that all "be informed as to what th€! 
State commands or forbids ... ," Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939), and that "men of common 
intelligence'; not be forced to guess at the meaning of the 
criminal law. Connally v. General Construction Co., 
269 U. S. 385. 391 (1932). Given today's tendencies to 
treat the flag unceremoniously, those notice standards 
arc not satisfied here. 
Wf' recognize that in a noncommercial context be-
havior as a general rule is not mapped out in advance on 
the basis of statutory language. 14 In such cases, perhaps 
the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is 
i1ot actual uoticc but the other principal element of the 
doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. It is in 
this regard that the statutory language under scrutiny 
has its most notable deficiencies. 
In its terms, the language at issue is sufficiently un-
bounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "any 
public deviation from formal flag etiquette .... " 343 
F. Supp., at 167. Unchanged throughout its 70-year 
history, 1" the "treats contemptuously" phrase was also 
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the 
relevant time in this case.16 We are without authority 
14 Am>:tNdam, supra, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 82, n. 79. 
1r, See n. 3, supra. 
lG See n. 6, supra. The contempt portion of the Massachusetts 
statute seems to have lain fallow for almost its entire history. Appar-
ently there have been about a hnlf dozen arrests under this part of 
the statute in recent year:;, but none has produced a reported 
deris.ion. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. In 1968, a teenager in Lynn, 
Massachusetts was charged, apparently under the present statute, 
with desrcrating the United States by sewing pieces of it into his 
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to cure that defect. 1 ' Statutory language of such a 
standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla~ 
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting 
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 165-169 ( 1972). In 
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120 (1969), 
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against 
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judg-
ment of the policeman on his beat." The aptness of 
his admonition is evident from appellant's candid con-
cession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals 
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion 
of the statute under which Goguen was convicted: 
" . . . [A]s counsel [for appellant] admitted, a war 
protestor who, while attending a rally at which it 
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the 
American flag by contemptuously covering himself 
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prose-
cuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a 
member of the American Legion who, caught in the 
same rainstorm while returning from an 'America-
Love It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag, 
but does so regrettably and without a contemptuous 
attitude. would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2d, at 
102 (emphasis in original). 
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such 
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process. 
trousers. New York Times, August 1, 1968, p. 31 , col. 1. The 
teenager was ordered by a state district court to prepare and deliver 
an esBay 011 the flag. The court continued the case without a find-
ing, depriving it of any precedential value. 
17 E. g., United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 
369 (1971). 
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III 
Appellant's arguments that the "treats contemptu~ 
ously" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least 
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive. 
Appellant devotes a. substantial portion of his opening 
brief, as he did his oral argument, to the contention that 
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness 
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness 
as applied" is properly before the federal courts,18 but 
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the 
statute is vague on its face. The latter claim, appellant 
insists, was not presented to the state courts with the 
requisite fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 
(1971). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belat-
edly raised,1 !l and it fails to take the full measure of 
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the 
state courts. 20 We do not deal with the point at length, 
18 Heply Brief 4. 
10 Gogupn filPd his federal habeas corpus petition subsPquent 
to Picar-d, sttpr-a. Yet it appears that appellant did not raise his 
pre:>f'nt exhauf'tion of remedies argument before the District Court. 
That court commented ~pecifically on this omission: "No con-
tention i~ now madE' that [Goguen] has not exhausted state remedjes, 
nor that tho con;;titutional issues presented here were not raised 
appropriately in state proceedings." 343 F. Supp., at 164. 
20 Goguen filed in state superior court an unsuccessful motion to 
dismiss the complaint in which he cited the Fourteenth Amendment 
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "imper-
missibly vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation 
by public officials." Appendix 1. This motion was also before the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was incorporated in 
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid. In addition, Goguen's 
brief before that Court raised vagueness points and cited vagueness 
cases. !d., at 19 , 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jer-sey, 306 U. S. 
451 (1930), and Pw·ker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (WD N. C. 
. . .. ~ 
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however, for we find the relevant statutory language 
impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. With-' 
out doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly 
presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion 
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278. 
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is prem-
ised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him 
a hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not 
vague. whatever its implications for those engaged in dif ... 
fercnt conduct. To be sure there are statutes that 
by their terms or as authoritatively constn:ed apply 
without question to certain activitie!:, but whose appli-
cation to other behavior is uncertain. The hard-core 
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such 
statutes. The present statute, however, is not in that 
category. This criminal provision is vague "not in the 
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct 
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, 
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is 
specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 
611, 614 (1971 ). Such a provision simply has no core. 
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion 
and exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process 
Clause. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in 
1071) (three-judge court) (North Carolina flag contempt statute 
void for vagueness and overbreadth). Appellant is correct in assert-
ing that Goguen failed to compnrtmentalize in his state court brief 
the due process doctrine of vagueness and First Amendment concepts 
of overbreadth. Sec Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of 
lcnknge between those particular adjoining compartments is under-
standable. Cf. Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doc-
trine," 3 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 871-875 (1970). The highest state 
court':; opinion, which dealt separately with Goguen's First Amend-
ment am! vagueness claims, Commonwealth v. Goguen, sup1'a, -
Mass ., at -, 279 N. E. 2d, at 667, indicates that that court was 
well aware that Goguen raised both set:; of arguments. 
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view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law 
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is cor-
rected either by amendment or judicial construction, it 
affects all who are prosecuted under the statutory lan-
guage. In our opinion the defect exists in this case. 
The language at issue is void for vagueness as applied to 
Goguen because it subjected him to criminal liability 
under a standard so indefinit~ that police, court, and jury 
were free to react to nothing more than their own prefer-
ences for treatment of the flag. 
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of 
the vagueness question presented, appellant argues that 
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow sub-
ject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the United 
States.~ 1 Appellant contends that this "takes some of 
the vagueness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptu-
ously .. . . ' '' 22 Anyone who "wants notice as to what. 
conduct this statute proscribes ... , immediately knows 
that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to 
stay clear of violating this statute, he just has to stay clear 
of doing something to the United States flag." 23 Apart 
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an 
"actual" flag,~• we fail to see how this alleged particu-
21 Apprllant '~ Brief 17; Trans. of Oral Arg. 9. 
22 Tr. of Oral Arg . 9. 
2afbid. 
21 At thr time of Goguen's j)rosecution, the statute referred simply 
to "the flag of the United States ... ," without further definition. 
That rai~es the obvious question whether GcguPn's miniature cloth 
flag constituted "thr flag of the United States .... " · Goguen 
argued un:snccrs:.:fnll~· before thr :state courts that the statute applied 
only to flag:.: that met "oificial :standards" for proportions, such as 
relation of height to width and the size of stripes and the field of 
:stars, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those standards. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 24-26; Appendix 2. There was no 
dispute that Goguen'~ adornment had the requisite number of stars 
and slripe:s and color:s. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The Massa-
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larity resolves the central vagueness qrestion-the 
·absence of any standard for defining contemptuous 
treatment. 
Appellanes remaining arguments are equally unavail-
mg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute 
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase, 
and that the Massachuretts Supreme Judicial Court 
customarily com:trues general language to take on color 
from more specific accompanying language. But it is 
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general 
phrase alone, and that the highest state court did not 
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory 
interpretation in this case. 25 Appellant further argues 
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has 
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional con~ 
tempt. 2 r; Aside from the problems presented by an 
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case 
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously 
chuHetto Suprem0 Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be 
rov<:>red by the statnt<:>, noting that " [t]he statute does not require 
that the fla g be 'official'" Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mass.-, 
-, 279 N. E. 2rl 666, 668 (1972). The lower federal courts did 
not addr0sH this holding, nor do we. We note only that the Massa-
chusC'tts Legi~latur0 apparently sensed an ambiguity in this respect, 
ber:ms0 sub::;equent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute 
in an effort to d0fin<:> what it had meant by the "flag of the 
United Stat(':;." S0e n. 3, supra. 
25 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. 
26 T h<:> Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t]he jury 
could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing any 
words of th0 defendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mass . -, 
-, 279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). Thus, the court held that the 
jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct. This is 
n.pparently also a holding that the jury must find contemptuous 
int<:>nt under the statut0, although the requirement amounts to very 
little since it is so easily ~atisfied. The court's reference to verbal 
communication reflected Goguen's r<:>liance on Str-eet v. New York, 
394 U. S. 579 (1969). 
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unnarrowed statute.27 this holding still does not clarify 
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentionai 
or inadvertent. 
Finally, appellant argues that state law enforcement 
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret 
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, prop-
erly read. reaches only direct, immediate contemptuous 
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity 
of the flag .... " 28 There is no support in the record 
for the former point. 2u Similarly, nothing in the state 
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of 
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen 
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language 
27 E. g., Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 198 (1966) . 
28 Apprllant 's Brief 22. 
29 With regard to prosecutorial policies, appellant cites two pub-
lislwd opinion~:~ of the Mas:sachusetts Attorney General. 4 Ops. of 
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (Reproduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Report 
of Atty. Grn., Pub. Doc. No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at 
Juris. Statrment App. 53). Appellant concedes that neither deals 
with thr contempt port ion of the statute under which Goguen was 
convicted. Thus, they are not in point here. They provided 
guidance to no one on tlw relevant statutory language. Neverthe-
less, apprllnnt is conect that they show a tendency on the part of 
the sUtte Attorne~· General to read other portions of the statute 
narrowly. At the same time, they reflect the lack of precision 
recurring throughout the Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The 
1915 opinion noted that a literal reading of one portion of the statute, 
prohibiting exhibition of engravings of the flng on certain articles, 
would make it n criminal offense to display tlw flag itself "in many 
of it~:; cheaper and more common forms." Appellant's Brief 31-32. 
The :>tate Attorne~· General roneluded that this would ben "manifest 
absurdity." ld. , at 32. The 1968 opinion advised that a flag rrpre-
srntation painted on a door was not "a flag of the United States" 
within the mraning of the statute. Juris. Statrment App. 53-55. A 
contrary interpretation would "raise serious questions under the 
Fir;;t and Fourtrenth Amendments . . . ," given the requirement 
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There 
was no allegation of physical desecration. 
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature 
of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot 
establish standards with great precision. Control of the 
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a 
policeman in the performance of his official duties may 
be one such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot 
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Colten v. 
Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no corn-
parable reason for committing broad discretion to law 
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt. 
Indeed, becaus.e display of the flag is so common and 
takes so many forms, changing from one generation to 
another and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a 
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior 
it intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legis-
lature from defining with substantial specificity what 
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags. 30 
that behavior made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the 
language of the statute." !d., at 54. 
30 The federal flag desecration statute, for example, reflects a 
congrC'ssional purpose to do just that. In response to a warning 
by the FnitC'd States Attorney General that to use such unbounded 
term~ as "ddies" or "casts contempt ... either by word or act" is 
'·to ri:sk invalidation" on vagueness grounds, S. Rep. No. 1287, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 7 (1967), the bill which became the federal statute was 
amended. 113 Cong. Rec. 16449, 16450 (1967), to reach only acts 
that physically damagC' the flag. The desecration provision of the 
statute, 18 U. S. C. § 700 (a), declares: 
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the 
Unit eel States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or 
trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned 
for not more than one year, or both." 
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to reach only defined 
pl1ysical acts of desecration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 3 
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The State's failure to approach that goal in the statutory 
language at issue requires invalidation of Goguen's 
conviction.'11 The judgment is affirmed. 
It tS so ordered. 
("The language of the bill prohibit~ intentional, willful, not acc1· 
dental or inndvertPnt public phy~ical acts of de>;erration ."); S. Rep. 
No. 12Ri, supra. at 3 ("Tlw language of the bill prohibits intent ional , 
willful, not accidental or inadvertE'nt public phy~ical acts of dese-
cration of the fin g."). The act has beE'n ~o read by the lower federal 
court~, which have uplwld it against vagueness chaliE'ngE'~. United 
States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96 (CA9) cE'rt. denird , 409 U. S. 1064 
(19i2); Joycr' v. Unitr'd States. - U. S. App. D. C. -, 454 F. 
2d 971 (1971), crrt . denied, 405 U.S. 969 (19i2). SeE' Hoffman v. 
United States, -- U. S. App. D. C.-, 445 F . 2d 226 (1971). 
:H ·we are aware, of cour~r. of the univE'r~al adoption of flag 
dr~rcrntion or contempt stat ut E'~ by the fE'deral and state govcrn-
mrnts . Sre n. ao. supra. Thr ~ta tute · of the 50 States arc synop-
sized in Hearing;; on H. H. 2i1, et al .. before Sub. Comm. No . 4 
of thr Hou~P Comm. on thE' Judiciar~· . 90th Cong .. 1st Sess., SE'r. 4, 
pt . Til , at :{24-:{46 (196i). l\Iost of thE' ~tatE' statutes are patterned 
after the U niform Flag Act of 191i, which in § 3 providE's that: 
"No pcr~on ~hall publicly mutilate. deface , dE'file, defy, trample 
upon, or br word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard , 
color, ensign or :-<hield." 
Comparr 9B l:niform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966) , with Hearings 
on H. R. 271, et al., supra. at 321-346. Because it is statE'd in 
the di~junrtivE', t hi ~ language. like that before us, makes possible 
criminal proHecution solely for casting contempt upon the flag. The 
validity of ;;tnt utrs utilizing this language , however, insofa r as the 
vagtH'IlE'oo doctrine is roncernrd, will deprnd as much on their 
judicial co notruct ion and enforcement history as their liberal terms, 
-If-
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MR. JuSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, ap-
peals from a judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt pro-
vision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconsti-
tutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471 
F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972) , prob. juris. 
noted, 412 U. S. 905 (1973). We affirm on the vague-
ness ground. We do not reach the correctness of the 
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment 
grounds. 
I 
The slender record in this case reveals little more 
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the 
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers. 1 The 
1 The record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions 
Goguen filed in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the 
opposing briefs before that court, the complajnt under which Goguen 
was proseruted, and Goguen's federal habeas corpus petition, 
Appendix 1-36, 42-43. We do not have a trial transcript, although 
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions briefly summarizes some of the 
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flag was approximately four by six inches and was 
displayed to the left rear of Goguen's blue jeans. On 
January 30, 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Mas· 
sachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The 
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with 
a group of persons on a public street. The group apparJ 
ently was not engaged in any demonstration or other pro-
test associated with Goguen's apparel." No disruption of 
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this offi-
cer approached Goguen to question him about the flag, 
the other persons present laughed. Some time later, the 
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking 
in the downtown business district of Leominister. 
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint 
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the 
Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part 
of the statute then read: 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, de-
faces or treats contemptuously the flag of the 
United States ... ; whether such flag is public or 
private property ... , shall be punished by a fine 
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one 
year, or both .... " 3 
testimony given by witnesse:: for the prosecution at his state trial. 
Goguen did not take the stand. Thus we do not have of record his 
account of what t ran8pired at the time of his arrest or of his purpose 
in wearing a flag on the seat of his trousers. 
2 Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 35-36. 
" Mass. Gen Laws Ann. c. 264, § 5 ( 1971). Omitting I;<'Veral 
sentences protecting the ceremonial activities of certain veterans' 
groups, the statute read as follows at the time of Goguen's arrest 
and conviction: 
"§ 5. Flag; penalty for misuse 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats 
contemptuously the flag of the Umted States or of Massachusetts, 
whether such flag is public or private property, or whoever displays 
SMITH v. GOGUEN 
Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was 
not charged with any act of physical desecration. 4 As 
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration 
such flag or any repre~entntion thereof upon which are words, figures, 
aclvcrtio<:'mcnts or designs, or whoever rauses or permits such flag 
to b<:' used in a parade as a receptacle for depositing or collecting 
monry or any othE'f article or thing, or whoever exposes to public 
view, manufactureo, sells, expo~es for sale, gives away or has in 
possession for sale or to give away or for usc for any purpose, any 
article or ~ubstance, being an article of merchandise or a receptacle 
of merchandi:o<:' or articles upon which is attached, through a 
wrn]lping or at herwis<:', engraved or printed in any manner, a repre-
srntation of the United States flag. or whoever uses any representa-
tioll of the arms or the great seal of the commonwealth for any 
advrrti~ing or commercial purpose, shall be punished by a fine of 
not. les.~ than ten or more than one hundred dollars or by imprison-
ment for not more than onr year, or both. Words, figures, adver-
tisrment::; or dr8igns attached to. or directly or indirectly connected 
with, such flag or any rrpresentation thereof in such manner that 
~nch flag or its representation is used to attract attention to or 
advertise such words, figure::;, advertisements or designs, shall for 
the purposes of this sertion be deemed to be upon such flag." 
The Htatute is an amalgam of provisions dealing with flag desecra~ 
tion and contempt (the first 26 words) and with commercial misuse 
or other exploitation of flags of the state and national govemment. 
Thi~ ca;;r concrrn::; on]~· tlJP "treats contemptuously" phra ·e of the 
statute, which has apparently been in the statute since its enactment 
in 1c99. Goguen '. Smith, supm, 471 F. 2d, at 90, n. 2. 
I11 1971, ::;ubsrquPnt to Goguen's pro::;ecution, the del:lecration and 
contempt portion of the statute was amended twice. On March 8, 
l!:li 1, the legislature, per St. 1971, c. 74, modified the first srntencr by 
inserting "burns or otherwise" between the terms "publicly" and 
"mutilates," and, in addition, by increa::;ing the fine. Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann. c. 264, § 5 (1973 Supp.). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, c. 
~the legislature apprnded a new sentence defining "the flag of the 
United State::;" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the 
pmpose~ of thi;; :;ection the term 'flag of the United States' shall 
mean any flag which has been designated by Act or Resolution of 
the Congress of the United State::; as the national emblem, whether 
or not such de::;ignation i<> currently in force." Ibid. The 1971 
[Footnote 4 is on p. 41 
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and contempt portion of the statute, the officer charged 
specifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat con-
temptuously the flag of the United States .... " 5 
After jury trial in the Worcester County Superior 
Court, Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a 
sentence of six months in the Massachusetts Hom:e of 
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed. Common-
wealth v. Goguen, - Mass. -, 279 N. E. 2d 666 
( 1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argu-
ment with the comment that "[w]hatever the uncer-
tainties in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in 
the statute as applied here." /d.,- Mass., at-, 279 
N. E. 2d, at 667. The court cited no Massachusetts 
prrceclrnts interpreting the "treats contemptuously" 
phrase of the statute.u 
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was 
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas 
corpus by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 
amrndrnent~ are relrvant lo thi~ case only in the tangential sense 
that they indicate a recognition by the legislature of the need to 
t1ghten up this impreci~e ~tatute. 
4 Perhaps this was brrause of the difficulty of the question whether 
Gogu<>n '::; conduct ron~tituted physical desecration of the flag. Cf. 
Goguen v. Smith , ~;upra, 471 F. 2d, at 91, n. 4 (" ... [W]e are not 
so sure that sewing a flag to a background clearly affects 'physical 
integrity.' ") . 
5 Appendix 4. 
6 Appellant corrrctly conreded at oral argument that Goguen's 
case is thr fir~t recorded Nlas~achu:;ettl:i court reading of this lan-
guagr. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. Indeed, with the exception of one 
turn of thr c(.'ntury case involving one of the statute's commercial 
misuse proviHions, Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co., 189 
Mal:iS. 76, 75 N . E. 71 (1905), thr entire statutr has been essrntially 
devoid of state court interpretation. 
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F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag con-
tempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly 
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First 
Amendment. In upholding Goguen's void for vague-
ness contentions, the court concluded that the words 
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily 
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., at 167. Especially 
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on 
hats. garments and vehicles ... ," the words under which 
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many in~ 
stances, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal 
prosecution." Ibid. The court also found that the 
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage 
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals, with one judge concurring, 
affirmed the District Court in all respects. Goguen v. 
Srnith, supra, 471 F. 2d 88. The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that "resolution of [Goguen's void for vagueness] 
challenge to the statute as applied to him necessarily 
adjudicates the statute's facial constitutionality . . .. " 
!d. , at 94. Treating as-applied and on-the-face vague-
ness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of 
the imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92, 
94, the court found that the language failed to provide 
adequate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guide-
lines for law enforcement officials, and set juries and 
courts at large. !d., at 94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now 
Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation 
from the Ninth Circuit, concurred solely on void-for-
vagueneEs grounds. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley thought 
the majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and 
other First Amendment issues unnecessary to the disposi-
tion of the case. Ibid. 
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II 
We agree with the holdings of the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vague~ 
ness. The settled principles of that doctrine require no 
extensive restatement here.7 The doctrine incorporates 
notions of fair notice or warning. 8 Moreover, it requires 
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law en-
forcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." u Where a 
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court 
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered 
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater 
7 The elemmt~ of the void for vagueness doctrine have been 
developed in a large body of precedent from this Court. The cases 
arc eatC'gorizcd in, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 
108-109 (1972). SC'c, Am~terdnm, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine 
in the Supreme Court," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960). 
8 E. g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 
(1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939): 
"No one may be required at peril of life, libert~' or property to 
spC'eulate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to 
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." (Citations 
omitted.); 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926): 
" . rAJ statutP which either forbids or requires the dcing of an 
act in trrms so vague that men of common intelligence must neces-
tiarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates 
the first essential of due process of law." (Citations omitted.) 
9 E. g., Grayned, supra, 408 U. S., at 108; United States v. 
L. Cohen Grorery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... [T]o attempt 
to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent of an effort to 
carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and punished 
all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreason-
able in the estimation of the court and jury."); United States v. 
Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221 ( 1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous 
if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who 
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large."). 
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degree of specificity than in other contexts.10 The statu-
tory language at issue here, "publicly ... treats con-
temptuously the flag of the United States ... ," has such 
scope, e. g., Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 5-76 (1969) 
herbal flag contempt), and at the relevant time was 
without the benefit of judicial clarification.11 
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as 
void for lack of notice on the theory that " [ w] hat is : 
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art to 
another." 12 Goguen's behavior can hardly be described 
as art. Immaturity or "silly conduct" l:l probably 
comes closer to the mark. But we see the force of the' 
District Court 's observation that the flag has become 
"an object of youth faEhion and high camp . . . ." 
343 F. Supp., at 164. As both courts below noted, casual 
t'reat.ment of the flag in many contexts has become a 
widespread contemporary phenomenon. !d., at 164,. 
167; 471 F. 2d, at 96. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed 
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to) 
attract attention. It and many other current, careless· 
uses of the flag · nevertheless constitute unceremonial 
treatment that many people may view as contemptuous .. 
Yet in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for · 
displaying · something· as ubiquitous as the United States 
flag or representations of it, it could hardly be the pur-
pose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal 
every informal use of the flag. The statutory language 
under which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw· 
10 E. g., Grayned; supra, 408 U. S., at 109; Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less stringent requirements 
of the modern vagueness cases dealing with purely economic regula-· 
tion. E. g .. United· States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp. , 372 U. S .. 
29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act). 
11 See n. 6, supra. 
12 Nole, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040, 1056 (1968). 
' 3 Cl:oguen v.: Smith, s·u:pra, 3..'13: F. Sum;>., at 166~. 
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reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremoniai 
treatment that are criminal and those that are not. Due 
process requires that all "be informed as to what th~ 
State commands or forbids ... ,"Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U. S. 451 , 453 (1939), and that "men of common 
intelligence'; not be forced to guess at the meaning of th~ 
criminal law. Connally v. General Construction Co., 
269 U. S. 385. 391 (1932). Given today's tendencies to 
treat the flag unceremoniously, those notice standards 
are not satisfied here. 
We recognize that in a noncommercial context be-
havior as a general rule is not mapped out in advance on 
the basis of statutory language. 14 In such cases, perhaps 
the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is 
not actual notice but the other principal element of the 
doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. It is in 
this regard that the statutory language under scrutiny 
has its most notable deficiencies. 
In its terms, the language at issue is sufficiently un-
bounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "any 
public deviation from formal flag etiquette. . . ." 343 
F. Supp., at 167. Unchanged throughout its 70-year 
history, u; the "treats contemptuously" phrase was also 
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the 
relevant time in this case.10 We are without authority 
14 Amsterdam, supra, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. , at 82, n. 79. 
1 5 See n. 3, supra. 
w See n. 6, supra. The contempt portion of the Massachusetts 
statute srrms to have Jain fallow for almost its entire history. Appar-
ently thcre havP bPen about a half dozen arre~ts under this part of 
the statute in rE'cE'nt years, but none has produced a reported 
derision. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. In 1968, a teenager in Lynn, 
Massachu~etts was charged, apparent! under the resent statute, 
with dr~ccrating tho UnitE'd States by sewing pieces of it into hls 
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to cure that defect. 17 Statutory language of such a 
standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla~ 
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting 
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 165-169 (1972). In 
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120 (1969), 
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against 
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judg-
ment of the policeman on his beat." The aptness of 
his admonition is evident from appellant's candid con-
cession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals 
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion 
of the statute under which Goguen was convicted: 
" . . . [A]s counsel [for appellant] admitted, a war 
protestor who, while attending a rally at which it 
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the 
American flag by contemptuously covering himself 
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prose-
cuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a 
member of the American Legion who, caught in the 
same rainstorm while returning from an 'America-
Love It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag, 
but does so regrettably and without a contemptuous 
attitude, would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2d, at 
102 (emphasis in original). 
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such 
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process. 
trousers. New York Times, August 1, 1968, p. 31, col. 1. The 
teenager was ordered by a state district court to prepare and deliver 
an essay on the flag. The court continued the case without a find-
ing, depriving it of any precedential value. 
17 E. g., United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 
369 (1971). 
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III 
Appellant's arguments that the "treats contemptu-
ously" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least 
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive. 
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening 
brief, as he did his oral argument, to the contention that 
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness 
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness 
as applied" is properly before the federal courts/8 but 
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the 
statute is vague on its face. The latter claim, appellant 
insists, was not presented to the state courts with the 
requisite fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 
( 1971). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belat-
edly raised.'!! and it fails to take the full measure of 
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the 
state courts. 20 We do not deal with the point at length, 
18 Reply Bripf 4. 
19 Gogurn filed his federal habeas corpus petition subsequent 
to Picard, supra. Yet it appears that appellant did not raise his 
presrn1 exhaustion of remedies argument before the District Court. 
That <·our1 commented specifically on this omission: "No con-
tention i~ now made that [Goguen] has not exhausted state remeclies, 
nor that the constitutional i~sues presented here were not raised 
appropriately in sta te proceedings." 343 F. Supp., at 164. 
20 Goguen filed in state superior court an unsuccessful motion to 
dismis the complaint in which he cited the Fourteenth Amendment 
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "imper-
missibly vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation 
by public officials." Appendix 1. This motion was also before the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was incorporated in 
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid. In addition, Goguen's 
brief before that Court raised vagueness points and cited vagueness 
cases. !d., at 19 , 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 
451 (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (WD N. C. 
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however, for we find the relevant statutory language 
impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. With-
out doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly 
presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion 
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278. 
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is prem-
ised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him 
a hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not 
vague. whatever its implications for those engaged in dif ... 
fercnt conduct. To be sure there are statutes that 
by their terms or as authoritatively construed apply 
without question to certain activitie~, but whose appli-
cation to other behavior is uncertain. The hard-core 
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such 
statutes. The present statute, however, is not in that 
category. This criminal provision is vague "not in the 
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct 
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, 
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is 
specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 
611, 614 (1971). Such a provision simply has no core. 
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion 
and exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process 
Clause. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in 
1071) (t hrce-jndge court) (North Carolina flag contempt statute 
void for vagueness and overbreadth). Appellant is correct in assert-
ing that Goguen failed to compnrtmentalize in his state court brief 
the due process doctrine of vagueness and Fir01t Amendment concepts 
of overbreadth. See Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of 
leakage betwePn those pnrticular adjoining compartments is under-
standable. Cf. Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doc~ 
trine," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 871-875 (1970). The highest state 
court's opinion, which dealt ~eparately with Goguen's First Amend-
ment and vagueness claims, Commonwealth v. Goguen, supra, -
Mass., at -, 279 N. E. 2d, at 667, indicates that that court was 
well aware that Goguen raised both set~; of argument~;. 
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view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law 
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is cor-
rected either by amendment or judicial construction, it 
affects all who are prosecuted under the statutory lan-
guage. In our opinion the defect exists in this case. 
The language at issue is void for vagueness as applied to 
Goguen because it subjected him to criminal liability 
under a standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury 
were free to react to nothing more than their own prefer-
ences for treatment of the flag. 
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of 
the vagueness question presented, appellant argues that 
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow sub-
ject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the United 
States. 2 1 Appellant contends that this "takes some of 
the vagueness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptu-
ously .... ' '' 2 " Anyone who "wants notice as to what 
conduct this statute proscribes ... , immediately knows 
that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to 
stay clear of violating this statute, he just has to stay clear 
of doing something to the United States flag." 23 Apart 
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an 
"actual" flag,"' we fail to see how this a.lleged particu-
21 Appellant'~ Brief 17; Trans. of Oral Arg. 9. 
22 Tr. of Ornl Arg;. 9. 
23 Ibid. 
21 At tlw time of Goguen's J)rosecution, the statute referred simply 
to "the flng of the United States ... ," without further definition. 
That rai~es the obvious quest ion whether Gcguen's miniature cloth 
flag ron~tituted ''the flag of the United States .... " · Goguen 
argued un~ucre~sfull~, before the state courts that the statute applied 
only to flngs that met ''official ~tandards" for proportions, such as 
relation of height to width nnd the size of stripes and the field of 
~tar;;, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those standards. 
Tr. of Oral Arg;. 11-12, 24-26; Appendix 2. There was no 
di~pute thnt Goguen'~ adornment had the requisite number of stars 
and stripe;:; and colors. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The Massa-
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larity resolves the central vagueness qrestion-th~ 
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous 
treatment. 
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavail ... 
mg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute 
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase, 
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
customarily com:trues general language to take on color 
from more specific accompanying language. But it is 
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general 
phrase alone, and that the highest state court did not 
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory 
interpretation in this case.~5 Appellant further argues 
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has 
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional con~ 
tempt.~6 Aside from the problems presented by an 
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case 
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously 
chu~ett~ Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be 
covered by the statute, noting that "lt]he statute docs not require 
that the flag be 'otfirial'" Commonwealth v. Goguen, - Mass. -, 
- , 279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). The lower federal courts did 
not ncldrt'8S this holding, nor do we. We note only that the Massa-
chusett;; Legi8lature apparently sensed an ambiguity in this respect, 
because sub8equent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute 
in an effort to define what it had meant by the "flag of the 
United States." Seen. 3, supra. 
25 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. 
26 The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t]he jury 
could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing any 
words of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mass.-, 
-, 279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). Thus, the court held that the 
jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct. This is 
apparently also a holding that the jury must find contemptuous 
intent under the statute, although the requirement amounts to very 
little since it is so easily ~atisfied. The court's reference to verbal 
commuuicat ion reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. New York, 
394 U. S. 579 (1969). 
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unnarrowed statute, 27 this holding still does not clarify 
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentionai 
or inadvertent. 
Finally, appellant argues that state law enforcement 
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret 
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, prop-
erly read. reaches only direct, immediate contemptuous 
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity 
of the flag .... '' 28 There is no support in the record 
for the former point. 2u Similarly, nothing in the state 
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of 
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen 
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language 
27 E. (]., Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 198 (1966) . 
2 & Apprllant 's Brief 22. 
2n With regard to prosecutorial policies, appellant cites two pub-
lished opinions of the Massachusetts Attorney General. 4 Ops. of 
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (Reproduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Report 
of Atty. Gen., Pub. Doc. No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at 
Jmis. Statem<:>nt App. 53). Appellant concedes that n<:>ither deals 
with the contempt portion of the statute under which Goguen was 
convict<:>cl. Thus, they are not in point her<:>. They provided 
guiclanre 1 o no one on the relevant stntutory language. Neverthe-
less, appellant is correct that they show n tendency on the part of 
the state Attorne~· General to read other portions of the statute 
narrowly. At thr samr time, they reflect the lack of precision 
recurring throughout the Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The 
1915 O]linion noted that a literal reading of one portion of the statute, 
prohibiting exhibition of engravings of the flag on certain articles, 
would make it n criminal offense to displny the flag itself "in many 
of its cheaper and more common forms." Appellant's Brief 31-32. 
The state Attorney General ronduded that this would be a ''manifest 
absurdity." !d ., at 32. The 1968 opinion advis<:>d that a flag repre-
s<:>ntation painted on a door was not "a flag of the United States" 
within the m<:>aning of the statute. Juris. Statement App. 53-55. A 
contrary interpr<:>tation would "raise serious quel:ltions under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments ... ," given the requirement 
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There 
was no allegation of physical desecration. 
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature 
of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot 
establish standards with great precision. Control of the 
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a 
policeman in the performance of his official duties may 
be one such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot 
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Colten v. 
K entucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no com-
parable reason for committing broad discretion to law 
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt. 
Indeed, because display of the flag is so common and 
takes so many forms, changing from one generation to 
another and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a 
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior 
it intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legis-
lature from defining with substantial specificity what 
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags. 3Q 
that behavior made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the 
language of the sta tute ." !d., at 54. 
30 The federal flag desecration statute, for example, reflects a 
congressional purpose to do just that. In response to a warning 
by the United Statrs Attorney General that to use such unbounded 
terms as "defies" or "casts contempt ... either by word or act" is 
''to risk invalidation" on vagueness grounds, S. Rep. No. 1287, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 7 (1967), the bill which became the federal statute was 
amended. 113 Cong. Rec . 16449, 16450 (1967), to reach only acts 
that physically damage the flag. The desecration provision of the 
statute, 18 U.S. C. §700 (a), declares: 
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the 
United State::; by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or 
trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned 
for not more than one year, or both." 
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to reach only defined 
physical acts of desecration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 3 
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o approach that goal in the statutory 
invalidation of Goguen's 
IS affirmed. 
It tS so ordered. 
(''The langnnge of the bill prohibit~ intentionnl , willful, not acci-
dental or inndvrrirnt public ph~·:sical acts of de~erration."); S. Rep. 
No. 12R7, supra. at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibit~ intentional, 
willful, not accidental or inadvertent public phy::;ical acts of dese-
cration of the flag."). The act has been ~o read by the lower federal 
court::;. which havr upheld it againHt vagueness challenges. United 
States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96 (CA9) crrt. deniPd , 409 U. S. 1064 
(1972); Joyce v. United States, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 454 F . 
2d 971 (1971), rNt. drnird, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). See JJoffrnan v. 
United States, -- U. S. App. D. C. -, 445 F. 2d 226 (1971). 
'1 ' We arr awa re, of cour~r. of the univrr~n l adoption of flag 
dr~rcrntion or rontrmpt :statut e::; b~· the fed era l and stat e govern-
ment:> . Ser n. :m. supra. Thr :s tatute~ of thr 50 States a rc :synop-
sized in Hraring,; on H. H. :271, et a!.. brfore Sub. Corum. No. 4 
of thr Hou~r Comm. on the .Judiciary. 90th Cong. , 1st Ses:s., ser . 4, 
p t. lii , at 82+-:~46 (1967) . :'do:st of the ~tate statutes arr patterned 
aftrr the Uniform Flag Act of 1917. which in § 3 provides that: 
"No pN;-;on ~hall publicly mutilate. defa ce, defile, drfy, trample 
upon , or by word or net ra::;t contempt U]lOn any such fl ag, standard , 
color, en~ign or :<h ield ." 
Comparr 9B Fniform Law::; Annotated 52-53 (1966). with H ea rings 
on H. n. 271, et al., su71ra. at 821-346. Beca use it is :stat.rd in 
th e di:sjunctive, thi:,; language. like that before us, makes possible 
criminal pro~ecution solely for casting contempt upon the fl ag. The 
validity of statutrs utilizing this language, howrver, insofar as the 
vaguenrss doctrinr i~ concernrd , will depC'nd as much on thC'ir 
judicial construct ion and enforcement history a;; their ly(ef"al terms, 
fhe ski-t.d-ov~ . 
f a.Vtjt.>..A.~ cl IS$k.Q.. 
~ -t:?a....:..ts .fo 
6.-pp rO"-cJ.- ~ . 
_joJ o.-.-eJ ,_s. uo,cJ 
3' b u"ju.en~s ... 
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The• :-1hcriff of Worcester County. Massachusetts. ap-
peals from a judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for tho First Circuit holding the contempt pro-
vision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconsti-
tutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471 
.F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972). prob. juris. 
noted . 412 l ' . S. 905 ( 1973). We affirm on the vague-
ness ground. \Ve do not reach the correctness of the 
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment 
grounds. 
I 
The slender record in this case reveals little more 
than that Goguen wore a s1uall cloth version of tho 
U nitecl :-1tates flag sewn to the seat of his trousers.' The 
1 The fl'<'Ord <'Oilsist,; ~o l e!~· of tlw anwnded bill of exceptions 
C:ognrn fikd 1n the :\la~:sachu::;ett;: 8nprE:'me .Judicia l Court , the 
oppo~ing hrirfs lwforl' that court, t hr complaint under which Goguen 
wa" pro"rr11tPd, nne! CogHeJl ',; fedrral habcati rorpu~ petition . 
App('ndix 1-:~(), 4:2- 4J. Wr do not havr a trial transcript, although 
Cogupn':-; amrtHlPd bill of <•xecptioll" briefly summarize~ oome of the 
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flag was approximately four by six inches and was 
displayed to the left rear of Goguen's blue jeans. 011 
January 30. 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Mas-
sachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The 
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with 
a group of person on a public street. The group appar-
ently was not engaged in any demonstration or other pro-
test asi"ociated with Goguen's apparel." No disruption of 
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this offi-
cer approached Goguen to question him about the flag. 
the other persons present laughed. Some time later, the 
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking 
iu tlw downtown business district of Leominister. 
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint 
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the 
Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part 
of the statute tlwu read: 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, de-
faces or treats contemptuously the flag of the 
Uuitecl States ... , whether such flag is public or· 
private property .. , . shall be punished by a fine 
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one 
year, or both . . .. ' ' 3 
tt'~tm1ony ~1Vl'll by witnr~~r~ for the pro~rcution at his ~tatr trial. 
Clogurn did not takr thr stand. Thus we do not have of record hi~ 
account of what I rani:lpirrcl nt the timr of hii:l arrri:lt or of hi~ purpoHr 
in wParing a flag 011 the Hrat of hi;; trouHC'fti . 
"Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 35-36. 
:J Mn;;.•. Grn Law:< Ann. c. :26+, § 5 ( 1971). Omittmg ;;rvl•rnl 
,;ent f•ncr~ protC'ctiug the ceremonial activities of certain vetrranH' 
group,;, thr Ht<1tutr read as follows at the time of Goguen's arre~t 
and ronvietwn : 
' ·§ .5 . Flag; pPnnlty for mi~use 
·'WhorvPr pnhlicl~· mutilate~. tramplr::; upon, deface~ or treats 
contrmptuously the flag of the United States or of 1\Iasl:iachu~ctt;;, 
wlwthe.r "uch flag i~ public or private property, or whoever dit:~pla>'~ 
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DPspite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was 
not charged with any act of physical desecration.' As 
twrmitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecrati011 
~ueh flug ot· an~· l·rpre~rntatiott thrrcof upon which nrc words, figur~'8, 
:l<h:prti~rnwnt~ or cl<·~tgn~. or ivhorvrr cau~r.~ or pNmit~ I>JtCh l~ag 
to br usPd in n parade a::; a n'cPptarlP for depositing or collec·ting 
mune~' or an.\' ot hC'!' artic'·lr or thing, or whoPver exposr;;; to public 
\'I!'W, manufacture·~ . ~Pll~, t•xpo~·Ps for ,;ale•, give>~ away ur has ill 
j>OH~c~::;iou for ::;alC' or to give ·uwu~· oi· for u::;r 'for any purposr, any 
art iclc• or sub~t:uJcc•, bring an urticlc• of merchandise> or a rccrptnclc 
of mrrchandisC' or ni'ticlc·::; uj1on which ts" ~tttilchrd, through fl 
wrapping or otiH•rwi~c·. cngntvec! or printrd in any. munnrr, a rPprPc 
.:::t•ntntwn of tlw Unitl'd Statps flag, or whoever u::;r::; any rrprrsenta-
tion of the· anns or the great sral of the commonwralth for any 
.adverti:::ing or comnfercial Jlurpo::>r. shall br punished by a fine of 
llot. le:-::; than tc•n or more' thim one hiindrecl dollnn; or b~: impri::;on-
mrnt for noi more than one rrar, or both. Word~. figurr~, ndver-
tt~t'lllC'nt~ or dP~igu~ :titacbed to. or diJ:ectly or indirectly connrrteci 
with, ~uC'h flag or :fn~· rrprr~ent:ition thereof in s{tch manner that· 
~HC'h Hag or its reprrsPntati.un is u~C'd to ' nttmct attrntion to or 
advPrti~P such word~. figun·~. advertisement~ ~lr desi.gn~, ~hall for' 
the pnrpo~c·;; of this ::;·prtion be deemed to br ttJ~On sttch flag." 
ThP statute is 11n amalgam of provi"ions dealing ~vith flag deserrn~ 
tiou and contc•mpt (tlw first ~(i wo['(h;) and with commPrctal mi~use 
Of UllWI' expJoitatillll of fi;tg~ Of the l:itHte and natiOnal gOV('l'lltnen(. 
Tlu~ ca~r t•onr('l'n~ only t !w "trrat~ contemptuou~J~·" .Phrase of the 
~tatutP, whtch has apparently bt'C'll in the ~tatute ::;ince 1t:; enartmeni 
in lH\:19 . 0o(JIU'11 , .. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d, at 90, n. 2. 
In 1971 , :;ub:;equput to Goguen's pro:;ecution, the de::;ecmtion and . 
C'Ontempt portion of the stat utr wa:s amended twice. On March H, 
1971, the legislatun•, per St. 1971, c. 74, modifird tlw first srntrncr b.v 
insPrting "bum~ or otherwt~P" between the terms ''publicly" and 
"mutilate>~," and, in addition, by inrrea~ing the fine. :VIa:;s. Gen. Laws 
Ann. c. 254, § 5 (1973 Supp.) . On Augu::;t 12, 1971, via St. 1971, c. 
1155, thr lcgi:;lature appPndPd a nrw srntence defining "thr flag of the 
United :::itate~" phra"c appc·anng in the fir~t sentence: "For the 
purpo~e:; of this ~Pction thr tPrm ·Hag of the United Statr::;' shall. 
IDfan any fiag which ha,.; brrn designated by Act or Rrsolution of · 
the Cougrr~~ of the United States a::; thr national rmblem, whriher 
or not ~ueh designatioil l~" currputly 111 force ." Ibid. Tlw 1971 
[Fovt11otc 4 !8 on p. 4J 
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and eontempt portion of the statute. the officer charged 
spccincally and only that Goguen "did publicly treat con-
temptuously the flag of the United States .... '' '' 
After jury trial in the Worcester County Superior 
Court. Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a 
sent<'nee of six months in the Massachusetts Home of 
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts 
Supn'tnc Judicial Court, which affirmed. Common-
wealth \'. Goguen, - Mass. -. 279 N. E. 2d 666 
( 1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argu-
ment with the common t that " [ w I hatever the uncer-
tainties in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in 
the statute as applied here." !d.,- Mass., at-, 279 
~. K 2d, at ()67. The court cited no Massachusetts 
precP(kn ts in tc>rprcting the "treats con tcm ptuously" 
phrase of tlw statute.'; 
After Goguen began serving his sentence. he was 
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas 
corpus by the rnited States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 
amPndmc•nt~ :tr<' n·levant to thi~ c·a~(' on]~· 111 the tangrntll\l ~en~e 
that tlw~ · llldicat<' a rr<'ognitton by thr lrgi~latur(' of th(' ll('E'U to 
tightc·n 11p thi~ tmpn·ri~C' ~t:il11tr . 
' l'<'rhap~ tin~ wa~ lwl':tll~l' of tlw tliflirHlt~ · of the· qur~tion whrthrr 
Uoguc·n ·~ f'onduct l'Oll~tit ut c•d phy~iral d('~Pcra t ioll of tlw flag. Cf .. 
Gu{IW' /1. \' . Snuth. wpra, 471 F. 2<.1, at 91. n. 4 (" ... IWJP arc not 
~CJ ~11rc• th:il >'l'Wing a flag to a background C'lrarl~· affect~ 'phy:sieai 
tllt('grit .1·.' '') . 
'· Appt'IHli\ -1 
" Appf'llant c·orn•etlr eonc·<·d<•d at oral argumrnt that Goguen's 
casp i~ the fir~t rc•rordrd :\Ia~~nehu~C'tlH court r('ading of t hi~ lan-
gwtg<' Tr. of Or:d Arg. 17-lK Indrrd. with the exception of onr 
tum of tlw c'C'llt\11'~· ra~C' 1m·olving otw of tlw ~tatute'~ commercial 
ml:<ll&' provision~. Conw1ontcealth v. H. I. 8hPrman Mauu. Co., 189 
:Vla"'-"· 7!i , 75 N. E. 71 (1905), thr ('ntirr :statute has bern e~srntially 
llPvoid of "tate court Ult<'rim•tation. 
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F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag con· 
tempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly 
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First 
Amemhm•nt. In upholding Goguen's void for vague-
ness contentions, the court concluded that the words 
" treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily 
ascertainable standard of guilt.'' !d., at 167. Especially 
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on 
hats. garments and vehicles : :. ," the words under which 
Uoguen was convicted "leave conjectural. in many in-
stances. what CC!nduct !~lay subject the actor to criminal 
prosecution ... Ibid. The court also found that thr 
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage 
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. ·• Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals. with one judge concurring. 
affirmed the District Court in all respects. Goguen v. 
Smdh , supra, 471 F. 2d 88. The Court of Appeals COII-
clud<'d that "resolution of I_ Goguen's void for vagurnessj 
challenge to the statute as applied to him necessarily 
aujudicates the statute's facial constitutionality .. . . , 
!d., at 04. Treating as-applied ami on-the-face vague-
ness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of 
the imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92, 
04. the court found that the language failed to provide 
adequate warning to anyone. contained insufficient guicle-
lim•s for law enforcement officials, and set juries and 
eourts at large. I d., at 94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now 
~€'nior Circuit Judge Hamley. sitting b:y designation 
from thf' Ninth Circuit. concurred solely on void-for-
vagueness grounds. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley thought 
the majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and 
other First Amendment issues unnecessary to the disposi-
tion of thf' case. Ibid. 
7:!-1254-0PINION 
6 8l\llTH v. GOGUEN 
II 
We ap;ree with the holdings of the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vague-
ness. The settled principles of that doctrine require no 
('xtensive restatement hen'.' The doctrine incorporates 
notions of fair notice or warning." Moreover, it requires 
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law en-
forcement officials and tri<'rs of fact in order to prevent 
''arhitrary and discriminatory enforcement.''" Where a 
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court 
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered 
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater 
' Tlw rlrmrnt~ of the voiJ for v:tgurnr:;::< doctrinE> haw U('l'll 
dt•vrlojwd in a Ia rg<· bod~· of precrclent from t hi" Court. Tlw ea:;e:; 
ar<' eategorizrd in, e. g .. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 40~ U.S. 104, 
lOX-109 ( 197:2). SP<'. Am~t erclmn. ··Thr Void-for-Vagurne:;" Dod rine 
.Ill tlw Suprrmr Comt." 109 U. Pn. L. Hrv. 67 (1960). 
·'E. y .. Paparhristou v. City of Jacksonville. 405 U. S. 15(), Hi2 
(1972): Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 45;3 (1939): 
"No OIH' may be> requirrd at prril of lifr, librrt~· or property to 
8JWCtdat<' as to thr meaning of penal .;tatute:s. All are entitled to 
lw informrd a:; to what thr State command;; or forbid~." (Citations 
omitted.) , 
Conrwlly , .. General Construrtion Co .. 269 ll. S. :385, :391 (192()): 
[Aj statui<· which l'ither forbid:,; or reqmre;; the clcing of au 
aet in term::; ,;o vagur that men of common intelligPttcr mu;;t. nece~­
"arily gll<'H::< at ib meaning and differ a~ to it.; application, violates 
the fin;t E'ssential of due proce;;s of law." (Citations omitted.) 
"E. g .. Orayned, supra. 40~ U. 8., at 1Qg; United States ''· 
L. Cuhen Grocery Co .. 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... [T]o attempt 
to pnforce the t:iection wo11ld bP the exaet equivalent of an effort to 
<·arry out a ::;tatute which in trrm~ mere!~· penalized and punished 
all acts det nmpnt nl to tlw public interest when unju:st and unreason-
able in the estimation of tlw court and jury."); United ~tates v. 
Reese. 92 U. S. :214. 221 (1H75) (''It would certainly be dangerou,; 
if the IPgislatun• could srt a net large pnough to catch all possible 
otTrmlrrs, and !rave it to the courts to step inside and ;;a~· who 
<:auld br rightfully drtained, and who should hr sf't at large."). 
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degree of specificity than in other contexts.1" The statu-
tory language at issue here, "publicly . . . treats con-
temptuously the flag of the United States .... :· has such 
scope, e. g., Street v. !v'ew York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969) 
(verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant time was 
without the benefit of judicial clarification." 
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as 
void for lack of notice on the theory that "[wlhat is 
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art to 
another."' " Goguen's behavior can hardly be described 
as art. Immaturity or "silly conduct"'" probably 
comes closer to the mark. But we see the force of the 
District Court's observation that the flag has become 
"an object of youth faehion and high camp . .. .' ' 
343 F . Supp., at 164. As both courts below noted, casual 
treatment of the flag in many contexts has become a 
widespread contemporary phenomenon. ld., at 164, 
167; 471 F. :2d, at 96. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed 
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to 
attract attention. It and many other current, careless 
uses of the flag nevertheless constitute unceremonial 
treatment that many people may view as contemptuous. 
Yet in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for 
displaying something as ubiquitous as the United ::-Jtates 
flag or reprcsen tations of it. it could hardly be the pur-
pose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal 
('Very informal use of the flag. Tho statutory language 
under which Goguen was charged, howf'ver. fails to draw 
H• E. g., Graynerl. supra, ..J.O~ lJ. S., at 109; Smith\'. Califomia, 
:~Gl U. S. l..J.7 , 151 (1959). Compare the Irs~ Htringent rrquirrment~ 
of t lw modern v:1gurnr~~ cuKr~ drnling with purely economic regula-
tion. E. g .. United States\'. National Dairy J>rod. Corp., 372 U. S, 
29 (1963) (Hobin:;on-Patman Act) . 
11 See n. 6, supra . 
1 ~ Note, 66 Mich . L. Hc>v. 10-J.O, 105() (1\)()8) . 
1a Goguen ' '· Smith , supra, a43 F. Supp., at H:i6. 
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reasonably clear lines lwtween the kinds of nonceremonial 
treatment that arc criminal and those that are not. Due 
proct'SS requires that all "be informed as to what the 
HtatP COllllllands or forbids ... ,"Lanzetta\' . .Yew Jersey, 
:30u C. H. 451. 45:3 ( 1039). and that "men of commo11 
intelligenep" not be forced to guess at the meaning of tht> 
cruninal law. Connally "· General Construction Co., 
269 l ' . H. 385. :391 ( 10:32). Given toclay's tendencies to 
tn'at the fiag UJJCen'moniously, those notice standards 
art> 11 o t sa tisfh'd here. 
\VP recugnizP that in a noJJcommcrcial context bC'-
havior as a g<'JtNal rule is not mapped out in advance on 
the basis of statutory language." In such cases, perhaps 
thP most lltt>aningfu 1 aspect of the vagueness doctrine is 
nut aetual notiCl' but the other principal rlement of tlw 
doctri JH'- tlH• req uirrnwn t that a legislature establish 
minimal guidrlines to govl'rn lav,· enforcement. It is in 
this rpgard that the statutory language under scrutiny 
has its most notable dPficicncies. 
In its terms. the language at issue is sufficiently un-
bounded to prohibit. as the District Court noted, "any 
public deviation from formal fiag etiquette .... ·· 343 
11' . ~upp .. at 167. ruchanged throughout its 70-year 
history."' the "trrats contcm ptuously'' phrase was also 
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the 
tekvant time in this case."· We are without authority 
11 Am:<trrdarn. supra, 109 U. l'a. L. Hrv ., at H:2, n. 79. 
1" ~('(' ll . ;j, 8/I}Jt'(/. 
1 ~ Bc•p n. 11, 81tJira . ThP <·ontl'mpt portion of the \la~~arhusNt r; 
,-tatutc: ,.;('<'Ills to havr lain fallow for almost it:< L·ntin· histor~·. Appar-
e>ntl~ · thPrr hav<' l><•t•n about a half do:wn arrC'~t" undrr thi~ part of 
tho "ta tutr in rrernt ~·p:~ r,, but notlr ha,.; produced a rrportrd 
dc•ci~ton . Tr. of Oral Arg. :2k-:29. In 1961-1, a t<·rnagrr in L~· nn, 
'\Ias~al'hw.:c•tt~ wa,.; l']wrgPd, iiJl]XIl'l'lltl~· under th!l prrsl'nt ~tatut~ . 
with rbrerating thP !Tnitl•d Htntr,.; Hag h~ · "rwing pirrr~ of it into his 
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to cure that Jefect. 1 7 Statutory language of such a 
standard less sweep allows policemen. prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla~ 
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting 
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. ~- 156. 165-169 ( 1972). In 
Greuory v. City of Chicayo, 394 U. S. 111, 120 ( 1969), 
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against 
f'Jltrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judg-
ment of the policeman on his beat.'' The aptness of 
his admonition is evident from appellanes candid con-
cession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals 
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion 
of thr statute under which Goguen was co11victed: 
" .. . I A js counsel lfor appellant] admitted, a war 
wotestor who, while attending a rally at which it 
begins to rain. evideuces his disrespect for the 
American flag by contemptuously covering himself 
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prose-
cuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a 
member of the American Legion who, caught in the 
same rainstorm while returning from an 'America-
Love It or Leave It' rally. similarly uses the flag, 
but does RO regrettably and without a contemptuous 
attitude. would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2d, at 
102 (emphasis in origiual). 
When~ inherently vague statutory language permits such 
SPlective law enforcement. there is a denial of due process. 
trom!Pt'' . :.:rw York Time;,;, Augu~t 1, 1968. p. 31 , col. l. The 
trenagl'l" wa~ order<•d b~· a ~tate di~trict court to prcpan• and deliver 
an <.'~l>a~· ou thP fiag. ThP court ront innf'd the ra;;e without a find-
illg, d<·priving it of au~· prPr<'C!Pntial vnlue . 
17 E. g., United States v. Thirty-seven Photogmphs, -!O:l U.S. :35:1 , 
:11)9 ( 1971 ) . 
71-125-i-OPIN"ION 
10 S:\HTH u. COGUEN 
III 
Appellant's argunwn ts that the "treats con temptu~ 
ously'' phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least 
should not bt' so lwld in this case, are unpersuasive. 
A.ppellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening 
brid. as he did his oral orgument, to the contention that 
Uoguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness 
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion. Appellant concedC's that the issue of "vaguelless 
as applied'' is properly before the federal courts," but 
con tends that GoguC'n 's only arguable claim is that the 
:>tatute is vague on its face. Tlw latter claim, appellant 
illsil'ts. was not prese11ted to the state courts with the 
requisite fair JH'<'cision. Picard Y. Connor, 404 U. ~. 270 
( 1\171). This <·xhaustion of remedies argument is belat-
edly raised."' and it fails to take the full measure of 
Uog1wn 's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the 
stat<' courts."" \\'e do not deal with the point at length , 
, , Hrph· BriPI' .J. . 
'" (;og;urn fiiPd ill>< fpdrrai habra~ eorput: Jl<'tttton ~111J~rqurnt 
to /'l(·arrl. supm. YPt it appPar~ that apprllant did not rai"<' hb 
pn·~(·nt Pxhau:,;tion of n•mNiir~ argumrnt hrfon• thr Di"t rict Court. 
That romt romtnl'll t Pd ,..;pecifieall~· on thi~ omi~~ion: .. ~ o ro n-
t<•ntton i~ no\\· mad<' t h:tt 1 ( :ogtwnj ha~ not c•xhau~tc•d ~t:ttl' n•mrdi<'~, 
not• that thr l'OII~tttutio11:tl i~~lH '>' prP~Pntt>d hrn· Wl'l'<' not rai;;l'd 
approprta t Pi~· in :<tat c• prol·Prding::;." ;).t{ F. Supp., at ]().!, 
"" <:ogtu'n fi!Pd in stall' ~upt>rior court :tn un~u<·C'<':<~fui motion to 
di~mi~~ thr <·ompiaint in \\'hieh hr citrd thr FourtrPttth An1Pndm<·nt 
and :tli<•gpd th,tt tlw ~tatutc• undl'r which iH' w:1~ ch:trgrcl w:t~ "impPr-
mi~~ihi~· vague and incapabk of fair and rea~onabir intPrprl't:ttiou 
h~· public ofllciak" Appl·ndix l. Thi:< motion wa~ also bl'forr thl' 
M:tssal'hll~Pt t~ 811 pn·nw .J udic·i:ti Comt, ~inN· it wa::; incorporatrd in 
C:ogn<'n ·, anwndcd hill of excPpt ion:<. Ibid . lt1 addirion. Gogu<'n'~ 
hnd hdorl• that ( 'omt rai"l'd vagtH'nt·~~ point~ and citrd v:tguctw::;::; 
<'H"l':<. lrl .. at 1!). :W-27. eiting Lanzetta v. Neu· Jersey , :mfi tf. 8 . 
..f./)1 (Hl:{()). and /'ar/.' er \'. J\!oryan. :32:2 F . Supp. 51:15 (\VD '1'\. C. 
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howf'vcr, for we fiild tlw relevailt statutory language' 
impC'rmissibly vague as applied to Goguen. With..: 
Gut doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly 
pr<'sent<'d" to the state courts under the exhaustiotl 
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278. 
Appt'llant's exhau::::tion of remedies argument is prem-
Ised on the notion that Goguen's bella vior rendered hint 
a. hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not 
vaguE', whatevrr its implications for those engagC'd in dif~ 
fpn•nt conduct. To be surf' there are statutes that 
hy their tf'rms or as authoritatively construed apply 
without qu<'stion to certain activities, but whose appli-
cation to other behavior is uncertain. The hard-core 
violator concc>pt makes som<' sense with regard to such 
statut('S. Tlw present statute. however, is not in that 
cate~-~;ory. This criminal provision is vague "not in the 
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct 
to au imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, 
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is 
spceificd at all." Coates"· C·ily of Cincinnati, 402 l'. S. 
('ill, ()14 ( 1D71). :-;uch a provision simply has 110 cor€'. 
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion 
and ('Xelusion is precisely what offends the Due Process 
( 'lause. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in 
l!lil) (thn·<·-judgr t•our1) (\"orth Carohna flag l'ontempt ~tatute 
,·oid for vagtH'lll'~~ and overbreadth). Appellnnt i~ correct in u~:><'rt­
ing; tlwt Gog;ul'n failt•d to eompartmPntuliz<' in hi:; :;tate court bripf 
t lw dn<' proce~~ doctrittr of vaguPnr~~ and Fir~t Am<>ndmeni eonrc•p!,; 
of on·rbr<'adtb. St•t• Appl'ndix 19-2-t. But permitting a degrPr of 
lt•aka~l' hetw<•rn tho~<· particular adjoininp; compartment:; ~~ under-
~1:llldabl<•. Cf. Xotr, ·'The First Ammdment Ovrrbreadth Doc-
trine." ~:~ Harv. L. H0v. k-!4, 1')71-~75 (19i0). The higbr:,;t ~tat<' 
<'ourt.'~ oplllion, which dPalt ::;eparatpl~· with Goguen's Fir::;t Amrnd-
mrnt and vap;urnr"" claim~, CommonweaLth \'. Gogue?t, supra, --
l\Ia~~ .. at -, 279 X. E. 2d, at fil)7, indicate~ that that court wa~ 
well aware thut Ciogupu raio;ed both ~rt::; of argumPntl:l. 
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vie·w of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law 
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is cor-
rected either by anwndment or judicial construction. it 
affeets all who are proEecutecl under the statutory lan-
guage. In our opinion the defect exists in this case. 
The language at issue is void for vagueness as applied to 
Goguen because it subjected him to criminal liability 
under a standard so indefinitP that police. court. and jury 
werP free to react to nothing more than their own prefer-
ences for treatment of the flag. 
Turuing from the exhaustion point to the merits of 
the vagueuess question presented, appellant argues that 
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow sub-
ject matter of thP statute. "actual" flags of the Uuitecl 
Rtaws."' Appellant contends that this "takes some of 
the vagueness away from the phrase. 'treats contemptu-
ously . ... ' """ Anyone who "wants notice as to what 
conduct this statute proscribes .... immediately knows 
that it has something to do with flags and if he wa11ts to 
stay clear of violating this statute. he just has to stay clear 
of doing something to the United States flag.""" Apart 
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an 
"actual" f:lag/' we fail to see how this alleged particu-
~~ Ap]wllan(~ Brid 1 i: Tran~. of Oral Arg. 9. 
" 2 Tr . of Oral Arg . H. 
2 " Ib id. 
"' At t hC' titnC' of Uoguen'::; pro::wcut ion. the ::;tatute referred tiimply 
to ''the flag of the l.TnitC'd Stale:< .... " without further definition. 
That rai::;eR t lw obviou:,; que;;tion whether Goguen'ti miniature cloth 
flng eontititutrd "the flag of tlw {' nited Sta.teti .... " Goguen 
arguPclun:<ucer~tifull~· hefon' thP titatP court:,; that the statute applird 
mll~· to fiag::< that mPt "olliciHl :,;tandard~" for JH'OJ10rtions, f<uch a;; 
relation of !wight to width and thr :,;izr of tilripes and the field of 
titar~. and that tlw cloth he worr• did not mret those tilamlards . 
Tt·. of Oral At-g. 11-12, 24-:W; AppPndix 2. There wa~ no 
di::q)ltte that Gogurn':< arlornmPnl had the rrquisitr number of ~tars 
and ~t ripr" >tnd rolor,.;, Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. Tlw :'da~~n-
]3 
larity resolv~s the central vagueness qL~estion-the 
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous 
treatment. 
Appellant's remaini11g argumei1ts are equally unavail-
mg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute 
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously'' phrase, 
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
customarily construes general language to take on color 
from more specific accompanying language. But it is 
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general 
phrase alone. and that the highest state court did not 
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory 
interpretation in this case. 2 '' Appellant further argues 
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has 
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional con-
tempt."!; Aside from the problems preseuted by an 
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case 
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously 
rhu~ett~ Supreme ,Judicial Court found C'.oguen's doth fiag to be 
coverPd b~· tlw :statute. noting thnt " [t]he statutr doe~ not require 
that the Hag bP 'officia l'" Commonwealth Y. Goguen,- 1\In~~. - , 
- , 279 ~. E. 2d lit)o, (if)8 ( 1972). ThP lower federal courts did 
not addn::;s t hi:; holding, nor do we. We note only that the Ma:ssa-
rhu::;Pt t;; Lrgi:sla t urr apparent I~· sensed an ambiguity in l hi:s reHpect, 
because ~nb:;equent to Goguen's pro~ecution it ammded the ~tatute 
in an effort to defin<' what it had meant by the "flag of the 
Pmted StatPH. '' Se<' n. 3, supra. 
~ 5 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. 
26 Tlw :\Lt~:sachu~ett~ coml commented ~imply that " Lt]he jury 
c-ould infer thnt the violation was intentional without reviPwing any 
words of the defrmhl!lt." Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Ma:,;s. -, 
- -, 279 r\. E. :.?d 666, (:if)tl (1972). Thus. the court held that the 
jmy could iufC'r intent mrrely from Goguen';; conduct. This is 
apparently a!Ho a holding that the jury must find contemptuous 
intent under thr ~tatutr, although the requirement amount~ to very 
little ;,inC(' it i~ ,.;o C'a:sily ~ntisfied. The court'~ reference to wrbal 
communicat iou rdlerted Gog;uen'$ reliance on ::)treet v. New York, 
:394 u. 8 . 579 ( 19(19) . 
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unnarrowecl statute."' this holding still does not clarify 
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentional 
or inadvertent. 
Finally, app0llant argues that state law enforcement 
authorities haV(' shown themselves ready to interpret 
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, prop-
erly read. reaches only direct. immediate contemptuous 
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity 
of the fiag ... .'' ""' There is no support in the record 
for the foruH•r point."" Similarly, nothing in the state 
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of 
that court sustains the latter. In any event. Goguen 
was charged only under the wholly open-ended languagP 
"' E. o ., A~hton , .. Kentul'ku . a~,1 C S. 195, 19~ (19liti J 
2" A pprlla nt'~ Bri<-1' 22. 
~"With rt•gard to pro~reutonal po l icie~, appPIJant cite~ two puh-
li~lwd opinion~'( of t hP ;\Ja~~aehu~dt~ Atlorm·,· Grnrral. -1 Op.~. of 
Att. <lrn. +iO (HJ15) (Hrprodu<·Pd at AppPIIaut '~ Brirf :w); Heport 
of Att~· . 0<'11., Pub. Doc. ~o. 12. p. 192 (l96X) (HeprodtH·<•d at 
.Juri:;. StntrmPnt App. 5:3). Ap]wllant eonrPd<·~ that nritlwr clPab 
with thr contrmpt portion of thC' ~tatute undN which GogtH'Il wa~ 
('OnviPt Pd. Tim~. t h<'~· arP not in poiut lwrc·. Thr~· providl•cl 
guidanrr to no on<· on t hP rriPvant ~tat utOIT language. Nevrrt IH•-
Jp;;~, appPIIant i;; <'OI'I'PCt that thry ~how a IPtHlenc~· on the part of 
thr ,;latP Attorne~· (;pneral to read othpr portion~ of tlw ~tatut<' 
nHrrowl~· . At tlw t<anw limP, thl'~· refiPct thr lack of pn•ri~ion 
rrrmring throughout thP :\ l a~~arhu;;ett:> flag miHtt::;P :,;tnttttP. The 
1915 opinion notrd that a litc•nd n•ading of onl' portion of thP ;;tatute, 
prohibiting Pxhihition of rngn11·ing~ of the flag on rl'rt:tin nrti('i<·~, 
would makr it ;t ('l'itntttal offen~<' to di~play thP fiag it:,;elf " in nutn~· 
of it,; clwap<'r and morr common form;;." Appellant':; Brirf :n-:32. 
The "tat<• At tome~· CPnPral c·on(']m!Pd that thi~ would be a "manifP::;t 
ab::<mdit~·.'' /d .. at :32. TIH• 19(11\ opinion advi:;rd that a flag J'<•pn·-
,;pntation painted on a door w:1~ not '';t flag of the !Tnitcd StatPt<" 
within tlw meaning of tlw "'tatutP. .Jmi::<. StatPmPnt App. 5:3-55. A 
cont mr~· intrrprPtnt ion would "rai~P ~eriou;; qta•:;t ion" IIJHl<>r the 
.Fir~t . :Ill([ FourtP<•nt h Am<>uclmrnt" ... ," givPn t hr rrquirenH·nt 
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uf publicly treating the flag "contemptuously ." There 
was 110 allegation of physical desperation . 
1'11<'re are an~ as of human conduct where, by the nature 
of the prohlC'ms presented, legislatures simply cannot 
estahli!"h flta ndards with great precision. Control of the 
broad rangE> of clisonlcrly conduct that may inhibit a 
polieelllan in the performance of his official duties may 
lw o1w such area. requiring as it does an on-the-spot 
assessment of the nec'd to keep order. Cf. Collen \'. 
Kentucky, 407 r. S. 104 ( 107:2). But there is no com-
parable' reason for committing broad discretion to law 
enforcemc 11t officials in the area of flag contempt. 
lnd('<'d. lweaul'<' display of the flag is so common and 
takPs so many forms. cha11ging from one generation to 
anotlwr and oftpn diffieult to distingui"h in principl 0, a 
legislature should ddi11c with some care the flag behavior 
it in t<' nds to outlaw. C'ertai nly nothing prevents a legis-
latun' from defining 'vvith substantial specificity what 
constitutes forbicldPn tn'atment of United States flags."Q 
lhnt lll'li:tl'ior madP C'l'l llllll<il mu~ t h<' " plainly prohibit<•d l>~ · tlH' 
languag;t• of th<' "'la tll tP." !d .. :11 54. 
·"' Tht• l'edrrnl {]ap_ d<',.,f'('l'<ltioll ~talule, for pxamplt•. r!' fl ('rt~ :t 
eollg;n'"'"'wllal JHtrpo~t· to do ju"'t thnt. In n·~pon~(' to a warning 
h~ th<• l ' nitPd Sl<~t<'"' Altornp~· (;<'lt Prnl that to IN' ~urh unbou11dPd 
lt·rm:< a:< "<kfip"'" or ··ra~t" c·oniPmpl . . . PithPr by word or act'' 1~ 
·· to n~k invnlidanon" on vaguc•nr~" g;roundH, S. 11 Pp. :\o. l:li-:7. 
!:lOth ( 'oug., :ld St·~"' .. 5 (19!1~); I-J. H. HPp. ~o. :350, 90th l'ong., M 
8e~l"., 7 (1\:.Hii), IIH' hill which l)('ellfr}(' the· fpderal :,;tatu1t• wa:,; 
aml' tH IC'd. 11:3 ( 'oug. Ht•c·. Hi44\:J, H\450 (l\:Jti7), to reach on!~- art~ 
tlwt ph~·" u·all~· dnnwg<' tht• Ha~r. Tlw de:,;crration provi~ion of the 
~tatut<. 11'-. l' :-;_ ('. ~700 (<~). dN·larP~: 
"(a) WhoPwr knowing; I ~- ea"t~ ront<'lll]JI upon :tit~· flag of the 
tlnit<'d State·~ h1· publirl~· mutilating;, ddn cing , defiling , burning, or 
lr:unpbng; upon it "' hall] )(' finpd 1101 more than :)1,000 or impri~oued 
for not mon• t h<t11 m1P yenr, or bot h." 
Tlw lt>g1~l<llil'l' ht ~to r~· n·YPnl~ n rlPnr ck~1rr to r(';Irh onl.1· d<:'tiuPd 
]Jhy~i,·al a<'t~ of dP~t·c·ration . H. H . Hcp. :\o. :350, wwa. at ;) 
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I The statutory language at issuf' here fails to approach that goal and is void for vaguetH'SS." 1 The judgment is affirm eel. 
1 t is so ordered, 
(' 'The language of t he• bill ]Jrohihiti'i int rntional, willful. not acei ~ 
dental or inadvrrtent public ph.,·~ienl act~ of de:;ecnttion."); S . Rep. 
No. 12S7, supra. at :3 ("Tlw languagP of the bill prohibit~; intrntionnl, 
willful, not acridrntal or inadvrrtent public physical acts of desc-
emtion of th(' Hag.''). ThP act hal:i bern ~:;o read by tl1(' lower federal 
court;;, whirh haYP nplwld it again:;! vaguenes~S challenge~. United 
States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d !:lti (CA!:l) crrt. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 
(1972); Joyce \'. C11itrd 8tates. - U. S. App. D. C. -, 454 F. 
2d 971 (1971), eert. d('JJied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). See floffman \' . 
United States. -- tT. 8. App. D. C.-, 445 F. 2d 22fi (1971). 
:n We arr aware•, of !'our"r. of the univer~Sal adoption of flag 
drtiecratwn or f'OnlPmJll ,;tat utt'~ by t hr federal and ~ta tr govern-
ment,;. See n. :30. supra. The ~tatut<>~S of the 50 State~; arr ~ynop­
~izcd in HParing~ ou H. H. 271, et a/ .. beforr Sub. Comm. No. 4 
of tlw Hou~r Comm. on tlw .Judiciar~·. 90th Cong .. l~:;t Srs"·• :ser. 4, 
pt. III. nt 32.J.-:34ti (1!:167). .\lo~t of the ~tnte ~tatutc;; arr patterned 
a her t lw lJ nifom1 Flag Aet of 1917, which in § 3 provides that : 
"No pt'r~on ~hall publici~· mutilate, defarr. defile•, def~·. trample 
upon. or br word or act ea~t ('OlltC'mpt upon any ~Such flag, ~tandard, 
color, en~ign or shi(•ld ." 
Com parr 9H Uniform Law~ AtmotatPd 52-53 (19613). with Hearing~ 
on H. R. :271, Pt a/ .. supra. at :321-:346. Becau~:;e it i~ ~tatcd in 
the di~junctiw, t hi~ language. likP that bPfore u~. make~ po~~Siblc 
criminal pro~c('ution ~ole>]~· for catiling contempt upon the flag. TllC' 
validit~· of statute~ utilizing thi~S language, however, insofar as thP 
1·aguene::;;; doctrine is e·on('('l'!led, will depeud a~; much ou thrir 
judicial eonstructwn and rnforeC'mcnt h1~torr Hs thC'ir litNal tC'rms . 
~ 
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On Appeal from the United 
States Court of Appeals for 
the .First Circuit. 
I January --, 1974] 
lVfH .hTWl'H'E PowELL deliver€'d the opmwn of the 
( 'uurt 
Tlw Slwriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts. ap~ 
JWals from a judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt pro~ 
vision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconsti-
tutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471 
F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972). prob. juris. 
not<><.!. 412 P. S. 905 ( 1973). We affirm on the vague-
nest> ground. \Ve do not reach th€' correctness of the 
holdiug below on ovPrbreadth or other First Amendment 
grounds 
I 
Tlw slemler record in this case reveals little more 
thau that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the 
Fnited States flag S€'Wll to the seat of his trousers.' The 
1 The record c·onsi:,;h,; ~olely of the amended bill of exceptionti 
UogtH'll filed Ill the ~Iat<tiaehu::wtt;; Supreme Judicial Court, the 
oppot'ing brief~ lwforc that eourt, Oil' complaint under which Goguen 
wat< pro:;<>rutl'd , and Ooguen's fC'dera l habea~ corpus petition , 
AppC'mllx 1-:J(i, 42-t:l. Wf' do not havr a trial transcript , although 
Ooguf'n ';; Htn(;>ncled bill of ('Xccptiou;; hrirfly summarizes oome of the 
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flag was approximately four by six iuches and was 
displayed to the left rear of Gogue n's blue jeans. On 
January 30, 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Mas-
sachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The 
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with 
a group of person on a public street. The group appar-
ently was not engaged in any demonstration or other pro-
test asf'ociated with Goguen's apparel." No disruption of 
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this offi-
cer approached Goguen to question him about the flag, 
the other p0rsous present laughed. Some time later, the 
seeond officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking 
iu thP downtown business district of Leominister. 
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint 
against GogU('n under the contempt provision of the 
Masf'achusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part 
of the statu tc tlwu read. 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, de-
faces or treats contemptuously the flag of the 
United States ... , whether such flag is public or 
private property . . , , shall be punished by a fine 
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred 
rlollars or by imprisonment for not more than one 
year, or both .. .. " ~ 
te::;tmwn~ · ~tveu L~ · wittie~::;e~ for the pro~ecutlon at hi~ :;tate trial. 
Goguell did not tnkr the ::;tnnd. Thu~ we do not have of record hi~ 
account of what tran::;pirrd at thr time of hi~ arre~t or of hi~ pmpoHe 
in wra ring n nag on t liP ~eat of hi~ t rou~rrs . 
"Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, :35-313. 
~ l\ln&~ . GE>n Laws Ann. c. 264, §5 (1971). Omittm{l; sevPral 
:sent encc::; protecting the ceremoni<ll activitif's of certam vrtrrans' 
group:; , 1 he ;;tntutP read as follows at the time of Goguen's arre::;t 
and convietion . 
"§ 5 Flag; penalty for mi::;use 
''Whoew.r publicly mutilate:;. trnmple~ upon, deface,; or treats 
contE>mptuou:;ly the flag of the United States or of Ma~sachuo>etts, 
whc•th<>.r ~uch flag i:o public or private propPrty, or whoever dispb;'~ 
· i2-1254-0PINION 
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DPspite the first SIX words of the statute, Goguen was 
not charged with any act of physical desecration .'; As 
twrmitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration 
~llrh flag or ally l'f'Jlrt'::;('l1( at ion thereof upon wlnch are word~, figures, 
;tdrl:'rtioem<•nt~ or de~tgno, or \vhoewr rau:seo or permits Hlt<'h fl_ag 
1 v br u::wd Ill a pnrade ao ;t rrc<>ptade for depo~iting or collecting 
mune) or a1ty other artidr or thing , or whoever eXJ)O~es to vublic 
\'I<'W , manufactur<'~. ~Plb, <·xpo~<'H for ~ale, givrt; away or ha~ ill 
po~~<'o~ion for ~a iC' or to !!:IV<' ·a way oi· for tl~<' 'for any purpo::~e, any 
art iek or :sub~tauc<', bring an article of nlrrchandisr or a rec<'ptaclo 
of lllC'l'Chandi~l' or ai'tJClPI:l Ui)OJ1 which is" attached, through U 
wrapping or otlwrwi~e. engraved or printed in any manner , a reprec 
. ~'('Jltatwn of tlw (' nit('(] StatPi:l Hag, or whoever llS<'i:l any rrpr~ent a-
11011 of thP arm~ or thr great seal of the commonwealth for any 
11dVPrt 1~mg or commPrctn l purpo8f', ::~ hall be puni:shed by a fine of 
not. le,-,; than 1<'ll or more thi111 on<' hi.indred dollars or by Jmprison-
mPtil for not more thnn one yrar, ·or both. Words, figure:;, ndver-
fH:i<'lll<'llf~ or d<·~ign~ attarhed to. or direrily or indirectly connected 
w1t h. ~uch Hag or :iny rrpr(><;ent;ition thereof 111 SJ.tch manner 1 hat· 
~Hrh t!ng or itH repre~entati'on i:; u~ecl to. attrart at_tention to or 
ndv<'rt i~e ~ueh word;:;, figurrH, adverti~ement;:; or designt;, :;hall for· 
t h<' purpo~r~ of thi:; ~ection be deemed to be upon :;trch t!ag." 
Th<· ~tat lltl' ~~ an amnlgam of provt~IO!lt; dea.Jing ~vrth flag desecrH~ 
tio11 and !'OIIft'mpt (the Jir~t ~(i word~) imd with commercial mi~u:;e 
01 other t>XploitatJOll of fiag~ of the ota te and· natiOnal governmrnt 
Tlu,; <·a~(· l'OllrPru~ only the " trPati:l contemptuously" _phra:;e of thu 
~tatutt•, wln<'h haH <l]Jpar<·nt ly bl'ell in the :;tatute ~ince Jt;:; enartment 
in 18\:JH. Goguen v. Smith, supm, 471 · F. 2d, at 90, n . ~ . 
In lUll. ::-ubH<'quent to Goguen'H prot;ecution, the de:;ecratwn :wd . 
rontPmpt portwu of the :statutr wa8 amended twice. On :\-larch 8, 
1971, the legi~lature, per St. 1971, c. 74, modified the first sentrncP by 
in:-~Prtmg " burn~ or otherwt;:;e" between the terms "publicly" and 
" mutilate·>'," aud, in addition, by increaoing the fine. Mat;:;. Gen. Law~; 
Arm. c. :!64-, § 5 (197a Supp.). On August 12, 1971 , via St. 1971 , c 
o5.'5, tlw legt:;laturr app!'nded a nrw ::;entence defining "the flag of the 
1 l mt (•d ~tn.te:s " phrat:i(' appParing in the fir:; t ::;entence: "For the 
purpo>'f'~ of tb1s ~ertion the trrm 'flag of the United Statrs' :;hall . 
mran auy Hag wlmh ha,; bPen de~ignated by Act or Resolution of -
the Congrr~s of the Umtt>d Staws a,; the national emblem, whether 
or U(J( ~urh destgnation t:,c runrntly m force ." Ibid. The 1971 
[Povtuotc 4 IS 0'/1 p 4] 
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and eontempt portion of the statute. the officer charged 
specifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat con-
temptuously the flag of the United States .... '' '' 
:\fter jury trial in the Worcester County buperior• 
Court, Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a 
selltence of six months in the Massachusetts Hou~e of 
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts 
~upreme JuJicial Court, which affirmed. Common-
wealth v. Goguen, - Mass. -, 279 N. E. 2d 666 
( 1972) . That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argu-
ment \nth the comment that "[w Jhatever the uncer-
taintil's in other circumstances, we see no · vaguelless iu 
thP statute as applied ht>re." !d.,- Mass., at-, 279 
N. E. 2d, at ()o7. The court cited no Massachusetts 
prccPdeuts ill terprct1ng the "treats con temptuously l1 
phrase of the statute." 
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was 
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas 
corpus by the l' nitecl States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 
amPildlllPIIt" <ll'l' rl'!rvant to thi~ ca~r on!~· 111 thr taugPntml ;;t>nse 
thnt tllC'~· ill(hral<' a rrcognition by thr lrgislaturp of thr need to 
tJght PJJ 11p thts mtpn· ri~e ~talute . 
• P<·rhap~ tlm; wa ~ becaus<· of the diHirult~· of the quP:stion whether 
<1ogtH'll ':-- eondurt eonstitut<•d phy~iral dE'srrratioJJ of the flag . Cf. 
Goguen , .. Srruth. wpra, 471 F. 2d, at 91 , n. 4 (" .. . [WJr are not 
~o ~lll'< ' that ~cwmg a Hng to a background clearly affect~ 'phy~icaT 
lllt<'grit~ · '") 
,, App<'IHlt \ -t 
I; Appt'llant <·orr('etly roll!'PU('d at oral argument that Gogucn'IS 
<'H::><' i ~ thr fir~t r<'rordcd :\Ias~achu::><:'tt:s court reading of this Ian-· 
guag<· Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. Iudrecl. with the exception of one 
tum of thr e<·nhtr~· ra::;~· tm·olvmg one of tlw ::>tatutr's comm<:'rciaf 
ml~ll>'t' proviHion;,; , Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu . C'o. , 189 
MaK<' . 7!i, 75 N. E. 71 (1905), the entire ~tntutc has be<:'n <:'s~entmlly 
<levoi<l of ~ t!t.tf:' eomi mtNJ.:>rPtation . 
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}". t:>upp. 161. The District Court found the flag con-
tempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly 
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First 
A lllendment. ln upholding Goguen's void for vague-
uess contentions, the court concluded that the words 
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily 
ascertainable standard of guilt.'' !d., at 167. Especially 
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on 
hats. garments and vehicles : : . ," the words under which 
<ioguen was convicted "leave conjectural. in many in-
stallees, what conduct .'!lay subject the actor to criminal 
prosecution ... Ibid. The court also' fouud that the 
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage 
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals, with one judge concurrin , 
ffirmed the District Court Goguen v: 
OV\ boTk FtY..s: t-
w;HA. ~-j~ +o 
~ )/_J)eA-
Smith, supra, 471 F. 2cl 88. ~ Court of Appeals con-
cluded that "resolution of !_Goguen's void for vagueness] 
challenge to the statute as applied to him necessarily 
adjudicates the statute's facial constitutionality ... .'' 
,4v.. e~.-r cR ~P ttM cR 
iiA:J'AJZ Y'-U7 ~J rt)~~Ps. 
3(0'-~/ .jAd 
!d., at 04. Treating as-applied and on-the-face vague-
ness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of 
the Imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92, 
94, the court found that the language failed to provide 
adequate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guide-
lines for law enforcement officials, and set juries and 
courts at large. !d., at 94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now 
~enior Circ~it Juc~ge _Hamley, sitting b:),' designation_ c:;;::: 
from the N!l)th Circmt, concurred solely foii void-for-~ 
~-'---:v::a:-:g-:-:-u:-:e,::-:1e:-.::s~s ,gFOuud~ !d., at 105. Judge Hamle~ ~~f:HT-., 
the majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and~ 
other FiFst Amendment issues unneeessaFy to the disposi' '--
L......- tiltH of tl::le case lbid. ~ 
.So Lu Vlo VLUvl +o re~ ~ ''{cur b roCA..J...tr,_ 
/ ~ . 1' n h ' n p ,, r r- . .ll ) o oue-'1. h ref)' PfV... 
<-t.'"'S-tt*U.-~"Ll"'"";.:: ~roLu..c. o·+- r- 1 ~rs+ t-rv"'ev..t yvLL<...::r 
1- e) 1 ~(.p 0'1-1. ~ -u.e ~ u~( fi.A-0 ft,:,_,:J t4-e. 1' 4-dlloe d. 
pr-iktt-ru elf> tlj'fe 11m a.e)j.:C~ztn:... ~ tjftv.J IJJr.v"'c~ 
f'~.-c:~h:UIA.-4 t'-0-" ,/!A<J-1 lo )u t:le~/- tv;il-<_ u.<-<1~<1-:J ·r;Vu__~ 0 
~.jdtt-::; ~o tf~l'tx:J:Z 1 ·-uu rreJ. ,, ·Zh,J. 
--------- - - --
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Wt> agree with the holdings of the District Court aml 
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vague-
twss. The settled principles of that doctrine require no 
extensive restatement hen'.; ThC' doctrine incorporates 
notions of fair notice or warning." Moreover, it requires 
legislatures to set reasouably clear guiclelines for law en-
forcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 
''arhitrary and discriminatory enforcement."" Where a 
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court 
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered 
by the First AmendrnC'nt, the Joctrine demands a greater 
; TIH· Plemrnt;; of the void for vagm'ne:;~ doetnnr havf' Ut'l'll 
dPvc·lopPd in a large• body of precrdPnt from this Court. Thl' <·asr~ 
an• ('atrgorized in, e. g .. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. 8. 104, 
10X-JU0 (197:l). Sre. Amstf'rdam. ''The Void-for-Vaguf'nP:;,; Doctruw 
m the Supreme Court." 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960). 
"E. IJ ., Papal'hristou v. City of Jacksonville. 405 U. S. 156, Hi2 
( 1\J?:l) : Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. 8. 451, 453 (1939): 
" No Olll' may be requirrd at JWril of life·, liberty or proprrty to 
8Jl(•c·nlatr as to the mC'aning of ]JE'nal statutr:s. All are entitled to 
i>P mformed aR to what thr State commands or forbids." (Citation:s 
onlltt<>d ) , 
('omwlly \. GeneraL Constructwn Co., 2()9 l 1• S. :385, :391 ( 1926): 
I A I ;;tat u t <' wlueh <•it her forb1d;; or reqmrr;; t lw demg of au 
a<:t 111 trrm~ so vngue that men of common intelligence must neces-
~arily gtwss at its meaning and differ ao; to its ttpplieatJOn, v10Jatrs 
tlw fir;;t es;;ential of due proce;;s of law." (Citation;,; omittrd.) 
"E. g., Grayned. supra. 40~ U. S., at 108; United State11 \ . 
L. Cohen Grocery Cu., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... [T]o attempt 
to enforcr the ;;pction would be the exact equivalmt of an effort to 
eany out a ;;tatute wh1ch in trrms merely penalized and punished 
all acts dctnmf'ntal to thr publie interrst whrn unju:st and unreason-
able in thr estimation of the court and jury."); United States v. 
lteese, 92 U. S. 214, :221 ( 1~75) (';It would certamly be dangerous 
tf the Ieg1sla turf' could :set a net large enough to catch all pos~:>ible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to ~:>tep in:side and ;;ay who 
could. bt> nghtfully detamrd , and who should br set at large .") . 
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degree of specificity than in other contexts. 1" The statu-
tory language at issue here, "publicly . . . treats con-
temptuously the flag of the United States ... ," has such 
scope, e. g., Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 5-76 (1969) 
(verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant time was 
without the benefit of judicial clarification.11 
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as 
voirl for lack of notice on the theory that "l w] hat is 
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art to 
another." '" Goguen's behavior can hardly be described 
as art . Immaturity or "silly conduct" 1 " probably 
comrs elos('r to the mark. But we see the force of the 
District Court's observation that the flag has become 
"an object of youth faEhion and high camp ... . " 
343 F . ~upp., at 164. As both courts below noted, casual 
trratmrnt of the ftag in many contexts has become a 
widespread contemporary phenomenon. ld., at 164, 
167; 471 F. 2d, at 96. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed 
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to 
attract attention. It and many other current, careless 
uses of the flag nevertheless constitute unceremonial 
treatment that many people may view as contemptuous. 
Y ct in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for 
displaymg something as ubiquitous as the United States 
ftag or representations of it, it could hardly be the pur-
pose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal 
every informal use of the flag. The statutory language 
under which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw 
"'E. g., Orayned. supra, 40H U. S., at 109; Smith , .. California, 
:{!il U.S. l-l7. 151 (1959). Compare the Irs;; ;;tringent rrquirement;; 
of tlw modrrn vaguruc~s ca~r~ draling with purely economic regula-
tion. E. g .. United States\'. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U . S, 
29 (196:3) (Hobinsou-Patman Art) . 
11 See n . 6, supm . 
'".1\:otr , 6!) ~Iirh. L. Ht'v . 1040, 105(1 (1968) . 
1~ Guguen v. Smith. supra, ;~43 F . Supp., at 1()(), 
S\IITH u. GOC'.UE~ 
t'Pa~onably e]{~ar lines between the kinds of nonceremouial 
tr(•a tllJ(•nt that are criminal and those that are not. Due 
process rPq uircs that all "br informed as to what the 
;-)tate commands or forbids ... , " La11zetta v. X ew Jersey , 
:30f) C. S. 451.4.53 (1D39), and that "men of common 
J n tP lligenct' ·· not be forced to guess at the meaning of tlw 
c•rinunal law. Connally ,., General Construction Co., 
:2fi!J lT. ;-;, :385, :3~)1 (1032) . Givell today 's tendencies to 
treat tlw fiag unceremoniously, those notice standards 
an' 1101. satisfiC'd lwr(' . 
WP rPcoguizP that in a llOncommercial context lw-
havior as a general rule is not mapped out in advance 011 
the basis of statutory language." In such cases, perhaps 
tht- most lfl(•aningful asr)('ct of the vagueness doctrine is 
not actual notice but the other principal elemeut of tlw 
doetmw-- tlw requirrment that a legislature establish 
tniitilllal gniddi nes to govPrn law enforcement. It is in 
this regard that the statutory language under scrutiny 
has its most notable deficiencies. 
ln its terms, the language at issue is sufficiently un-
bounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "any 
public deviation from formal flag etiquette .... " 343 
F. Supp .. at Hi7. Unchanged throughout its 70-ycar 
history ."' the "trrats contemptuously'' phrase was also 
d(•void of a narrowi ng state court interpretation at the 
rt>l(•vant tinw in this casP."; ·we are without authority 
1
' Atnt<tPrdmn . .supra, 109 (J. Pa . L. Hev., at H:2, n. 79 
1 • 8r<· 11. :{, supra. 
1'; ~,.,, n. fi, 8UJ1ru. Tlw contempt portwu of thr :\la :;;;arhu~rtt~ 
~tat111<' "<'('nt~ to havr lain fallow for almo~t it:; entirr llll'tory . App:tr-
rntl~· tht-r<• havP b<•L'n :tbout a half dozen arrrst:,; under thi~ part of 
tho "tat ut e 111 n•c·rnt )'Par,., but none has produced a reportPd 
deeii'ion. Tr of' Oral Arg. 2h-29. In 196H, a teenagpr m L~· ny 
\la,.,.arhuH•tt" wa,; rhnrgPd, apparl'ntly undPr th!l prp~;ent ><1Htut~~ 
with d(•,;eerating tlw £TnitPd Stntr" ling b~· :;ewin~~: piPrP:; of it int o l1i :-< 
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to cure that defect.'; Statutory language of such a 
stam1ardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla~ 
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting 
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v. 
('ity of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156. 165-169 ( 1972). In 
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 120 ( 1969), 
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against 
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judg-
ment of the policeman on his beat.'' The aptness of 
hi8 admonition is evident from appellant's candid con-
cession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals 
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion 
of tlw statute under which Goguen was convicted: 
I AJs counsel lfor appellant] admitted, a war 
protestor who, while attending a rally at which it 
brgins to rain. evidences his disrespect for the 
American flag by contemptuously covering himself 
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prose-
euted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a 
member of the American Legion who, caught in the 
same rainstorm while returning from an 'America-
J,ove It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag, 
but does 8o regrettably and without a contemptuous 
attitude. would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2d, at 
102 (emphasis in original). 
Wlwre inlwn,n tly vague statutory language permits such 
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process. 
tro1t:oC'r~ . 1\<-'w York Time::;, Augu:si 1, 19U8, p. ;n, col. l. The 
t E'<'nager wa:s ordl'r('d by a tit a tf' di~t rict court to prepare and ddive1 
an t'H~ay 011 thr flag_ ThE' court continued thn ratie without a find-
iug, oPpnviug it of an~· prcct>d<:ntial value . 
17 E. g. , (Tnded States v. Thirty-seven Photographs , 402 U.S 86:), 
81i9 (197! ) . 
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III 
.\ppellant's arguments that the "treats contemptu~ 
ously" phrast- is not impermissib ly vague, or at least 
should not be so hPld in this case, are unpersuasive. 
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening 
briC'f. as he did his oral orgument, to the contention that 
Goguru failed to preserve his present void for vagueness 
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus j urisdic-
tion. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueuess 
as applied" is properly before the federal courts," but 
cont<'tHis that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the 
::;tatute is vague on its face . The latter claim. appellant 
mst~ts, was not pre8e n ted to the state courts with the 
requisit(' fair prt>cision. Picard"· Connor, 404 U. 1:-1. 270 
(l!J71 ). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belat-
t-'dly raisrd.'" ami it fails to take the full measure of 
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the 
state courts."" We do not deal with the point at length , 
" H c· pl~· BriPI' ..J. . 
'" (;ogupn f11Pd hi>' fPdrral habra:; corpu:-; pt>tition ::;ub,.:rqurnt 
lu l'u·ard, 8/t]Jm. Yt>l II appc•ar,; that appPIIant did not rai,;e hi:; 
prP>'!'IIt rxha u::;tioll of remrd irs a rgmnrnt brforr the Di:;trict Comt. 
That l'ourt commPntl'd sprcifically on thi" omi:;:;ion: ··No con-
tl'ntwn i~ now mmlr that I (ioguPnj ha::; not rxhau~tc>d :state· remc•clic>:;, 
nor that thr eon,.; ti tutwnal i~"\ll'~ prC'~<·ntt>d hrrC' wrrr not rai"ctl 
ap]n·opnatPI~ · i11 ,;ta t<' pro<·Peding;;." :{4:{ F. Supp., at 164. 
"" ( :oguen fiiPd in ~ tatt• ~nperior court an un~ u<· CE'l:lt:> ful motion to 
dbmi~' the eompla mt in whirh hr cited th<' Fourt renth Amrndnwnt 
and atl!'~?:Pd that the ~tatutr umkr which IH' wa::; clwrgrd wa~ " impPr-
mi~~~ bl~· Yagup all(! incapable• of fair and rrat:>ouabk int €'rpretation 
hy publie offieiab.'' ApJwndix 1. Thi~ motion wa ::; abo brfor<' thr 
J.\.la,;~achn~l'tt~ Supn·mp .Jndieia l Conrt, ~incr it wa t:> incorporated in 
(1ogu<'n ·~ amPmkd bill of Pxcrption~. Ibid. In addition. Gogurn'::; 
bnrf hl'fon· t Ill It l'ou rt rai~<'d Yagurm'"" poilltl:l and ritPd vaguPJlPi:i~ 
ra~(·~ !d .. nt 19. 2H-:27. ri ling Lauzetta v. Neu· Jerse y, :306 F . S, 
-Hil (mm ), a11d l'arker ' · Mor(falt. :l:2:2 F . Supp . 585 (WD )I C. 
... . ~ . 
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hovwver. for we flitd tlw relevailt statutory ianguagc 
Impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. With.: 
Gut doubt thP "substance'' of this claim was "fairly 
pn'seu ted" to the state courts under the exhausti01l 
standards of Picard, supra, 404 tJ. S., at 275, 278. 
Appellaut's exhaustion of remedies argument is prem• 
]sed on the notion that Goguen ;s behavior rendered hini 
a. hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not 
vague. whatever its implications for those engaged in dif-
ferent conduct. To be sure there are statutes that 
by their terms or as authoritatively construed apply' 
without question to certain activitie~. but whose appli-
catiott to other behavior 1s uncertain. The hard-core 
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such 
statutes. The present statute, however, is not in that 
category. This criminal provisio11 is vague "not in the 
sense that it requ]res a person to conform his conduct 
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, 
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is 
speeificd at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 P. ~. 
()11, 614 (1071). ~uch a provision simply has no core. 
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusiou 
and exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process 
('laust'. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in 
Hl71) (thrr('-Jildi!;(' court) (North Carolina Hag co11tempt ~tatut(· 
nml for vnguellPH>i and overbreadth). Apprll:mt i~ correet in a~::;ert ­
llll); rhnt Uogm·n fnilNl to compartmentalize ill hi~ :-;tnte court bri(·f 
rlw dup ]Jrore~~ doctrine of vagu<>ne~~ and Fin;t Anwndment concept~ 
of ov<·rbn·ndth. 8(•n AppPndix 19-24. But permittmg a degree of 
]('akagP lwtwPPil tho~e particul:tr adjoining compartmf'nt~ js mu.ler-
~t andnuh•. C f. 1\'ote. ·'Tlw Fir~t Amendment Overbreadth Doc-
trine,'' 1'\3 Harv. L. HPv. 1->44, ::l71-875 (1970). The highPst :;tate 
<'ourt.'~ opmion, which dealt ~eparatdy with Goguen's Fin;t Amend-
m(•nt and vaguenPss claims, Commonwealth v. Goguen, supra, --
;vJ as". at - . 279 'N. E. :2d, at G67, indicates that that court wa::; 
wPJI awan' that C.oguen rai~(>d both ~P1~ of nrguments. 
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vit--w of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded laV\' 
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is cor-
rected either by allwndment or judicial construction, it 
affects all who are prosecuted under the statutory lan-
guagP. [n our opinion the defect exists in this case. 
The language at issue is void for 'vagueness as applied to 
Goguen because it subjected him to criminal liability 
under a standard so indefinite that police, court. and jury 
were frt'<' to react to nothing more than their own prefer-
enci~S for ir<'atlllent of the flag. 
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of 
the vagueness question presented, appellant argues that 
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow sub-
ject matter of the statute, "aetual" flags of the United 
Stat<'s.~ ' Appellant contends that this "takes some of 
the vagueness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptu-
ously .. .. ' " ~~ Anyone who "wants notice as to what 
conduct this statute proscribes .... immediately knows 
that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to 
stay clear of violating this statute, he just has to stay clear 
of doing something to the United States flag.""" Apart 
from tlw ambiguities pres<'nted by the concept of an 
"actual" fiag,"' we fail to see how this alleged particu-
"' .\p]wllant ·~ Brid 17 ; Tran~. of Oral Arg. 9. 
"" Tr. of Oral Arg . H. 
2 " Ibid . 
"'At the timr of Goguen's JHOsecution. tlw ::;tatute referred simply 
to "tlw flag of the United State;; ... ," without further definition . 
Tlwt rmHe~ tbt' obviou;; que;;tion whetlH'r Goguen's miniature cloth 
flag ron;;titutrd " thr flag of the United States ... .'' Goguen 
arguetlun~ucce~~full.' · befort' the state court;; that the statute applied 
onl~· to flag~ that mPt '"ollicial ::>tandardt>" for proportions, such aH 
rt>la1JOn of hPight to width and th<' t>iZ<' of stripes and the field of 
~tan;, and t hn t the cloth he wore did not meet thosE' t>tnndarcls 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 24--26; Appendix 2. There was no 
dtsp111e thnt Coguen'~ adornment had the requisite number of stars 
and ~t ripPo: and color~ . Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. Tht> i\!tU:iHU -
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larity resolves the central vagueness qvestion-the 
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous 
treatme11 t. 
Appellant's remaining argumei1ts are equally unavail-
tllg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute 
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously'' phrase, 
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
customarily construes general language to take on color 
from more specific accompanying language. But it is 
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general 
phrase alone. and that the highest state court did not 
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory 
illterpretation iu this case."'' Appellant further argues 
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has 
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional con-
tempt."'' Aside from the problems presented by an 
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case 
iu which a defendant has been tried under a previously 
ehu,ett, Supreme .Juchcwl Court found Goguen's C'loth fiag to be 
covered b)· the ~tntute, noting that "Lt]he statute doei:l not re<.juir•e 
that the fiag be· 'official'" Commonwealth Y. Goguen,- Mni:ls. - , 
- , :279 N. E. 2d fi()(), (j(jg (1972). The lowE>r federal courts did 
not addrc~,.; tl11~ holding, nor do we. We note only that the l\lla,.;l:la-
rlnr~Ntl:l Lcgi,.;lature apparent!)· i:lCUsed an ambiguity in thii:l rci:lpect, 
becau~c· ~ubs<'quPnt to Gogupn's prosecution it amended the statute 
in an effort to dcfinp what it had meant by the ''flag of the 
!lmtPd State,.;." See n. 3, supra. 
25 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. 
2
H The Mu,~achusett~ court commemerl ~imply that "l t] he JUry 
c·otdd infer that the viOlation was intentional without reviewing any 
word" of the cldendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mass.-, 
--, 279 N. E. 2d 666, 6()g (1972). Thu:s. the court held that the 
jury eould mft·r intent merely from Goguen'~ conduct. Thii:l is 
apparently also a holding that the jury must find contemptuou~ 
intent under tlw ~tat ute. although the requirement amounts to very 
little ~inee it i~ so eai:li!y ~atiHfied. The court's reference to verbal 
l'ommunicatwn n•flected Gog:uen's relianre on f:!.t1·eet v. New York , 
;{94 lf s 579 ( 1969) . 
7~-1:254-0PINfON 
14 S~IITJ-:1 11 . (;OGUEN 
unnarroweJ statute. 2 ' this holding still does not clarify 
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentional 
or inadvertent. 
Finally, appellant argues that state law enforcement 
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret 
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, prop-
rrly read. reaches only direct. immediate contemptuous 
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity 
of the flag .... " "' There is no support in the record 
for the former point. "!' Similarly, nothing in the state 
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of 
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen 
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language 
"' E. (f., A11hton 1 . Kenturk!J , ;~8-1 U . S . 195, 191-\ (19(ili ) 
2~ Appellant ·~ Bri<'f :2:2 . 
"!' " ' ith reg:ard to pro~<·rutorial poliriP::;, apJH'lhmt e1te::; two JHlb-
h::;hed opinion~ of thP N!a~~nehu~ett::; Atlorne~· Genrntl. 4 Op;; . of 
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (H<'JHodnrf•d at AppPIIant '~ Brief ;{0) : Heport 
of Atty. UPu., l'nb. Dor. ?\o . 1:2. p. 19:2 (1968) (Reprodur<'cl at 
.Juri::;. Stat<'nwnt App. 5:3) . Appellant conct'clc.•:s that nPithPr deal~ 
with thP <'O!ltcmpt portion or thC' statute undpr which GogUl'll WHI:' 
ronvict<•d . Tim~. th<',l' are not ill point lwrc. ThPy provitkd 
guidallcC' to no Oil(\ Oil the rdt•vant ~tat u tor~· languagr . N ev<'!'tiH•-
les~, apprllaut i ~ corrPct that thry ~how a tc•ndPJlc~ · on the• part of 
tlw ~tate Attom<·~· Urnpral to rPad uthrr portion::; of tlw ::; tatut<:' 
na rrowl~· At t lw :<a mr t imr, t hr~· rrHrct t hr lack of pn•cJ~lOn 
rrrurring throughout thr :Vln~~arhn~<'t t~ Hug mi;;u:;e ::;tnt utc . The 
1915 opimon notrd that a litrraln•ading of onr portion of th<' "tHtute, 
prohibiting Pxhihition of t•llgraving~ of thr flag on certain articlc•,.;, 
would makr it :1 crimmal offen~r to di~play the flag it ~:> elf ·'in man~· 
of 1ts cheaper and morl' rommon form::;. " Appellant ':> Brirf :u-a2. 
The btat<' Attome~· (;rlleral roneluded that thi" would be a "manifP:; t 
absurdity ." /d ., at :Q . TlH' 19fil'l opinion :1dvi~c·d thHt a flag n•pn·-
::;pntntiou painted on a door wu" not "a flag of thr United Statp,.; " 
within the mf'aning of the ~tatutr .. lmi~. Statemrnt App. 5:~-55. A 
rontrary iuterpr<'tation ll'ould "rai:,;e ;-;erious que::;tion~ lliHirr t hr 
F1r,;t and FourtPr nth An1eudmrnts ... ,'' given thr n ·quin•mPnt 
l.'i 
of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There 
was no allegation of physical desecration. 
Tlwrc• arE' areas of human conduct where, by the nature 
of the problems presented. legislatures simply cannot 
Pstablish standards with great precision. Control of the 
broad rang<' of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a 
policeman in the performa11ce of his official duties may 
lw one such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot 
asfo'etoismcnt of the need to keep order. Cf. Colle·n v 
Kentucky, 407 ('. ~. 104 (1072). But there is uo com-
parable reason for committing broad discretion to la\'v' 
pnforemwn t officials in the area of flag contempt. 
f ndeed. lwcalJi''(' display of the flag is SO COllllllOn and 
takP::; so tuany forms. cha11ging from one generation to 
a11otlwr and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a 
legil"lature should define with some care the flag behavior 
Jt intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legis-
lature from definiug with substantial specificity what 
eonstitutPs forbidden treatment of United States fiags.'10 
that l•l'il:tvim maJ<· cnmJwtl mu~t \w "plainly pruhibitPd br tlw 
language of tlw ,.:tntut<•." ld .. at 54-. 
·'" Thl' I'PdC'ral tln~t dl',.:<'cmtion ~JtntutP, for <'xamplP. rdl0ct~ :1 
t•ongl · < ·~~ !ounl purpo~t· to do JU~t that. ln re~Jpon~P to a warning 
ll\ th<· l llltPd :::\tat<'., .-\ttorup~· C:PJIC'ral that to llllC' ~uch ltllbouud<'d 
t<·rm"' a"' " d<'fw,.:" or · ·ca~t,.: C'OJJtcmpt . .. citlwr b~· word or aet" 1~ 
" to n ,.: k IIIVHiid<tl!on" on VH~ILPIIP~~ ~round~, S. Hrp. ~o. 12X7. 
HOtl! ('ong . 2d :-\('~ ,.: .. 5 (19ol-.): H. H. H<'p. :\io. :~50. 90th l'ong., lot 
8e,.:,.: ,, 7 (J~(i71. tlw bill which bream<' the fl>deral ~JtatutP wa,.: 
anu•n<i<•d , lt:i C'ong HP<'. Hl-449, 16450 (l~(i7), to reach on!~· actH 
t lw t ph~ :-ic · all~ · damngr I he· Hag. The de~ccrn tion provision of the 
:-llltut(', J~ l ' :-\ . l' . §700 (a), d<'clar!',.:: 
·(a) Wlwc·v<•J kuomngl~· ca,.:t::; contempt upon any flag of the 
l 1JiitPd Stat Po: b~· pubhrl~· mut ilnt ing. drfacmg, defiling, burning, or 
tramphug 11pon it "'hall lw fin('(! not mor<' than !)1,000 or nnpri;;mwd 
f01 nut mon• t ha11 OJH' )'Par, or both." 
Tlw lPgJ,.:Iatn·p ln~tor~· r<·vc•ab a rl<'ar dc,.;u·r to r<'aeh on!) ddil!(·d 
phy~tcnl aet~ of c!P,.:c•cn1tion . H. H. Hrp. :'oio. :350, suwa. at ·~ 
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The statutory language at issue here 
that goal and is void for vagut•ness."' 
-affirmed. ~ 
fails to approach 
The judgment is 
1 t is so ordered. 
("'The language of I he bill prohibit~ intrntional, willful, not acri~ 
dental or inadvrrtenl public physical act;; of drsecration."); S. RPp. 
No. 1:2H7 . supra. at :3 (''ThP languagE' of the bill prohibits intPntional, 
willful, not acridPntal or inadvertent public physical act8 of dr:;e-
cmtion of the flag."). Tlw net ha;; bcpn ;;o read by the lower frderal 
court;;. which havr uphrld il again~! vaguenes;; challenge;;. United 
States v. C1'osson, 462 F. :2d 96 (CA9) cPrt. dPnied, 409 U.S. 1064 
(1972}; Joyce v. U11ited States, - U. S. App. D. C. -. 454 F . 
2<.! 971 (1971), CPrt. drnird, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). Src Hoffman,. 
United States. -- LT . S. ApJJ. D. C. -, 445 F. 2d 22(i (1971) . 
'11 W e arr awar<' , of r·our~r. of the univer;;al adoption of flag 
de~ecralion or r·ontrmp1 statutes by thP frderal and statr govem-
ment ;; . SPe n. 30. :>upm. The ::;tatutrs of the 50 8tate:; are Hynop-
~ized 111 HParin~J:~ 011 H . H. :271 , et a/. beforr Sub. Comm. No . .f 
of tlw IIouHr Comm. on thr .Judiriar~· . 90th Cong ., 1;;t Srss ., srr. 4, 
pt. Ill. at 3:24-34G ( 1967). :\lo,:t of the :;tatr statute· arr patternPd 
after tlw Uniform Flag Act of 1917. which in §3 provideti that : 
"No prr"'on ~hall publici~· mutilate, defarr, clPfile, defy , tramplP 
upon. or hy word or act ca~t eontPmpt upon any such /lag, standard, 
color, eu~ign or shield." 
Compare 9B Uniform Law~ AuuotatPd 52-53 (1966), with Hearmg::; 
on H. R. :271 , et a/ .. supra. at :3:21-:346. Brcau:;e it i~ :;tated in 
the di::;junrtivr, thi"' language. like that beforP u::;, make,.; po::;;;ible 
criminal proi:ieeution ~ole!~· for ea~ting contempt upon the flag. The 
validity of :;latutr:; utilizing thi::; language, howPver, insofar as thP 
vaguenrso; doctrine i~ roncPrnPd , will dPprnd a~ much on their 
judicial con:;trnctwn and rnforerment history a>: their htPral term~ . 
3/4/74 Rider A, p. 16 (new footnote) 
Smith v. Goguen 
~e have not addressed Goguen's First Amendment arguments 
because, having found the challenged statutory language void for vague-
ness, there is no need to decide additional issues. Moreover, the 
skeletal record in this case, see n. 1, supra, affords a poor oppor-
tunity for the careful consideration merited by the importance of the 
First Amendment issues Goguen has raised. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, 
concurring in the result, posits that "the jury was appropriately 
informed that the defendant, if he was to be convicted, must have 
that Goguen was punished for what he communicated. But, as counsel 
for appellant confirmed at oral argument, there is no extant record 
of the jury instructions in this case Tr. orJ Arg. 51 fA-M.,J .ft.u{.s 
0~ ' 
tJ vz;;t? I C , 
I 
we ~ ~ we::; 1) ~tMbf~ J 
tv4.J -t~ 1'tAAj wtk:l 1/tArfrP<A..UI, 
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On Appeal from the United 
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the First Circuit. 
[January - , 1974] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, ap-
peals from a judgment of the United States C'ourt of 
Appeals for the Fi~st Circuit holding the contempt pro-
vision of the Massachusetts fil:l-g misuse statute unconsti-
·tutionally vague and overbro&d. Goguen v. Smith, 471 
F. 2q 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972), prob. juris. 
noted, 412 U. S. 995 (1973). We affirm on the vague-
ness ground. We do not reach the correctness of the 
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment 
grounds. 
I 
The slender record in this case reveals little more 
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the 
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers.1 The 
1 The record consists. solely of the amended bill of exceptions 
Goguen filed in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the 
opposing briefs before that court, the complajnt under which Goguen 
was prosecuted, and Goguen's federal habea~ corpus pPtition. 
{\.ppend.ix 1-36, 42-43. We do not have a tr.wl transwpt, although 
'CJoguen's amended bill of exceptions briefly Hummamt>s some of the 
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fl.ag was approximately four by six inches and was 
displayed to the left rear of Goguen's blue jeans. On 
January 30, i970, two police officers in Leomiuister, Mas .. 
sachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. Th€1 
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with 
a group of persons on a public street. The group appar-
ently was not engaged in any demonstration or other pro-
test associated with Goguen's apparel. 2 No disruption of 
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this offi-
cer approached Gogue11 to question him about the flag. 
the other persons present laughed. ~ome t1me later. the 
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walkmg 
in the downtown busi11ess district of Leominister 
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint 
against Goguen umier the con tempt provision of the 
Massachusetts flag misul:)e statute. The r(']cvaut part 
of the statute then read. 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, de-
faces or treats contemptuottsly tlw flag of the 
United States , whether such flag is public or 
private property . . shall bf' punished by a fine 
of not less than ten nor morP than one hundrecl 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than onP 
year, or both 
testimony given by WJtue"~e~ for the pro:.:Pt·utlou at lllH ~tah· triaL 
Goguen did not talw tlw ~t<l!Jd. Thti~ we do not have of record hiH 
account of what transpired nt the tiuie of hi~ arrest or of lm; purpo~e 
in wearing a flag on the >;cat of hi~ trou~er~ . 
2 Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-5, 35-36. 
3 Mass. Gen Law~ Ann. c. 264, §5 (1971). Omitting I-I!'Yeral 
sentences protecting the ceremoflial actJvJhe~ of certam veterans' 
group~, the statute read aH follow~ at thl' tJmf• of Goguen's arrest 
and conviction. 
'~§ 5. Flag; penalty for nususe 
"Whoever publicly mutilate~:-~, trampler- upun, defaces or treats 
contemptuously the ffa!( of the United Statl'~ or of Massachusetts, 
whether sttch flag is IHthlic or privatr property, or who(wer displayH 
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Despite the fir-st six words of the statute, GGguen was 
not charged with any act of physical desecration.4 As 
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecrati<Jii 
:such flag or any representation thereof upon which are words, figures, 
_advertisements or designs, or whoever eattses or petinits such flag 
to be used in a parade as a receptacle for depositing or collecting 
~oney or any other article or thing, or whoever expose:; to p11blic 
,view, manufactures, sells, exposes for sale, gives away or has in 
posse~sion for sale or to give away or for use for any purpose, any 
article or l:lubstance, being an article of merchandise or a receptacle 
of merchandise or articles upon which is attached, through a 
:wrapping or otherwise, engraved or printed in any mannPr, a repre· 
sentation of the Uni!e4 Stat~§ flag, or whoever uses any rPpresenta· 
tion of the arms or the great seal of the commonwealth for any 
~dvertising or commercial purpose, shall be punished by a fine of 
pot less than ten pr more than one .. hundred dollars or by imprison· 
ment for not more than one year, or both. Words, figmes, advcr• 
tisements or designs attached to. or directly or indirectly connected 
~ith, such flag or any representation ther~:of in l:lnch manner that 
such flag or its representation i:; used to. attract attention to or 
advertise such words, figures, adverti:;ements or designs, l:lhall for 
the purposes of this section be dermed to be upon such flag." 
.The statute is an amalgam of provisions dealing with flag dPl:lecra• 
tion and contempt (the fir~t 26 words) and with commercial misuse 
or other exploitation of flags of the state and national government. 
This case concerns only the " treat:; eontemptuously" phrase of the 
statute, which has apparently been in the statut i.' since its enactment 
in 1899. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 47~ F .. 2d, at 90, n . 2. 
In 1971, subsequent to Go~uen '~< prosPcntion, the desccrahon and 
contempt portion of the statute was amended twice. On March 8, 
1.971, the legislature, per St. 1971, c. 74, modified the first ;;entence by 
inserting "burns or otherwise" between the terms ''publicly" and 
"mutilates," and, in addition, by increasing the fine. Mass. Gen . Laws 
Ann. c. 264, § 5 (1973 Supp.) . On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, c. 
65.5, the legislature appendPd a new sentence defining ''the flag of tho 
United States" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the 
purposes of this section the term 'flag of the United States' shall 
l;llean any flag which has been designated by Act or Resolution o~ 
the Congress of the United Stntes a:; tht• national emblem, whether 
or not such designatJo~ is currently m forcP ." lb~d The 1971 
[Ji'ootnote 4 1s vn p 4] 
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and contempt portion of the statute, the officer charged 
specifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat con-
temptuously the flag of the United States .... " " 
After jury tr:ial in the Worcester County Superior 
Court, Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed ~ 
sentence of six months ii1 the .Massachusetts House of 
Corrections. Goguen appealed. to the 1\fassachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, whiqh affirmed. Common-
wealth v. Goguen, - Mass. - , 279 N. E. 2d 666 
( 1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argu-
ment with the comment that " [ w] hatever the uncer-
tainties in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in 
the statute as applied here." !d.,- Mass., at-, 279 
N. E. 2d, at 667. The court cited no Massachusetts 
precedents interpreting the "treats contemptuously" 
phrase of the statute.6 
After Goguen bega11 serving h1s sentence, he was 
·granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas 
corpus by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 
F. Supp. 161. The District COurt found the flag con-
iunendments are relevant to this case only m the tangential sense 
that they indicate a. recognition by the legislature of the need to 
tighten up this imprecise statute. 
4 Perhaps this wa~ because of the difficulty of t!w question whether 
Goguen's conduct constituted physical drseeration of the flag. Cf. 
Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F . 7d, at 91 , 11. 4 (" ... [WJe are not 
so sure that sewing a flag to a background clearly affects 'physical 
integrity.' ") . 
"Appendix 4. 
6 Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's 
case is the first recorded Massachusetts court reading of this lan-
guage. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. Indeed, with the exception of one 
turn of the century case involving one of the ~tatute 's commerc@ 
misuse provisions, Commonwealth v. R . /. Sherman Manu . Co., 189 
Mass. 76, 75 N. E. 71 (1905), the entire statut E· has been essentially 
devoid of state court interpretation. 
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tempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly 
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First 
Amendment. In upholding Goguen's void for vague-
ness contentions, the court concluded that the words 
~'treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily 
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., ~t 167. · Especially 
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on 
,hats, garments and vehicles . . . ," the words under which ' . 
Goguen was convicted "leave ~onj1ctural, in many in .. 
stances, what conduct .may subject the ac)tor to criminal 
prosecution." Ibid. The court also found that the 
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage 
arbitrary and erratic arrests and conviotions." Ibid. 
. The Court of Appeals, with one judge concurringt 
affirmed the District Court on both First Amendmen 
.and vagueness groqnds. Goguen . v. Smith, supra, 471 F 
2d 88. With regard to the latte~ ground, . the .Court o.f 
Appeals concluded that 11resolution of [Goguen's void for 
vagueness] challenge to the statute as applied to him 
necessarily adjudicates the statute's facial constitutional-
ity . . . . " !d., at 94. Treating as-applied and on-the-
face vagueness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in 
light of the imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue, 
id., at 92, 94, the court found that tJ1e language failed to 
provide adequate warning to anyone. contained insuffi-
cient guidelines for law enforcement officials, and set 
juries and courts at large. I d., at 94- 96. Then Circuit 
Judge, now Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by desig-
nation from the Ninth Circuit, concurred solely in the 
void-for-vagueness holding. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley 
saw no need to reach the 11far broader constitutional 
ground" of First Amendment overbreadth relied on by 
the · majority, noting the "settled principle of appellate 
ad;iudication that constitutional questiont< are not to be 
.. 
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dealt with unless this is necessary to dispose of the \ 
appeal." !bid. 
TI 
We agree with the holdings of the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vague~ 
ness. The settled principles of that doctrine require no 
.extensive restatement here.7 The doctrine incorporates 
notions of fair notice or warning.8 Moreover, it requires 
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law en-
forcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 
1'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." " Where a 
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court 
7 The element~:~ of the vmd for va~uen<'8~ dodrine have been 
.developed in a large body of precedent from this Comt. The cases 
are categorized in, e.(/ .. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108-109 ( 1972). See, Amstt>rdam, "The Void-for-Vaguem"',; Doctrine 
.in the Supreme Court," 109 U. Pa. L. H.t>v. 67 (19()0). 
8 E. g., Papachl'istou v. City of Jar:kso.nville. 405 U. S. 156, 1G~ 
(1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939): 
"No one may be required at peril of lift', liberty or pf{)perty to 
speculate ao; to the mt>nniqg of JW1111l statutes. All ure entitled to 
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." (Citations 
omitted.); 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 2ti9 U. S. a85, ;~91 {192()): 
" ... [A] statute winch rither forbids or reqmre,; the doing of an 
act in terms so vague that men of common intrlhgeuce must. neces"· 
sarily gpess at its meaning and differ tt,; ( o it~ apphcation, violatt>s 
the first essential of due procest~ of law." (Citations omittt>d.) 
0 E. g., Gm11ned, supra, 408 U. S., at 108; United States v. 
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (" . .. [T]o attempt 
. to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent of an t>ffort to 
carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and punished 
all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreason~ 
able in the estimation of the court Hnd jury."); United States v. 
'{leese, 92 U. 8. 214, 221 (1875) (''It would cPrtninly be dangProus 
if the legislature could set a net large enough to ratch all possible 
pffenders, and le[J..ve it to the court~ to Htep m~ide aucl ~ay wqQ 
pould be rightfully detaineq, and who should be ~Pt ~t lHrge.") . 
. . ~ .. 
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i.nterpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered 
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a great&: 
degree of specificity than in other contexts.10 The statu~ 
tqry language at issue here, "publiciy . . . treats con-
t~:mptuously the flag of the United States ... ,"has such 
scope, e. g.,. Street. v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969)' 
(verbal flag· conteir,ipt), and at the relevant time was 
without the benefit of judicial clarfficationP 
. Flag contempt statl,.l~es have been characterized as 
t-oid for lack 6f notice· on t:he theory that " [ w] hat .ls 
90ntemptuous to one man may be a work of art to 
another." 12 Goguen's behavior can hardly be described 
11~· art. Immaturity or "·silly conduct''. Ia probably 
~6mes closer to the mark. But we see the force 6{ the 
District Court's observation that ·the flag has become 
~'ar1 obje·ct of y6uth fashidn and hig'h camp ·rr 
343 F. Supp., at 164 . . As both courts below noted, casual 
treatment of the flag· in many contexts has become a 
'jVidespread contemporary phenomelJOn. ld., at 164, 
167; 471 F. 2d, at 96., Flag· wearfng· in a cfay 6f relaxed 
()lathing styles may be' simply for adon1ineilt or a ploy to' 
~ttract attention, It and many other current, careless 
Uses of the flag nevertheless constitc1te Oncere'm6ni:d 
treatment th~t .many people may view as contemptuous. 
)'"et in a time of ·widely varying .attitudes and tastes for 
displaying something as ub1quit6'us as the United States 
flag or representations of it, it could hardly be the pur-
pose of the Massachusetts legislature to make crimina! 
• 10 E. g., Grayned, supra, 408 U. S., at 109 ; Smith v. California; 
361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less ~tringent requirements 
of the modern vagueness oases dealing with purely economic regula~ 
tion. E. g., United States v. National Dairy Prod~ Corp., 372 U. S, 
2'1-J (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act) 
11 See n. n, supra. 
12 Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev 1040, 1056 (1968 ). 
118 Ooguen v. Smith, supra, 843 F . Stlpp., at 11)6~ 
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every informal use of the flag. The statutory language 
under which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw 
reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremonial 
treatment that are criminal and those that are not. Due 
process requires that all "be informed as to what the 
State commands or forbids . . . ,'' Lanzetta v. l'v' ew Jersey, 
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939), and that "men of common 
intelligence" not be forced to guess at the meaning of the 
criminal law. Connally v, General Co·nstructio11 Co., 
269 U. S. 385. 391 (1932). Given today's tendencies to 
treat the flag unceremoniously, those' notice standards 
are not satisfied here. 
We recognize that 111 a noncommermal context be-
havior as a general rule is uot mapped out in advance on 
the basis of statutory language.' ' In such cases, perhaps 
the most meaningful aspC'ct of thr vagueness doetrine is 
not actual notic<' but the othN' pdllclpal f•lement of the 
doctrine-the requir€•ment that a legislature Pstablish 
minimal guidelines to govern law Pnforcenwnt 1 t is ill 
this regard that the statutory language' uuder serutiuy 
has its most notable clcficicneies, 
In its terms, the language at issue 1s sufficiently un-
bounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted. "any 
public deviation from formal flag etiquette. . " 343 
F. Supp.. at Hi'l. Unchanged throughout its 70-year 
history,' " the "treats contemptuously'' phrase was also 
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the 
relevant time in this case.'" We are without authority 
14 Amsterdam, supra, 109 U. Pa . L. Rev .. at 8~. n 79. 
15 See n. :~, supra. 
16 See n . 6, supra. The \'Ontetnpt port wn ol the \lla:;::;achusetts 
statute seems 1 o lmve lam fallow for altllo::;t it~ entire hi:;tory. Appar~ 
ently there have been n bout a ha If doZP.ll a rrC'::;t~ under thi:> part of 
the :>tatute in recent year,.;, but none ha:; produced a. reported 
decision. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29 . In 19fi8, a teenager in Lynn, 
Massachu;;ett:; wt~s chnrged, apparent!) under the pn~::;ent .;tatute, 
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to cure that defect.17 ~tatutory language of such a 
standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
,juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla-
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting 
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 165-169 (1972). !ri 
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 120 ( H.i69), 
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against 
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judg-
ment of the policeman on his heat." The aptness of 
his admonition is evident from appellanes candid con-
cession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals 
tegarding state enforcement standards for that portiort 
of the statute under which Goguen was convicted: 
" ... [A]s counsel lfor appellant] admitted, a war 
protestor who, whilf> attending a rally at which it 
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the 
American flag by contemptuously covering himself 
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prose-
cuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a 
member of the American Legion who, caught in the 
same rainstorm while returning from an 'America-
Love It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag, 
but does so regrettably and without a contemptuous 
attitude, would not be prosecuted .'' 471 F 2d, at 
102 (emphasis in original) . 
Where inherently vague statutory lauguage permits such 
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process. 
with desecrating thf United State~> flng by sewing pwce:> of it into his 
trousers. New York Time~>, Augu~t 1, 1968, p . 31 , col. 1. The 
teenager was ordered by a state district cotirt to prepare and deliver 
an essay on the flag. Tho eourt continued the case without a find-
ing, depriving 1t of any pl'ecedential vahw 
17 E. g., United States v, Thirty-8e'IWtt f'hoto(traphs, 402 U, S :36;.j1 
369 (1971), 
72-1254--0PINION 
10 SMITH v. GOGUEN 
III 
Appellant's arguments that the "treats contemptu-
pusly" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least 
~Should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive. 
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening 
brief, as he did his oral_Qrgument, to the contention that 
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness 
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness 
tts applied" is properly before the federal courts/8 but 
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the 
statute is vague on its face. The latter claim, appellant 
insists, was not presented to the state courts with the 
requisite fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 
(1971). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belat-
edly raised,t0 and it fails to take the full measure of 
_Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the 
state courts.20 We do not deal with the point at length, 
18 Reply Brief 4. 
'10 Goguen filed his federal habeati corpus petition subsequent 
to Picard, supra. Yet it nppears that appellant did not raise his 
present exhaustion of remedies argument before the District Court. 
That court commented specifically ou this omJstiion: ''No con-
tention is now made that [Goguen] has not exhausted state remedies, 
nor that the constitutional itism•s pn'tiented here Wfrf not raised 
appropriately in state proceedings." 343 F. Supp., lit 164. 
• 20 Goguen filed in state superior court an unsucces::sful motion to 
dismiss the complaint in which he cited the FourtePnth Amendment 
and alleged that the statute under which hf was charged was "imper-
missibly vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation 
by public officials." Appendix 1. This motion was also before the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was incorporated in 
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid. In addition, Goguen's 
prief before that Court raised vngneness points and citffi vagueness 
cases. Id., at 19, 2ti-27, citing Lanzetta v. N ew Jerseu, :306 U. S, 
451 (1930), and Parker v Morgan, :322 F. Supp. 585 (WD N. C. 
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however, for we find the relevant statutory language 
,Impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. With-
out doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly 
presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion 
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278. 
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies arg·umei1t is preni7 
fsed on the notion that Goguen,.s behavior rendered him 
a hard-core violator as to whom the statl,lte was not 
vague, whatever its implications for those engaged in dif-
ferent conduct. T-o be sure there are statutes that 
by their terms or as authoritativ~ly ·construed apply 
without question to certain activities, but whose appli~ 
cation to other behavior is uncertain. The hard-core 
violator concept makes some sense' with regard to such 
statutes. The present statute, however .. is not in that 
category. This crimil'lal provision is vague "not in the' 
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct 
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, 
but rather in the sense tha.t u.o standard of conduct is 
specified at all." Coates v. C1:ty of Oincinnati, 402 U. S, 
611, 614 (1971). Such a provision simply has no core·, 
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion 
f1Bd exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process 
Clause. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in 
1971) (three-judge court) (North Carulinn flag contern1lt statut9 
void for vagueness and overbreadth). Appellant is correct in assert.,-
ing that Goguen failed to compartmentalize in his state court brief 
the due process doctrine of vaguenetis and First Amendment concepts 
of overbreadth. See Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of 
leakage between those particular adjoining compartments Js under~ 
standable. Cf. Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doc-
~rine," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 871-875 ( 1970) . The higlwst state 
court's opinion, which dealt separately with Goguen's First Amend-
ment and vagueness claims, Commonwealth v. Goguen, supra, - -
Mass., at -, 279 N. E. 2d, at 667, indicates that that court wa~ 
well aware that Goguen raised. both Het.s· of argmnrnt::-r, 
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view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law 
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is cor-
rected either by amendment or judicial construction. it 
affects all who are prosecuted under the statutory lan-
guage. In our opinion the defect exists in this case. 
The language at issue is void for vagueness as applied to 
Goguen because it subjected him to criminal liability 
under a standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury 
were free to react to nothing more than their own prefer-
ences for treatment of the flag. 
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of 
the vagueness question presented, appellant argues that 
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow sub-
ject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the United 
States.21 Appellant contends that this "takes some of 
the vagueness away from the phraEe, 'treats contemptu-
ously .... ' " .2 t Anyone who "wants 11otice as to what 
conduct this statute proscribes ... , immediately knows 
that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to 
stay clear of violating this statute. he just has to stay clear 
of doing something to the United States flag." 28 Apart 
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an 
"actual" flag, 2<1 we fail to see how this aUeged partiCu-
21 Appellant's Brief 17; Trau~. of Oral Arg. 9. 
22 Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. 
23 Ibid. 
24 At the time of Goguen's prosecution, th€' statute referred simply 
to "the flag of the United States ... ," without further ddinition. 
That raises the obvious question whether Gogu€'n's miniature cloth 
flag constituted "the ffag of the United States . .. . " Goguen 
argued unsuccessfully before the state cotirts that the statute applied 
only to flags that met "official stan&trds"· for proportions, such as 
relation of height to width nne! the size of stripes and the field of 
stars, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those standards. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 24-26; Appendix 2. There was no 
· c!'ispute that Goguen's adornmf'nt had the reqnisitc number of ~tars 
and stripes and colors. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The Mass~t~ 
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larity resolves the central vagueness question-the 
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous 
treatment. 
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavaii=-
ing. It is asserted that the first six words of the statut~ 
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously;; phrase, 
and that the Massachusetts Suprerpe Judicial Court 
customarily construes general language to take on color 
from more specific accompanying language. But it is 
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general 
phrase alone, and that the highest . state court did not 
rely on any general-to-specific pr,inciple of statutory 
interpretation in this case. 2 fi Appellant further argues 
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has 
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional con~ 
~empt.20 Aside from the problems presented by an 
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case 
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously 
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be 
covered by the statute, noting that "[t]he statute does not require 
that the flag be 'official'" Commonwealth v. Goguen, - Mass. -, 
-, 279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). The. lower federal courts did 
not address this holding, nor do Wf'. ·We note only that the .Massa-
chusetts Legislature apparently ~ensed an ambiguity in thi8 respect, 
because subsequent to Goguen's prosecution it · amended the statute 
in an effort to define what it l!ltd meant by the "flag of the 
United States." See n . 3, supra. 
25 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. 
26 The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t] he jury 
could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing any 
words of the defendant ." Commonwealth v. Goguen, - Mass. -, 
- , 279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). TllUs, the court held that the 
jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct. This is 
apparently also a holding that the jmy m·ust find con1emptuous 
intent under the statute, although the rPqui~ement amounts to very 
little since it is so easily sat isfied. The eou,rt's, reference to verbal 
Q.qfllmunica~~on ,reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. New York; 
394 u. s. 579 (1969). 
'. 
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unnarrowed statute, 27 this holding still does not clarify 
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentional 
or inadvertent. 
Finally, appellant argues that state law enforcement 
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret 
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, prop-
erly read, reaches only direct, immediate contemptuous 
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity 
bf the flag .... " 28 There is no support in the record 
for the former point.2n Similarly, nothing in the state 
court's opinion in this case or in ailY earlier opinion of 
that court sustains the latter. In any eveut, Goguen 
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language 
·27 E. g., Ashton v. Kentucky, :384 U. S. 195, 198 (1966) . 
28 Appellant's Brief 22. 
29 With regard to prosecutorial policie~, appellant cites two pub-
lished opinions of the Massachusetts Attorney General. 4 Ops. of 
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (Reproduc~·d at Appellanfs Brief 30) ; Report 
of Atty. Gen., Pub. Doc. No. 12, p. i92 (1968) (Reproduced at 
Juris. Statement App. 5S). Appellant concede~ that neither deals 
with the contempt portion of the s1 atute under which Goguen was 
convicted. Thus, they arei riot in point here. They provided 
guidance to no one on the relevant ~tatutory Janguag('. Neverthe-
less, appellant is correct that thry show a tendency on thr part of 
the state Attorney Generai to 1:ead other portions of ti1e statute 
narrowly. At the same time, they reflect the lack of precision 
recurring throughout the Massacl~tisctt~ flag misuse statute. Ti1e 
1915 opinion noted that a literal reading of one portion of tlw ~tatute, 
J)rohibiting exhibition of ei1graving~ of the tl'ag on certain articles, 
would mnke it a. criminal offense to di~play tlw flag itself " in many 
of its cheaper and more common forms ." Appellant's Brief 31-32. 
The state Attorney General concluded that this wmild be a ''manifest 
absurdity." I d., at 32. Tht> 1968 opinion advi~rd that a flag rrpre-
sentation painted on a door wns not "a flag of the United States" 
within the meaning of the statute. Juris. StatemC'nt App. 53-55. A 
contrary interpretation would "raise serious questions undPr the 
First and FmWteentl1 All)'endment" . ," given the reqmremc1l't 
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There 
was no allegation of physical desecration. 
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature 
bf the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot 
establish standards with great precision. Control of the 
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a 
policeman in the performance of his official duties may 
be ~:me such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot 
·assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Cotten v. 
Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no com-
parable reason for committing broad discretion to law 
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt. 
Indeed, because display of the flag is so common and 
takes so many forms. changing from one generation to 
another and often difficult to distfl1guish i11 priucit)le, a ? 
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior 
lt intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legis-
lature from defining with substantial specificity what 
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States fiags. 30 
that behavior made criminal must be 1'plainly probib1ted by the 
language of the sh1tute." !d., at 54. 
30 The federal flag desecration statute, for exampl<>, reflects a 
?ongressional purpose to do just that . In re~pon~e to a warning, 
by the United States Attoruey General that to use such unbounded 
terms as "defies" or "casts contempt . . e1thPr hy word or act " is 
"to risk invalidation" on vaguene~~ ground~, S. Hep._ No. 1287, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (l!J68); H. R. Rep. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 7 ( 1967), the bill which became the federal statute was 
amended, 113 Cong. Rec. 16449, 16450 (1967), to reach only acts 
tbat physically damage the flag. The desecration provision of the 
statute, 18 U. S. C. § 700 (a), declares: 
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the 
United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, ciC'fi!ing, burning, or 
trampling upon it shall be fined not rn()re than $1,000 or imprisoned 
for not more than one year, or both." 
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to reach only defined 
physical acts of desecration, H . R~ Rep. No. :350, BUj;JI"a, at 3; 
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The statutory language at issue here fails to approach 
that goal and is void for vagueness.31 The judgment is 
affirmed. 32 
It is so ordered. 
("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not acci· 
dental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration.").; S. Rep. 
No. 1287, s-upra, at 3 (''The language of the bill prohibits intentional, 
willful, not accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of dcce~ 
cration of the flag."). The act has been so read by thelower federal. 
courts, which have upheld it against vagueness challenges. United 
States v. Crosson, :162 F, 2d 96 (CA9) cert. denied, 409 U . S. 1064 
(1972); Joyce v. United States, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 454 F . 
2d 971 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972) . . See Hoffman v. 
United States,- U. S. App. D. C.-, 445 F. 2d 226 (1971). 
31 We are aware, of course, of the universal adoption of flag 
desecration or contempt statutes by the federal and state govern-
ments. See n. 30, supm. The statutes of the 50 S.tates are synop-
sized in Hearings on B. B. 271, et al., before Sub . . Comm. No. 4 
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, 
pt. III, at 324-346 ( 1967). Most of the state statutes are patterned 
after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which in § 3 provides that: 
"No person shall publicly mutilate, def;1ce, defile, defy, trample 
upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag , standard, 
color, ensign or shield." 
Compare 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52- 53 (1966) , with Hearings 
on H. R. 271, et al., supra, at 321-346. Because it is ;;tated in 
the disjunctive, this language, like that before us, make::; possible 
criminal prosecution solely for casting contempt upon the flag. The 
validity of statutes utilizing this language, however, insofar ns the 
vagueness doctrine is concerned, will . depend as . much on thrir 
j~dicial construction and enforcement history as their literal terms. 
~·We have not addressed Goguen's First Amrndment arguments 
because, having found the challenged statutory language void for 
vagueness, there is no need to de~ide additional issue'~. Moreover, 
the skeletal record in this ca,;e, see n. 1, supra, affords a poor 
opportunity for the careful consideration mrritrd by the importanee 
of the First Amendment issue::; Goguen ha:,; raised. Mit. JmnrcE 
WHITE, concurring in the result; positR that " the jury wa;; appro-
priately informed that the defendant, if he was to be convicted1 
must have intended to treat the flag contemputonsly ... .' ' Antt:1 
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nt -. This nssumption appears to be the prPmis<' for tlw con-
curring opinion's conclusion that Goguen was puni"hrd for what h(• 
communicated. But, as counsel for ap]wllant confirmerl at oral 
argument, there is no extant. rE-cord of the jury instrnctions in thi~ 
case, Tr. of Oral Arg. 51, and thus we have no wny of knowin~ whnt 
the .jur.y was informed, 
JAN ~ 8 197 
NOTE: Where It Is fenstble, n syllabus (headnote) wlll be re· 
lensed, as Is being done in connection with this case, at the time 
the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
SMITH, SHERIFF v. GOGUEN 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
No. 72-1254. Argued November 12-13, 1973-
Decided J anuary -, 1974 
Appellee, for wearing a small United States flag sewn to the seat of 
his trousers, was convicted of violating the provision of the Massa~ 
ehusetts fbg misuse statute that subjects to criminal liability any~ 
one who "publicly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the 
United States .... " The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed. The District Court in appellee's habeas corpus action 
found the "treats contemptuously" phrase of the statute uncon~ 
stitutionally vague and overbroad. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Held: 
1. The challenged statutory language, which had received no 
·narrowing state court interpretation, is void for vagueness under 
the Due Process Clause of fhe Fourteenth Amendment, since by 
failing to draw reasonably clear lines between the kinds of non-
ceremonial treatment of the flag that are criminal and those that 
are not it does not provide adequate warning of forbidden conduct 
and sets fortn a standard so indefinite that police, court and jury 
·are free to react to nothing more than their own preferences for 
treatment of the flag. Pp. 6-9, 12. 
2. By challenging in state courts the vagueness of the "treats 
contemptuously" phrase as applied to him, appellee preserved his 
due process claim for purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion, Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, since the challenged lan-
guage is void for vagueness as applied to appellee or to anyone 
else. A "hard-core" violator concept has little meaning with 
·regard to the challenged language, 'because the phrase at issue is 
vague not in the sense of requiring a person to conform his 
·conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible standard, but in .. 
I 
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the sense of not specifying any ascertainable standard of conduct 
at all. Pp. 10-12. 
3. Even if, as appellant contends, the statute could be said 
to deal only with "actual" flags of the United States, this would 
not resolve the central vngueness deficiency of failing to define 
contemptuous treatment. Pp. 12-13. 
4. That other words of the desecration and contempt portion 
of the statute address more specific conduct (mutilation, tram-
pling, and defacing of the flng) does not assist appellant, since 
appellee was tried solely under the "treats contemptuously" phrase, 
and the highest state court in this case did not construe the 
challenged phrase as taking color from more specific accompanying 
language. P. 13. 
5. Regardless of whether restriction by that court of the scope 
of the challenged phrase to intentional contempt may be held 
against' appellee, such an interpretation nevertheless does not 
clarify what conduct constitutes contempt of the flag, whether 
intentional or inatl.vertent. _Pp. 1;3-1:,4, 
4?1 F. 2d 88, affirm'?!f· 
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Appellee, for wearing a small United States flag sewn to the seat of 
his trousers, was convicted of violating the provision of the Massa-
chusetts flag misuse statute that subjects to criminal liability any-
one who "publicly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the 
United States .... " The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed. The District Court in appellee's habeas corpus action 
found the "treats contemptuously" phrase of the statute uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Held: 
1. The challenged statutory language, which had received no 
narrowing state court interpretation, is void for vagueness under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since by 
failing to draw reasonably clear lines between the kinds of non-
ceremonial treatment of the flag that are criminal and those that 
are not it does not provide adequate warning of forbidden conduct 
and sets forth: a standard so indefinite that police, court and jury 
are free to react to nothing more than their own preferences for 
treatment of the flag. Pp. 6-9, 12. 
2. By challenging in state courts the vagueness of the "treats 
contemptuously" phrase as applied to him, appellee preserved his 
due process claim for purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion, Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, since the challenged lan-
guage is void for vagueness as applied to appellee or to anyone 
else. A "hard-core" violator concept has little meaning with 
regard to the chaltenged language, because the phrase at issue is 
vague not in the sense of requiring a person to conform his 
conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible standard, but ~: 
I 
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Syllabus 
the sense of not specifying any ascertainable standard of conduct 
at all. Pp. 10-12. 
3. Even if, as appellant contends, the statute could be said 
to deal only with "actual" flags of the United States, this would 
not resolve the central vagueness deficiency of failing to define 
contemptuous treatment. Pp. 12-13. 
4. That other words of the desecration and contempt portion 
of the statute address more specific conduct (mutilation, tram-
pling, and defacing of the flag) does not assist appellant, since 
appellee was tried solely under the "treats contemptuously" phrase, 
and the highest state court in this case did not construe the 
challenged phrase as taking color from more specific accompanying 
language. P. 13. 
5. Regardless of whether restriction by that court of the scope 
6f the challenged phrase to intentional contempt may be held 
against appellee, such an interpretation nevertheless does not 
clarify what conduct constitutes contempt of the flag, whether 
intentional or inadvertent. Pp. 13-14. 
471 F. 2d 88, affirmed. 
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DouGLAS, 
BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARt~HALL, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed 
an opinion concurring in the judgment. BLACKMUN, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which BunGER, C. J., joined. REHNQUIST, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which BunGER, C .. J., joined. 
NOTICE : This opinion Is subJect to for mal r evision before publication 
In t he prelimina r y prin t of the United States Reports. Reader8 a re re-
quested to noti fy the Hepor ter of Decisions, Supreme Court of t he 
United Stutes, Washington, D.C. 20543 , of any ty po~:raphical or other 
formal errors, in order tlut t corrections may be made lJefore the pre-
liminary print goes to press . 
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On Appeal from the United 
States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit. 
[March 25, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, ap-
peals from a judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt pro-
vision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconsti-
tutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471 
F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972), prob. juris. 
noted, 412 U. S. 905 (1973). We affirm on the vague-
ness ground. We do not reach the correctness of the 
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment 
grounds. 
I 
The slender record in this case reveals little more 
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the 
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers.1 The 
1 The record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions 
Goguen filed in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court , the 
opposing briefs before that court, the complaint under which Goguen 
was prosecuted, and Goguen's federal habeas corpus petit ion. 
Appendix 1-36, 42--43. We do not have a trial t ranscript , although 
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions briefly summarizes some of the 
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flag was approximately four by six inches and was 
displayed to the left rear of Goguen's blue jeans. On 
·January 30, 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Mas-
sachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The 
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with 
., a group of persons on a public street. The group appar-
' .ently was not engaged in any demonstration or other pro-
test associated with Goguen's appareP No disruption of 
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this offi-
cer approached Goguen to question him about the flag, 
the other persons present laughed. Some time later, the 
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking 
in the downtown business district of Leominister. 
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint 
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the·. 
Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part 
of the statute then read: 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, de-
faces or treats contemptuously the flag of the 
United States : .. , whether such flag is public or 
private property . . ; , shall be punished by a fine 
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one 
year, or both .... " 3 
testimony given by witnesses for the prosecution at his state trial . 
. Goguen clid not take. the stand. Thus we do not have of record his 
account of what transpired,at the time of his arrest or of his purpose. 
i in wearing a flag on the seat of his trousers. 
2 Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 35-36. 
3 Mass. Gen Laws Ann. c. 264, § 5 (1971). Omitting several 
sentences protecting the ceremonial activities of certain veterans' 
,groups, the statute read as follows at the time of Goguen's arrest 
and conviction: 
.. ~'§ 5. Flag; penalty for misuse 
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats. 
contemptuously the flag of the United States or of Massachusetts, 
whether such flag is public or private property, or whoever displays 
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Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was 
not charged with any act of physical desecration.4 As 
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration 
such flag or any representation thereof upon which are words, figures, 
advertisements or designs, or whoever causes or permits such flag 
to be used in a parade as a receptacle for depositing or collecting 
money or any other article or thing, or whoever exposes to public 
view, manufactures, sells, exposes for sale, gives away or has in 
possession for sale or to give away or for use for any purpose, any 
article or substance, being an article of merchandise or a receptacle 
of merchandise or articles upon which is attached, through a 
wrapping or otherwise, engraved or printed in any manner, a repre-
sentation of the United States flag, or whoever uses any representa-
tion of the arms or the great seal of the commonwealth for any 
advertising· or commercial purpose, shall be punished by a fine of 
not fess than ten or more than one hundred dollars or by imprison~ 
ment for not more than one year, or both. Words, figures, adver-
tisements or designs attached to, or directly or indirectly connected 
with, such flag or any representation thereof in such manner that 
such flag or its representation is used to attract attention to or 
advertise such words, figures, advertisements or designs, shall for 
the purposes of this section be deemed to be upon such flag." 
The statute is an amalgam of provisions dealing with flag desecra~ 
tion and contempt (the first 26 words) and with commercial misuse 
or other exploitation of flags of the state and national government. 
This case concerns only the "treats contemptuously" phrase of the 
statute, which has apparently been in the statute since its enactment 
in 1899. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d, at 90, n. 2. 
In 1971, subsequent to Goguen's prosecution, the desecration and 
contempt portion of the statute was amended twice. On March 8, 
1971, the legislature, per St. 1971, c. 74, modified the first sentence by 
inserting "burns or otherwise" between the terms "publicly" and 
"mutilates," and, in addition, by increasing the fine. Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann. c. 264, § 5 (1973 Supp.). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, c. 
65.5, the legislature appended a new sentence defining "the flag of the 
United States" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the 
purposes of this section the term 'flag of the United States' shall 
mean any flag which has been designated by Act or Resolution of 
the Congress of the United States as the national emblem, whether 
or not such designation is currently in force." Ibid. The 1971 
[Footnote 4 is on p. 4] 
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and contempt portion of the statute, the officer charged 
specifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat con-
~emptuously the flag of the U nitcd States .... " 5 
After jury trial in the Worcester County Superior 
Court, Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a 
sentence of six months in the Massachusetts House of 
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed. Common-
wealth v. Goguen, - Mass. -, 279 N. E. 2d 666 
(1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argu-
ment with the comment that "[w]hatever the uncer-
tainties in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in 
the statute as applied here." !d.,- Mass., at-, 279 
N. E. 2d, at 667. The court cited no Massachusetts 
precedents interpreting the "treats contemptuously" 
·phrase of the statute.6 
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was 
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas 
corpus by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 
F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag con-
amendments are relevant to this case only in the tangential sense 
that they indicate a recognition by the legislature of the need to 
tighten up this imprecise statute. 
4 Perhaps this was because of the difficulty of the question whether 
Goguen's conduct constituted physical desecration of the flag. Cf. 
Goguen v. Smith, suprQI, 471 F . 2d, at 91 , n . 4 (" ... [W]e are not 
so sure that sewing a flag to a background clearly affects 'physical 
integrity.' "). 
5 Appendix 4. 
6 Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's 
case is the first recorded Massachusetts court reading of this lan-
guage. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. Indeed, with the exception of one 
turn of the century case involving one of the statute's commercial 
misuse provisions, Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co., 189 
Mass. 76, 75 N. E. 71 (1905), the entire statute has been essentially 
devoid of state court interpretation. 
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tempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly 
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First 
Amendment. In upholding Goguen's void for vague-
ness contentions, the court concluded that the words 
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily 
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., at 167. Especially 
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on 
hats, garments and vehicles ... ,"the words under which 
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many in-
stances, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal 
prosecution." Ibid. The court also found that the 
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage 
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals, with one judge concurring, 
affirmed the District Court on both First Amendment 
and vagueness grounds. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 
2d 88. With regard to the latter ground, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that "resolution of [Goguen's void for 
vagueness] challenge to the statute as applied to him 
necessarily adjudicates the statute's facial constitutional-
ity .... " !d., at 94. Treating as-applied and on-the-
face vagueness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in 
light of the imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue, 
id., at 92, 94, the court found that the language failed to 
provide adequate warning to anyone, contained insuffi-
cient guidelines for law enforcement officials, and set 
juries and courts at large. I d., at 94-96. Then Circuit 
Judge, now Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by desig-
nation from the Ninth Circuit, concurred solely in the 
void-for-vagueness holding. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley 
saw no need to reach the "far broader constitutional 
ground" of First Amendment overbreadth relied on by 
the majority, noting the "settled principle of appellate 
adjudication that constitutional questions are not to be 
72-1254-0PINION 
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dealt with unless this is necessary to dispose of the 
appeal." Ibid. 
II 
We agree with the holdings of the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vague· 
ness. The settled principles of that doctrine require no 
extensive restatement here.7 The doctrine incorporates 
notions of fair notice or warning.8 Moreover, it require·s 
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law en-
forceinent officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 
('arbitrary and. discrih1inatory enforcement." 0 Where a 
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court 
7 The elcmen't11 of the void for vagueness doctrine have been 
develbped in a large ·body of precedent from this Court. The cases 
are categorized in, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 
108-109 (1972). Sec, Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vngueness Doctrine . 
jn the Supreme Court," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960). 
8 E. g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 
(197Q); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939): 
"No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to 
speculate as to the meaning of penni o;tatutes. All are entitled to 
be informed as to what the State Jlommands or forbids." (Citations 
omitted.); 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926): 
" ... [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of ar! 
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must Iieces..-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates 
ihe first essential of due process of law." (Citntions omitted.) 
0 E. g., Grayned, suprd1 408 U. S., at 108; United States v. 
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... [T]o attempt 
to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent of an effort to 
carry out a statute which iri terms merely penalized and punished 
all ' acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreason· 
abie in the estimation of the court and jury."); United States v. 
Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221 (1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous 
if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who 
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large."). 
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interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered 
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater 
degree of specificity than in other contexts.1.o The statu-
tory language at issue here, "publicly . . . treats con-
temptuously the flag of the United States ... t has such 
scope, e. g., Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969) 
(verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant time was 
without the benefit of judicial clarification.11 
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as 
void for lack of notice on the theory that " [ w] hat is 
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art to 
another." 12 ' Goguen's behavior can hardly be described 
as , art. Immaturity or "silly conduct" 13 probably 
eomes closer to the mark. · But we see the force of the 
District Court's observation that the flag has become 
"an object of youth fashion and high camp . . . ." 
343 F. Supp., at 164. As both courts below noted, casual 
treatment of the flag in many contexts has become a 
widespread contemporary phenomenon. /d., at 164, 
167; 471 F. 2d, at 96. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed 
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to 
attract attention. It and many other current, careless 
uses of the flag nevertheless constitute unceremonial 
treatment that many people may view as contemptuous. 
Yet in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for 
displaying something as ubiquitous as the United States 
flag or representations of it, it could hardly be the pur-
pose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal 
10 E. g., Grayned, supra, 408 U. S., at 109; Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less stringent requirements 
of the modern vagueness cases dealing with purely economic regula-
tion. E. g., United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 
29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act). 
11 See n. 6, supra. 
12 Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040, 1056 (1968). 
13 Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp., at 166. 
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every informal use of the flag. The statutory language 
under which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw 
reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremonial 
treatment that are criminal and those that are not. Due 
process requires that all "be informed as to what the 
State commands or forbids ... ,"Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939), and that "men of common 
intelligence" not be forced to guess at the meaning of the 
criminal law. Connally v. General Construction Co., 
269 U. S. 385, 391 (1932). Given today's tendencies to 
treat the flag unceremoniously, those notice standards 
are not satisfied here. 
We recognize that in a noncommercial context be-
havior as a general rule is not mapped out in advance on 
the basis of statutory language.14 In such cases, perhaps 
the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is 
not actual notice but the other principal element of the 
doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. It is in 
this regard that the statutory language under scrutiny 
has its most notable deficiencies. 
In its terms, the language at issue is sufficiently un-
bounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "any 
public deviation from formal flag etiquette. . .. " 343 
F. Supp., at 167. Unchanged throughout its 70-year 
'history/5 the "treats contemptuously" phrase was also 
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the 
relevant time in this case.16 We are without authority 
14 Amsterdam, supra, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 82, n. 79. 
1 5 See n. 3, supra. 
18 See n. 6, supra. The contempt portion of the Massachusetts 
statute seems to have lain fallow for almost its entire history. Appar-
·.ently there have been about a half dozen arrests under this part of 
the statute in recent years, but none has produced a reported 
decision. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. In 1968, a teenager in Lynn, 
Massachusetts was charged, apparently under the present statute, 
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to cure that defect.17 Statutory language of such a 
standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and 
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla-
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting 
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 165-169 (1972). In 
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 120 (1969), 
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against 
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judg-
ment of the policeman on his beat." The aptness of 
his admonition is evident from appellant's candid con-
cession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals 
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion 
, of the statute under which Goguen was convicted: 
" ... [A]s counsel [for appellant] admitted, a war 
protestor who, while attending a rally at which it 
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the 
American flag by contemptuously covering himself 
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prose-
cuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a 
member of the American Legion who, caught in the 
same rainstorm while returning from an 'America-
Love It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag, 
but does so regrettably and without a contemptuous 
attitude, would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2d, at 
102 (emphasis in original). 
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such 
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process. 
with desecrating the United States flag by sewing pieces of it into his 
trousers. New York Times, August 1, 1968, p. 31, col. 1. The 
teenager was ordered by a state district court to prepare and deliver 
an essay on the flag . The court continued the case without a find-
ing, depriving it of any precedential value. 
11 E. g., United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 
369 (1971). 
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III 
Appellant's arguments that the "treats contemptu-
ously" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least 
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive. 
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening 
brief, as he did his oral argument, to the contention that 
Goguen failed 'to preserve his present void for vagueness 
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness 
as applied"- is properly before the federal courts/8 but 
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the 
statute is vague on its face. The latter claim, appellant 
insists, was not presented to the state courts with the 
requisite fa.ir precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 
(1971). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belat-
edly raised/0 and it fails to take the full measure of 
G'oguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the 
state courts.20 We do not deal with the point at length, 
18 Reply Brief 4. 
19 Gogurn filed his federal habeas corpus prt it ion subsequent 
to Picard, supra. Yet it appears that appellant did not raise his 
present exhaustion of remedies argument before the District Court. 
That court commented , prcifically on this omiRRion: "No con-
tention is now made that fGoguen] has not exhausted state remedies, 
nor that the constitutional issues pre cnted here were not raised 
appropriately in state proceedings." 343 F . Supp., at 164. 
20 Goguen filed in Rtate superior court an unsuccessful motion to 
dismiss the complaint in which he cited the Fourteenth Amendment 
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "imper• 
missibly vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation 
by public officials." Appendix 1. This motion was also before the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was incorporated in 
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid. In addition, Goguen's 
brief before that Court rai~ed vagueness points and cited vagueness 
cases. /d., at 19, 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 
451 (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (WD N. C. 
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., ~owever, for we find the relevant statutory language 
impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. With-
but doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly 
presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion 
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278. 
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is prem-
ised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him 
a hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not 
vague, whatever its implications for those engaged in dif. 
ferent conduct. To be sure there are statutes that 
by their terms or as authoritatively construed apply 
. without question to certain activities, but whose appli-
i;ation to other behavior is uncertain. The hard-core 
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such 
statutes. The present statute, however, is not in that 
category. This criminal provision is vague "not in the 
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct 
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, 
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is 
specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 
r611, 614 (1971). Such a provision simply has no core, 
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion 
and exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process 
Clause. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in 
1971) (three-judge court) (North Carolina flag contempt statute 
void for vagueness and overbreadth). Appellant is correct in assert-
ing that Goguen failed to compartmentalize in his state court brief 
the due process doctrine of vagueneRs and First Amendment concepts 
of overbreadth. Sec Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of 
leakage between those particula.r adjoining compartments is under-
standable. Cf. Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doc-
trine," 83 I-Iarv. L. Rev. 844, 871-875 ( 1970). Tho highest state 
court's opinion, which dealt separately with Goguen's First Amend-
ment and vagueneRR cl:1ims, Commonwealth v. Goguen, supra, -
Mass., at -, 279 N. E. 2d, at 667, indicates that that court was 
well aware that Goguen rai ·ed both sets of arguments. 
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view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law 
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is cor-
rected· either by amendment or judicial construction, it 
affects all who are prosecuted under the statutory lan-
guage. In our opinion the defect exists in this case. 
The language at issue is void for vagueness as applied to 
Goguen because it subfected him to criminal liability 
under a standard so indefi'nite that police, court, and jury 
were free to react to nothing more than their own prefer-
ences for treatment of the flag: 
Turning from the exhaustion point ' to the merits of 
tlie vagueness question pre~ented; appellant argues that 
any notice difficulties are a:me·liorated' by the narrow sub-
ject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the United 
States.21 Appellant contends that tnis "takes some of 
the vagueness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptu-
ously .... ' " 22 Anyone who "wants notice as to what 
conduct this statute proscribes ... , immediately knows 
that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to 
stay clear of violating this statute, he just has to stay clear 
of doing something to the United States flag." 23 Apart 
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an 
"actual" flag/ 4 we fail to see how this alleged particu-
21 'Appellant's Brief 17; Trans. of Oral Arg. 9. 
22 Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. 
28 Ioia. 
24 At the time of Goguen's prosecution, the statute referred simply 
tO' "the flag of the United States ... ," without further definition. 
That raises the obvious question whether Goguen's miniature cloth 
flag constituted "the flag of the United States .... " Goguen 
argued unsuccessfully before the state courts that the statute applied 
only to flags that met "official standards" for proportions, such as 
relation of height to width and the size of stripes and the field of 
stars, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those standards. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 24-26; Appendix 2. There was no 
dispute that Goguen's adornment had the requisite number of stars 
and stripes and colors. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The Massa-
72-1254--0PINION , 
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larity resolves the central vagueness question- the 
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous 
treatment. 
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavail-
mg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute 
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase, 
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
customarily construes general language to take on color 
from more specific accompanying language. But it is 
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general 
phrase alone, and that the highest state court did not 
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory 
interpretation in this case.25 Appellant further argues 
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has 
"restricted the scope of the statute to intentional con-
tempt.26 Aside from the problems presented by an 
,appellate court's limiting construction in the very case 
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously 
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be 
covered by t he statute, noting that " [t]he statute does not require 
t)1at the flag be 'official'" Commonwealth v. Goguen, - Mass. -, 
-, 279 N . E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). The lower federal courts did 
not address this holding, nor do we. We note only that the Massa-
chusetts Legislature apparently sensed an ambiguity in this respect, 
b ecause subsequent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute 
in an effort to define what it had meant by the "flag of the 
United States." See n. 3, supra. 
25 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. 
· 26 The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t]he jury 
·could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing any 
words of the defendant ." Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mass.-, 
- , 279 N . E. 2d 666, 668 (1972) . Thus, the court held that the 
jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct . This is 
apparently also a holding that the jury must find contemptuous 
intent under the statute, although the requirement amounts to very 
little since it is so easily satisfied . The court's reference to verbal 
communication reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. N ew York, 
394 U. S. 579 (1969). 
72-1254-0PINION 
14 SMITH v. GOGUEN 
unnarrowed statute,27 this holding still does not clarify 
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentional 
or inadvertent. 
Finally, appellant argues that state law enforcement 
'liuthorities have shown themselves r·eady to interpret 
this penal statute narrowly and that th~ statute, prop-
erly read, reaches only Clirect, immediate contemptuous 
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity 
of the flag .... " 28 'There is no support in the record 
for the former point. 29 Similarly, nothing 'in the state 
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of 
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen 
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language 
27 E. g., Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 198 (•1966). 
2s Appellant's Brief 22. 
29 With regard to prosecutorial policies, appellant cites two pub-
lished opinions of the Massachusetts Attorney GeneraL 4 Ops. of 
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (Reproduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Report 
of Atty. Gen., Pub. Doc. No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at 
Juris. Statement App. 53). Appellant concedes that neither deals 
with the contempt portion of the statute under which Goguen was 
convicted. Thus, they are not in point here. They provided 
guidance to no one on the relevant statutory language. Neverthe-
less, appellant is correct that they show a tendency on the part of 
the state Attorney General to read other portions of the statute 
narrowly. At the same time, they reflect the lack of precision 
· recurring throughout the Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The 
1915 opinion noted that a literal reading of one portion of the statute, 
' prohibiting exhibition of engravings of the flag on certain articles, 
would make it a criminal offense to display the flag itself "in many 
of its cheaper and more common forms." Appellant's Brief 31-32. 
The state Attorney General concluded that this would be a "manifest 
aBsurdity." !d., at 32. The 1968 opinion advised that a flag repre-
sentation painted on a door was not "a flag of the United States" 
within the meaning of the statute. Juris. Statement App. 53-55. A 
contrary interpretation would "raise serious questions under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . ," given the requirement 
72-1254-0PINION 
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There 
was no allegation of physical desecration. 
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature 
of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot 
establish standards with great precision. Control of the 
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a 
policeman in the performance of his official duties may 
be one such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot 
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Colten v. 
Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no com-
parable reason for committing broad discretion to law 
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt. 
Indeed, because display of the flag is so common and 
takes so many forms, changing from one generation to 
another and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a 
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior 
it intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legis-
lature from defining with substantial specificity what 
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States fiags. 80 
that behavior made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the 
language of the statute." Id., at 54. 
30 The federal flag desecration statute, for example, reflects a 
congressional purpose to do just that. In response to a warning 
by the United States Attorney General that to use such unbounded 
terms as "defies" or "casts contempt ... either by word or act" is 
"to risk invalidation" on vagueness grounds, S. Rep. No. 1287, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 7 ( 1967), the bill which became the federal statute was 
amended, 113 Cong. Rec. 16449, 16450 (1967), to reach only acts 
that physically damage the flag. The desecration provision of the 
statute, 18 U.S. C. §700 (a), declares: 
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the 
United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or 
trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned 
for not more than one year, or both." 
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to reach only defined 
physical acts of desecration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 3 
72-1254-0PINION 
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The statutory language at issue here 
that goal and is void for vagueness.31 
affirmed.82 
fails to approach 
The judgment is 
It is so ordered. 
("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not acci-' 
dental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration."); S. Rep: 
No. 1287, supra, at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, 
willful, not accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of dese~· 
cration of the flag."). The act has been so read by the lower federal 
courts, which have upheld it against vagueness challenges. United' 
States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96 (CA9) cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1064 
(1972); Joyce v. United States, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 454 F. 
2d 971 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). See Hoffman v. 
United States, - U. S. App. D. C.-, 445 F. 2d 226 (1971). 
81 We are aware, of course, of the universal adoption of flag 
desecration or contempt statutes by the federal and state govern-
ments. See n. 30, supra. The statutes of the 50 States are synop-
sized in Hearings on H. R. 271, et al., before Sub. Comm. No. 4 
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, 
pt. III, at 324-346 ( 1967). Most of the state statutes are patterned 
after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which in § 3 provides that: 
"No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample 
upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard, 
color, ensign or shield." 
Compare 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966), with Hearings 
bn H. R. 271, et al., supra, at 321-346. Because it is stated in 
the disjunctive, this language, like that before us, makes possible 
eriminal prosecution solely for ca ·ting contempt upon the flag. 
But the validity of statutes utilizing tins language, insofar as the 
vagueness doctrine is concerned, will depend as much on their 
judicial construction and enforcement history as their literal terms. 
32 We have not addressed Goguen's First Amendment arguments 
because, having found the challrnged statutory language void for 
vagueness, there is no nerd to decide additional issues. Moreover, 
the skeletal record in t.his case, see n. 1, supra, affords a poor 
opportunity for the careful consideration merited by the importance 
of the First Amendment issues Goguen has raised. 
ist .bRAFT . 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE 
Chie:f Just ice 
Jus t'.no Do-:.,gla::J 
J t: C<:l :Dn 11nan 
Mr . ,Tt· · " ' S t; n ,~ rt 
Mr.· ,T~, ... t- •G<> L ".:' ~12.11 
m: Vlhite, J. 
Circulated: .:l- ::l.-7- 7Y 
No. 72-1254 






On Apt)eal from the United 
States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit. 
[March - , 1974] 
MR. Jt:HTJCE WHl'l'l·~ . concurring 111 the judgment. 
It is a crimP in Massachusetts if one mutilates, 
tramples, defaces or "treats contemptuously" the flag of 
the lTnitcd States. Respondent Gogue11 was convicted 
of treating the flag con tC'mptuously, the evidence being 
that he wore a lihness of the flag on the seat of his 
pants. The Court holds this portion of the statute too 
vague to provide an ascC'rtainable standard of guilt in any 
situation, including this one, Although I concur in the 
judgment of affirmance for other reasons, I cannot agree 
with this rationale, 
lt is self-Pvident that there is a whole range of conduct 
that anyone with at least semblance of common sense 
would know is contemptuous conduct and that would 
be covered by the statute if directed at the flag. In 
these instances, there would be ample notice to the actor 
and no room for undue discretion in enforcement officers, 
There may be a variety of other conduct that might or 
might not be claimed contemptuous by the State, but 
unpredictability in those situations does not change the 
certainty iu others. 
I am also confident that the statute was not vague 
with respect to the conduct for which Goguen was ar-
rested and convicted, It should not be beyond the rea~ 
72-1254-CONCUR 
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sonable comprehension of anyone who would conform 
his conduct to the law, to realize that sewing a flag ou 
the seat of his pants is contemptuous of the flag. Fur-
thermore, the jury was appropriately informed that the 
defendant, if he was to be convicted, must have intended 
to treat the flag contemptuously; and the jury found 
this to be the case. Goguen can hardly complain that 
be did not realize his acts were in violation of the stat-
ute, for he intended the very acts which the statute 
forbids. "fT J he requirement of specific intent to do a 
prohibited act may avoid those COllsequences to the· 
accused w·hich may otherwise render a vague or in-
definite statute invalid ... where the punishment im-
posed is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose 
of doing what the statut<' prohibits, the accused cannot 
be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that 
the act which he does is a violation of law." Screws v. 
United States, 325 U. S. 91, 101-102 (1945). 
If it be argu<'d that the statute in this case merely 
requires an intentional act, not a willful one in the sense 
of intending what the statute forbids, then it must be 
recalled that respondent's major argument is that wear-
ing a flag patch on his trousers was conduct that "clearly 
expressed an idea. albeit unpopular or unpatriotic. about 
the flag or about the country it symbolizes .. . Goguen 
may have meant to show that he believed that America 
was a fit place only to sit on or the proximity to that 
portion of his anatomy might have had more vulgar 
connotations. Nonetheless, the strong and forceful com-
munication of ideas is unmistakable." Appendix 13. 
Goguen was under no misapprehension as to what he 
was doing and as to whether he was showing contempt 
for the flag of the United States. As he acknowledges 
in his brief here, ". . it was necessary for the jury to 
find that appellee conveyed a contemptuous attitude in 
order to convict him ." 1 cannot! therefore! agree that 
72-1254-CONCUR 
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the Massachusetts statute is vague as to Goguen; and 
if not vague as to his conduct, it is irrelevant that it 
may be vague in other contexts with respect to other 
conduct. "In determining the sufficiency of the notice 
a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of 
the conduct with which a defendant is charged." United 
States v. Xational Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29, 
33 (1963). Statutes are not "invalidated as vague 
simply because difficulty is found in determining whether 
marginal offenses fall withiu their language.'' I d. , at 32. 
The unavoidable inquiry, therefore, becomes whether 
the "treats contemptuously" provision of the statute, as 
applied in this case, is unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment. That amendment, of course, applies to 
speech ami not to conduct without substantial com· 
municative intf'nt and impact. Even though particular 
conduct may be expressive and is understood to be of 
this nature, it may be prohibited if necessary to further 
a nonspeech interest of the Government that is within 
the power of the Government to implement. United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). 
There is no rloubt in my mind that it is well within 
the powers of Congress to adopt and prescribe a national 
flag and to protect the integrity of that flag. Congress 
may provide for the general welfare, control interstate 
commerce, provide for the common defense and exer-
cise any powers necessary and proper for those ends. 
These powers, and the inherent attributes of sovereignty 
as well, surely encompass the designation and protection 
of a flag . It would be foolishness to suggest that the 
men who wrote the Constitution thought they were 
violating it when they specified a flag for the new Nation, 
Act of January 13, 1794, 1 Stat. 341 (c)(1), just as they 
had for the Union under the Articles of Confederation. 
8 Journal of the Continental Congress 464 (June 14, 
1777). It is a fact of history that flags have been asso-
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ciated with nations and with government at all levels, 
as well as with tribes and families. It is also an his-
torical fact that flags including ours, have played an 
important and useful role in human affairs. One need 
not explain fully a phenomenon to recognize its exist-
ence and in this case to concede that the flag is an im-
portant symbol of nationhood and unity, created by the 
nation aml endowed with certain attributes. Conceived 
iu this light, I have no doubt about the validity of laws 
designating and describing the flag and regulating its 
use. display and disposition . The Fnited States has cre-
ated its own flag, as it may. The flag ts a national 
property. and the Xation may regulate those who would 
make, imitate, sell. possess or usc it. 
I would not question those statutes which proscribe 
mutilation , defacement or burning of the flag or which 
otherwise protect its physical integrity. Neither would 
I find it beyond congressional powf'r. or that of state 
legislaturf'S, to forbid attaching to or putting 011 the flag 
a11y words. symbols or advertisements. All of these ob-
jects, whatever thf'ir naturr. are foreign to thf' flag, 
change its physical character and interfere with its cle-
sign and function. There would seem to be little ques-
tion about the power of Congress to forbid the mutila-
tion of the Lincoln Memorial or to prevent overlaying 
it with words or other objects. The flag is itself a 
monument, subject to similar protection. 
The Massachusetts statute, however, cloes not stop 
with proscriptions against defacement or attaching for-
eign objects to the flag. It also makes it a crime if one 
"treats contemptuously" the flag of the United States. 
To violate this part of the statute, it is not enough that 
one "treat" the flag; he must also treat it "contemptu-
ously," which, in ordinary understanding is the expres-
sion of contempt for the flag. In the case before us, as 
has been noted, the jury must have found that Goguen 
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not only wore the flag on the seat of his pants but also 
that the act-and hence Goguen himself-was contemp-
tuous of the flag. To convict on this basis is to convict 
not to protect the physical integrity or to protect against 
acts interfering with the proper use of the flag, but to 
punish for communicating ideas about the flag unaccept-
1 ' • 
able to the controlling majority in the legislature. 
Neither the United States nor any State may require 
any individual to salute or express favorable attitudes 
towards the flai. West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette, 319 U. 8. 624 ( 1943) . It is also clear under 
our cases that disrespectful or contemptuous spoken or 
' l 
written words about the flag may not be punished con .. 
\ ' sistently with the First Amendnwnt. Street v. LYew 
York, 394 u; S. 576 ( 1969). Although neither written 
nor spoken, an act may be sufficiently communicative to 
invoke the protection of the First Amendment, Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Distr-ict, 
393 U. S. 503 (1969). and may not be forbidden by law 
except incidental to preventing unprotected conduct or 
unless the communication is itself among those that falls 
outside the protecticHl of the First Amendment. In 
O'Brien, the Court sustained a conviction for draft card 
burning, althou~h admittedly the burniu~ was itself ex-
pressive. There, destruction of draft cards, whether 
cornmunicative or not, was found to be inimical to im-
1 ' 
portant governmental consiaerations. But the Court 
made clear that if the cohcern of the law was withm :t;:l_,., 
expression associated with th~ act, the result would be 
otherwise: 
"The case at bar is th~refore unlike one where 
the alleged governmental interest in regulating con-
duct arises in some measure because the communi-
cation allegedly integral to th e .conduct is itself 
thought to be harmful. In Strombe1·b v: California, 
'a SMITH V; GOOUEN 
283 U.S. 359 (1931), for exampl~, this Court struck 
down a statutory phrase which punished people who 
expressed their 'opposition to organized government' 
by displaying 'any flag, badge, banner, or device.' 
Since the statute there was aimed at suppressing 
communication it could not be sustained as a regu-
lation of noncommunicative conduct.'' 391 U. S. 
367, 382 (1968). 
It would be difficult, therefore, to believe that the con-
victiOJ1 in O'Brien would have been sustained had the 
statute proscribed only contemptuous burning of draft 
cards. 
Any conviction under the "treats contemptuously.l>pro-
vision of the Massachusetts statute would suffer from the 
same infirmity. This is true of Goguen's conviction, 
~nd I concur in the Court's jud~ment, 
~: The Chief J t..d Hr. Justice flo ,.., 
Mr. Justice Br8· 
llr . ·Justice Stev.a 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Kr . Justice Blackmun 
1st DRAFT • Justice Powell 
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MR. JF::;'l'ICE REHNQl ' ll:;'l', diss<'nting. 
I agree with the concurring opinion of my Brother 
WHITE insofar as he concludes that thP Massachusetts 
law is not unconstitutionally vague. but l do not agree 
with him that the law uuder which respondent Goguen 
was convicted violates the First and .Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The issue of the application of the First Amend-
ment to exprPssive conduct. or "symbolic speech," is 
undoubtedly a difficult one, and in cases dealing with 
the United States flag it has unfortunately been 
expounded only i11 ·dissenting opinions. :-lee Street v. 
New York, 394 U.S. 576. Warren, C. J .. dissenting, id., at 
594; Black, J., diss<'nting. id., at 609; WHI'l'E. J .. dissent-
ing, id., at 610; Fortas. J .. dissenting, id., at 615; and 
Cowgill v. California, 396 P. :-1 . :371 ( Hl70), Harlan . J., 
concurring, ibid. ~ onetheless, swce I disagree with the 
Cotfrt's conclusion that the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague, I must, uulike the Court. address petitioner's First 
Amendmellt contentions. 
The question whether the Statp may regulat<' the dis-
play of the flag iu thf' circumstances shown by this record 
appears to be an open one under our decisions. Halter 
v. Nebraska, 20.5 F. S. 34 (1907); 'Street ,. Sew York, 
394 U. S. 576 (196~)); Cowuill v. California, an6 C. S. 371 
(1970), Harlan , J ., concurring; PeoplP v. Radich, 26 
-------
2 S1\1ITH I' C:O<alE:\'" 
N.Y. 2d 114, 257 ).;'.E. 2d 30. aff'cl by an equally divided 
Court. 401 e. fl. 531 (1971). 
What the Court rightly describes as "the slender record 
in this case:' ante, p. 1. shows only that Goguen wore 
a small cloth version of the enited States fiag sewn to 
the seat of his blue jeans. When the first police officer 
questioned him. he was standing with a group of people 
on Main Street in Leominster. Massachusetts. The 
people with him ,,.·ere laughing. \Yhen the second police 
officer saw him. he was "walking in the downtown busi-
ness district in Leominster. wearing a short coat, casual 
type pants ami a miniature AmPriean fiag H<'wn on tlw 
left side of his pants.'' Goguen did not LPstify , and there 
is nothing in the record beforP us to indicat<> what h(> 
was attempting to communicate by his conduct . Or, 
indeed. whether he was attempting to communicate any-
thing at all. The record before us Joes not even coil-
elusively reveal whether Goguen sewed the fiag on the 
pants himself. or whether the pants were manufactured 
complete with flag; his counsel here. howevC>r, who was 
also his trial counsel, stated in oral argument that of his 
own knowledge the pauts wrre not manufactured with 
the flag 011 theln. Finally. it dors not appear whether 
appellee said anything during his journey through the 
streets of Leominster; his bill of exceptions to the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts made no mention 
of any testimony indicating that he spoke at all. 
Goguen was prosecuted under the Massachusetts stat-
ute set forth in the opiuion of the Court. and has 
asserted here not only a claim of unconstitutional vague-
ness but a claim that thf' statute infringes his right under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
There is a good dPal of doubt on this record that 
Goguen was trying to communicat~ any particular idea, 
72-1254-DlSSE.NT 
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and had he been convicted under a statute which simply 
prohibited improper display of the flag I would be satis-
fied to conclude that his conrluct in wraring the flag on 
the seat of his pants did not come within even the outer-
most limits of that sort of "expressive conduct" or "sym-
bolic speech'" which is entitled to any First Amendment 
protection. But Goguen was convicted of treating the 
flag contemptuously by the act of wearing it where he 
did, and I have difficulty seeing how Goguen could be 
found by a jury to have treater! thP flag contemptuously 
by his act and still not to have Pxprcsscd any idea at all. 
ThPre arc. therefore, in my opinion. at least marginal 
elements of "symbolic speech" in Goguen's conduct as 
reflected by this record. 
Many casf's which could be said to involve conduct 
no less expressive that Goguen·~. however, have never 
been thought to require analy~is in First Amendment 
terms becaus<' of the presence of other factors. One who 
burns down the factory of a con1pany whose products he 
dislikes can exprct his First Amendment defense to a 
consequent arson prosecution to he given short shrift by 
the courts. The arson statutf' safeguards the govern-
ment's substantial interest in preventing the destruction 
of property by means dangerous to human life. and an 
arsonist's motiw is quite irr<>levant. The same fate 
would doubtless await the First Amendment claim of 
one prosecuted for destruction of government property 
after he defaced a speed limit sign in order to protest the 
stated speed limit. Both the arsonist and the defacer 
of traffic signs have infring<'d on the proprrty interests 
of others, whether of another individual or of the gov-
ernmeHt. Yet Goguen, unlike eithf'f, has so far as this 
record shows infringed on the ordinary property rights 
of no one. 
That Goguen owned the flag with which he adorned 
himself, however, is not dispo~iti ve of the' First Amend-
T.!- 1254-DISSE:t\'T 
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ment issue. Just as the govem men t may not escape 
the reach of the First Amendment by asserting that it 
acts only in a proprietary capacity with respect to streets 
and parks to which it has title, Hague v. CIO, 307 F . S. 
496, 514-516 ( 1939), a defendant such as Goguen may 
not escape the reach of the police power of the State of 
Massachusetts by asserting that his act affected only his 
own property. Indeed, there are so mauy well-estab-
lished exceptions to the proposition that one may do 
what he likes with his own property that it cannot be 
said to have even the status of a ~t'IJPral ru]p 
The very substantial authority of state and local ~ov­
eming bocliPs to regulate the use of land . aud thereby 
to limit the uses available to the owner of the land , w~ 
established nearly a half century ago in Euclid\' , Amber 
Realty Co., 272 F. H. 365 (1D20) . LaJJd use regulatio'ns 
in a residential zoning district typically do 11ot merely 
exclude malodorous and unsightly rendering plants; they 
often also prohibit erection of buildings or monuments. 
including ones open to tlH' publie, which might itself 
in an aesthetic sense involve substantial elements of 
"expressive conduct." The p<'rfonnance of a play may 
well constitute expressive conduct or "pure' ' speech, but 
a landowner may not for that reason insist on the right 
to construct and operate a theater in an arc>a zoned for 
noncommercial uses. So long as tlw zoning laws do not, 
under the guise of ll<'Utrality. actually prohibit the 
expression of ideas bf'cause of their content, tlwy have 
not been thought open to challenge under the First 
Amendment. 
As may land. so may other kinds of property be sub-
jected to close regulation and control. A person with 
an ownership interest in controlled drugs, or in firearms, 
cannot use them, sell them, and transfer thern in what-
ever manner he pleases. The copyright laws, 17 11. R. C. 
~ 1 et seq., limit what use the purchaser of a copyrighted 
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book may make of his acquisition. A company may be 
restricted in what it advertises on its billboards. Packer 
Corp. v. Utah, 285 F. ~. 105 ( 1032). 
The statute which Goguen violated. howevPr. docs uot 
purport to protect the related interests of other property 
owners, neighbors, or indeed any competing ownership 
interest in the same property; the interest which 1t 
protects is that of the Government. and is not a tradi-
tional property interest. 
Even in this. however, laws regulating use of the flag 
are by 110 means unique. A numl.>Pr of examples can 
be found of statutes enacted by Congress whieh protect 
only a peculiarly govemmental intrrest in property 
otherwise privately owned. 1R t'. S C. ~ 504 ptoh~bits 
the printing or publishing in actual sile Ol' ill actual 
color of any Pnited States postagP or revenue stamp, 
Or of any obligation or security of tlw United :::ltates. 
It likewise prohibits the importation of any plates for 
the purpose of such imprinting. H~ r. S. C. ~ :~:n pro-
hibits the alteration of any FedPral Reserve note or 
national bank note. and 18 C. :-1. C. ~ 333 prohibits the 
disfiguring or defacing of a11y naLioJJal bank note or ~ ScJA. cJ-
coin. 18 U. R. C. ~ 702 prohibits th<' wearmg of a mili-J o... u 
tary uniform, any part of such uniform. or anything ~J 3';8 4 . ~ SB 
similar to a military uniform or part thereof without (tcno) rwev.StV::{ 
proper authorization. 18 C. :-1 . < '. ~ 704 prohibits the .} . . _. _ -~ 
1 . . I • f . I 1 I . . h £c..n...u <C'f"ICJ'\. ~unaut 1onzeu weanng o service me( as. t IS not w1t - ~ ~ 
out significance that many of these statutes. though a--c-t vel -4 
long on the books. have newr bf•en judicially construed ,-..,.. b~ til l.s+ 
or even challenged . ~~ (~,1-tttJ~---. 
My Brother WHJn; says, however, that whakver may lk, ()vi J &latk. ') 
be said of neutral statutes simply designed to protect a · · 
governmental interest in private property, which in the 
case of the flag may be characterized as an interest in 
preserving its physical i11tegrity , th<> Massachusetts stat-
ute here is not neutral. It punishes only Lhose who 
6 
treat the flag contemptuously. illlposing no JWnalty on 
those who "treat" it otherwise, that is. thosr who impair 
its physical integrity 111 somP other way. 
II 
Leaving aside for· thP nwruent the nature of the gov-
ernmental interest in protrcting the physical integrity 
of the flag, I cannot accept the conclusion that the Mas-
sachusetts statute must be invalidated for punishing only 
some conduct that impairs the flag's physical integrity . 
It is true, as the Court observes. that w<:' do not haw in 
so many words a "narrowing com;truction" of the stat utc 
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
But the first of this Court's d{'cision:s cited in the short 
rescript opinion of the ~upremc Judicial Court is Halter 
v. Xebraska, 205 F. ~. :34 ( 1907). which uplwld against 
constitutional attack a Nebraska statute which forbade 
the use of the United Stat<>s flag for purposes of adver-
tising. We also have the benefit of au opinion of the 
Attorney General of the CommOil\\'f'alth of Massachu-
setts that the statute under which Goguen was prosf'-
cuted, being penal. "is not to lw Pnlarged l)('yond its 
plain import. and afl a geueral ruiP iR strictly constru<'d.'' 
Rep. A-G Pub. Doc. ~o . 12 ( 19fi8) 102- Hl3. With 
this guidance. and tlw further assiRtance of the content 
of the entire statutory prohibition, I think the SuprPme 
Judicial Court wonld read the langH&ge "wiH::l~"gr pnb-
licly mutilates, tramples upon, deface 
1-1 ow ~ --t;l<.R. 
Co~Ml .;y ~ c._ , 
d.if>'~'"'h~ ~'j 
% .41& ~? 
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performed at a distance from the flag. as well as purely 
verbal disparagement of it.* 
If the statute is thus limited to acts which affect the 
£hysical integrity of the flag, the question remains 
whether the State has sought only to punish those who 
impair the flag's physical integrity for the purpose of 
disparaging it as a symbol. while permittiug impairment 
of its physical integrity by those who do not seek to 
disparage it as a symbol. If that were the case. holdings 
like Schacht v. United States , 398 U. S. 58 ( 1970) , sug-
gest that such a law would abridge the right of free 
expressiOn. 
But Massachusetts metes out punishment to anyone 
who publicly mutilates, tramples. or defaces the flag ~ 
regardless of his motive or purpose. It also punishes the 
display of any "words. figures , advertisements or designs" 
on the flag, or the use of a flag iu a parade as a receptacle 
for depositing or collecting money. Likewise prohibited 
is the offering or selling of any article on which is en-
graved a representation of the United ~tates flag. 
The variety of these prohibitions demonstrates that 
Massachusetts has not merely prohibited impairment of 
the physical integrity of the flag by those who would 
cast coutempt upon it. but equally by those who would 
seek to take advantage of its favorable image in order 
·X·To the extPut that coun::;pf for [Wtitwnrr who argm·d 11!E' cnu~r 
iu tlw Court of Apprab rna)· havr intimntrd a broackr con~truction 
ill thr colloquy in that court quotf'd in thi~ Court',; opinion, ante , 
p. 9, I would attach littlr Wf'ight to it. Wf' havP previou~ly ~aid 
that we are '"loath to nttarh ronclu::;iv<' weight to the rrlatively 
spontaneou~ re::;pon::;e:> of rou!l::;el to rqually >-'pontanron~ qne::;t ioning 
from th<' Court during orlll nrgumrnt," Moose Lodge No . 1U7 , .. 
lrvis, 407 U. S. 1();3, 170, and if that be thr ra;;p ,;urf'ly f'VPll [p~,; 
w~·ight should bP a;;eribeu by u~ to a rolloquy whirh took pine'<' ln 
'another court. 
tvo+ -hrt.ut ~. 
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to facilitate any commercial purpose, or those who would 
seek to convey any message at all by tneans of ituprint-
ing words or designs on the flag. These prohibitions are 
broad enough that it can be fairly said that tlw Mas~a­
chusetts statute is one essentially designed to preserve 
the physical integrity of the flag. and not mPrely to 
punish those who would infringe that integrity for the 
purpose of uisparaging the flag as a symbol. While it is 
true that the statute does not appear to cover one who 
simply wears a flag. unless his conduct for oth('r reasons 
falls within its prohibitions. the legislature is not re-
quired to ad.dress evrry related mattt>r in an area ''lith 
one statute. Katzenbach v. Morgan, :~84 U, ~ . 641, 656-
658 (1966). It may well be that the incidence of such 
conduct at the time the statute was enacted was not 
thought to warrant legislation in order to preserve the 
physical integrity of the flag. 
In United States v. O'Brien, 391 P. ~ . 367 (19G8) , the 
Court observed: 
"We cannot accept the view that apparently limit~ 
less variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' 
whenev~r the person engaging in the conduct in-
tends thereby to express an idea." 391 U. S .. at 37(). 
~rhftt, proceeding "on the assumption that the alleged 
communicative element in O'Brien 's conduct was suffi-
cient to bring into play the First Amendment," the 
Court held that a regulation of conduct was sufficiently 
justified 
"If it is within the constitutional power of th€' 
government; if it furthers an important or substan- ..flA. -1- +- ca......t+ he_ 
tial governmental interest; if the governnwntal in., {_ {t ~ 
terest is unrelated to the suppressiOn of free S f'vJ2.c 
expression; and lf the ll1Cldental restrictiQll on a].,. ?. :I ~ ,;rutz-
le~ed First Amendment freedqms is no gr<>atPr than .S J:~~~Vl. . 
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is essential to the furtherance of that interest.'' :3Dl 
P. R .. at 377. 
While I have some doubt that the first enunciation of 
a group of tests such as those established in O'Brien sets 
them in concrete for all time, it does seem to me that 
the Massachusetts statute substantially complies with 
those tests. There can be no question that a statut<' 
such as the Massachusetts one here is "within" th<' con-
stitutional power of a State to enact. Since the statute 
by this reading punishes a variety of . uses of the ffag 
~hich would impair its physical integrity, without rrg!ircl 
to presence or character of expressive conduct in con-
nection >vith those uses. 1 thlllk the governmental interest 
is unrelated to the suppressio11 of free expression. 'l'lw 
question of whether the governmental interest is "sub-
stantial" is not easy to sever from the question of whether 
the restriction is "no greater than is essential to tlw 
furtherance of the interest." and I therefore treat thosP 
two aspects of the matter together. I believe that both 
of these tests are met, and that the governmental interest 
is sufficient to outweigh whatever collateral supprPssion 
of expressive conduct was involved in the actions of 
Goguen. I11 so concluding, I find myself in agreement 
not only with my Brother 'WHITE in this case. but with 
those members of the Court referred to earlier in this 
opinion who dissented from the Court's disposition in 
the case of Street v . . Vew York, supra. 
My Brother WHITE alludes to the early legislation of 
both the Con tin en tal Congress and of the Congress of 
the new nation dealing with the flags . and observes. 
"One need 110t explain fully a phenomenon to recognize 
its existence and in this casP to concede that the flag is 
an important symbol of nationhood and unity, created 
by the nation and endowpd \Vi th certain attributes: 
Conceived in this light, I have 110 doubt about the 
7:2- 1254-DISSEKT 
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validity of laws designating and descriLi11g tlw flag and 
regulating its use. display and disposition.·· I agree. 
On September 17, 1787. as thr last meml><'rs of tlw 
Constitutional Convention W<'r<' ~igning tlw instrUllH'nt, 
James Madison in his "X otes'' dPscribrs thP occun·pnce 
of the following incidPnt: 
"Whilst the last members were signing it Doc·tor 
Franklin looking towards the PresidPnt's Chair. at 
the back of which a rising sun happ<'nf'd to be 
painted. observed to a few mt>mbc·rs npar him, that 
Painters had found it difficult to di~tinguish in their 
art arising from a setting sun. l have said lw. often 
and ofte11 in the course of th<' ;-;<>ssio11, and tlw viei -
situdes of my hopes and fears as to its issu<·. looked 
at that bPhind the President without being able to 
tell whethE'r it was rising or setting;: But now at 
length I have the happiness to know that it is a 
rising and not a Sf'tting sun.'' \i\'ritings of Jamc>s 
Madison, Vol. 4, pp. 482-483. (G. P. Putnam's 
Sons 1903.) 
Writing for this Court more than one hundred yPars 
later, Mr. Justice Holmes made> the familiar statement: 
" ... l W]hen we are dealing with words that also 
are a constituent act. like the Constitutivn of the 
United States, vve must realize that they have caiJ~d 
into life a being the development of which could 
not have been foreseen completely by the most 
gifted of its begE'tters. r t was enough for them to 
realize that thE' hopE' that they had crE'atc>d an orga-
nism; it has takC'n a century and has caused their 
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they 
created the natio11. The casp before us must be 
considered in the light of our whole exp€'riencE' and 
pot merely in that of what wa~ said a hundred y~ar~ 
SMITH v. 00(: lfEX 1) 
ago.)) Missouri v. Holland, 252 P. ~. 416. 433 
(1920). 
}'rom its earli<'st days. the art and literature of our 
country have as~:;igned a special place to the> flag of the 
United States. It figures prominently in at least one 
of Charles Wilson Peale's portraits of Gfjrqge Washing-
ton, showing him as leader of thf' forces of the 13 colonies 
during the Re>volutionary \Var. ::\o one who lived 
through the Second World War in this country can forget 
the impact of the photograph~ of th e membc>rs of the 
Fnited Stat<'S Marine Corps raising the Pnitcd States 
flag on the top of Mount foiuribachi on the Island of lwo 
Jima. which is now commemorated in a statue at th<' I wo 
Jima Memorial adjoining Arlington :\Tational C:cnwtary. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson. writmg .50 years aftc>r the 
battles of Lexington and Concord, wrote> : 
"By the rude !wid* that arclwd the fiood 
Their flag to A]>ril'~ br(•eze unfurled 
Here once thf' embattled farmers stood 
And fired the shot hf'ard 'round tlw world .'' 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, SE'nior. celebrated the flag that 
had flown on "Old Ironsides" during tht' War of 1812, 
and John Greenleaf Whittier lllade Barbara Frietchie's 
devotion to the "silken scarf' in the tPC'th of Stonewall 
Jackson's ominous threats the central theme of his 
familiar poem . John Philip i-lousa 's "Stars and /-\tripes 
Forever'' and GPorgc M. Cohan's "It's a Grand Old Flag" 
are musical cc>lebrations of the flag familiar to adults a]](l 
ehildrcu alike. Francis Scott Key 's "Star Spangled 
Banner" is the cou11try's national anthem. 
\Vhile most of the artistic C'vocations of the flag occur 
in the context of times of national strugglf', and corre-
spondingly greatf'r depf'tHif'nre on th e> flag as a symbol 
of national unity. the importanf•e of the flag is by no 
72- 1254-l >ISSEWr 
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means limited to the field of hostilitirs. The United 
i::ltates flag flies over every ff•deral courthouse in our 
:!'; ation, and is promi1wntly displayed in almost ev<~ry 
f0deral, stak or local public building throughout the 
land. It is the onp visible f'mbodinwnt of the authority 
.of the National GovPrnllleilt, through which the laws of 
the Nation and the guarantres of the ( 'onstitution are 
enforced. 
It is not <'mpty rhetoric to say that the rnited States 
Constitution, ev<'n the First and Fonrteenth Amt>lHl-
ments undrr which Uogue11 seeks to upset his convietioJJ , 
does not invariably in tl1e world of practi<~al affairs rnforer 
itself. Going baek no further than tlw m0morir-s of most 
of us presently alive. the United States flag was carried 
by federal troops stunmo1wd by the Preside11t to rnforce 
decrees of federal eourts in Littk Hock. Arkansas. in 19.57, 
and in Oxford. Mississippi , in 1!162. 
The significanee of the flag. and the drep emotional 
feelings it arousfs in a )arg<' part of our citi~enry. cannot 
be fully expressed in the two dimrnsions of a lawyer 's 
brief or of a judieial opiuion. But if the government 
may create private proprietary interests in written work 
and in musical and theatrical performances by virtue of 
copyright laws, 1 sec no reason why it may not , for all 
of the reasons mentioned, create a similar governmental 
interest iu the flag by prohibiting even thos0 who have 
purchased the physical object from impairing its physi~ 
cal integrity. For what they have purchased is not 
merely cloth dyed red. whik and blue. but also the oue 
visible m.anifestation of two hundr<>d years of nation-
hood-a history compiled by generations of our forbears 
aud contribut<>d to by streams of immigrants from the 
four corners of the globe. which has travelled a course 
sinee th(:' ti_me of this country's origin that could not 
have be<;>n "fQrf)se~~!l by the most gifted of its b~gett~rs," 
72-1254-DISSENT 
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Tlw JWrmissible ocopr of p;overnment regulation of thi's 
uniqul' physical obj(•ct eannot he~ adequately dealt with 
in tenus of tlw law of private property or by a highly 
abstract. sellolastic interpretation of the First Anwnd-
llWilt. Massaehusetts has not prohibited Goguen from 
wearing a sig11 sewn to thl' seat of his pants expressing 
in words his low opi1lion of the flag. of the country. or 
anything els<-'. It has prohibited him from wearing there 
a particular symbol of extraordinary significance and 
GOIItent. for which significancl' and eontenr~ UogliC'II is 
in 110 wise~ responsiblP. 'J;'he flag of the Pnitcd_:jt tes is 7 T~ cott.J 
not just anotlwr "thin · '' · · · ~11o1ther / · ct?dt' 
"idea''; i ·s not primarily an idPa at alL . ·------' ~ ~ ;re !
7 
Here Goguc·n was. so far as this r~cord .appeats. qf1ite -{bw t~r:::~ ~pwl ' 
free to exprPss verbally whatevpr vwws 1t w·as· hl-' was: 
seeking to express by wearing a flag sewn to· his pants, 
on the streets of Leominster or in any of its parks or 
commons wht~re free speech and assembly was custo~ 
marily permittrd. He was not compelled in any way 
to salute the flag, pledge a11egiallel' to it. or mah• any 
affirmative gestun' of support or resp<-~ct for it such as 
would COiltravPne West ViriJ'I:nia Board of Education Y. 
Barnette , :31!l P. S. 624 ( 1943). He was sirnply pro-
hibited from illlpairing the physical integrity of a Ullique 
national symbol which has bePn given colltent by gen-
Pratwns of his and our forebears. a symbol of which he 
had purchased a eopy. 1 believe Massachusetts had a; 
right tol enaet this pwbibitio11. 
Uniform Flag Act: 
No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, 
trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard, 
color, ensign or shield. 
Different: 
Alaska "while owned by others" 
Connecticut "puts indignity upon" 
Georgia "contemptuously abuse flag" 
Iowa "satirize, deride or burlesque" 
Massachusetts - "whether such flag is public or private property" 
"treats c ante mptuous ly" 
Nevada - mulilates, tramples upon, or who tears down or wilfully ~nd 
maliciously removes while owned by others, or defames, 
slanders, or speaks evilly or in a contemptuous manner of 
or otherwise defaces or defiles any of the flags, or ensign, 
which are public or private property. 
Oklahoma - "tears down, ... treats with indignity, or wantonly destroys 
the flag" · 
South Carolina - "jeer at" 
;:;':Wisconsin- Whoever intentionally and publicly mutilates, defiles, or 
casts contempt upon the flag may be fined not more than $100 
or imprisoned not more than 3 months, or both. ? ? ? 
Wyoming - "tears down" 
·. 
No persone shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample 
upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard, 
color, ensign or shield. 
~.[ ,.~ ) 
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· •til CoNGHESS 
/•!Session } .SENATE { REPORT No. 1287 
PENALTIES FOR DESECRATION OF THE FLAG 
Jmm 21 (legislative day, JuNE 19), 1968.-0rderecl to be printed 
Mr. DIRKSEN, from the Committee on the Judicia.ry, 
submitted the following 
REPORT 
[To accompany H.n. 10480] 
Til(' Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill 
ILK 10480) to prohibit desecration of the flag, and for other 
!1\l rj•oc:cs, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with 
•·.' II!' IH.!Inent.s and recommends t.hat the bill as amended do pass. 
AMENDMENTS 
1. On page 1, line 8, after the word "whoever" insert the word 
" i,Hrt \\·ingly". 
'2 . On page 1, line 9, after the word "defiling," insert the word 
· hn rning,". 
PunPOSE OF AJ\.mNDMENTS 
The purpose of amendment No.1 is to make it clear that knowledge 
r.r,d Intent must be present to constitute n. crirninaJ act; and amend-
''1•·nt :\o. 2 is to make it clear that the bill proscribes public burning 
d thr flag along with other contemptuous acts of destruction. 
PuRPosE 
Th<' p\ll·pose of t.he proposed legislation, as amended, is to prohibit 
e; d punish by Federal law certain public acts of desecration of tho ,, ··'' 
·~· 
S'1' A'rr~ 1\U~N'r 
Tlti;; bill wou_ld prohibit and_ punish by Federu~ lftw certain public 
'
1
' of desecratwn of the Amenca.n Jlag. It seems meongruous, but at 
bil-007 
,_ 
2 PENALTIES FOR DESECHA'l'I,ON OF THE FLAG 
the present time there is no Federal crirninnJ sta tue makin" 
desecration of the flag a criminttl oil'en~c, with tho solo exception of~ 
statuto codiflcd .in 4 U.S.O. 3, and duplicated in 22 D.O. Oodo 3414 
which applies oxclu~ively to the District of Columbia. That statut~ 
prohibits, subject to a fino not exceeding $100 or impri~onmcnt for 
not more than 30 days, or both, tho usc of the flag for ad vcrtising or 
on merchandise, as well as the mutilation or dc~ccrntion of tho Hng. 
The in~tn,nt bill is occasioned by a munbcr of recent public Hag. 
burning incidents in various parts of the United States and in foreign 
countries by American citizens. It is dcsignccl to remeLly an anomah· 
in existing bw where de~ecr11tion of tho flag is proscribed by Feclerlil 
sLtttute only in the District of Columbia. While each of the 50 State,; 
by stutute prohibits certain acts of flag desecration, the penaltie) 
imposed by the State sttttutcs vary widely. This bill would extend 
Federalprotection to our nn,tional t\alY. 
The House bill will assure F.ederal investigative and prosecutil'e 
jurisdiction over those who would cast contempt by publicly mutili\t-
ing, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon tho flng of the United 
States. It is intended Lhat ~ttttc jurisdiction in this mtttter shotdd 
not be disphtced. Often, tho only immediate method of detection i\tHI 
apfn·ehension of those who desecmLe tho law mn,y be SLate and local 
po ice. In other areas, the exercise of Federal jurisdiction mn,y Ill' 
critical in tho enforcement of the lttw. It is in tho wttional interest that 
concurrent j urlsdiction be exorcised by Fedeml and State law en-
forcement agencies over this subject. 
Recent ne"·s dispatches indicn,te that somo American citizen' 
abroad httvc publicly burned or otherwise publicly defiled the flagl •i 
tho United Stntes. Tho bill intends that the prohibitions apply JlPl 
only within the United States but also to tho acLion of Am erica n 
citizens abroad. By its decision in United States v. Bowman (2GO U.~ 
94 (1 022)), the Supremo OoUl't made clear that citizens of the Unilt•l 
States while in a foreign country arc subject to the penal htws enacted 
to protect the United States or its property, though there was Ill' 
express statutory declaration to that effect. (See n,lso ll.1a1·in v. Un,ilt •i 
States, 352 Fed. 174 (O.O.A. 5, 1965), where the proscriptions of secLiou 
174, title 21, United States Code- importing narcotic drugs-wcrl· 
held to htwe cxtraterritoral application to U.S. citizens.) Uncle• 
section 3238, Litle 18, United States Code, crimes against the Unitt I 
States are triable in the district where tho offender is found, or i11t •• 
which he is first brought. 
. The committee believes that the bill is constitutional. It is impressed 
with the conclusion reached and the reasoning expounded in Uni~tJ 
States v. Miller (367 Fed. 2d 72 (O.O.A. 2, 1966), certiorari denitJ 
35 U.S. Law Week, 3278). There, the Second Circuit Court of .Appc~J· 
affirmed a draft card burning conviction against a challenge of tL• 
Federal statute as an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom ' f 
speech. (Of. O'Brien v. United States, Fed. 2d (O.O.A. 1, Apr. ll'. 
19G7) .) In that case tho court stated: 
* * * Except to prohibit destruction of certificates, the 
statute does not prevent political dissent or criticism in any 
way. It is narrowly drawn to regulate a limited form of action, 
Undel' the statute, aside from destroying certificates, 
appellant and otbel's can protest n,gainst tho draft , tho 
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PENALTIES FOR DESECHA'flON OF THE FLAG 
military action in Vietnam, n,nd tho stn.tut.e itself in any terms 
they ";ish- and indeed did so n.t the rn1ly where appellant 
wus lUTes ted. Appellltnt claims, ho\\·evcr, that the burning 
<•f n dmfL card is more dramatic than mere speech and that 
he has lt right to the most effective mon,Hs of communicu,tion. 
Hut surely this gcnemlization hits its own limits. * * * 
* * * * * * * * We are supported in this conclusion by the knowl-
edge that appellant n,ud those who n.gree with hint remain 
free, as indeed they should be, to criticize natioHal policy a::; 
·dgorously as they desire by the written or spoken word; 
t.hey are simply not free to destroy Selective Service cer-
tificates (367 Fed. 2d at 81, 82). 
3 
The committee believes that H. R. 10480 will successfully withstand 
1111 constitutional chnJlenges to which it may be subjected in the courts. 
The bill does not prohibit speech, the communication of ideas, or 
p<,Jiticlll dissent or protest. The bill does not prescribe orthodox 
('"nduct or require affirmative action. The bill does prohibit public 
nd~ of physical dishonor or destruction of the flag of the United 
:)tntcs. The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful; not p 
Hcridental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecmtion of the J 
lla". Utterances are not proscribed. Specific examples of prohibited , . 
<'lll~dnct under the bill would include casting contempt upon the flag 
hy burning or tearing it and by spitting upon or otherwise dirtying it. 1 
' lllll're is nothing vague or uneerLain about the terms m~cd in the bill. j 
. Of ~ourse, ~othing ~n t~e bill will prohibit any person f1:om comply-
lng \\1.Lh secLwn 176(]) title 36, Umted States Code, which provides 
t bn L when the il~tg "is in such condition that it is no longer a fitting 
t·mhlem for dis~)lay [it] should be destroyed in a dignified way, pref-
rrnhly by burmng." Compliance with this provision obviously does 
nn! cast contempt on the flag. 
Public burning, destruction, and dishonor of the national emblem 
irdlids n.n injury on the entire Nation. Its prohibition imposes no 
~ubstantinl burden on anyone. Enactment of this legislation 1s wholly 
~nlntn.ry. 
Aecordingly, the committee recommends fltvorable consideration of 
lf.H. 10480, as n.mended. 
ALLnched hereto and made tt part hereof is the letter from the 
Attorney General of the United States to the chairman of this com-
mit tee with respect to similar flag desecration bills pending before the 
((llnmittee. 
OFFICE OF •rJIE A:r'l'OHNEY GENEHAL, 
·washington, D.C., May 15, .1067. 
l l !lf l. .TAl\rES 0. EASTLAND, 
f '!1nirm an, Senute Jnd·ic?:ar?J Committee , 
f ,,0...,', 8(' )/(lfC, n Tashinuton, n.c. 
lhAH )-In. CHATIUTAN: Tl1is is in respon,.;c to a request for the views 
,.f thc DcpnrtmcnL of Justice on S. 515, S. 151)3, S. 1020, S. Hi2G, and 
..;enute H(',.;olut.ion 73, nll \riLh respect to Jescenttiou of Lhe flng of 
:h<· Ur1it c,l SL,!Les. 
S. He11t. 1287 
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4 PENAL'l'IES FOil. DESECHATION OF THE FLAG 
There is uo Feclcru1 criminnJ legislation on this subject with the 
sole exception of 11 s ttttute codified in 4 U.S.C. 3 u.nd duplicated in 
22 D.C. Code 3414, whiclt applies exclusively to the District of 
Columbitt. It prohibits, s ubject ton fine not execeding $100 or impris-
onment for not more Lhm1 :30 dn.ys, or both, the use of the flag for 
advertising or ou merchandise, as well as the mutilation or desecration 
of the flu.g. 
Three of the bills here considered, i.e., S. 515, S. 1583, u.nd S. 1626, 
would amend 4 U.S.C. 3 for the purpose of exLeuding purt or all of 
it to genernlmtlional applicability. 0£ this group, S. 515 and S. 158:3 
would retain u.ll of the htuguttge presently in section 3 but differ as to 
penalty provisions. S. 1G26 would modify the advertising provisions 
of section 3 as well as the provisions rclatiug to defacement or defile-
ment of the flag 11ud change tho penalty provisions. S. 1620 would add 
provisions to chapter 33 of the Criminal Code making it an offense 
to burn, deface, mutilate, or trmnple upon the flag of the United 
Stales. Differing from these measures, to impose a pennlty for deseem-
tion of the flag, is Senate Resolution 73 whieh would ltuthorize 1\ 
comprehensive study and investigation, by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee or any Lluly authorized subcommittee for report and 
recommendations to the Senate, on all matters pertaining to the display 
n.lH.l use of the flag. 
These proposals, and others presently pending in the Congress, 
are the result of a number of recent flag-burning incidents. 
The American people are deeply devoted to their flag. It is in the 
hearts and minds of our citizens, the symbol of our national ideal: 
"liberty and justice for all." We are deeply hurt when our flag is 
dishonored for it represents not only a noble history and the sacrifice 
and spirit of our fathers, but our aspirations for our children and their 
fulfillment. 
Whenther a Federal criminal statute is the proper redress for the 
injury inflicted on the Nation when the flag is burned and whether il 
would serve as a needed deterrent against further transgressions is n. 
question for the Congress. 
As you address yourselves to these issues, I would urge study of the 
following considerations: 
The real tmgedy when the flag is willfully burned is not the loss of 
the flag, but the fact that there are those among us, however few, who 
have so little love for country, or confidence m its purposes, or are 
otherwise so thoughtless or insensitive, that they want to burn th~ 
flag. Today their number is infinitesimal; a handful among 200 million. 
Should their number ever become substantial, and there is no evidence 
of any likelihood of this, then their conduct would be a matter of 
deepest concern, which all history shows no statute can resolve. 
We are a federal system. Our national strength depends on tllc 
strength of State and local governments and their devotion to the 
Union. We have survived tho tests of 179 years with ever-increusin~ 
strength. Each of the 50 States, like tho District of Columbia, hn.' 
laws prescribing criminal lenalties for desecration of the flag. Until 
this time, a general Fedora law has not been found necessary. Ideally. 
we would look to the States for effective enforcement of their ln'~"' 
against such local conduct. Their devotion to tho Hag is no loss thu•l 
that of Federal officials who are also citizens of the several Stu.tes. 
S. Rept. 1287 
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PENALTIES FOR DESECRATION OF THE FLAG 5 
lf the Congress determines that St11te or local enforcement is for 
•nr. reHson inadequate, or that there arc oYerriding rcn,sons why burn~ 
u!.! the N n,tion's flag shou14 be .a Federal offense, th? Departm~nt of 
.T11 stice can, and of course w1ll, vigorously prosecute vwln.tors. 'iV1thout 
fl ntltionnJ police force, which no one wants, Federal ofncials cannot, 
hnwoYer, effectively prevent the commission of the erime in many 
situations where only local police 11re av11ilable in adequate numbers. 
lf Congress decides to en11et such legislation, it should be clea,r 
!l11d· the St11tes will not by such enactment be precluded from prosecut~ 
irw for desecration of the nationn,l fl11g. A provision to preserve State 
ju;isdietion could read as follows: 
"This act shall not be construed as indicating an intent on 
the part of Congress to deprive any State, territory, possession 
or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of jurisdiction over any 
offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of 
this act." 
Particular care should be exercised to avoid infringement of free \ 
<.pccch. To make it a crime if one "defies" or "casts contempt * * * 
t'i llwr by word or act" upon the national flag is to risk inva,lidation. 
Such language reaches toward conduct which 1nay be protected by 
lir,;t 111nendment gua,mntees. The courts hn,ve been insistent on guard~ 
ing against sn,nctions which re11ch the protected expression of ideas 
nnd also have struck do1vn on grounds of vagueness provisions which 
ure so broad that they might include protected speech along with 
conduct that could constitutionally be penalized. 
These issues were not involved in Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 
(1907) which upheld the power of a. State to enact legislation with 
rc.-; pecL to the flag, but. are suggested by more recent decisions of the 
•·uurts dealing with other conduct im·olving manifestations of respect 
or disrespect for the flag and the system of government. in represents. 
SrP, e.g., West Virginia State Board of Edttcation v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624 (1943); Stromberg v. C<;Z,ifornia, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Baggett 
'. Bulh'tt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). 
Phrases prohibiting speeeh m·e in fact unnecessnry to accomplish 
the goal of prohibiting direct acts of disrespect or deseeration, because 
!he ren:11inin~ ln.nguage comprehensiye]y deseribes such acts. Accord~ 
tt1gly, m orcier to . reduce the risk of challenge on vagueness a,nd \ 
Ji!·st amendmenCg1·ounas, ·it'is i;CZ..ori11rienctcd -thattlie\\,Oi·d . ·aefies" 
nnc1 th~ phrase "or casts contempt, either by \\'OJ'cl or act," be a.voidcd 
tt-i ~cpnrate 11Cts eonsLituLing offenses. To secure further profectiorl 
1\;.;ninst such constitutional cbi1lleng-e', we suggest thnt t.he objective 
nets described in the provision be made criminal only if performed as 
t\ means of casting contempt upon the fl11g. 
The eentrallangua.ge, as thus rc\'i,;ecl, \\'CHild Lhen rend: 
"'VhocYer casts contempt upon fLny fln.g, sinndard, colors, or 
ensign of the United States by publidy mutilating, defacing, 
defiling, or trampling upon it., shall be punished by * * *." 
If this legislation is to be ennet.ed, iL is the view of tl1is Department 
that \\·bile the selection uf the approprin,te penalLy for deseemtion of 
ll. t· flng is a mntt.er of legislati\·e polic·y, thoro should be fl 11nifonn 
' 111 \lt!e for the Distriet. of Columbia and for the United States. S. 515 
S. Hept. 1287 
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or S. 1G20 would result in incun::;is tent p enalties, applicltble to Lhe sam e 
condu ct in cases !Lrising in the Di::; Lrict. We also sugges t that thn 
Di::; Lrict of Columbia Code pro vision be conformed or deleted to avoid 
any incon::;is lency \\·it.lt the United S ttttes Code provi:>ions Lhat will he 
applie!Lblo in the Dis trict. Additionally, we s ugges t o.voicl!Lnce of a 
r equirement of fine "ttnd" impri,:;mnncnt a::; proposed in S. 515. Snrh 
mmling is inconsi.-; ient with the sentencing flexibil.ity genero.Jly pro-
vided by Federal erirninall!Lws. 
We uecd only n,dd that we would find unobjec tionable the proposal 
in S. Res. 73 for 11 ::; tmly and recommeudtttions to the Uo11gress if it is 
felt that issues in t.his area cannot othm·\\·i::; e be resolved. 
The Burettll of the Budget has advised that tl10re is no objection lu 
the s ubrnis~;ion of this report from the ::; LandpoinL of the !Ldminislra-
Lion's program .. 
Sincerely, 
RAMSEY CLAHK, 
Allor ney General. 
CHANGES IN ExisTING LAw 
In compliance with subsection (4) of rule XXIX of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, changes in exis tin()' law made by the bill, as 
reported, are shown as follows (exis ting law proposed to be omitted 
is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, exis ting 
law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 
TITLE 18·- UNITED STATES CODE- CRIMES AND CRIMINAl. 
PROCEDURE 
Chapter 33.- EMBLEMS, INSIGNIA, AND NAMES 
700. Desecra.tion of the flag of the United Stales; penalties. 
701. * * * 
• • • • * * 
§700. Desecration of the flag of the United States; penalties. 
(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt ·upon any flag of the United 
States by p1.tblicly rmLtilating, defacing, defiling, burning, o·r trampling 
upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more 
than one year or both. 
(b) The term "flag of the United States" as used in this section, shall 
include any flag, standard, colors, ensign or any picture or representat-ion 
of either, or of any part or parts of either, made of any substance or 
represented on any substance, of any size eviclently p·urpoTting to be 
either of said flag, standard, colors or ensign of the United States of 
America, or a pict·ure or a representu.tion of either, ·upon which shall be 
shown the colors, the stars and the stripes, in any number of either thereQf 
or of any part 07' parts of either, by which the average person seeing the 
same without deliberation mcty believe the same to represent the flag, 
standards, colors or ensign of the United States of America. 
(c) Nothing ·in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent 
on the pw·t of Congress to deprive any State, territory, possession or thr 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of j1trisdiction over any offense over wh-ich 
it would have jurisdiction in the ctbsence of this section. 
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TITLE 4- UNITED STATES CODE-- FLAG AND SEAL, SEA'f 
OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES 
Chapter 1-THE FLAG 
§ 3. Use of flag for adver tising purposes; mutilation of flag. 
Any person who, within the District of Columbia, in any manner, 
fur exhibition or display, shall place or cause to be placed any word, 
figure, mark, picture, design, drawing, or any advertisement of any 
n11 ture upon any flag, standard, colors, or ensign of the United States 
uf America; or shall expose or cause to be exposed to public view any 
such flag, standard, colors, or ensign upon which shall have been 
printed, painted, or otherwise placed, or to which shall be attached, 
nppeuded, affixed, or annexed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, 
or drawing, or any advertisement of any nature; or who, within the 
DisLrict of Columbia, shall manufacture, sell, expose for sale, or to 
public view, or give away or have in possession for sale, or to be 
gi,·cn away or for usc for o,ny purpose, fLny o,rticle or substo,nce being 
nn article of merchandise, or tt receptacle for mercho,ndise or article 
or thing for carrying or transporLing merchandise, upon which shall 
luwe been printed, painted, atto,ched, or otherwise placed a represen-
tl\tion of any such flo,g, standard, colors, or ensign, to advertise, call 
attention to, decorate, mark, or di:s tinguish the o,rticle or substance 
on wlrich so placed [; or who, within the District of Columbio,, shRJl 
publicly mutilate, deface, defile or defy, trample upon, or co,st con-
tempt, either by word or act, upon o,ny such fiag, st.andard, colors, or 
ensign,] shall be deemed guilty of a misdeameo,nor o,ml sho,ll be pun-
ished by a fine not exceeding $100 or by imprisonment for not more 
tlum thirty days, or both, in the discretion of the court. The words 
"Jirrg, standard, colors, or ensign" o,s used herein, sho,ll include any 
Hag, standard, colors, ensign, or any picture or representation of 
either, or of any part or parts of either, mo,de of o,ny substance or 
represented on any substance, of any size evidently purporting to be 
either of sR.id flag, sta,ndn,rd, colors, or ensign of the United States of 
America or a picture or a representation of either, upon which shall 
be shown the colors, the stars o,nd the stripes, in o,ny number of either 
thereof, or of any J?art or parts of either, by which the o,vemge person 
seeing the same w1thout deliberation may believe the same to repre-
f'Cut the flag, colors, standard, or ensign of the United Sto,tes of 
America. 
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No. :~50 
l'E~ALTIES FOR DESECH.ATION OF THE FLAG 
, "· ~~ . J!l(ii. - llcf(•rrrd to the Honse Cnlenclar and ordered to be printed 
'I· RocEns of Cnlomdo, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 
submitten the follo\Ying 
. REPORr:C 
[To accompnny II. H .. 104SO] 
Tl1<' Committee on the Judir·i1ry, to whom \Yil.S referred the bill 
ii . IL J04SO) to pruhihit. dcsccrntion of the flug, ha.Ying considered 
,, "arne, report fn.YoJ'1Lhly thereon with amendments n.nd recom-
,.,, t! thnl the bill do ]HlS'-'. 
TJ, ;• <illlCtlclrncuts 1ll'C a~ fnllo"·s: 
c In page 1, line 9, nfter "<lcfilin~," insert "burning,". 
On p;1ge 3, line 15, after "deltling," insert "burning,". 
ExPk\~A'l'ION oF A~rE~JDIEC\TS 
T hP pnrpo.-;c of the ttmenclmenis is io make clea.r that the bill pro-
' Jil<'"i puhlic bmning of the flng n1ong with other contemptuous acts 
·f clP,trnclion. 
PunPOsl~ 
ThP purpose of ihe hill is to prohihit a.nd punish by Fcdeml hLw 
···linin puldic ads of dc,;e~·mtion of tl1e flag. 
S·rA TI·:~n;NT 
'l' lt P 1Jill i..; oe<·;~Sioncd hy a numhcr of rcccJlt pulllic Hng-hmning 
~·' tdPnh in Y:t.ri(tlls pa.r!s of the l'nitcd St:ttes and in forPign ('ountries 
'1 .\nwrir·nn <·.itizeus. ft j,; dcsig;ned to rPmeclY tW fLnomnlY in cxistin0; 
l \\ ,,.IH'f'cin clesccmtion of 1 he f!:tg is pros('i·ibcd by Fedeml stntut'c 
1_, in the District (If ('olu11Ji:in. \\'hat is more, nllhough Pnch of the 
· 1 :-- tn_trs b~· slldtrte proltihits certain :tds of Jlng d<:>:.:C'l'f'i1tion, tl1e 
i :J.tl\rC's in1posed 1>.1' thr :)(air sl:>tutt's Y:try \\·idcly. 'l'ltc c·mnrnit.tr•c 
:·:wlttd<•s that the n:ttional CJnlJlrm should 1e giycn coll<'lll'f'Cnt. 
l··d (•ral prolrdion. 
~>~. oor. G7 ·---l 
